Endorsements Preclude Coverage for Alleged Faulty Workmanship
December 30, 2019 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe court found coverage for alleged faulty workmanship was barred by the Combination Construction Related Endorsement and Roofing Endorsement. Evanston Ins. Co. v. A&S Roofing, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142828 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 22, 2019).
In 2010, A&S entered into a subcontract with the contractor to replace roofs on three buildings owned by Oklahoma Property Investors (OPI). Eagle was a subcontractor of A&S that installed the roofing. After the roofs were replaced, OPI filed suit against A&S, alleging that A&S provided 15-year warranties for the roofing work performed on the three buildings and that A&S breached each warranty by performing the work in a poor manner, resulting in failures to each of the roofs. OPI sought monetary relief including damages to its properties, of its tenants, and costs of repairs to its properties.
A&S's insurer, Evanston, denied coverage. Evanston pointed to the"legally obligated to pay" language of the CGL policy and argued coverage only extended to tort-based claims. Evanston argued the OPI lawsuit did not allege any tort claims, only warranty claims arising from contract. Second, Evanston contended the alleged "poor craftsmanship" giving rise to the claims in the OPI lawsuit that did not constitute an "occurrence" under the policy.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Texas Jury Finds Presence of SARS-CoV-2 Virus Causes “Physical Loss or Damage” to Property, Awards Over $48 Million to Baylor College of Medicine
September 26, 2022 —
Michael S. Levine & Kevin V. Small - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogA Texas jury has found that the presence of SARS-CoV-2 virus on the property of Baylor College of Medicine (BCM) caused “physical loss or damage” and resulting economic loss, triggering coverage under BCM’s commercial property insurance program. The jury awarded BCM over $48 million following a three-day trial; the award consisted of $42.8 million in business interruption, $3.3 million in extra expense, and $2.3 million in damage to research projects.
The verdict came after the court denied the insurers’ pre-trial motion for summary judgment, rejecting the insurers’ contention that a virus cannot—as a matter of law—cause physical loss or damage to property. In denying the motion, the court held that whether the presence of the virus causes physical loss or damage presents a question of fact for the jury to resolve; a copy of the order rejecting the insurers’ summary judgment argument can be found
here.
Reprinted courtesy of
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Kevin V. Small, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Small may be contacted at ksmall@HuntonAK.com
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Dust Infiltration Due to Construction Defect Excluded from Policy
September 09, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFA summary judgment was affirmed in the case of Brown v. Farmers Group, by the California Court of Appeals. The Browns bought a new home in Oakley, California. At the time, they signed disclosure statement “acknowledging that the area around their home experienced gusty winds and would be in development for years to come, which might result in dust and airborne mold.”
The Browns found an unusual amount of dust in their home, which became worse when they ran their heating and air conditioning system. Shelia Brown was later diagnosed with chronic valley fever, which was attributed to airborne mold. The Browns contacted Farmers which investigated the house. Although the adjustor from Farmers said the Browns would be covered, Farmers denied the claim.
After the Browns moved out of the house, an inspector found that the HVAC line in the attic was disconnected, sending dust into the home. The Browns brought action against Mid-Century Insurance, which managed the policy, and Farmers. The identified the HVAC defect, window problems, and valley fever as causes, suing for breach of contact, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The court rejected all these claims. The policy with Farmers excluded losses due to defective construction. This ruled out the faulty HVAC system and any problems there might have been from the windows. The policy also specifically excluded losses from contamination, fungi, pathogens, and noxious substances. The court further found that the adjustor’s opinion was irrelevant to the question of what the policy actually covered. Finally, the court found no evidence of intentional infliction of emotional stress.
On review, the appeals court upheld the trial court’s conclusions and affirmed the summary judgment.
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Failure to Meet Code Case Remanded to Lower Court for Attorney Fees
May 24, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFJudge Patricia J. Cottrell, ruling on the case Roger Wilkes, et al. v. Shaw Enterprises, LLC, in the Tennessee Court of Appeals, upheld the trial court’s conclusion that “the builder constructed the house in accordance with good building practices even though it was not in strict conformance with the building code.” However, Judge Cottrell directed the lower court to “award to Appellants reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in their first appeal, as determined by the trial court.”
Judge Cottrell cited in her opinion the contract which specified that the house would be constructed “in accordance with good building practices.” However, after the Wilkes discovered water leakage, the inspections revealed that “that Shaw had not installed through-wall flashing and weep holes when the house was built.” The trial court concluded that:
“Separate and apart from the flashing and weep holes, the trial court concluded the Wilkeses were entitled to recover damages for the other defects they proved based on the cost of repair estimates introduced during the first and second trials, which the court adjusted for credibility reasons. Thus, the trial court recalculated the amount the Wilkeses were entitled to recover and concluded they were entitled to $17,721 for the value of repairs for defects in violation of good business practices, and an additional 15%, or $2,658.15, for management, overhead, and profit of a licensed contractor. This resulted in a judgment in the amount of $20,370.15. The trial court awarded the Wilkeses attorneys” fees through the Page 9 first trial in the amount of $5,094.78 and discretionary costs in the amount of $1,500. The total judgment following the second trial totaled $26,973.93.”
In this second appeal, Judge Cottrell concluded, that “the trial court thus did not have the authority to decide the Wilkeses were not entitled to their attorneys” fees and costs incurred in the first appeal.”
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Wait! Don’t Sign Yet: Reviewing Contract Protections During the COVID Pandemic
April 13, 2020 —
Danielle S. Ward - Balestreri Potocki & HolmesAs the circumstances of the COVID pandemic change day by day, and we all rush to keep business moving where and when we can, companies should consider hitting the “pause button” before renewing or executing any new contracts. Developing contracts often takes considerable time and expense, and companies are not in the habit of reworking them often. A change in law may prompt a company to revisit their contract terms, but otherwise business is often carried out with a standard form contract for a period of years. With the COVID pandemic affecting nearly every business and industry, life is not business as usual, and companies should make sure their contracts consider what previously seemed like an unforeseeable event.
Force Majeure clauses are included in many contracts to excuse contract performance when made impossible by some unforeseen circumstance. These clauses typically fall under two categories: general and specific. General force majeure clauses excuse performance if performance is prevented by circumstances outside the parties’ control. By contrast, specific force majeure clauses detail the exhaustive list of circumstances (acts of god, extreme weather, war, riot, terrorism, embargoes) which would excuse contract performance. Force majeure clauses are typically interpreted narrowly. If your contract has a specific clause and pandemic or virus is not one of the listed circumstances it may not apply. Whether a particular existing contract covers the ongoing COVID pandemic will vary depending on the language of the contract.
Force majeure clauses previously made headlines when the great economic recession hit in 2008. A number of courts held that simple economic hardship was not enough to invoke force majeure. The inability to pay or lack of desire to pay for the contracted goods or services did not qualify as force majeure. In California, impossibility turns on the nature of the contractual performance, and not in the inability of the obligor to do it. (Kennedy v. Reece (1964) 225 Cal. App. 2d 717, 725.) In other words, the task is objectively impossible not merely impossible or more burdensome to the specific contracting party.
California has codified “force majeure” protection where the parties haven’t included any language or the circumstances in the clause don’t apply to the situation at hand. Civil Code section 1511 excuses performance when “prevented or delayed by an irresistible, superhuman cause, or by the act of public enemies of this state or of the United States, unless the parties have expressly agreed to the contrary.” (Civ. Code § 1511.) What qualifies as a “superhuman cause”? In California, the test is whether under the particular circumstances there was such an insuperable interference occurring without the party's intervention as could not have been prevented by the exercise of prudence, diligence and care. (Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C. S. T., Ltd. (1946) 29 Cal.2d 228, 238.)
If you find yourself in an existing contract without a force majeure clause, or the statute does not apply, you may consider the doctrine of frustration of purpose. This doctrine is applied narrowly where performance remains possible, but the fundamental reason the parties entered into the contract has been severely or substantially frustrated by an unanticipated supervening circumstance, thus destroying substantially the value of the contract. (Cutter Laboratories, Inc. v. Twining (1963) 221 Cal. App. 2d 302, 314-15.) In other words, performance is still possible but valueless. Note this defense is not likely to apply where the contract has simply become less profitable for one party.
Now that COVID is no longer an unforeseeable event, but rather a current and grave reality, a party executing a contract today without adequate protections may have a difficult time proving unforeseeability. Scientists are not sure whether warm weather will suppress the spread of the virus, as it does with the seasonal flu, but to the extent we get a reprieve during the summer we may see a resurgence of cases this Fall or Winter. Companies should take care in reviewing force majeure clauses, and other clauses tied to timely performance such as delay and liquidated damages before renewing or executing new contracts.
Your contract scenario may vary from the summary provided above. Please contact legal counsel before making any decisions. During this critical time, BPH’s attorneys can be reached via email to answer your questions.
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Danielle S. Ward, Balestreri Potocki & HolmesMs. Ward may be contacted at
dward@bph-law.com
Anatomy of a Data Center
October 28, 2024 —
Robert A. James & Matt Olhausen - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogTraditional and social media are thick with reports and predictions of the remarkable increase in size, power consumption and significance of data centers. Not only technology companies but real estate and energy developers, investment funds, lenders, and professionals of all stripes are in or determined to enter this sector. Our inboxes are full—it’s data center this, data center that.
But what exactly is a data center? What infrastructure, technology and human resources come together to create and sustain one of these localized points of computation? By understanding their components, we can glean some understanding of the business, public policy and (our focus) legal issues that arise before and during their operation.
In this article, we cite key characteristics of a reference Blackacre Data Center, with occasional glances at other (real) structures that offer variations on themes. Blackacre is a composite of several centers we have encountered in our law practice. These facilities differ widely in size, location and functions, so your mileage will vary.
Reprinted courtesy of
Robert A. James, Pillsbury and
Matt Olhausen, Pillsbury
Mr. James may be contacted at rob.james@pillsburylaw.com
Mr. Olhausen may be contacted at matt.olhausen@pillsburylaw.com
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Housing Starts in U.S. Slumped More Than Forecast in March
April 20, 2016 —
Sho Chandra – BloombergNew-home construction in the U.S. slumped more than projected in March, reflecting a broad-based retreat that showed the industry lost momentum heading into the busiest time of year.
Residential starts decreased 8.8 percent to a 1.09 million annualized rate that was the lowest since October and weaker than any forecast of economists surveyed by Bloomberg, Commerce Department data showed Tuesday in Washington. Permits, a proxy for future construction, also dropped.
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Sho Chandra, Bloomberg
The Johnstown Dam Failure, as Seen in the Pages of ENR in 1889
April 08, 2024 —
Scott Lewis - Engineering News-RecordThe small headline of the Engineering News article shown here belies the gravity of the disaster: the deadliest dam failure in U.S. history. The South Fork Dam in Pennsylvania was a 72-ft-tall, 931-ft long earth and rockfill structure. After a stop-and-start construction process over a dozen years, it was completed in 1853. The dam went through several changes of ownership and was repaired inadequately. Fish screens were installed that obstructed the spillway and caused water to overtop and erode the structure. This mass of water uprooted trees, rocks, houses, rail cars and animals as it thundered down the valley before smashing into a stone railway embankment. Fires ignited by wrecked locomotives burned for three days. The death toll was 2,208.
Reprinted courtesy of
Scott Lewis, Engineering News-Record
Mr. Lewis may be contacted at lewisw@enr.com
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