Economic Damages and the Right to Repair Act: You Can’t Have it Both Ways
March 16, 2017 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogIn 2002, the California State Legislature passed Senate Bill 800 also known as the Right to Repair Act (Civil Code Sections 895 et seq.) in an effort to stem a then rising tide in residential construction defect litigation.
SB 800, which applies to newly constructed residential units including single-family homes and condominiums (but not condominium conversions) sold after January 1, 2003, was intended to curb residential construction defect lawsuits by giving developers and others in the construction chain an opportunity to repair construction defects before being sued in court. SB 800 also provides minimum construction standards and limits the time in which a homeowner can bring a claim for construction defects.
In Acqua Vista Homeowners Association v. MWI, Case No. D068406 (January 26, 2017), the California Court of Appeals for the Fourth District examined the circumstances in which homeowners can sue a material supplier under the Right to Repair Act.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
New York Developer’s Alleged Court Judgment Woes
May 13, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAccording to The Real Deal, the New York Developer Jeshayahu “Shaya” Boymelgreen claims to owe $50 million in court judgments. Currently, Boymelgreen faces “a $1.2 million judgment in a lawsuit connected to his River Lofts condominium in Tribeca.” Furthermore, Boymelgreen is a co-defendant (along with Africa Israel) “in a separate suit at 15 Broad Street, where New York state Attorney General Eric Schneiderman is investigating the developers over the failure to obtain a certificate of occupancy at the condominium, which is marketed under the name Downtown By Starck.”
Boymelgreen had been “held in contempt after failing to respond to a 2013 subpoena…requesting all financial and legal records.” The Real Deal reported that Boymelgreen declared that all documents were lost when his company’s offices “were taken by eminent domain about five years ago.”
The Real Deal could not reach Boymelgreen or his lawyer for comment.
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Attorney's Erroneous Conclusion that Limitations Period Had Not Expired Was Not Grounds For Relief Under C.C.P. § 473(b)
February 27, 2019 —
David W. Evans & Stephen J. SquillarioIn Jackson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc. (2/8/19 No. A150833), the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion for relief from a voluntary dismissal, without prejudice, filed by the plaintiff based on the erroneous conclusion of an attorney who she had consulted (but who had not yet appeared as counsel in her case) that the applicable statute of limitations had not yet expired. In reality, the limitations period had expired on the same date plaintiff had filed her complaint in propria persona. The plaintiff later retained the attorney on a limited basis to present the motion for relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 473(b) based on the attorney’s affidavit of fault. Therein, the attorney testified that he had advised the plaintiff to dismiss her action voluntarily based on a misinterpretation of the applicable limitations period, which the attorney characterized as having been based on his “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.”
Section 473 provides two distinct provisions for relief from default or dismissal – one is discretionary, while the other is mandatory. Discretionary relief is available in the case of an attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. In contrast, mandatory relief is available where the resulting dismissal was caused by an attorney’s mistake, whether or not excusable. In denying the plaintiff’s motion, the trial court reasoned that the plaintiff could not rely upon Section 473(b) because (1) the attorney did not represent the plaintiff at the time and (2) this provision did not apply to the voluntary dismissal of an action without prejudice.
Reprinted courtesy of
David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com
Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com
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Construction Warranties and the Statute of Repose – Southern States Chemical, Inc v. Tampa Tank & Welding Inc.
January 20, 2020 —
David R. Cook - AHC Construction and Procurement BlogIn a recent holding by the Georgia Court of Appeals, the court held that Georgia’s eight-year statute of repose applied to bar the project owner’s warranty claims. The renovation work by the contractor on the owner’s chemical tank constituted an improvement of real property, and thus, the statute of repose bared any claims eight years after substantial completion thereof. In addition, the court rejected the project owner’s claim that it qualified as a third-party beneficiary of an extended warranty contained in a report given by a subcontractor to the contractor.
Factual Background
In 2000, Southern States Phosphate and Fertilizer Company (“Southern States”) hired Tampa Tank & Welding, Inc (“Tampa Tank”) to renovate a tank to hold sulfuric acid. The parties’ written contract contained an express one-year warranty for material and workmanship from the date of completion. Two years later, in January 2002, the tank renovation was completed. Tampa Tank contracted with Corrosion Control Inc. (“CCI”) to design, assist with, and test the cathodic corrosion system. CCI provided only consultation and did not provide any onsite installation. Upon completion of installation, CCI supplied a report to Tampa Tank that the system was properly installed and fully functioning. Additionally, a post–installation report from CCI to Tampa Tank calculated an estimated life expectancy of forty-three to forty-five years.
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David R. Cook, Autry, Hall & Cook, LLPMr. Cook may be contacted at
cook@ahclaw.com
Court Calls Lease-Leaseback Project What it is: A Design-Bid-Build Project
August 19, 2015 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogFirst there was “Prince.”
Then there was “The Artist Formerly Known as Prince.”
Then there was “The Artist Formerly Known as Prince (Because he Changed His Name to a Symbol), But Then Realized That No One Could Pronounce the Symbol (and What Good is a Symbol if Everyone Has to Wave Their Hands Wildly at You to Get Your Attention or Scream ‘Hey You!’), and So Changed His Name Back to Prince Again.”
Whatever name (or symbol) he was going by, everyone knew him as the guy who told us to party like it was 1999 (when 1999 still seemed like the distant future), who sang about a girl with a “pocket full of horses” (which totally flew past my junior high school brain at the time), and gave us such great metaphors as “if the elevator tries to bring you down, go crazy, punch a higher floor!”
Like Prince or his symbol, sometimes it doesn’t matter what label you put on something when everyone knows what that something is. In law, we call it looking at the “substance” rather than its “form.” And, in the next case, Davis v. Fresno Unified School District, the California Court of Appeals for the Fifth District made quick work of a purported “lease-leaseback” project – a project delivery method available to school districts whereby a school district leases property it owns to a developer for a minimum of $1, who in turns builds a school facility on the site and leases the facility and the site back to the school district, who in turn takes ownership of the facility and site at the end of the lease – and called it for what it was: a run-of-the-mill “design-bid-build” project.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
They Say Nothing Lasts Forever, but What If Decommissioning Does?
June 10, 2019 —
Stella Pulman - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogThe looming decommissioning liabilities of offshore energy producers have been a focus of the federal government in recent years. One recent case out of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, Taylor Energy v. United States, highlights the tension between the federal government’s desire to maintain financial security for decommissioning activities, and that of an operator whose security is tied up indefinitely while the government awaits technological advances to allow for safe decommissioning.
The case relates to a trust agreement between Taylor Energy and the United States, established to secure Taylor’s decommissioning liabilities for 28 wells in the Gulf of Mexico. Taylor completed certain decommissioning work for which it was reimbursed by the trust. However, with over $400 million remaining in the trust, Taylor and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) concluded that the ecological benefits of further decommissioning would be outweighed by the ecological risks. But despite recognizing that the limitations of current technology made the environmental impacts of further decommissioning work unjustifiable, the BSEE declined to release Taylor from its decommissioning obligations and instead decided to await “changes in technology and a better understanding of the undersea environment.” Because Taylor’s decommissioning obligations remained in place, the U.S. refused to release the remaining funds in the trust.
Taylor claimed that the United States should release the remaining funds in the trust because “decommissioning the remaining wells is not ‘currently technologically feasible.’” Taylor asserted that Louisiana law applied to the trust agreement, and that under Louisiana law every contract must be completed within an ascertainable term. By holding the trust funds until decommissioning was complete, Taylor argued that the government was essentially holding the funds in perpetuity given the technological infeasibility of completing decommissioning. Taylor also asserted that the agreement was premised on an impossibility (the full decommissioning of the wells), and/or a mutual mistake of the parties (that the wells could be decommissioned).
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Stella Pulman, PillsburyMs. Pulman may be contacted at
stella.pulman@pillsburylaw.com
No Coverage for Co-Restaurant Owners Who Are Not Named In Policy
August 24, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Federal District Court denied two plaintiffs' claims for breach of the policy and for bad faith because they were not insureds under the policy. Tu v. Dongbu Ins. Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115200 (N.D. Calif. July 24, 2017).
Dongbu, a Hawaii insurance company, issued a two-year policy to Plaintiff Ken Tu for his business. He was the only named insured under the policy.
The waste system at Plaintiffs' restaurant failed, causing fumes to impact neighboring tenants and waste to contaminate the underlying soil. Plaintiffs were forced to close the restaurant. A claim was tendered for damage and repair, loss of business income, and other insured losses. Dongbu denied coverage.
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Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Five Pointers for Enforcing a Non-Compete Agreement in Texas
June 08, 2020 —
Kristopher M. Stockberger - The Grindstone Lewis Brisbois' Labor & Employment Blog1. The Devil’s in the Details
Under Texas law, for a non-compete agreement to be enforceable, it must meet strict requirements as to timing, geography, and the type of conduct that it prohibits. While courts have enforced agreements for between one and two years, your situation could be subject to a shorter time period. If the geographical scope of the agreement is too broad or vague, that could render the agreement unenforceable. Also, the type of conduct prohibited by your agreement should be tied to the specifics of your business, because categorical barriers to other employment are often not enforced. If an employer knowingly instructs an employee to enter an overbroad non-compete agreement, the employer runs the risk of paying the employee’s attorneys’ fees.
2. Timing on the Front End
If an employee has been with an employer for years and the employer suddenly decides to have her sign a non-compete without any other meaningful change in the employee’s role, then the agreement will probably not be enforceable, unless the employee receives “consideration.” In this context, consideration is something of value, other than money or benefits, which the law deems to warrant protection by a non-compete agreement. For example, allowing an employee to learn the secret formula to Coca-Cola or to gain access to an employer’s confidential financials constitutes legally sufficient consideration given to an employee in exchange for the employee’s promises in a non-compete agreement.
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Kristopher M. Stockberger, Lewis BrisboisMr. Stockberger may be contacted at
Kris.Stockberger@lewisbrisbois.com
