New England Construction Defect Law Groups to Combine
November 13, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe lawyers of Little Bulman Medeiros & Whitney PC will be joining Pierce Atwood on December 9, 2013. The combined firm will have a larger construction litigation practice. Little Bulman is already recognized for its handling of construction disputes. Pierce Atwood is one of the largest firms in New England. Their combined forces intended to create a strong presence in construction litigation throughout New England.
Gloria Pinza, a managing partner at Pierce Atwood said of Little Bulman that “their exceptional credentials in the construction law area will combine with our strong construction practice to create a regional practice that will provide highly competitive expertise, depth and value throughout New England and beyond.
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California Supreme Court Raises the Bar on Dangerous Conditions on Public Property Claims
February 16, 2016 —
Roger Hughes – California Construction Law BlogEarlier we wrote about the affirmative defense of “design immunity” which can be used by public entities to shield themselves from personal injury claims dangerous conditions on public property. Under the design immunity doctrine a public entity can avoid liability for dangerous conditions on public property if it can show:
1.A causal relationship between the plan or design and the accident;
2.Discretionary approval of the plan or design prior to construction; and
3.Substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of the plan or design.
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Roger Hughes, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Hughes may be contacted at
rhughes@wendel.com
Georgia Supreme Court Limits Damages Under Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act
March 01, 2017 —
Chadd Reynolds – Autry, Hanrahan, Hall & Cook, LLPOn January 27, 2017, the Supreme Court of Georgia issued a decision determining whether the Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act (“GCSPA”) provides for punitive damages. While not directly related to construction, the GCSPA can be a potential mechanism for asserting claims against former employees that use company information stored in computers.
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Chadd Reynolds, Autry, Hanrahan, Hall & Cook, LLPMr. Reynolds may be contacted at
reynolds@ahclaw.com
Why Builders Should Reconsider Arbitration Clauses in Construction Contracts
October 21, 2019 —
David M. McLain – Colorado Construction LitigationMy advice to home builders has long been to arbitrate construction defect claims instead of litigating them in front of juries. Based on my experience and watching others litigate claims, I have learned that home builders usually fare better in arbitration than in jury trials, both in terms of what they have to pay the homeowners or HOAs and also in what they recover from subcontractors and design professionals. Because of these dynamics, conventional wisdom has been that builders should arbitrate construction defect claims. For several reasons, I am now questioning whether the time is right to consider a third option.
First, plaintiffs’ attorneys dislike arbitration and will continue their attempts to do away with arbitration for construction defect claims. In 2018, the Colorado Legislature considered HB 18-1261 and HB 18-1262. While both bills were ultimately killed, they showed the plaintiffs’ attorneys disdain for arbitration, and serve as a warning that attempts to prevent arbitration legislatively will continue. If the legislature does away with the ability to arbitrate construction defect claims, and that is the only means of dispute resolution contained in a builder’s contracts, that builder may find itself in front of a jury.
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David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & RoswellMr. McLain may be contacted at
mclain@hhmrlaw.com
CA Supreme Court Permits Insurers to Bring Direct Actions Seeking Reimbursement of Excessive Fees Against Cumis Counsel Under Limited Circumstances
August 19, 2015 —
David W. Evans & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPThe California Supreme Court held in Hartford Casualty Insurance Company v. J.R. Marketing, L.L.C. (Squire Sanders) (8/10/2015 - #S211645) that if Cumis counsel, operating under a court order which such counsel drafted and which expressly provided that the insurer would be able to recover excessive fees, sought and received fee payments from the insurer that were fraudulent or otherwise manifestly and objectively useless and wasteful when incurred, Cumis counsel have been unjustly enriched at the insurer’s expense and the insurer will be permitted under such limited circumstances to seek reimbursement directly from Cumis counsel.
Certain Hartford insureds who had been issued commercial general liability policies were sued in multiple proceedings for a variety of claims, including unfair competition, defamation and intentional misrepresentation. Hartford disclaimed a duty to defend or to indemnify the defendants on the grounds that the acts complained of occurred prior to Hartford’s policy, and that some of the defendants were not Hartford insureds. A coverage action was filed by some of the insureds against Hartford; they were represented by the Squire Sanders law firm. Although Hartford subsequently agreed to defend several of the defendants subject to a reservation of rights, it declined to pay defense expenses incurred prior to the date of such agreement. Some months later, the trial court entered a summary adjudication order, finding that Hartford had a duty to have defended the liability action on the date it was originally tendered; the order required Hartford to fund the insured’s defense with independent counsel (i.e., so-called “Cumis” counsel; see San Diego Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 358). The insureds retained Squire Sanders as their Cumis counsel.
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David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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Michigan Supreme Court Finds Faulty Subcontractor Work That Damages Insured’s Work Product May Constitute an “Occurrence” Under CGL Policy
November 02, 2020 —
Jason Taylor - Traub Lieberman Insurance Law BlogIn Skanska USA Bldg. Inc. v. M.A.P. Mech. Contractors, Inc., 2020 WL 3527909 (Mich. June 29, 2020), the Michigan Supreme Court addressed whether unintentionally faulty subcontractor work that damages an insured’s work product constitutes an “accident” under a commercial general liability insurance policy. In aligning itself with a growing number of jurisdictions, the Michigan Supreme Court answered, “yes.” In Skanska, a construction manager brought an action against a commercial general liability (CGL) insurer seeking coverage as additional insured for the cost of repairs to correct faulty work performed by its subcontractor in renovation of medical center. In 2009, the construction manager hired MAP to install a steam boiler and related piping for the medical center’s heating system. MAP’s installation included several expansion joints, which it was later discovered, were installed backward. Significant damage to concrete, steel, and the heating system occurred as a result. The construction manager performed the work of repairing and replacing the damaged property to the tune of $1.4 million, and submitted a claim to MAP’s CGL insurer, Amerisure, seeking coverage as an additional insured.
Amerisure denied the claim contending that MAP’s defective construction was not a covered “occurrence” within the CGL policy. The policy defined “occurrence” as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions,” but did not define the term “accident.” The trial court looked to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co. v. Vector Const. Co., 185 Mich. App. 369 (1990), which defined “accident” as “…a result which is not anticipated and…takes place without the insured’s foresight or expectation and without design or intentional causation on his part.” But, again citing Hawkeye, the trial court concluded that “[d]efective workmanship, standing alone, is not an occurrence within the meaning of a[ ] general liability insurance contract[;] an occurrence exists where the insured’s faulty work product damages the property of another.”
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Jason Taylor, Traub LiebermanMr. Taylor may be contacted at
jtaylor@tlsslaw.com
Illinois Appellate Court Finds That Damages in Excess of Policy Limits Do Not Trigger Right to Independent Counsel
June 22, 2020 —
Jason Taylor - Traub LiebermanUnder Illinois law, an insurer’s duty to defend includes the right to control the defense, which allows insurers to protect their financial interest in the outcome of the litigation. However, where a conflict of interest exists, the insured, rather than the insurer, is entitled to assume control of the defense of the underlying action. If this occurs, the insurer satisfies its obligation to defend by reimbursing the insured for the cost of defense provided by independent counsel selected by the insured. What circumstances and situations arise to the level of an actual conflict of interest between the insurer and insured are often grounds for dispute.
In Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of America, 2020 IL App (1st) 182491 (Apr. 7, 2020), the Illinois Appellate Court addressed whether damages awarded by a jury in excess of the policy limits were sufficient to trigger a right to independent counsel for post-trial and appellate proceedings. According to the Illinois Appellate Court, at least under the facts of the Ryerson case, the answer is “no.”
In Ryerson, Nancy Hoffman sued Ryerson for injuries sustained in a tractor-trailer accident. Ryerson tendered the suit to its primary insurer, Travelers, and its umbrella insurer, Illinois National. The policy limits were $2 million and $25 million, respectively. A jury found in favor of Hoffman for over $27.6 million in damages, and Ryerson appealed.
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Jason Taylor, Traub LiebermanMr. Taylor may be contacted at
jtaylor@tlsslaw.com
Brown Paint Doesn’t Cover Up Construction Defects
April 25, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFIn a decision that describes the case as illustrating “the perils that real estate brokers and their agents assume when acting as a dual listing agent to both the buyers and sellers of the same house,” the California Court of Appeals has issued a decision in William L. Lyon & Associates v. The Superior Court of Placer County. Lyon & Associates sought summary judgment to dismiss the claims of the Henleys who bought a home in a transaction where a Lyon agent represented both sides.
The prior owners of the home, the Costas, had used a Lyon agent in purchasing their home. When they later sought to sell it, that agent “became aware of some of the house’s defects and problems.” In response, the Costas sought the help of another agent, Connie Gidal, also of Lyons & Associates. Photos taken in the presence of Ms. Gidal show defects of the paint and stucco. The Costas also took the step of painting the house dark brown. During the sale process, “rain caused many of the painted-over defects to reappear.” The Costas “purchased more dark brown paint and covered up the newly visible damage prior to inspection by the Henleys.”
With the damage concealed, the Henleys bought the home in May 2006. The agreement with Lyons & Associates noted that “a dual agent is obligated to disclose known facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property to both parties.” Escrow closed on May 9, 2006. The contract with the broker included a two-year limit on the time to bring legal action.
The Henleys moved in during June 2006, and “began to discover construction defects that had been concealed by the Costas.” In addition to the painted-over stucco problems, the Henleys found that the Costas had “installed quartzite stone overlays on the backyard steps in a manner that caused water intrusion on the house’s stucco walls.”
In May 2009, the Henleys sued the Costas, Ron McKim Construction, Lyons & Associates, and Ms. Gidal. Their complaint alleged that Lyons & Associates had committed breach of contact, negligence, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent nondisclosure in connection with the construction defects. The Costas named Lyons in a cross complaint. Lyons moved for summary judgments on the grounds that the two-year statute of limitations had expired before the complaint and cross-complaint were filed. Both the Henleys and the Costas opposed this claim. The court denied the motion and Lyons appealed.
The appeals court upheld the denial, noting that the both California Supreme Court decision and later action by the legislature compels real estate brokers and salespersons “to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent visual inspection of the property offered for sale.” The court noted that under California law, brokers have responsibilities to both sellers and buyers. The section of law cited by Lyons applies to seller’s agents. The court rejected the contention by Lyons that they were “cooperating brokers.” The Henleys were “not constrained by the two-year statute of limitations.”
Lyons contended that even if California’s statute did not apply, there was a contractual limit of two years. The court also rejected this, agreeing with the Henleys that “the two-year limitation period must be extended by the discovery rule.”
The court noted that “Lyon & Associates may not reap the benefit of a shortened contractual limitation period when its own alleged malfeasance contributed to the delay in the discovery of the buyer’s injury.” The court found that the Henleys could proceed with their breach of contract claim, because, “when a breach of contract is committed in secret, such as the intentional nondisclosure of a real estate broker regarding a previously visible construction defect, the contractual limitations period is properly held subject to the discovery rule.” The court felt that the interpretation favored by the California Association of Realtors would “halve the applicable statute of limitations period.”
In addition to rejecting Lyon request for summary judgment on the claims made by the Henleys, the court also rejected the request of summary judgment on the claims made by the Costas, concluding that neither claim is time-barred. Costs were awarded to both the Henleys and Costas.
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