Insurer Must Indemnify Additional Insured After Settlement
October 21, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe court determined that Target was an additional insured under its supplier's policy and the insurer had a duty to indemnify Target after it settled the underlying suit. Selective Ins. Co. v. Target Corp., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123230 (E.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2015).
Angela Brown sued Target when she was allegedly injured by a door to a fitting room that came unhinged and fell on her head. Harbor Industries, Inc. supplied Target with its fitting rooms. Pursuant to the "Supplier Qualification Agreement" (SQA), Harbor named Target as an additional insured under its policy with Selective Insurance Company. The SQA became effective and was to remain in effect until terminated by either party. A second agreement, the "Program Agreement," set forth the terms under which Harbor sold the fitting rooms to Target. The Program Agreement went into effect on April 23, 2009, and expired on July 1, 2010. Brown's injury occurred on December 17, 2011, while the SQA and the policy were in effect, but after the Program Agreement expired.
After Brown's injury, Target tendered to Selective, who denied coverage, contending Target was not an additional insured. The policy's endorsement expanded insureds to any additional insured whom Harbor agreed in a written contract to add as an additional insured. Selective filed suit and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Building Supplier Sued for Late and Defective Building Materials
December 04, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe Lawson Henry Co. bought an unfinished townhome in Snowshoe, West Virginia with the intent of getting it finished and sold. To reach that goal, they contracted with O.C. Cluss Professional Services and O.C. Cluss Lumber Co. to provide them with building materials. According to the plaintiff, Cluss failed to deliver the building materials by the agreed-on date, causing the plaintiff to miss out on the peak season for selling the townhome.
The suit also alleges that in addition to materials being delivered late, some were defective or of poor quality. The Lawson Henry Co. is charging Charles C. Cluss and his companies of breach of contract.
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Federal Magistrate Judge Recommends Rescission of Policies
February 12, 2024 —
Craig Rokuson - Traub LiebermanIn the recent case of Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. 142 Driggs LLC, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220393, Magistrate Judge Lois Bloom of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York recommended granting the insurer's default judgment and holding that of three policies issued to 142 Driggs LLC ("Driggs") be rescinded ab initio.
Driggs had represented on its insurance applications that it did not provide parking to anyone other than itself, tenants, and its guests at the subject insured premises. However, Union Mutual learned that Driggs had been renting out three garages to non-tenants. Second, Driggs represented that the mercantile square footage was around 1,000 square feet, when in actuality, it was larger than allowed under the policies.
Union Mutual provided underwriting guidelines in connection with its default motion, which state that "parking provided for anyone other than the insured, tenants and their guests," presents an "unacceptable risk." The guidelines also state that answering yes to any "preliminary application questions (which presumably included those regarding mercantile square footage and parking) is an "unacceptable risk." The court held that these guidelines supported a finding that Driggs made material misrepresentation and that Union Mutual relied on these misrepresentations in issuing the policies. The court, as such, recommended that the policies at issue be rescinded from inception.
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Craig Rokuson, Traub LiebermanMr. Rokuson may be contacted at
crokuson@tlsslaw.com
The Difference Between Routine Document Destruction and Spoliation
October 18, 2021 —
Steven A. Neeley - Construction ExecutiveIn today’s world, there is a tendency to believe that everything must be preserved forever. The common belief is that documents, emails, text messages, etc. cannot be deleted because doing so may be viewed as spoliation (i.e., intentionally destroying relevant evidence). A party guilty of spoliation can be sanctioned, which can include an adverse inference that the lost information would have helped the other side. But that does not mean that contractors have to preserve every conceivable piece of information or data under all circumstances. There are key differences between routine document destruction (when done before receiving notice of potential claims or litigation) and spoliation.
The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals decision in Appeal of Sungjee Constr. Co., Ltd., ASBCA Nos. 62002 and 62170 (Mar. 23, 2021) provides a good reminder. There, Sungjee challenged its default termination under a construction contract at Osan Air Base in South Korea. Sungjee argued that the government denied it access to the site for 352 days (out of a 450-day performance period) by refusing to issue passes that were needed to access the base. The government argued that it had issued the passes, but it could not produce them to Sungjee in discovery because they had been destroyed as part of a routine document destruction policy. The base security force issued hard copy passes and entered the information in a biometric system. The government was able to produce the biometric system data but not the hard copy passes because they were destroyed each year.
Sungjee argued the government was guilty of spoliation and moved for sanctions. It asked the Board to draw an adverse inference that the passes would have shown that the government had not issued proper passes on a timely basis, which delayed Sungjee’s performance. The Board denied Sungjee’s motion for several reasons.
Reprinted courtesy of
Steven A. Neeley, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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Mr. Neeley may be contacted at
steve.neeley@huschblackwell.com
Lien Release Bonds – Remove Liens, But Not All Liability
February 20, 2023 —
Mia Hughes - ConsensusDocsLien Release Bonds – Remove Liens, But Not All Liability
Among owners and contractors, payment and performance bonds are commonly used together in an effort to mitigate future risk against derivative subcontractor claims. But what happens when despite the effort to mitigate risk, a derivative claimant nevertheless files a mechanics’ lien on the owner’s real property? Not all hope is lost. There is another classification of bond, a “lien release bond”—also commonly referred to as an indemnity bond or a mechanics’ lien bond—which provides protections for real property after a mechanics’ lien has already been filed. The purpose of a lien release bond is to remove claims against the relevant real property. Notably, a lien release bond does not necessarily eliminate all liability of an owner or a general contractor. In number of states, an owner or a general contractor can be held personally liable for derivative claims despite a valid lien release bond.
What is a Lien Release Bond?
A lien release bond is a specific type of surety bond that removes an existing mechanics’ lien from an owner’s real property. In an effort to protect real property, an owner, or a general contractor, can obtain a lien release bond that will substitute or take the place of a mechanics’ lien. In the event a lien claimant files suit on the mechanics’ lien and seeks to collect on their claim, any proceeds recovered will come from the lien release bond rather than proceeds from the sale or foreclosure of the real property. The threat of mechanics’ liens is always present on a construction project— it is estimated that over 60,000 mechanics liens were filed in 2021 alone. Lien release bonds are an added layer of protection for an owner’s real property against a pending mechanics’ lien.
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Mia Hughes, Jones Walker LLP (ConsensusDocs)Ms. Hughes may be contacted at
mhughes@joneswalker.com
Recent Florida Legislative Changes Shorten Both Statute of Limitation ("SOL") and Statute of Repose ("SOR") for Construction Defect Claims
March 19, 2024 —
Holly A. Rice - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.The Florida Legislature and Governor DeSantis passed Senate Bill 360, effective April 13, 2023, which imposes significant changes to Florida’s statute of limitation (“SOL”) and statute of repose (“SOR”) periods prescribed in Florida Statute § 95.11. In short, the SOL and SOR periods will commence earlier and run earlier, which in effect shortens the time to bring a construction defect claim on both ends of the timeline.1
These changes will have positive impacts for general contractors who may save on insurance premiums with shorter completed operations tails. In other words, the timeframe within which contractors are at risk of being sued for construction-related errors is significantly reduced under the new version of the statute. Owners and developers, on the other hand, may feel that the increased pressure of uncovered construction defects necessitates the filing of lawsuits sooner than they might have otherwise filed. Collectively, all parties involved will certainly have to consider when and how to place their carriers on notice of claims or potential claims and, coupled with Florida’s sweeping changes to fee shifting statutes, insured parties may see more coverage denials which, in turn, could lead to more coverage actions.2
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Holly A. Rice, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Ms. Rice may be contacted at
HRice@sdvlaw.com
It's a Wrap! Enforcing Online Agreements in Light of the CPRA
March 08, 2021 —
Kyle Janecek – Newmeyer DillionWe're all familiar with it at this point. A popup comes up on your device informing you of a change to terms and conditions, or otherwise asking for permission. For those operating websites, they know that this inconvenience is required to comply with various legal requirements. What they may not be aware of yet, is that these requirements, and popups, are about to become much, much, more prevalent. Recently, the California Privacy Rights Act ("CPRA"), passed by the voters of the State of California, includes new language specifying how consent is supposed to be obtained for the collection of personal information, amending the California Consumer Privacy Act ("CCPA"). This new manner of consent rules out browsewrap agreements, and would require that popups increase as website operators shift focus to clickwrap agreements, if they have not already.
Browsewrap and Clickwrap
Typically, online agreements comprising Terms of Service or a Privacy Policy can be broken into either (a) browsewrap agreements - agreements that imply assent or agreement to online terms by the mere act of using a website or an online service after a clear and conspicuous notice that terms exist or (b) clickwrap agreements - agreements that show assent or agreement to online terms by having an individual click or otherwise agree to. While the best option to ensure enforceability is always the one that leaves the most documented signs of assenting to terms (i.e. a clickwrap agreement), both are typically recognized and enforced under California law. The practical effect of this is that to get consent, all that is technically needed is either to (a) show actual consent by having the person click on an "I agree" button, or (b) provide that the website visitor had ample notice that terms existed.
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Kyle Janecek, Newmeyer DillionMr. Janecek may be contacted at
kyle.janecek@ndlf.com
Virginia Joins California and Nevada in Passing its Consumer Privacy Act
March 15, 2021 —
Kyle Janecek – Newmeyer DillionCalifornia tends to be on the forefront in consumer privacy laws within the United States. However, there is a growing momentum for other states to join California in legislating consumer privacy rights, as well as pushes for federal legislation. The latest state to join in and pass consumer privacy legislation is Virginia, with its Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act (VCDPA). With Virginia joining the fray, several questions arise, such as how closely does the VCDPA follow California's legislation? How, if at all, does it differ from already-existing legislation? What do businesses need to comply with the VCDPA, if at all?
WHAT IS THE VIRGINIA CONSUMER DATA PROTECTION ACT?
The VCDPA largely mimics elements from its Californian cousins, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) as modified by the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA). The main features of the law include: (a) issuing the right to request what information is collected; (b) the right to correct information provided; (c) the right to deletion; (d) providing notice to consumers regarding the collection of their data; and (e) protecting consumer data. Further, the consumer requests, akin to the CCPA, do require verification, and similarly phrased data security practices that rely on how "reasonable" they are, depending on the volume and type of information at issue. Though, the VCDPA does expand on this slightly, requiring "data protection assessments" to determine the security of protected information, how it is shared and used, the benefits in sharing the information and harm resulting from any breaches.
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Kyle Janecek, Newmeyer DillionMr. Janecek may be contacted at
kyle.janecek@ndlf.com
