Recent Developments Involving Cedell v. Farmers Insurance Company of Washington
September 05, 2022 —
Donald Verfurth, Sally Kim, Stephanie Ries & Kyle Silk-Eglit - Gordon & Rees Insurance Coverage Law BlogEver since the Washington Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Cedell v. Farmers Insurance Company of Washington, 176 Wn.2d 686, 295 P.3d 239 (2013), insurance coverage attorneys have been struggling to define the exact parameters of the Cedell ruling in order to safeguard the attorney-client privilege as to the communications between the insurer and its counsel. As a brief background, the Washington Supreme Court held in Cedell that there is a presumption of no attorney-client privilege in a lawsuit involving bad faith claims handling. However, an insurer can overcome the presumption of no attorney-client privilege by showing that its counsel provided legal advice regarding the insurer’s potential liability under the policy and law, and did not engage in any quasi-fiduciary activities, i.e. claims handling activities, such as investigating, evaluating, adjusting or processing the insured’s claim.
Since Cedell, various trial courts have held that the following activities by an insurer’s counsel constitute quasi-fiduciary conduct that do not overcome the presumption of no attorney-client privilege, resulting in an order to produce documents and/or to permit the deposition of the insurer’s counsel:
- Insurer’s attorney being the primary or sole point of contact with the insured for the insurer;
- Insurer’s attorney requesting documents from the insured that are relevant to the investigation of the claim;
- Insurer’s attorney communicating directly with the insured or the insured’s counsel regarding claims handling issues or payments;
- Insurer’s attorney interviewing witnesses for purposes of the investigation of the claim;
- Insurer’s attorney conducting an examination under oath of the insured;
- Insurer’s attorney drafting proposed or final reservation of rights letter or denial letter to the insured; and
- Insurer’s attorney conducting settlement negotiations in an underlying litigation.
Reprinted courtesy of
Donald Verfurth, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani,
Sally Kim, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani,
Stephanie Ries, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani and
Kyle Silk-Eglit, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani
Mr. Verfurth may be contacted at dverfurth@grsm.com
Ms. Kim may be contacted at sallykim@grsm.com
Ms. Ries may be contacted at sries@grsm.com
Mr. Silk-Eglit may be contacted at ksilkeglit@grsm.com
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Arizona Supreme Court Clarifies Area Variance Standard; Property Owners May Obtain an Area Variance When Special Circumstances Existed at Purchase
October 19, 2017 —
Nick Wood, Adam Lang, Noel Griemsmann, & Brianna Long – Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIn Pawn 1st v. City of Phoenix, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected a Court of Appeals rule that would have unduly restrained alienation of property in Arizona. The Court of Appeals found that the City of Phoenix Board of Adjustment acted beyond its authority when it granted an area variance to a pawn shop where the special circumstances causing a need for the variance existed before the pawn shop purchased the property. Under Arizona law, boards of adjustment cannot grant an area variance where the special circumstances requiring the variance are self-imposed. The Court of Appeals adopted a rule that knowledge of special circumstances at the time of purchase made the special circumstances self-imposed, foreclosing the purchaser’s ability to obtain a variance. This rule would have severely restricted property purchasers’ ability to obtain area variances in Arizona and by extension likely strained property transactions.
The underlying case involved a pawn shop that was proposed in southeast Phoenix. After the property purchaser obtained approval for a required use permit (for a pawn shop) and a variance (for a 500 foot residential setback) from the City of Phoenix Board of Adjustment, a competing pawn shop filed a special action arguing that the variance was a use variance, not an area variance, beyond the board of adjustment’s authority.
Reprinted courtesy of Snell & Wilmer attorneys
Nick Wood,
Adam Lang,
Noel Griemsmann and
Brianna Long
Mr. Wood may be contacted at nwood@swlaw.com
Mr. Lang may be contacted at alang@swlaw.com
Mr. Noel may be contacted at ngriemsmann@swlaw.com
Ms. Brianna may be contacted at bllong@swlaw.com
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Sometimes you Need to Consider the Coblentz Agreement
January 19, 2017 —
David Adelstein – Florida Construction Legal UpdatesSince insurance, particularly liability insurance, is such an important component when it comes a construction project, understanding certain nuances such as a
Coblentz Agreement (a what kind of agreement agreement?!?—keep reading) becomes helpful.
If there is a construction defect claim / lawsuit, the implicated parties (e.g., contractor, design professional, subcontractor, sub-consultants) are going to tender the claim / lawsuit to their respective liability insurer. This is what they should be doing – notifying the insurer so that the insurer can defend them from the claim / lawsuit and indemnify them from covered damages associated with the claim / lawsuit.
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dadelstein@gmail.com
City of Birmingham Countersues Contractor for Incomplete Work
March 12, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFBack in December of 2013, WVTM News reported that Chris Woods, a contractor, filed a lawsuit against the City of Birmingham, Alabama, demanding $1.5 million for the West Police Precinct and two other projects he had been contracted on. However, “Birmingham claimed Woods was fired for not completing projects on time and other contract breaches.”
On March 7th, WVTM News reported that the City of Birmingham has filed a counterclaim against Woods, alleging that he “owes $1.2 million for incomplete work.” The city listed his “inability to meet specific construction deadlines and finish either project on time as factors for his termination.” Woods, however, blamed the city for delays, citing multiple design changes requested by Birmingham.
The city’s counterclaim also alleged that “Star Insurance Company, ‘identified major, numerous defects in the work that Woods had performed prior to the termination of the West Precinct Project.’”
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Why A.I. Isn’t Going to Replace Lawyers Anytime Soon
April 18, 2023 —
Amir Kahana - Kahana FeldIn a recent article entitled, “A.I. Is Coming for Lawyers, Again” the New York Times explored the longstanding idea that the legal profession is most at risk of being disrupted by A.I. The article claimed that: “There are warnings that ChatGPT-style software, with its humanlike language fluency, could take over much of legal work.” And that: “Law is seen as the lucrative profession perhaps most at risk from the recent advance in A.I. because lawyers are essentially word merchants.”
The problem with these predictions is that they are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of what lawyers do, which is primarily to provide sound advice and formulate sophisticated strategy. All the wordsmithing in the world won’t make a bad case good, or vice versa. Lawyers do not have a Jedi mind trick. We analyze the facts, we make the best arguments possible under the circumstances, we advise our clients on their prospects, and we come up with a strategy for an optimal outcome, which almost always includes a path towards settlement. We are strategists and trusted advisors. Not wordsmithers.
This is not anything ChatGPT or current A.I. can do, or even come close to doing. And how do I know that? Because in a recent Wall Street Journal article, experts on self-driving cars explain that A.I. is nowhere close to being able to drive a car autonomously. In an article entitled “When Will Cars Be Fully Self-Driving?” the experts explain that the main impediment to fully autonomous vehicles is how dumb A.I. is. As one of the leading experts explains, fully autonomous cars “would require human-level artificial intelligence, and there is no commonly accepted theory on how to get there. As long as there is no human-level AI, autonomous mobility will be limited.”
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Amir Kahana, Kahana FeldMr. Kahana may be contacted at
akahana@kahanafeld.com
Ohio Supreme Court Holds No Occurence Arises from Subcontractor's Faulty Workmanship
January 09, 2019 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Ohio Supreme Court bucked the modern trend by finding that there was no coverage under CGL policy's the subcontractor's exception for faulty workmanship claimed against the insured. Ohio N. Univ. v. Charles Constr. Servs. 2018 Ohio LEXIS 2375 (Ohio Oct. 9, 2018).
The University contracted with Charles Construction Services, Inc. to build a new luxury hotel and conference center on campus. After work was completed, the University discovered extensive water damage from hidden leaks that it believed were caused by the defective work of Charles Construction and its subcontractors. Repairs were made at the cost of $6 million.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Insurance Alert: Insurer Delay Extends Time to Repair or Replace Damaged Property
November 26, 2014 —
Valerie A. Moore & Christopher Kendrick – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Stephens & Stephens XII v. Fireman's Fund Ins. (No. A135938, filed November 24, 2014), the plaintiffs obtained property insurance on a warehouse. Within a month, it was discovered to be stripped of all wiring and metal. Fireman's Fund paid for emergency repairs but nothing more, concerned that the damage had occurred outside the policy period.
The policy provided for valuation of either "replacement cost," meaning the expenditure required to replace the damaged property with "new property of comparable material and quality," or "actual cash value," defined as the actual, depreciated value of the damaged property. For replacement cost, Fireman’s Fund was not required to pay "until the lost or damaged property is actually repaired ... as soon as reasonably possible after the loss or damage," and only "[t]he amount [the insured] actually spend[s]...."
In the subsequent bad faith lawsuit, the jury awarded the full cost of repair, despite there being no repairs. The appeals court reversed, holding that there was no right to an immediate award for the costs of repairing the damage; however, the court nonetheless held that the insured was entitled to a "conditional judgment," awarding those costs if repairs were actually made.
Reprinted courtesy of
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com; Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
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The Reptile Theory in Practice
September 06, 2021 —
Nicholas P. Hurzeler - Lewis BrisboisThe “Reptile Theory” is a trial strategy that attempts to use fear and anger to make the jury dislike the defendant so strongly they will award a plaintiff a grossly excessive amount of damages. The plaintiff’s attorney will seek to activate the jurors’ “survival mode” instincts by presenting the defendant’s conduct as highly dangerous and worthy of punishment. The defendant’s conduct will be portrayed as a threat to the safety of the general public, and the award as a deterrent needed to protect the community at large. The Reptile Theory appeals to the jurors’ emotions in place of any rational, impartial evaluation of the evidence.
The term “Reptile Theory” originated in the writings of nuero-physiologist Paul D. MacLean in the 1950s, who suggested that one major part of the brain consisted of a “reptilian complex” that controlled instinctive behaviors involved in aggression, dominance, and territoriality. Then in the 2009 publication “Manual of the Plaintiff’s Revolution” by David Ball and Don Keenan, the authors first described the “Reptile Theory” in the context of litigation. Since then it has become a hot topic in litigation as defense counsel develop methods to combat “Reptile” tactics resulting in runaway jury awards.
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Nicholas P. Hurzeler, Lewis BrisboisMr. Hurzeler may be contacted at
Nicholas.Hurzeler@lewisbrisbois.com