NJ Transit’s Superstorm Sandy Coverage Victory Highlights Complexities of Underwriting Property Insurance Towers
February 24, 2020 —
Traub LiebermanIn New Jersey Transit Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 2019 WL 6109144 (N.J. App. Div. Nov. 18, 2019), New Jersey Transit (“NJT”) defeated the claim of several of its insurers that a $100 million flood sublimit applied to its Superstorm Sandy damages and recovered the full $400 million limits of its property insurance tower. The decision is a big win for the beleaguered transit agency, and for insurance professionals working with complex insurance towers, the decision highlights critical underwriting issues that can dramatically affect the amount of risk transferred by the policyholder or assumed by the insurer.
In NJ Transit, NJT secured a multi-layered property insurance program providing $400 million in all-risk coverage. The first and second layers provided $50 million each, the third and fourth layers provided $175 million and $125 million, respectively, with several insurers issuing quota shares in each layer. The program contained a $100 million flood sublimit, and “flood” was defined to include a “surge” of water. The program did not contain a sublimit for damage caused by a “named windstorm,” which was defined to include “storm surge” associated with a named storm. After NJT made its Superstorm-Sandy claim, some of the third- and fourth-layer insurers advised NJT that the $100 million flood sublimit applied to bar coverage under their policies. NJT sued these excess insurers and won at the trial and appellate levels.
In holding that the $100 million flood sublimit did not apply, the court applied the rule of construction that the specific definition of “named windstorm,” which included the terms “storm surge” and “wind driven water,” controlled over the policies’ more general definition of “flood.” In ascertaining the parties’ intent, the court noted that the omission of the term “storm surge” in the definition of “flood” evidenced an intention that the flood sublimit would not apply to storm surges. Based on this finding, the court rejected several arguments made by the insurers that other policy provisions evidenced the parties’ intent to apply the flood sublimit to all flood-related losses, regardless of whether the loss was caused by a storm surge.
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Traub Lieberman
Subrogation Waiver Unconscionable in Residential Fuel Delivery Contract
April 29, 2024 —
Ryan A. Bennett - The Subrogation StrategistIn a matter of first impression, the Superior Court of Connecticut (Superior Court), in American Commerce Ins., Co. v. Eastern Fuel Corp., No. CV-206109168-S, 2024 Conn. Super. LEXIS 380, held that a waiver of subrogation provision in a consumer fuel service/delivery contract violated public policy. The Superior Court overruled the motion for summary judgment filed by Eastern Fuel Corporation (Eastern) and determined that the clause was impermissible as the contract was entered into by two parties with unequal bargaining power.
American Commerce Insurance Company (American) provided property insurance to Arlene and James Hillas (the Insureds) for their home in Woodbridge, Connecticut. The Insureds hired Eastern to service their heating system on or around October 25, 2018. The service work at the property included inspecting the oil filters and flushing the fuel lines. On November 1, 2018, when the Insureds turned the heating system on for the first time that season, the two oil tanks on the property were allegedly full. After a series of deliveries, claims that the oil levels were lower than expected, discovering oil staining on the floor and Eastern’s replacement of the oil lines, Eastern delivered another 429 gallons. However, after the delivery, additional leaks were discovered relating to the oil line replacements. Ultimately, the Insureds submitted a claim to American and American paid in excess of $59,000 for the damage incurred.
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Ryan A. Bennett, White and Williams LLPMr. Bennett may be contacted at
bennettr@whiteandwilliams.com
The Biggest Thing Keeping Young Homebuyers out of the Market Isn't Student Debt
September 17, 2015 —
Patrick Clark – BloombergConventional wisdom has it that the staggering student debt incurred by the current generation of young professionals has made it harder to save for a home—and deprived the U.S. housing market of the first-time buyer lifeblood it depends on. But not so fast.
A blog post published by Zillow today shows that student-loan debt has little impact on the homebuying prospects of young families.
This is not the first report to poke holes in the student-debt-holding-back-home-ownership theory, but Zillow's research makes its point by limiting the data to married couples in their early-30s with at least one child. The idea was to cut out the student debtors who don't own homes because they haven't yet started a family and attempt to isolate the effect of student debt on home ownership.
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Patrick Clark, Bloomberg
Determining Duty to Defend in Wisconsin Does Not Include Extrinsic Evidence
September 22, 2016 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe policyholder's attempt to extend the duty to defend analysis beyond the complaint's allegations and the four-corners of the policy failed before the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Water Well Solutions Service Group Inc. v. Consolidated Ins. Co., 2016 Wisc. LEXIS 163 (Wis. Sup. Ct. June 30, 2016).
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Supreme Court of Oregon Affirms Decision in Abraham v. T. Henry Construction, et al.
April 20, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFAfter reviewing the decision in Abraham v. T. Henry Construction, et al., the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed that a tort claim for property damage arising from construction defects may exist even when the homeowner and the builder are in a contractual relationship.
When the case was initially filed, the plaintiffs alleged breach of contract and negligence. The defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that one, the claim was barred by the six-year statute of limitations and two, no special relationship (such as one between a doctor and patient) existed. The court agreed with the defendants. However, the Court of Appeals while affirming the trial court’s decision on breach of contract reversed the decision on negligence. The Court of Appeals stated that an administrative or statute rule could establish a standard of care independent from the contract.
The Oregon Supreme Court gave an example of cases where a tort claim could exist when a contract is present: “If an individual and a contractor enter into a contract to build a house, which provides that the contractor will install only copper pipe, but the contractor installs PVC pipe instead (assuming both kinds of pipe comply with the building code and the use of either would be consistent with the standard of care expected of contractors), that failure would be a breach of contract only. […] If the failure to install the copper pipe caused a reduction in the value of the house, the plaintiff would be able to recover that amount in an action for breach of contract. […] On the other hand, if the contractor installed the PVC pipe in a defective manner and those pipes therefore leaked, causing property damage to the house, the homeowner would have claims in both contract and tort. […] In those circumstances, the obligation to install copper instead of PVC pipe is purely contractual; the manner of installing the pipe, however, implicates both contract and tort because of the foreseeable risk of property damage that can result from improperly installed pipes.”
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Appeals Court Reverses Summary Judgment over Defective Archway Construction
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFA judge has ruled that a plaintiff can go forward with her suit that she was injured by a defective archway during a birthday party. A three-judge panel of the California Court of Appeals issued this ruling on January 23, 2012, in the case of Trujillo v. Cosio.
Ms. Trujillo attended a birthday party at the home of Maria Cosio and Joel Verduzco. A piñata was hung between a tree and a brick archway. Ms. Trujillo went to get candy that had fallen from the piñata, during which the archway fell on her hand. Subsequent examination of the archway showed that it had not been “properly anchored to the supporting pillars to protect the arch from falling.”
Ms. Cosio and Mr. Verduzco argued that they could not have been aware of the defective nature of the archway’s construction, as it had been built at the request of the prior property owner. The structure was constructed without building permits. Mark Burns, a civil engineer testifying for the plaintiff, said that “a reasonable property owner would have thoroughly tested the archway to ensure it was capable of withstanding such horizontal forces before allowing children to enter into the area.” Mr. Burns noted that twenty rope pulls would have been sufficient to demonstrate the structure’s instability.
The trial court rejected Mr. Burn’s statements, finding that the respondents did not have any knowledge of the defect and that a visual inspection should have sufficed. The court noted that this a triable issue, whether visual inspection suffices, or whether the property owners should have done as Mr. Burns suggested and yank a rope twenty times. The court noted that “although a jury may ultimately disagree with Burn’s opinion, it was supported by sufficient foundation and was not speculative.”
The opinion was written by Judge Flier, with Judges Rubin and Grimes concurring.
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Jury Trials: A COVID Update
July 18, 2022 —
Joshua Lane - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCJURY TRIALS. Budd v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc., — Wn. App. 2d –, 505 P.3d 120 (Wash. Ct. App. 2022). (1) Courts must ensure that juries are randomly selected to provide a fair and impartial jury. (2) While the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the systematic exclusion of distinctive groups from jury pools, Washington Courts’ COVID-19 policy to excuse people who were ages 60 and older and did not wish to report for duty was not a “systematic” exclusion.
Raymond Budd developed mesothelioma after working with a drywall product called “joint compound” from 1962 to 1972. He sued Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc. and others for damages, contending that the company’s joint compound caused his illness. A jury returned a verdict in Budd’s favor and awarded him nearly $13.5 million. Kaiser appeals, claiming (1) insufficient randomness in the jury-selection process, (2) erroneous transcription of expert testimony, (3) lack of proximate causation, (4) lack of medical causation, (5) an improper jury instruction on defective design, (6) improper exclusion of sexual battery and marital discord evidence, (7) improper admission of post-exposure evidence, (8) improper exclusion of regulatory provisions, and (9) a failure to link its product to Budd’s disease. The Court of Appeals, Division 1, affirmed the verdict in favor of Budd.
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Joshua Lane, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMr. Lane may be contacted at
joshua.lane@acslawyers.com
Texas EIFS Case May Have Future Implications for Construction Defects
October 02, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFLennar Homes addressed a problem with EIFS in homes built in Texas in the 1990s by replacing every roof they had built. Some of those homes had problems with leaks, rotting, or termites, but other roofs hadn’t suffered any problems. Lennar’s insurers initially refused coverage. Lennar managed to settle with all but one, Markel American Insurance.
Their dispute formed the case Lennar Corp. v. Markel American Insurance Co. This was first tried before a jury and eventually appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. Brian S. Martin of Thompson Coe Cousins & Irons LLP discusses this case at Insurance Journal.
Markel’s claim was that under the policy language, Lennar could not make voluntary payments without getting Markel’s consent, which they did not. But the Texas Supreme Court disagreed, determining that Lennar took, as Mr. Martin notes, “a reasonable approach to a serious problem.”
Markel also made the claim that the whole amount of the damages was not covered by the policy, as they did not view the policy as covering the cost of determining the extent of the damage. The Court disagreed, noting that “under no reasonable construction of the phrase can the cost of finding EIFS property damage in order to repair it not to be considered ‘because of the damage.’”
Mr. Martin concludes by calling the Texas Supreme Court decision “a frontal assault on several critical provisions of liability policies that will assuredly lead to further litigation.” He also notes that the decision “may indicate a shift in the Court’s approach in insurance cases to a more result-oriented jurisprudence.”
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