Seattle Washington Building Expert Directory

Contract Change #9: Owner’s Right to Carry Out the Work (law note)

March 28, 2018 — Melissa Dewey Brumback - Construction Law in North Carolina
In prior versions of the General Conditions, if a contractor defaulted and the Owner (after giving notice) opted to cure by carrying out the work itself, an appropriate Change Order would be issued. However, a Change Order is a contract that requires an agreement by both the Owner and Contractor, and, obviously, Contractors were reluctant to agree that they were in default and responsible for a deductive change order. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Dewey Brumback, Construction Law in North Carolina

Woodbridge II and the Nuanced Meaning of “Adverse Use” in Hostile Property Rights Cases in Colorado

November 23, 2020 — Luke Mecklenburg - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation Blog
Earlier this year, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued an opinion addressing at length “whether the requirement that the use be ‘adverse’ in the adverse possession context is coextensive with adverse use in the prescriptive easement context.” See Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34 (Woodbridge II), ¶ 2, cert. granted, No. 20SC292, 2020 WL 5405376 (Colo. Sept. 8, 2020). As detailed below, the Woodbridge II court concluded that the meanings of “adverse” in these two contexts are not coextensive—while “hostility” in the adverse possession context requires a claim of exclusive ownership of the property, a party claiming a prescriptive easement is only required to “show a nonpermissive or otherwise unauthorized use of property that interfered with the owner’s property interests.” Thus, the Woodbridge II court reasoned a claimants’ acknowledgement or recognition of an owner’s title alone is insufficient to defeat “adverse use” in the prescriptive easement context. This significant ruling is at odds with a prior division’s broad statement, while considering a prescriptive easement claim, that “[i]n general, when an adverse occupier acknowledges or recognizes the title of the owner during the occupant’s claimed prescriptive period, the occupant interrupts the prescriptive use.” See Trask v. Nozisko, 134 P.3d 544, 553 (Colo. App. 2006). Perhaps for that reason, Woodbridge II is currently pending certiorari review before the Colorado Supreme Court in a case that should provide some much-needed clarity on what constitutes “adverse use” in the context of a prescriptive easement. As we await the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision, I thought it worthwhile to provide a brief analysis of the Woodbridge II court’s deep dive into the nuances of “adverse use” in this field of Colorado law. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Luke Mecklenburg, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Mecklenburg may be contacted at lmecklenburg@swlaw.com

Taylor Morrison v. Terracon and the Homeowner Protection Act of 2007

June 11, 2014 — Buck Mann – Colorado Construction Litigation
On January 30, 2014, the Colorado Court of Appeals decided the case of Taylor Morrison of Colorado, Inc. v. Bemas Construction, Inc. and Terracon Consultants, Inc. 2014WL323490. The case addressed a substantial issue of Colorado constitutional law, as well as a variety of procedural issues of potential importance to construction litigation attorneys. Of particular interest is the question of whether the provisions of the 2007 Homeowner Protection Act (“HPA”) are limited in application to contracts between residential homeowners and construction professionals, or whether they have broader application between commercial construction professional parties as well. As discussed below, the Court of Appeals stated that it would not answer the question, and then, separately, implied that the statute might only apply to homeowner transactions – with the resulting exclusion of commercial transactions. However, after its analysis, it left the actual decision of that issue to a future court in a later case. The factual background for the case involved claims of breach of a contract for soils engineering by Terracon Consultants, Inc. (“Terracon”) and negligent excavation work by Bemas Construction, Inc. (“Bemas”). Plaintiff was Taylor Morrison of Colorado (“Taylor Morrison”), the developer and general contractor for a residential subdivision called Homestead Hills. After it constructed many homes, Taylor Morrison began to receive complaints of cracking drywall resulting from foundation movement and it made repairs at significant expense. Taylor Morrison then filed suit against Terracon and Bemas in connection with their respective roles in the original construction. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Buck Mann, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
Mr. Mann may be contacted at mann@hhmrlaw.com

An Overview of the New EPA HVAC Refrigerant Regulations and Its Implications for the Construction Industry

September 30, 2024 — Stefanie A. Salomon, Nadia Ennaji & Ali Heyat - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently announced a series of significant changes to the rules governing the use of refrigerants in heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems. These changes, which were promulgated under the American Innovation and Manufacturing (AIM) Act, are designed to phase down the use of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), a class of potent greenhouse gases. The AIM Act: A Game-Changer for HVAC Industry The recent changes to refrigerant regulations by the EPA signify a substantial shift in environmental policy that will have profound implications for the construction industry. For the construction industry, this means a transition to next-generation technologies that do not rely on HFCs. The AIM Act’s sector-based restrictions will affect a wide range of equipment, including refrigeration and air conditioning systems integral to building design and function. Starting January 1, 2025, the manufacturing or importing of any product in specified sectors that uses a regulated substance with a global warming potential of 700 or greater is prohibited (40 C.F.R. § 84.54(a)). The specified sectors listed include R-410A, the most common refrigerant used in the HVAC industry. The installation of systems using a regulated substance with a global warming potential of 700 or greater in specified sectors is allowed until January 1, 2026, provided that all system components are manufactured or imported before January 1, 2025. See 40 C.F.R. § 84.54 (c). “Installation” of an HVAC system is defined as the completion of assembling the system’s circuit, including charging it with a full charge, such that the system can function and is ready for its intended purpose. See 40 C.F.R. § 84.52. Reprinted courtesy of Stefanie A. Salomon, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. and Nadia Ennaji, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. Ms. Salomon may be contacted at ssalomon@pecklaw.com Ms. Ennaji may be contacted at nennaji@pecklaw.com Read the court decision
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Arizona Supreme Court Confirms a Prevailing Homeowner Can Recover Fees on Implied Warranty Claims

August 30, 2017 — Rick Erickson - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation Blog
On August 9th, in Sirrah Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Wunderlich, the Arizona Supreme Court settled the question about recovery of attorneys’ fees after prevailing on implied warranty claims against a residential contractor. The simple answer is, yes, a homeowner who prevails on the merits can recover the fees they spent to prove that shoddy construction breached the implied warranty of workmanship and habitability. Why? Because, as Justice Timmer articulated, “[t]he implied warranty is a contract term.” Although implied, the warranty is legally part of the written agreement in which “a residential builder warrants that its work is performed in a workmanlike manner and that the structure is habitable.” In other words, a claim based on the implied warranty not only arises out of the contract, the claim is actually based on a contract term. Since, in A.R.S. § 12-341.01, Arizona law provides for prevailing parties to recover their fees on claims “arising out of contract” and because the implied warranty is now viewed by the courts as a contract term, homeowners can recover their fees after successfully proving breach of the implied warranty. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Rick Erickson, Snell & Wilmer
Mr Erickson may be contacted at rerickson@swlaw.com

Four Ways Student Debt Is Wreaking Havoc on Millennials

December 10, 2015 — Natalie Kirtroeff – Bloomberg
Navient, the country's largest student debt servicer, put out a report Wednesday that suggests young people are doing just fine with their finances. The study surveyed 3,000 millennials and concluded that they are happily taking out mortgages, starting families, saving money, and managing their budgets. "Young adults are not only financially healthy but also actively focused on saving," the report said. Navient may be overstating things. Here are four reasons you should not be convinced that things are going that well for young people who took out student loans. 1. Student Debt Seems to Dampen Homebuying People who finished college were more likely to have a mortgage than people who got only a high school education, the Navient study showed. Students who took out loans for college and didn't graduate, however, are worse off than those who never went at all. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Natalie Kirtroeff, Bloomberg

Preliminary Notices: Common Avoidable But Fatal Mistakes

August 26, 2019 — William L. Porter - Porter Law Group
In the California building and construction industry, service of a “Preliminary Notice” is a prerequisite for Subcontractor and Supplier claims for payment through the Mechanics Lien, Stop Payment Notice and Payment Bond Claim process. Without proper drafting and service of a Preliminary Notice, these extremely valuable claims cannot be protected. Unfortunately, despite the vital importance of the Preliminary Notice, Subcontractors and Suppliers often make common self-defeating mistakes that make their Preliminary Notice efforts completely ineffective, resulting in loss of their claims rights. The purpose of this article is to list some of these common mistakes in the hope that the reader will avoid such mistakes, preserve the integrity of the Preliminary Notice, and protect the claims rights it makes available: Not Sending out the Preliminary Notice Within 20 Days After Supplying Labor or Materials: The protection of a Preliminary Notice begins 20 days before it sent out. This means that if a Subcontractor or Supplier claimant delivered $100,000 in materials on February 1, that same claimant must serve the Preliminary Notice on or before February 21 (the sooner the better), or the claimant will not be able to pursue an enforceable Mechanics Lien, Stop Payment Notice or Payment Bond claim for that $100,000. There are very few exceptions. Best practice: A Subcontractor or Supplier must send out the Preliminary Notice as soon as an agreement to provide work or materials to a California construction project is in place (See California Civil Code 8204). Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of William L. Porter, Porter Law Group
Mr. Porter may be contacted at bporter@porterlaw.com

Court Rejects Efforts to Limit Scope of Judgment Creditor’s Direct Action Under Insurance Code Section 11580

May 01, 2019 — Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
In Ins. Co. of St. of PA v. Amer. Safety Indemnity Co. (No. B283684, filed 3/1/19) (“ICSOP”), a California appeals court rejected one insurer’s efforts to limit the scope of another insurer’s direct action as a judgment creditor under Insurance Code section 11580(b)(2). In ICSOP, homeowners filed a claim in arbitration against their general contractor alleging damages from subsidence. While the arbitration was pending, the general contractor filed suit against the grading subcontractor seeking indemnity and contribution. The complaint attached the homeowners’ complaint in arbitration pleading damages of $2.3 million, and alleged that the subcontractors had a duty to indemnify for those damages. The arbitrator awarded the homeowners $1.1 million. The general contractor was insured by plaintiff ICSOP, which paid the arbitration award. A default judgment was entered against the grading subcontractor for $1.5 million, that included both the arbitration award plus $356,340 for the general contractor’s attorney’s fees. American Safety insured the grading subcontractor but refused to indemnify ICSOP. ICSOP then sued American Safety on the default judgment, pursuant to Insurance Code section 11580(b). The trial court granted summary judgment for ICSOP and the appeals court affirmed. Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com Reprinted courtesy of Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Read the court decision
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