Still Going, After All This Time: the Sacketts, EPA and the Clean Water Act
September 13, 2021 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelOn August 16, 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the Idaho property of Michael and Chantell Sackett was a regulated wetlands under the then-controlling 1977 EPA rules defining “waters of the United States,” and that the Sacketts dredging and filling of their property was subject to regulation by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or EPA. EPA’s case, as it has been for many years, was based on 2008 EPA and Corps inspection reports and Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test as the controlling opinion in the 2006 Supreme Court case, Rapanos v. United States. The Sacketts’ argument was that the text of the Clean Water Act, as interpreted by Justice Scalia and three other Justices, was controlling, but for several years, the Ninth Circuit has relied on Justice Kennedy’s opinion in these CWA controversies. The court’s opinion expressed considerable sympathy for the Sacketts as they negotiated the thicket of EPA’s regulatory processes, but it could not disregard circuit precedent. A few years ago, the Supreme Court ruled, in a unanimous decision, that EPA’s then extant administrative compliance orders were arbitrary and capricious. (See Sackett v. US, 566 US 120 (2015).) After that decision, the case was remanded to the federal district court, where it lingered for several more years.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Illinois Court Addresses Rip-And-Tear Coverage And Existence Of An “Occurrence” In Defective Product Suit
September 04, 2018 —
Brian Bassett - TLSS Insurance Law BlogIn Lexington Ins. Co. v. Chi. Flameproof & Wood Specialties Corp., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135871, 2018 WL 3819109 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2018), the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that rip-and-tear costs could qualify as covered “property damage,” but the court rejected coverage for claims that the insured intentionally sold a noncompliant product as the suit did not allege an “occurrence.”
Lexington Insurance Company (“Lexington”) issued a CGL policy to Chicago Flameproof & Wood Specialties Corp. (“Flameproof”). During the policy period, a third party ordered fire-retardant-treated lumber from Flameproof for construction in Minnesota. Flameproof instead sent materials that were not tested, certified, or labeled as compliant. The third party installed the materials, discovered the non-compliance, and then removed the materials. Removing the materials allegedly damaged other portions of the building on the project. The third party then sued Flameproof, alleging costs associated with replacing the lumber as well as property damage to the other materials from the removal of the lumber. Flameproof tendered the claim to Lexington seeking a defense. Lexington filed a declaratory action in the Northern District of Illinois.
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Brian Bassett, Traub Lieberman Strauss & Shrewsberry LLPMr. Bassett may be contacted at
bbassett@tlsslaw.com
Nevada Supreme Court to Decide Fate of Harmon Towers
June 28, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe Nevada Supreme Court started hearings on Tuesday, June 4 over the fate of Harmon towers. MGM Resorts is hoping to obtain permission from the court to tear down the tower, which they claim could collapse should an earthquake strike Las Vegas. Perini Corp, the builder, wants the building to remain standing in order to support their claim that the building’s flaws are through design and not construction errors.
KLAS quoted one of Perini’s lawyers claiming that MGM had pursued a media strategy to prejudice potential jurors against the contractor. “CityCenter hired Cedric and Bunting to place advertisements with the media to win the hearts and minds of the community and to convince the public pretrial that Perini was, quote, ‘scum of the earth.’”
If the Supreme Court gives the go-ahead, demolition would begin soon. Still pending, is the $500 lawsuit over the allegations of construction defects.
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Couple Claims Poor Installation of Home Caused Defects
December 30, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFRobert and Tracy Samosky of Spanishburg, West Virginia have filed a lawsuit claiming that the improper delivery of their modular home caused defects and damages, preventing them from actually using their home. The couple purchased a modular home from J&M Quality Construction for a home designed and built by Mod-U-Kraf Homes. They are suing the two firms for $50,000 in damages, reports the West Virginia Record.
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California Court Broadly Interprets Insurance Policy’s “Liability Arising Out of” Language
December 20, 2017 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogIn McMillin Mgmt. Servs. v. Financial Pacific Ins. Co., Cal.Ct.App. (4th Dist.), Docket No. D069814 (filed 11/14/17), the California Court of Appeal held that the term “liability arising out of,” as used in an ongoing operations endorsement, does not require that the named insured’s liability arise while it is performing work on a construction project.
In the McMillin case, the general contractor and developer (McMillin) contracted with various subcontractors, including a concrete subcontractor and stucco subcontractor insured by Lexington Insurance Company. Both subcontractors performed their work at the project prior to the sale of the units.
The Lexington policies contained substantively identical additional insured endorsements that provided coverage to McMillin “for liability arising out of your [the named insured subcontractor’s] ongoing operations performed for [McMillin].” Several homeowners filed suit against McMillin, alleging that they had discovered various defective conditions arising out of the construction of their homes, including defects arising out of the work performed by Lexington’s insureds. Lexington argued that there was no potential for coverage in McMillin’s favor under the endorsements because there were no homeowners during the time that the subcontractors’ operations were performing work at the project (the homes closed escrow after the subcontractors had completed their work); thus, McMillin did not have any liability for property damage that took place while the subcontractors’ operations were ongoing.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rose Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Claims Made Insurance Policies
November 04, 2019 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates“Claims-made policies are common in the professional liability insurance market. They “differ from traditional ‘occurrence’-based policies primarily based upon the scope of the risk against which they insure.” With claims-made policies, coverage is provided only where the act giving rise to coverage “is discovered and brought to the attention of the insurance company during the period of the policy.” In contrast, coverage is provided under an occurrence-based policy if the act giving rise to coverage “occurred during the period of the policy, regardless of the date a claim is actually made against the insured.” “The essence, then, of a claims-made policy is notice to the carrier within the policy period.”
Crowely Maritime Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 2019 WL 3294003 (11thCir. 2019)
The recent Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal opinion in Crowely Maritime Corp. discussed the distinction between a claims-made insurance policy and an occurrence-based insurance policy. Professional liability policies are generally claims-made policies whereas commercial general liability policies are generally occurrence-based policies. While this opinion does not involve a construction matter, the case did concern the definition of a “claim” in a claims-made policy and whether such claim was timely reported to the insurer within the discovery period / extended reporting period.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 09, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFIn the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
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Nevada Insureds Can Rely on Extrinsic Facts to Show that An Insurer Owes a Duty to Defend
November 15, 2021 —
Sarah J. Odia & Scott S. Thomas - Payne & FearsOn Oct. 28, 2021, the Nevada Supreme Court in Zurich American Insurance Company v.. Ironshore Specialty Insurance Company, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 66, held that an insured can rely on extrinsic facts to show that an insurer has a duty to defend the insured, as long as the facts were available to the insurer at the time the insured tendered the claim. The court also held that an insured has the burden of proving that an exception to an exclusion in an insurance policy applies to create a duty to defend.
In Zurich, Ironshore refused to defend to its insured against multiple property damage claims arising out of construction defects, claiming that its policies’ continuing and progressive damage exclusions barred coverage. The underlying lawsuits made no specific allegations describing when or how the property damage occurred. Ironshore claimed that the property damage had occurred due to faulty work that predated the commencement of its policies. Two different federal trial courts came to conflicting conclusions in the underlying cases. One held that Ironshore had a duty to defend because Ironshore failed to show that an exception to the exclusion did not apply. The second granted summary judgment in favor of Ironshore holding that the insured failed to meet its burden of proving that an exception to the exclusion applied.
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Sarah J. Odia, Payne & Fears and
Scott S. Thomas, Payne & Fears
Ms. Odia may be contacted at sjo@paynefears.com
Mr. Thomas may be contacted at sst@paynefears.com
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