SEATTLE WASHINGTON BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Should CGL Insurer have Duty to Defend Insured During Chapter 558 Notice of Construction Defects Process???

September 01, 2016 — David Adelstein – Florida Construction Legal Updates
Does a CGL insurer have a duty to defend its insured-contractor during Florida Statutes Chapter 558 notice of construction defects pre-suit process? This answer is currently undecided and will be up to the Florida Supreme Court to decide. (It is on appeal stemming from a federal district court saying that an insurer does not have a duty to defend its insured-contractor in the 558 process based on the definition of the word “suit” in the CGL policy.) Why is this an important issue? The 558 pre-suit notice of construction defects process is designed to facilitate an avenue for construction defect lawsuits to get resolved without having to file a lawsuit or, at least, have issues narrowed before a lawsuit needs to be filed. (Check here for a summary of the 558 process.) It requires pre-suit notifications so that implicated parties can become aware of the defects and have an opportunity to inspect the defects / damage, test the defects / damage, and respond to the notice of construction defects; it provides an avenue for beneficial pre-suit discovery. Through participating in the 558 process, the contractor and/or design professional (and those downstream from them) can: (i) offer to remedy the defect, (ii) settle the defect, whether through money or a combination of money and repairs, (iii) dispute the defect, or (iv) advise that available insurance proceeds will be determined by its liability insurer. See Fla. Stat. s. 558.004. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David M. Adelstein, Kirwin Norris
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

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Three's a Trend: Second, Fourth and Ninth Circuits Uphold Broad "Related Claims" Language

February 23, 2016 — Greg Steinberg – White and Williams LLP
The hallmark of a claims-made insurance policy is that the policy only provides coverage for claims that are “first made” during the policy period. As noted by the Texas Supreme Court, “for the insurer, the inherent benefit of a claims-made policy is the insurer's ability to close its books on a policy at its expiration and thus to attain a level of predictability unattainable under standard occurrence policies.”[1] To ensure this “level of predictability,” claims-made insurance policies contain provisions stating that all “Related Claims” will be treated as a single claim deemed first made at the time the earliest of such claims was made. The “Related Claims” provision is an issue that comes up time and again – claims can span years, especially in the context of regulatory investigations, which often culminate in enforcement proceedings and litigation. This inevitably leads to disputes regarding whether later claims can be related back to the earlier claim, an issue that becomes even thornier when different insurers participate on different policy years. Over time, case law on “Related Claims” has been mixed and somewhat inconsistent, with each case tending to hinge on its own unique set of facts, making it difficult to identify a clear standard for determining whether claims are related. However, three recent decisions out of the Second, Fourth and Ninth Circuits show that courts are increasingly deferring to the plain language of the policy and applying these provisions broadly. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Greg Steinberg, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Steinberg may be contacted at steinbergg@whiteandwilliams.com

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Houses Can Still Make Cents: Illinois’ Implied Warranty of Habitability

March 01, 2011 — Marisa L. Saber

In a report published earlier this week Marisa L. Saber writes about the implied warranty of habitability in the context of construction defect litigation. The piece speaks of the difficulties in alleging tort theories against builders and vendors in light of Illinois’ expansion of the economic loss doctrine, and how the implied warranty of habitability may provide another avenue for recovery.



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Colorado Supreme Court Decision Could Tarnish Appraisal Process for Policyholders

September 16, 2019 — Michael V. Pepe - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
On June 24, 2019, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the plain language of appraisal provisions in insurance policies, requiring “impartial appraisers,” direct appraisers to be “unbiased, disinterested, and unswayed by personal interest,” regardless of who hires them, and prohibits the party-appointed appraisers from acting as advocates. A common and attractive alternative dispute resolution option, the appraisal process usually entails the policyholder and insurer each hiring their own appraiser, who estimates how much the claim is worth. These appraisers also select a third-party umpire, and if they cannot agree upon one, a court appoints one. The umpire analyzes the conflicting estimates and presents a number to resolve the dispute. If two of the three parties agree with the outcome, the number becomes binding. Owners Ins. Co. v. Dakota Station II Condo. Ass'n, Inc.1 began when Dakota Station II Condominium Association Inc. (“Dakota”) and its insurer, Owners Insurance Company (“Owners”) could not agree on how to value two claims arising out of weather damage. To settle the differences and come to a resolution, Dakota invoked the appraisal provision in the insurance policy instructing each party to select its own “competent and impartial appraiser.” Ultimately, a court-appointed umpire considered six cost categories in dispute and adopted four of Owners’ estimates and two of Dakota’s. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Michael V. Pepe, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Mr. Pepe may be contacted at mvp@sdvlaw.com

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So You Want to Arbitrate? Better Make Sure Your Contract Covers All Bases

August 16, 2021 — Stephanie Nolan Deviney - ConsensusDocs
As a General Contractor, you may prefer to arbitrate any contractual disputes rather than engage in protracted litigation. Many Courts favor arbitration clauses and will enforce them if there is a sufficient reason to do so. However, there are several issues that a General Contractor should consider when including an arbitration clause in its construction agreement with its client. When an arbitration clause is not properly crafted, questions can arise as to who must arbitrate? Who decides whether to arbitrate? Who selects the arbitrator? What will the subject matter of the arbitration be? A look at a recent case in Pennsylvania highlights the need for properly crafted arbitration clauses. A Recent Case Highlights The Importance Of Arbitration Clauses In TEC Construction, LLC v. Greg Rich and Lora Rich filed in the Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, TEC Construction, LLC (“TEC”) and Greg and Lora Rich (the “Riches”), entered into a Construction Agreement with an arbitration clause. Specifically, the parties to the Construction Agreement, TEC and the Riches, agreed to arbitrate any disputes with the American Arbitration Association. Five subcontractors completed the work under the Construction Agreement but none of the subcontractors agreed to arbitrate. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Stephanie Nolan Deviney, Fox Rothschild LLP (ConsensusDocs)
Ms. Deviney may be contacted at sdeviney@foxrothschild.com

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Application of Frye Test to Determine Admissibility of Expert

April 03, 2019 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
Florida went back to the Frye test/standard, instead of the Daubert test utilized in federal court, to determine the admissibility of expert testimony. The Frye test is more favorable to plaintiffs because it applies when an expert renders an opinion based on new or novel scientific principles. See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Heron’s Landing Condominium Ass’n of Jacksonville, Inc., 44 Fla.L.Weekly D109b (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“The supreme court has described the Frye test as one in which the results of mechanical or scientific testing are not admissible unless the testing has developed or improved to the point where the experts in the field widely share the view that the results are scientifically reliable as accurate. Stated differently, under Frye, the proponent of the evidence has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence with the general acceptance of the underlying scientific principles and methodology. However, as stated, the Frye standard only applies when an expert attempts to render an opinion that is based upon new or novel scientific principles.”). In D.R. Horton, Inc., a condominium association sued the developer and general contractor (same entity) for construction defects that included claims in negligence, violation of building code, and breach of statutory warranties. The developer/general contractor moved in limine / to strike the association’s experts under, at the time, a Daubert analysis, but which became a Frye analysis during the pendency of the appeal. The expert opined as to construction defects and damage and the appropriate repairs – really, no different than any construction defect dispute, from what it appeared. The trial court denied the motion and during trial the experts testified and a sizable damages judgment was entered against the developer/contractor prompting the appeal. One issue on appeal was the admissibility of the expert’s opinion. The appellate court noted that a Frye analysis is not necessary because the experts used a scientifically reliable and peer-reviewed methodology. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

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A New Hope - You Now May Have Coverage for Punitive Damages in Connecticut

February 15, 2018 — Stella Szantova Giordano – SDV Blog

On December 19, 2017, the Connecticut Supreme Court released its decision in Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasiak. The decision is significant for two reasons: 1) it clarifies the amount of proof an insurer needs to determine whether an exclusion to coverage applies; and 2) it found that where an insurance policy expressly provides coverage for an intentional act such as false imprisonment, common-law punitive damages are also covered.

Underlying action

The underlying action proves that real life is often stranger than fiction. Ms. S worked as an office help for a construction company owned by Mr. P, which operated out of his home. Ms. S was working alone in the home office, when an armed, masked intruder entered the office, tied her hands, gagged and blindfolded her and, pointing a gun to her head, threatened to kill her family if she did not give him the combination to a safe in the home. As this was happening, Mr. P entered the office, unmasked the intruder, and discovered it was his lifelong friend. After Ms. S was untied, she asked to leave, but Mr. P told her to stay. She was not allowed to leave for several hours as Mr. P made her accompany him to an errand. Ms. S sued Mr. P for false imprisonment, among other things. The trial court awarded her compensatory and punitive damages. Insurance coverage for the underlying judgment is at the heart of the Pasiak case.

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Reprinted courtesy of Stella Szantova Giordano, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Ms. Szantova Giordano may be contacted at ssg@sdvlaw.com

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Massachusetts Business Court Addresses Defense Cost Allocation and Non-Cumulation Provisions in Long-Tail Context

March 06, 2022 — Eric B. Hermanson & Austin D. Moody - White and Williams
A business court in Massachusetts has weighed in on two key issues affecting allocation of insurance coverage for long-tail liabilities in Massachusetts. Specifically, in Crosby Valve LLC et al. v. OneBeacon America Insurance Company, et al.,[1] involving asbestos bodily injury claims, Judge Kenneth Salinger of the Suffolk County Business Litigation Session addressed:

• whether defense costs in long-tail cases were subject to the same pro rata allocation scheme the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) adopted to govern successively triggered insurers' indemnity obligations in Boston Gas Company v. Century Indemnity Company;[2] and
• whether “non-cumulation” provisions, like those addressed by the New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Viking Pump,[3] were consistent with this pro rata allocation methodology.

As to the first issue — i.e., allocation of defense costs — Judge Salinger declined to follow Boston Gas, and found the SJC’s holding in that case was limited to an insurers’ indemnity obligations. The SJC in Boston Gas had focused on the language of the policy insuring agreement, saying “[t]his policy applies to ... property damage ... which occurs anywhere during the policy period.” The SJC had also pointed to the policy definition of “occurrence” as “an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.”[4] Reprinted courtesy of Eric B. Hermanson, White and Williams LLP and Austin D. Moody, White and Williams Mr. Hermanson may be contacted at hermansone@whiteandwilliams.com Mr. Moody may be contacted at moodya@whiteandwilliams.com Read the court decision
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