Construction Litigation Roundup: “A Close Call?”
August 05, 2024 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyNot really, said a Florida state appellate court when a public construction project owner sued a defaulted general contractor after recovering from the general contractor’s surety.
The general contractor, Close Construction, entered into a contract for a lift station rehabilitation construction project with the City of Riviera Beach in Florida. During the course of the work the public owner terminated the contract, whereupon the GC and the owner brought claims against each other in court. A jury ultimately held against the general contractor and in favor of the public owner in the amount of approximately $1.9 million. The general contractor appealed.
On appeal, the general contractor noted that the public works surety which it was required by the contract to obtain for the project had hired another company to complete the work when the general contractor was terminated and had otherwise “settled with the District under its bond for $1,000,000.” Based on that settlement, the general contractor had moved, unsuccessfully, in the trial court for a post-trial setoff because the “settlement covered the same damages that the jury assessed” against the GC, and because the surety was “jointly and severally liable” with the GC – pursuant to the terms of the bond – for those damages. In essence, the general contractor sought to avoid having the public owner “obtain a double recovery.”
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
KY Mining Accident Not a Covered Occurrence Under Commercial General Liability Policy
December 04, 2018 —
Phillip A. Perez - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.In Am. Mining Ins. Co. v. Peters Farms, LLC,1 the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that a mining error was not a covered accident under a commercial general liability insurance policy. The central issue was whether an insured mining company’s unauthorized removal of minerals from a neighboring property was an “occurrence” that unintentionally caused “property damage” as defined by the mining company’s commercial general liability policy (“CGL Policy”).
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Phillip A. Perez, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Mr. Perez may be contacted at
pap@sdvlaw.com
Let’s Get Surety Podcast – #126 Building the Future: AI, Construction and Law
December 31, 2024 —
Denis Serkin - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.Denis Serkin, partner in P&A’s New York and New Jersey offices, joins the latest episode of the NASBP podcast “
Let’s Get Surety” to delve into the transformative impact of AI on the construction industry and construction law.
In this insightful discussion, Denis explores how AI tools are already enhancing design and supply chains and shares his vision for AI’s eventual integration across every facet of the industry.
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Denis Serkin, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.Mr. Serkin may be contacted at
dserkin@pecklaw.com
Kiewit-Turner Stops Work on VA Project—Now What?
December 31, 2014 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorThe Kiewit-Turner joint venture created to build the VA’s hospital near Denver stopped work on December 10 after the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals ruled that the VA breached the contract. Kiewit-Turner claims that the VA owes it over $100 million on the project. And, given the appeals board’s recent ruling entirely against the VA, the claim may get some traction.
This project has been plagued with problems from the beginning. One strange aspect of the project is the VA’s apparent unwillingness to incorporate value engineering or require the architects to redesign the project to fit within the budget. The latest budget was $582M, while the latest projections show that the project will cost more than $1 billion to complete.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
SCOTUS Opens Up Federal Courts to Land Owners
July 15, 2019 —
Wally Zimolong - Supplemental ConditionsFor nearly 36 years, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985) severely frustrated, if not all but foreclosed, a property owner’s right to bring a claim in federal court based on a regulatory taking. Under the Fifth Amendment, a property owner whose land has been “taken” by the government is entitled to just compensation. There are two types of takings direct or “inverse” or regulatory takings. A direct taking is where the government declares that it needs your land for public use and offers to pay you compensation. You might disagree with the amount offered – and that often is the case. But, a mechanism exists whereby a neutral third party – a condemnation board – will arrive at the compensation that is owed. On the other hand, an inverse condemnation or regulatory taking occurs when the government takes some action that restricts the use of the land in such a way as to severely impact it beneficial economic use. For example, if you own a strip of commercial property and intend to develop it and then the municipality comes along and suddenly changes the zoning classification of the parcel such that you can no longer develop it in a beneficial way, then you might have a regulatory takings case.
Under the Court’s Williamson County decision, property owners falling within the later category were required to exhaust state remedies before proceeding to federal court under a claim that their Fifth Amendment rights were violated. The problem with this is that, as the Supreme Court explained, it creates a Catch-22. If property owners exhaust their state remedies and the state remedies result in an unfavorable outcome, the federal court is powerless to overturn that decision under the doctrines of res judicata and the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.
Well, yesterday, the Court overturned Williamson County, in Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. _____ (2019). There the Court held unequivocally a “property owner has suffered a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights when the government takes his property without just compensation, and therefore may bring his claim in federal court under Section 1983 at that time.”
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Wally Zimolong, Zimolong LLCMr. Zimolong may be contacted at
wally@zimolonglaw.com
#7 CDJ Topic: Truck Ins. Exchange v. O'Mailia
December 30, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAccording to attorney
Tred R. Eyerly on a post on his
Insurance Law Hawaii blog, “The Montana Supreme Court determined there was no coverage for the insured due to a lack of property damage during the policy period.” Eyerly concluded, “Even if exposure to excessively high temperatures created a harmful condition during the policy period, the existence of that condition did not result in property damage to the water heater occurring during the policy period, and thus did not constitute an ‘occurrence’ as defined by the policy.”
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New Jersey Federal Court Examines And Applies The “j.(5)” Ongoing Operations Exclusion
October 07, 2019 —
Anthony L. Miscioscia and Timothy A. Carroll - White and Williams LLPIn PJR Construction of N.J. v. Valley Forge Insurance Company, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127973 (D.N.J. July 31, 2019) (PJR Construction), a New Jersey federal court held that the “j.(5)” “Ongoing Operations Exclusion” applied to bar coverage for property damage to property on which a construction company allegedly performed faulty work. The court’s opinion follows prior New Jersey state court precedent, including Ohio Casualty Insurance Company v. Island Pool & Spa, Inc., 12 A.3d 719 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (Island Pool), but also provides additional guidance on the elements which can make the Ongoing Operations Exclusion applicable to exclude coverage.
In PJR Construction, a commercial property owner engaged a construction company to build a 26,000 square foot swim club and related 3,000 square foot pavilion building in New Jersey. After about 75% of the work was completed, the property owner fired the construction company and denied it access to the property. The owner later sued the construction company in New Jersey state court alleging “shoddy workmanship” in, among other things, sealants, flashing, water resistant barriers, masonry and the handicap ramps. The construction company sought coverage from its CGL insurer, which denied coverage based on, among other things, the j.(5) Ongoing Operations Exclusion. After the denial of coverage, the company sued the insurer in New Jersey federal court seeking a declaration of coverage.
Reprinted courtesy of
Anthony L. Miscioscia, White and Williams LLP and
Timothy A. Carroll, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Miscioscia may be contacted at misciosciaa@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Carroll may be contacted at carrollt@whiteandwilliams.com
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Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 09, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFIn the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
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