Construction Problem Halts Wind Power Park
November 13, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFEngineers have yet to determine why a blade on a wind turbine broke at a wind power plant in Michigan, but as part of their investigation they are halting work on the final 10 turbines. The already completed 60 turbines have been taken out of operation. As a result, the Echo Wind Park is no longer generating power.
Scott Simons, a spokesperson for the project, said “we’re not going to put anyone or anything at risk until we get to the bottom of this.” However, Dennis Buda, the project manager, attributed the broken blade to a manufacturing defect. Construction was planned to end in November.
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Jury Awards 20 Million Verdict Against Bishop Abbey Homes
April 08, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFA Rockwall County, Texas “jury has awarded a $20.8 million verdict against a Dallas homebuilder for performing substandard work on a local family's home and refusing to accept responsibility,” according to a press release published in The Wall Street Journal.
The lawsuit alleged that “the defendants were aware that the site of the Hales' future Highpoint Lake Estates home had significant foundation defects before construction began. The Hales said Mr. Halsey later promised that his company would take responsibility by fixing the structural defects that arose after construction, but he reneged and refused to repair the problems.”
The award included “damages for the cost of repairs, lost value and additional penalties based on Mr. Halsey's actions and the defendants' ‘grossly negligent’ conduct, including violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The jury award includes attorneys' fees for the Hales' legal team.”
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Insurer’s Broad Duty to Defend in Oregon, and the Recent Ruling in State of Oregon v. Pacific Indemnity Company
January 02, 2024 —
Keith Sparks - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCOregon law mandates a broad duty to defend, requiring insurers to provide legal representation to their policyholders whenever there is a potential for coverage under the policy. The significance of this broad interpretation means that an insurer has a duty to defend an insured even in situations where the alleged facts only imply a covered claim, and even in situations where the underlying claim is ultimately not covered by the policy. The insurer’s duty to defend is triggered if the allegations of the complaint, reasonably interpreted, could result in the insured being held liable for damages covered by the policy. This is referred to as the “four-corners” rule; it is also sometimes referred to as the eight-corners rule (for the four corners of the complaint plus the four corners of the policy). Oregon’s adoption of a broad interpretation of the duty to defend affirmatively places the onus on insurers to err on the side of coverage.
This broad duty to defend is based on the principle that an insured should not have to bear the expense of defending a lawsuit that the insurer may ultimately have to pay for. The duty to defend is also important because it helps ensure that insureds have access to legal representation when faced with a lawsuit.
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Keith Sparks, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMr. Sparks may be contacted at
keith.sparks@acslawyers.com
SEC Approves New Securitization Risk Retention Rule with Broad Exception for Qualified Residential Mortgages
November 26, 2014 —
Neil P. Casey & Lori S. Smith – White and Williams LLPThe Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and five other federal agencies recently approved a joint rule (the “Risk Retention Rule”) mandating that sponsors of certain types of securitizations retain a minimum level of credit risk exposure in those transactions and prohibiting such sponsors from transferring or hedging against that retained credit risk.[i]The final Risk Retention Rule will be effective one year after its publication in the Federal Register for securitizations of residential mortgages, and two years after publication for securitizations of all other asset types. The SEC vote was 3-2, with sharp dissents from Commissioners Gallagher and Piwowar concluding that the adopting agencies had missed a prime opportunity to rein in risky mortgage lending practices that had precipitated the 2008 financial crisis.
Background
Following the meltdown of the securitization markets in 2007 (particularly subprime residential mortgage-backed securities), and the resulting global financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act mandated that the U.S. federal banking, securities and housing agencies adopt and implement rules to require sponsors of most new securitizations to retain not less than five percent of the credit risk of any assets that the securitizer, through the issuance of an asset-backed security, transfers, sells or conveys to a third party. It was thought that requiring securitization sponsors to keep “skin in the game” would align the interests of the sponsors with the interests of investors and thereby incentivize the sponsors to ensure the quality of the assets underlying the securitization through appropriate due diligence and underwriting procedures when selecting assets for securitization. Although the Dodd-Frank Act explicitly exempted securitizations of certain types of mortgage loans called “qualified residential mortgages” (or “QRMs”) from this risk retention requirement, it invited the rulemaking agencies to define that key term, provided that their definition could be no broader than the definition of “qualified mortgage”adopted by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act.[ii] In considering how to define QRM, the rulemaking agencies were directed by the Dodd-Frank Act to take into consideration “underwriting and product features that historical loan performance data indicate result in a lower risk of default.”[iii]
Reprinted courtesy of
Neil P. Casey, White and Williams LLP and
Lori S. Smith, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Casey may be contacted at caseyn@whiteandwilliams.com; Ms. Smith may be contacted at smithl@whiteandwilliams.com
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Coverage Denied Where Occurrence Takes Place Outside Coverage Territory
December 11, 2018 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe court held there was no coverage for construction defect claims that occurred outside the coverage territory. Foremost Signature Ins. Co. v. Silverboys, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154524 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2018).
Solo Design, LLC, a Miami-based design company, entered into a contract with Silverboys, LLC (Owner) to provide interior design services in conjunction with the renovation of the Owner's vacation home in the Bahamas. Solo retained Whittingham, a Bahamian architect, as a subcontractor to serve as project manager.
Owner sued Solo, Whittingham and others in Florida for breach of contract, fraud, conversion and negligence when the project did not go as planned. The underlying complaint alleged intentional misconduct, lying about qualifications and the progress of the project, submitting false invoices, requesting money for services that were not performed, etc. Owner alleged that the damages included: (a) the cost to repair substandard work; (b) loss of use of the home due to delay; and (c) overcharges for furnishings, contract fees, and expenses. The underlying complaint set forth only a few instances of physical injury to the home, including mold on the ceiling in the master shower, faulty millwork on the children's playroom bookshelf, and a defective front door and resysta facade.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
The 2023 Term of the Supreme Court: Administrative and Regulatory Law Rulings
December 03, 2024 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogIt is instructive to review the Supreme Court’s record in its most recent term, concentrating on regulatory and administrative law cases, which are usually back-burner issues. But not this term.
The Supreme Court began the current term on October 7, 2024. The Court has already chosen many cases to review in the new term, and it promises to be as interesting as the 2023 term, which produced several significant rulings affecting regulatory and administrative law, chiefly the Loper Bright Enterprises ruling. Loper Bright overturned the Court’s landmark administrative law ruling of Chevron, USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
The Background to Loper Bright
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided Chevron USA, Inc. v. National Resource Defense Council. (See 467 U.S. 839 (1984).) The unanimous decision, written by Justice Stevens, reversed then-D.C. Circuit Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s ruling that set aside EPA’s Clean Air Act “bubble policy,” which was intended to provide regulatory relief from certain EPA permitting requirements.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
The Preservation Maze
June 12, 2023 —
Sofya Uvaydov - Kahana & Feld LLPTo appropriately preserve an issue for appeal is frankly confusing to many attorneys due to differing rules depending on the issue or procedural posture (presumably why appellate attorneys are more commonly used during trial). On May 25th, the US Supreme Court handed down Dupree v. Younger, 598 U.S. __ (2023) clarifying preservation requirements from denied summary judgment orders. When a federal court denies summary judgment on sufficiency of evidence grounds, a party must raise the argument again post-trial to preserve it for appeal as per the Court’s prior ruling in Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180 (2011). When a court denies summary judgment on a purely legal issue, the Court unanimously held that the issue is preserved in an appeal from a final judgment without having to raise it again post-trial. The Supreme Court distinguished this from their prior rule in Ortiz by explaining that sufficiency or factual issues which were previously denied at summary judgment must be evaluated based on the totality of the evidence adduced at trial. A purely legal issue decided on summary judgment is not changed by factual evidence at trial.
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Sofya Uvaydov, Kahana & Feld LLPMs. Uvaydov may be contacted at
suvaydov@kahanafeld.com
Changes To Commercial Item Contracting
May 29, 2023 —
Marcos R. Gonzalez - ConsensusDocsThe FAR Council has recently published two changes to commercial item contracting that clarify the definition of commercial services and simplify commercial item determinations (“CIDs”) for contracting officers (“COs”). Since the 1990s, the federal government has encouraged the purchase of commercial items to ease the regulatory burden on vendors who have not previously conducted federal business, encourage innovation, and lower prices[
1]. These different objectives (cost savings, broadening markets, innovation) often have corollary policies; for example, vendors who are not accustomed to the regulatory burdens of government business are encouraged to enter the market by being exempted from a slew of regulations (found in standard commercial items clause FAR 52.212-4). As a result, the regulations applicable to commercial item contracting are those required by statute and executive orders in addition to generic commercial terms that may be tailored due to potential variation in commercial terms.[
2]
Commercial Products v. Commercial Services
The first change, in effect since November 2021 pursuant to the 2019 National Defense Authorization (“NDAA”), split the old definition of “commercial item” into two separate definitions: “commercial product” and “commercial service.”[
3] We are now blessed with the following definitions of commercial products and services, respectively:
Commercial product means—
(1) A product, other than real property, that is of a type customarily used by the general public or by nongovernmental entities for purposes other than governmental purposes, and–
(i) Has been sold, leased, or licensed to the general public; or
(ii) Has been offered for sale, lease, or license to the general public;
Reprinted courtesy of
Marcos R. Gonzalez, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
Mr. Gonzalez may be contacted at mgonzalez@pecklaw.com
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