General Contractor Supporting a Subcontractor’s Change Order Only for Owner to Reject the Change
December 09, 2019 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesThe opinion in Westchester Fire Ins. Co, LLC v. Kesoki Painting, LLC, 260 So.3d 546 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) leads to a worthy discussion because it involves a common scope of work occurrence on construction projects involving a general contractor and subcontractor. The contractor submits a subcontractor’s change order request to the owner and the owner rejects the change order. What happens next is a scope of work payment dispute between the general contractor and subcontractor. Yep, a common occurrence.
In this case, a general contractor hired a subcontractor to perform waterproofing and painting. A scope of work issue arose because the specifications did not address how the window gaskets should be cut and then sealed. The owner wanted the window gaskets cut at a 45-degree angle and the subcontractor claimed this resulted in increased extra work. The general contractor agreed and submitted a change order to the owner to cover these costs. The owner rejected the change order claiming it was part of the general contractor’s scope of work even though the cutting of window gaskets at a 45-degree angle was not detailed in the specifications.
After the subcontractor filed a suit against the general contractor’s payment bond surety, the project architect further rejected the change order because gasket cutting was part of the specification requirements. (Duh! What else was the architect going to say? It was not going to concede there was an omission that resulted in a change order to the owner, right?)
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
What Happens When a Secured Creditor Files a Late Claim in an Equity Receivership?
September 28, 2017 —
Ben Reeves - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogPitting a receivership court’s inherent equitable powers against pre-existing property rights can lead to some pretty interesting questions. In SEC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 848 F.3d 1339, 1343-44 (11th Cir. 2017), the Eleventh Circuit recently examined whether a district court’s inherent authority to establish a claims submission process allowed the court to extinguish a security interest in real property based solely upon an untimely proof of claim. Much to the relief of secured creditors, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred, as a matter of law, by extinguishing the creditor’s pre-existing property rights under those circumstances.
Introduction
Equity vests a district court with “‘broad powers and wide discretion to determine relief in an equity receivership.’” Wells Fargo, 848 F.3d at 1343-44 (quoting SEC v. Elliot, 953 F.2d 1560, 1566 (11th Cir. 1992)). These powers include: (i) establishing procedures for the submission of claims to a receiver, and (ii) setting a claims bar date. Id. at 1344 (citing SEC v. Tipco, Inc., 554 F.2d 710, 711 (5th Cir. 1977)).
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Ben Reeves, Snell & WilmerMr. Reeves may be contacted at
breeves@swlaw.com
Massachusetts Business Court Addresses Defense Cost Allocation and Non-Cumulation Provisions in Long-Tail Context
March 06, 2022 —
Eric B. Hermanson & Austin D. Moody - White and WilliamsA business court in Massachusetts has weighed in on two key issues affecting allocation of insurance coverage for long-tail liabilities in Massachusetts. Specifically, in Crosby Valve LLC et al. v. OneBeacon America Insurance Company, et al.,
[1] involving asbestos bodily injury claims, Judge Kenneth Salinger of the Suffolk County Business Litigation Session addressed:
- whether defense costs in long-tail cases were subject to the same pro rata allocation scheme the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) adopted to govern successively triggered insurers' indemnity obligations in Boston Gas Company v. Century Indemnity Company;[2] and
- whether “non-cumulation” provisions, like those addressed by the New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Viking Pump,[3] were consistent with this pro rata allocation methodology.
As to the first issue — i.e., allocation of defense costs — Judge Salinger declined to follow Boston Gas, and found the SJC’s holding in that case was limited to an insurers’ indemnity obligations. The SJC in Boston Gas had focused on the language of the policy insuring agreement, saying “[t]his policy applies to ... property damage ... which occurs anywhere during the policy period.” The SJC had also pointed to the policy definition of “occurrence” as “an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.”
[4]
Reprinted courtesy of
Eric B. Hermanson, White and Williams LLP and
Austin D. Moody, White and Williams
Mr. Hermanson may be contacted at hermansone@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Moody may be contacted at moodya@whiteandwilliams.com
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Understanding the Miller Act
February 26, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFJohn P. Ahlers of Ahlers & Cressman PLLC, explained who is covered by the Miller Act in regards to Federal public works projects on the firm’s blog. Ahlers stated that “[t]he Miller Act requires that all general contractors post payment bonds on contracts in excess of $25,000.00.”
In his blog post, Ahlers goes over coverage and the distinction between subcontractor and supplier. Ahlers commented, “While, at first glance, it may seem fairly simple to sort out who is and who is not covered by the Miller Act payment bond, the analysis can at times be factually and legally complex. This is an area that, if faced, the contractor should seek legal advice of an experienced construction lawyer before jumping to conclusions.”
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South Carolina Court of Appeals Diverges from Damico Opinion, Sending Recent Construction Defects Cases to Arbitration
October 24, 2023 —
Laura Paris Paton - Gordon Rees Construction Law BlogCould the latest opinion from the South Carolina Court of Appeals be the distant ringing of a death knell for runaway construction defects verdicts? On the heels of the Damico ruling earlier this year, the courts have issued several opinions distinguishing various arbitration agreements from the one analyzed in Damico and have sent subsequent cases to arbitration.
This summer, the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals compelled arbitration in Cleo Sanders v. Savannah Highway Automotive Company, et al. Appellate Case No. 2021-000137 / Opinion No. 28168 (petition for rehearing pending) and Joseph Abruzzo v. Bravo Media Productions, et al. Appellate Case No. 2020-001095 / Opinion 6004. Now, in the matter of Jonathan Mart, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Respondent, v. Great Southern Homes, Inc., Appellant, Appellate Case No. 2018-001598, the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s order denying a homebuilder’s motion to dismiss and compelled arbitration in this action, which was brought by the homeowner, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated homeowners.
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Laura Paris Paton, Gordon Rees Scully MansukhaniMs. Paton may be contacted at
lpaton@grsm.com
NY Supreme Court Rules City Not Liable for Defective Sidewalk
February 12, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFEileen N. Fanning sued the city of Watertown, New York after incurring injuries from a fall on a sidewalk on Court Street, according to the Watertown Daily Times. A state Supreme Court judge dismissed the lawsuit.
According to Fanning as reported by the Watertown Daily Times, the plaintiff “fell on an uneven section of sidewalk” and “suffered multiple broken bones in her hand, as well as neurological damage to her arm, among other injuries.” She claimed that the damage is permanent. The lawsuit involved Purcell Construction (the landscape pavers), Neighbors of Watertown (a renovation project), and the city of Watertown.
The judge ruled that “Neighbors of Watertown was not liable for her injuries because the agency neither owned nor controlled the property where the injuries occurred and therefore ‘did not owe a duty of care’ to users of the walk as it was not responsible for the sidewalk’s maintenance.” The city was not held liable “because it had received no prior written notice about the alleged defective condition of the property.” Furthermore, the judge “agreed with Purcell Construction’s claim that the area claimed to be defective is ‘one little section’ of sidewalk ‘over which the public walked’ for nearly 20 years.”
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“Wait! Do You Have All Your Ducks in a Row?” Filing of a Certificate of Merit in Conjunction With a Complaint
January 13, 2020 —
Rahul Gogineni - The Subrogation StrategistIn Barrett v. Berry Contr. L.P., No. 13-18-00498-CV, 2019 Tex. LEXIS 8811, the Thirteenth District Court of Appeals of Texas considered, among other things, the procedural timing requirements of filing a certificate of merit in conjunction with a complaint. The court concluded that the proper reading of the statute requires a plaintiff to file a certificate of merit with the first complaint naming the defendant as a party.
In Barrett, after sustaining injuries while working at a refinery, David Barrett (Barrett) filed suit against Berry Contracting, LP and Elite Piping & Civil, Ltd. on July 6, 2016. In Barrett’s first amended complaint, which he filed on August 23, 2016, Barrett added Govind Development, LLC (Govind) as another defendant. Barrett subsequently filed a second amended complaint (omitting Govind) and, on December 27, 2017, shortly before the statute of limitations ran, a third amended complaint (reasserting claims against Govind). On January 28, 2018, after the statute of limitations period ran, Barrett filed a certificate of merit. Govind filed a motion to dismiss the claim, asserting that Barrett violated the statute that required a certificate of merit to be filed with the complaint, Tex. Civ. Prac & Rem. Code §150.002.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §150.002(a) states,
In any action or arbitration proceeding for damages arising out of the provision of professional services by a licensed or registered professional, a claimant shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of a third-party licensed architect, licensed professional engineer, registered landscape architect or registered professional land surveyor…
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Rahul Gogineni, White and Williams LLPMr. Gogineni may be contacted at
goginenir@whiteandwilliams.com
Court Grants Partial Summary Judgment on Conversion Claim Against Insurer
February 01, 2023 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiAlthough the court was incredulous that the parties were disputing the possession of a gate opener allegedly damaged in a lightning strike, it granted the insured's motion for partial summary judgment finding the insurer had converted the gate opener. Privratsky v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins Co., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196002 (D. Haw. Oct. 27, 2022). (Full disclosure, our office is co-counsel for the insured).
Mr. Privratsky alleged his home on Maui was struck by lightning which caused an electrical surge. The home and personal property were damaged. The alleged cost of repair work at one point was as much as $325,000. A claim was submitted under a homeowner's policy issued by Liberty Mutual. Liberty paid for only some of the damage. Privratsky filed suit alleging three causes of action for: (1) declaratory judgment that the losses were covered by the policy issued by Liberty; (2) bad faith; and (3) conversion of personal property, namely, the damaged gate operator.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com