Lawsuits over Roof Dropped
December 04, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFAn Iowa roofing contractor has dropped its lawsuit over a contract to re-roof a condominium complex. The condominium association has dropped its counterclaim against the roofer. Hansel Construction alleged that the Harbourage Owners Association failed to fulfill the contract’s provisions, which prevented Hansel Construction from fulfilling its contract. Further, Hansel alleged that it had expenses, losses, and damages, as a result of Harbourage’s actions.
In response, Harbourage sued James Hansel. Now, both lawsuits have been dismissed by the parties.
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Federal Judge Refuses to Limit Coverage and Moves Forward with Policyholder’s Claims Against Insurer and Broker
December 07, 2020 —
Michael S. Levine & Casey L. Coffey - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogOn November 10, 2020, a New York federal judge dismissed an insurer’s counterclaims seeking to cap its exposure under a $15 million sublimit and an order estopping the policyholder from pursuing any additional amounts.
In February 2017, Plaintiff Pilkington North America, Inc. (Pilkington), suffered between $60 and $100 million in damage from a tornado that struck its glass manufacturing factory in Illinois. Pilkington sought coverage for its loss under a commercial property and business interruption policy issued by Defendant Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Company (MSI). Pilkington also claimed its insurance broker, Aon Risk Services Central, Inc. (Aon), is liable for faulty advice provided while brokering the policy. Aon’s negligence allegedly gave way to MSI’s fraudulent revision of the insurance policy, which caused the losses from the tornado to not be fully compensable.
Pilkington’s fraud and faulty brokering claims stem from MSI’s revision of an endorsement contained in the policy. The revision changed the wording of a windstorm sublimit. Allegedly, Aon was informed by MSI of the changes and failed to inform Pilkington that the revision would substantially reduce coverage for windstorms, including tornados.
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Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews KurthMr. Levine may be contacted at
mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Notice of Completion Determines Mechanics Lien Deadline
August 13, 2019 —
William L. Porter - Porter Law GroupThe California Mechanics Lien is one of the most valuable collection devices available to contractors, subcontractors and suppliers who are unpaid for work performed and materials supplied in relation to a California Private Works project. The mechanics lien allows the claimant to sell the property where the work was performed in order to obtain payment. The process starts with the recording of a mechanics lien in the office of the County Recorder where the property in question is located. As noted below, certain deadlines must be met.
Know Your Mechanics Lien Filing Deadlines Generally
Working within deadlines is absolutely crucial to preserving mechanics lien rights under California law. The deadlines differ, depending on whether you are a ”direct” contractor, also known as “original” or “prime” contractor (one who contracts directly with the property owner) or a subcontractor or material supplier. The primary differences are that, the direct contractor is only required to serve the “Preliminary Notice” on the Construction Lender (Civil Code section 8200-8216), whereas the subcontractor and material supplier must serve not only the Construction Lender, but also the Owner and Direct Contractor (see Civil Code section 8200(e)). Another difference is that a direct contractor has a longer period of time in which to record a mechanics lien after a valid “notice of completion” or a “notice of cessation” has been recorded (Civil Code sections 8180-8190), (60 days for original contractors as compared to 30 days for subcontractors and suppliers – See Civil Code sections 8412 and 8414). A further general description of the rules is as follows:
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William L. Porter, Porter Law GroupMr. Porter may be contacted at
bporter@porterlaw.com
“A No-Lose Proposition?”
October 07, 2024 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyA Miller Act payment bond surety and its principal general contractor both sued in federal court in New Orleans by a project subcontractor sought to compel arbitration the claims against both contractor and surety based on an indisputably enforceable arbitration clause in the subcontract. This was urged to avoid separate actions against the contractor (arbitration) and its surety (litigation), even though the surety was not a party to the subcontract and, therefore, not a party to the arbitration clause.
In the face of the lack of an express agreement to arbitrate, the contractor and contractor argued that “no federal statute or policy prohibits all of Plaintiff’s claims from proceeding to arbitration….” Additionally, those parties urged that the surety should be allowed to affirmatively compel arbitration because the surety “would otherwise have the ability to assert the right to compel arbitration as a defense….”
The New Orleans federal district court was unpersuaded:
“[D]istrict courts within this circuit have recognized that ‘Miller Act claims by a subcontractor for unpaid labor and materials are separate and distinct from those for general breach of contract… [and] arbitration and Miller Act suits, are not, per se, inconsistent with one another.’…[A]bsent express contractual intent to subject Miller Act claims to arbitration, the court [will] not force the parties to arbitrate claims against nonparties to the contract at issue…. [C]laims against a surety, which was a non-signatory to the contract, would not be subject to arbitration without any contractual basis to do so.”
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
Do Construction Contracts and Fraud Mix After All?
October 27, 2016 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsOn several occasions here at Construction Law Musings, I’ve discussed the fact that, with a few exceptions, fraud claims and written construction contract based claims do not mix. One of the exceptions to the so called “economic loss rule” that would seem to preclude both fraud and contract claims in the same lawsuit is where fraud is used to induce the contract in the first place. This exception would only apply where an independent duty, wholly outside of the duties created by the contract, is properly plead and proven to the court. For the same reason, namely a separate duty outside of the contract, the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (“VCPA”) may allow for an exception that would allow a cause of action under this statute.
Up until recently, the courts of Virginia have used these exceptions sparingly. However, the recent Loudoun County, VA Circuit Court opinion in Interbuild, Inc. v. Sayers (opinion also found at Virginia Lawyers Weekly) may signal a broadening of these exceptions. In the Interbuild case, the Court considered a claim for fraud in the inducement and breach of the VCPA. The basic facts plead by the plaintiffs were that Interbuild induced them into the contract through statements that it had been an established business since 1981, the project did not require a building permit, it had obtained all necessary subcontractor prices and would provide full-time project supervision, the project would be completed within 16 weeks, 4000 PSI concrete would be used for the project and that the project would be located in the agreed-upon area depicted and that they reasonably relied on these representations in deciding to enter into the contract to build their recreational facility.
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Christopher G. Hill, The Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms Judgment in Landis v. Fannin Builders
April 20, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFThe Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in Landis v. William Fannin Builders. Landis contracted Fannin Builders to build their home. The case involved staining problems on the T1-11 siding chosen by the plaintiffs.
After a year and a half of discussion on how to resolve the problem of uneven staining on the siding, Landis filed suit “against Fannin Builders, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of the express limited warranty, and violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”). Fannin Builders, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against 84 Lumber, alleging claims for breach of contract and indemnification. With the trial court’s leave, Fannin Builders also later amended its answer to add a counterclaim against appellees for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. In the counterclaim, Fannin Builders alleged that appellees still owed it $3,908.98 for the construction of appellees’ home.”
“In its decision, the trial court found in appellees’ favor on their breach of contract claim and against appellees on their claims for breach of the express limited warranty and violation of the OCSPA. Additionally, the trial court found in Fannin Builders’ favor on its counterclaim for breach of contract and against Fannin Builders on its third-party claims for breach of contract and indemnity. The trial court determined that appellees’ damages amounted to $66,906.24, and after setting off the $3,908.98 that appellees owed Fannin Builders under the construction contract, the trial court awarded appellees $62,997.26. The trial court reduced its decision to judgment on May 18, 2010.”
Fannin Builders appealed this judgment and assigned the following errors:
[1.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant Breached its Contract with Appellees when it provided a Semi-Transparent Oil-Based Stain that Simply did not Meet their Approval.
[a.] The Contract does not Contain a Satisfaction Clause.
[b.] Even if the Court Implies a Satisfaction Clause, the Court Should Apply an Objective Standard.
[2.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Failing to Consider Appellant’s Right to Cure.
[3.] The Trial Court committed Reversible Error by not Assessing Damages Using “Diminished Value Standard,” and by Creating a Remedy that Constitutes Economic Waste.
[4.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant is Barred from Seeking Indemnification When 84 [Lumber] Never Fulfilled its Obligations Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement Entered on August 2, 2005.
In response to the first assigned error, the Court of Appeals stated: “Because the failure to provide siding of a uniform color, not appellees’ displeasure, breached the contract, we reject Fannin Builders’ contention that the trial court implied a satisfaction clause into the contract and found a breach of that clause. Accordingly, we overrule Fannin Builders’ first assignment of error.”
The Court of Appeals overruled the second assignment of error and provided the following reasoning: “Although Fannin Builders depends upon a term of the limited warranty for its right to cure, the trial court concluded that no breach of the limited warranty occurred. Fannin Builders breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIA’s Quality Standards. Consequently, the limited warranty does not apply to this case, and thus, it does not prevent appellees’ recovery of damages.”
The Appeals Court found “the trial court’s award of damages” was “both reasonable and supported by competent, credible evidence,” and therefore concluded “that the trial court did not err in setting appellees’ damages at $62,997.26.” The Fannin Builders third assignment of error was overruled.
The fourth and final assignment of error was also overruled by the Court of Appeals. “While Fannin Builders correctly asserts that 84 Lumber never installed the replacement siding, it ignores the fact that it ordered 84 Lumber to remove the replacement siding from appellees’ property. Thus, Fannin Builders precluded 84 Lumber from completely performing under the August 2, 2005 letter agreement. […] Consequently, Fannin Builders cannot now claim that the letter agreement is unenforceable or that it is entitled to indemnification from 84 Lumber. Because Fannin Builders assumed all liability for the defective siding in the letter agreement, it is responsible for appellees’ damages.”
James A. Zitesman, Columbus, Ohio Business Attorney, compared the case to Jones v. Centex (Ohio App. 2010), which had a different verdict:
“The common thread is the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the Jones case, the Court found that the buyers had in fact waived all implied warranties, including the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the contract between Jones and Centex, the builder stated that it “…would not sell the property to Purchasers without this waiver.” Probably should have been a sign to the buyers.
In the Landis case, the Court stated, “Contracts for the future construction of a residence include a duty, implied by law, that the builder must perform its work in a workmanlike manner.” The Court gave significant weight to the concept of the implied warranty of good workmanship. The builder relied upon the BIA Warranty which limits builders’ liability and exposure to legal issues. The trial court concluded there was no breach of the limited warranty, rather the builder “breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIAs Quality Standards.”
The Supreme Court of Ohio has accepted the Jones v. Centex Homes case for review.
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Ensuing Loss Provision Found Ambiguous
April 25, 2012 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiAfter the insurer denied coverage in a homeowner’s policy for construction defects under various exclusions, the court found the ensuing loss provision was ambiguous.Kesling v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38857 (D. Colo. March 22, 2012).
After purchasing a home from the sellers, the insureds noticed problems with the deck of the home. Massive cracking appeared, causing lifting and leaking on the deck and water running through the exterior foundation wall into the home. There was also damage to the roof and crawlspace.
The insureds had a homeowner’s policy with American Family, which covered accidental direct physical loss to property described in the policy unless the loss was excluded. They requested coverage for "conditions, defects and damages." American Family denied coverage because wear and tear, as well as damage to foundations, floors and roofs were excluded. The policy did provide coverage, however, for "any resulting loss to property described . . . above, not excluded or excepted in this policy.
When coverage was denied, the insureds sued American Family.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
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Hirer Not Liable Under Privette Doctrine Where Hirer Had Knowledge of Condition, but not that Condition Posed a Concealed Hazard
December 11, 2023 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogThe Privette doctrine, so-called because of a case of the same name,
Privette v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.4th 698 (1993), provides a rebuttable presumption that a hirer is not liable for workplace injuries sustained by employees of hired parties. In other words, if a property owner hires a contractor, and one of the contractor’s employees gets injured while working on the property, there is a rebuttable presumption that the property owner is not liable for the employee’s injuries, the rationale being that because the contractor is required to carry workers’ compensation insurance the contractor is in the better position to absorb losses incurred a workplace injury.
There are, however, two widely recognized exceptions to the Privette doctrine. The first, is the Hooker exception, again named after a case of the same name,
Hooker v. Department of Transportation, 27 Cal.th 198 (2002), which provides that a hirer is liable for injuries to a hired parties’ employees, if the hirer retained control over the work being performed, negligently exercised that control, and the negative exercise of that control contributed to the employee’s injury.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
