Floating Cities May Be One Answer to Rising Sea Levels
August 07, 2022 —
Adam Minter - BloombergThanks to climate change, sea levels are lapping up against coastal cities and communities. In an ideal world, efforts would have already been made to slow or stop the impact. The reality is that climate mitigation remains difficult, and the 40% of humanity living within 60 miles of a coast will eventually need to adapt.
One option is to move inland. A less obvious option is to move offshore, onto a floating city.
It sounds like a fantasy, but it could real, later if not sooner. Last year, Busan, South Korea's second-largest city, signed on to host a prototype for the world's first floating city. In April, Oceanix Inc., the company leading the project, unveiled a blueprint.
Representatives of SAMOO Architects & Engineers Co., one of the floating city's designers and a subsidiary of the gigantic Samsung Electronics Co., estimate that construction could start in a "year or two," though they concede the schedule might be aggressive. “It's inevitable,” Itai Madamombe, co-founder of Oceanix, told me over tea in Busan. “We will get to a point one day where a lot of people are living on water.”
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Adam Minter, Bloomberg
New York Court of Appeals Finds a Proximate Cause Standard in Additional Insured Endorsements
June 15, 2017 —
Geoffrey Miller - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.In The Burlington Insurance Company v. NYC Transit Authority, et al., No. 2016-00096, the New York Court of Appeals issued a landmark decision with regard to the meaning of “caused, in whole or in part, by” in the additional insured context. In a split decision, the court rejected Burlington Insurance Company’s argument that the language implied a “negligence” standard, but held that coverage was provided to the additional insured only where the named insured’s acts or omissions were the proximate cause of the injury:
While we [the majority] agree with the dissent that interpreting the phrases differently does not compel the conclusion that the endorsement incorporates a negligence requirement, it does compel us to interpret ‘caused, in whole or in part’ to mean more than ‘but for’ causation. That interpretation, coupled with the endorsement’s application to acts or omissions that result in liability, supports our conclusion that proximate cause is required here.[1]
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Geoffrey Miller, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Mr. Miller may be contacted at
gjm@sdvlaw.com
Colorado’s Federal District Court Finds Carriers Have Joint and Several Defense Duties
July 31, 2013 —
Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiAn issue that has plagued builders in Colorado construction defect litigation is the difficulty of getting additional insured carriers to fully participate in the builder’s defense, oftentimes leaving the builder to fund its own defense during the course of the litigation.
Many additional insurers offer a variety of positions regarding why they will not pay for fees and costs during the course of a lawsuit. Some insurers argue that, until after trial, it is impossible to determine its proper share of the defense, and therefore cannot make any payments until the liability is determined as to all of the potentially contributing policies. (This is often referred to as the “defense follows indemnity” approach.) Others may make an opening contribution to defense fees and costs, but fall silent as fees and costs accumulate. In such an event, the builder may be forced to fund all or part of its own defense, while the uncooperative additional insured carrier waits for the end of the lawsuit or is faced with other legal action before it makes other contributions.
Recent orders in two, currently ongoing, U.S. District Court cases provide clarity on the duty to defend in Colorado, holding that multiple insurers’ duty to defend is joint and several. The insured does not have to go without a defense while the various insurers argue amongst themselves as to which insurer pays what share.
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Tred EyerlyTred Eyerly can be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
The Washington Supreme Court Rules that a Holder of a Certificate of Insurance Is Entitled to Coverage
March 09, 2020 —
Sally Kim & Kyle Silk-Eglit - Gordon & Rees Insurance Coverage Law BlogThe Washington courts have historically found that the purpose of a certificate of insurance is to advise others as to the existence of insurance, but that a certificate is not the equivalent of an insurance policy. However, the Washington State Supreme Court recently held that, under certain circumstances, an insurer may be bound by the representations that its insurance agent makes in a certificate of insurance as to the additional insured (“AI”) status of a third party. Specifically, in T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co. of America, the Supreme Court found that where an insurance agent had erroneously indicated in a certificate of insurance that an entity was an AI under a liability policy, that entity would be considered as an AI based upon the agent’s apparent authority, despite boilerplate disclaimer language contained in the certificate. T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co. of America, Slip. Op. No. 96500-5, 2019 WL 5076647 (Wash. Oct. 10, 2019).
In this case, Selective Insurance Company of America (“Selective”) issued a liability policy to a contractor who had been retained by T-Mobile Northeast (“T-Mobile NE”) to construct a cell tower. The policy conferred AI status to a third party if the insured-contractor had agreed in a written contract to add the third party as an AI to the policy. Under the terms of the subject construction contract, the contractor was required to name T-Mobile NE as an AI under the policy. T-Mobile NE was therefore properly considered as an AI because the contractor was required to provide AI coverage to T-Mobile NE under the terms of their contract.
However, over the course of approximately seven years, Selective’s own insurance agent issued a series of certificates of insurance that erroneously identified a different company, “T-Mobile USA”, as an AI under the policy. This was in error because there was no contractual requirement that T-Mobile USA be added as an AI. Nonetheless, the certificates stated that T-Mobile USA was an AI, and they were signed by the agent as Selective’s “authorized representative.”
Reprinted courtesy of
Sally S. Kim, Gordon & Rees and
Kyle J. Silk-Eglit, Gordon & Rees
Ms. Kim may be contacted at sallykim@grsm.com
Mr. Silk-Eglit may be contacted at ksilkeglit@grsm.com
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No Coverage For Construction Defects When Complaint Alleges Contractual Damages
September 01, 2011 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe underlying plaintiff’s allegations contended the contractor was in breach of contract for construction defects caused in building her home. Accordingly, the court found no coverage.See Nat’l Builders and Contractors Ins. Co. v. Slocum, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81694 (S.D. Miss. July 26, 2011).
Slocum Construction LLC sold a home it built to Laura Peterson. Subsequently, Peterson filed suit, alleging a breach of the contract and seeking rescission and cancellation of the contract. Peterson further alleged at least thirty-three specific defects in the construction of the house.
Slocum tendered to its insurer, National Builders and Contractors Insurance Company (NBCI). NBCI filed suit for a declaratory judgment.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
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Colorado’s New Construction Defect Law Takes Effect in September: What You Need to Know
November 21, 2017 —
Jesse Witt - The Witt Law FirmOriginally published by CDJ on September 7, 2017
Colorado’s new construction defect law officially takes effect this month. Although HB 17-1279 was passed in May, the statutory text provides that it only applies “with respect to events and circumstances occurring on or after September 1, 2017.” With that date now upon us, practitioners should be mindful of the law’s new requirements.
The law applies to any lawsuit wherein a homeowner association files a construction defect action on behalf of two or more of its members. “Construction defect action” is defined broadly to include any claims against construction professionals relating to deficiencies in design or construction of real property. Before an association may commence such an action, its board must follow several steps.
First, the board must deliver notice of the potential construction defect action to all homeowners and the affected construction professionals at their last known addresses. This requirement does not apply to construction professionals identified after the notice has been mailed, or to construction professionals joined in a previously-approved lawsuit. The notice must include a description of the alleged construction defects with reasonable specificity, the relief sought, a good-faith estimate of the benefits and risks involved, and a list of mandatory disclosures concerning assessments, attorney fees, and the marketability of units affected by construction defects. The notice must also call a meeting of all homeowners. The notice should be sent to the construction professionals at least five days before the homeowners.
Reprinted courtesy of
Jesse Howard Witt, Acerbic Witt
Mr. Witt may be contacted at www.witt.law
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Woodbridge II and the Nuanced Meaning of “Adverse Use” in Hostile Property Rights Cases in Colorado
November 23, 2020 —
Luke Mecklenburg - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogEarlier this year, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued an opinion addressing at length “whether the requirement that the use be ‘adverse’ in the adverse possession context is coextensive with adverse use in the prescriptive easement context.” See Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34 (Woodbridge II), ¶ 2, cert. granted, No. 20SC292, 2020 WL 5405376 (Colo. Sept. 8, 2020). As detailed below, the Woodbridge II court concluded that the meanings of “adverse” in these two contexts are not coextensive—while “hostility” in the adverse possession context requires a claim of exclusive ownership of the property, a party claiming a prescriptive easement is only required to “show a nonpermissive or otherwise unauthorized use of property that interfered with the owner’s property interests.” Thus, the Woodbridge II court reasoned a claimants’ acknowledgement or recognition of an owner’s title alone is insufficient to defeat “adverse use” in the prescriptive easement context.
This significant ruling is at odds with a prior division’s broad statement, while considering a prescriptive easement claim, that “[i]n general, when an adverse occupier acknowledges or recognizes the title of the owner during the occupant’s claimed prescriptive period, the occupant interrupts the prescriptive use.” See Trask v. Nozisko, 134 P.3d 544, 553 (Colo. App. 2006). Perhaps for that reason, Woodbridge II is currently pending certiorari review before the Colorado Supreme Court in a case that should provide some much-needed clarity on what constitutes “adverse use” in the context of a prescriptive easement. As we await the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision, I thought it worthwhile to provide a brief analysis of the Woodbridge II court’s deep dive into the nuances of “adverse use” in this field of Colorado law.
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Luke Mecklenburg, Snell & WilmerMr. Mecklenburg may be contacted at
lmecklenburg@swlaw.com
Occurrence Definition Trends Analyzed
August 27, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFIn The Legal Intelligencer, Gordon S. Woodward, partner at Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis, analyzed the changing definition of occurrence in the insurance industry, and more specifically in Pennsylvania.
Woodward begins by going over “the traditional view of occurrence as it relates to coverage for faulty products or defective work,” in which “the existence of a defect in a product or an event in which a defective product injures only itself does not constitute an occurrence.” However, he stated that “there is a growing trend in favor of finding that an occurrence can include the circumstance where defective work results in damage only to the work or product itself (so long as the damage was neither intended nor expected by the insured).” Woodward also explained Pennsylvania developments and legislative changes (such as a South Carolina statute).
These changes need to be monitored, Woodward stated, “as they have the potential to dramatically alter the coverage landscape from one jurisdiction to the next.”
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