NAHB Reports on U.S. Jobs Created from Home Building
May 05, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe National Association of Home Builders’ Eye on Housing reported that for every “average single-family home” built in the U.S., almost three full-time jobs are created.
“A substantial share of this is employment for construction workers,” according to the NAHB article. “But also included is employment in firms that manufacture building products, transport and sell products, and provide professional services to home builders and buyers (e.g., architects and real estate agents).”
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
SB800 Not the Only Remedy for Construction Defects
October 01, 2013 —
CDJ STAFF“We anticipate an increase in residential construction defect litigation in response to this ruling,” David Frenznic, a construction defect lawyer at Wilke, Fleury, Hoffelt, Gould & Birney LLP told the Central Valley Business Times. Mr. Frenznic was responding to an August ruling by the California Court of Appeals that found that SB800 does not create the only remedy for homeowners with construction defects.
“Homeowners who suffer actual damage as a result of construction defects have a choice of remedies,” said Mr. Frenznick. SB800 established a shorter statute of limitations for construction defect claims, however, “the ruling makes clear that common law claims are still governed by the longer statues of limitations.”
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Orchestrating Bias: Arbitrator’s Undisclosed Membership in Philharmonic Group with Pauly Shore’s Attorney Not Grounds to Reverse Award in Real Estate Dispute
June 21, 2017 —
Lyndsey Torp - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogThe California court of appeal recently issued an unpublished decision in Knispel v. Shore, 2017 WL 2492535, affirming a judgment confirming an arbitration award in a real estate dispute involving Pauly Shore. The court of appeal held that the arbitrator’s failure to disclose her membership in the Los Angeles Lawyers Philharmonic Group with the attorney representing Pauly was not grounds to overturn the judgment.
The underlying arbitration involved a dispute between Michael Scott Shore, on the one hand, and his brother, Pauly, among others, on the other hand, regarding certain residential property located on Sunset Boulevard near The Comedy Store in West Hollywood (owned and operated by their mother, Mitzi Shore). The parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute before Judge Aviva K. Bobb (Ret.) of the Alternative Resolution Center. Judge Bobb issued an award in favor of Pauly, and he petitioned the trial court to affirm the award. Michael opposed, contending the arbitrator failed to disclose that she and Pauly’s attorney had both been members of the Lawyers Philharmonic, for which they had been practicing and performing together since November 2010.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Lyndsey Torp, Snell & WilmerMs. Torp may be contacted at
ltorp@swlaw.com
California Supreme Court Raises the Bar on Dangerous Conditions on Public Property Claims
February 16, 2016 —
Roger Hughes – California Construction Law BlogEarlier we wrote about the affirmative defense of “design immunity” which can be used by public entities to shield themselves from personal injury claims dangerous conditions on public property. Under the design immunity doctrine a public entity can avoid liability for dangerous conditions on public property if it can show:
1.A causal relationship between the plan or design and the accident;
2.Discretionary approval of the plan or design prior to construction; and
3.Substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of the plan or design.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Roger Hughes, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Hughes may be contacted at
rhughes@wendel.com
Challenging and Defending a California Public Works Stop Payment Notice: Affidavit vs. Counter-Affidavit Process
October 21, 2019 —
William L. Porter - Porter Law GroupOne of the most effective collection procedures available to subcontractors and suppliers to California Construction projects is the “stop payment notice” procedure found under California Civil Code sections 9350 – 9364. Under this procedure, the unpaid subcontractor or supplier may serve the stop payment notice on the public entity and the direct or “prime” contractor and cause the public entity to withhold from the direct contractor 125% of the funds identified in the stop payment notice. Thereafter, funds will not generally be released unless the parties reach a settlement agreement or the issue is decided through litigation, arbitration or mediation. There is however an alternative procedure available to direct contractors to expedite the determination of whether a stop payment notice is valid and to possibly obtain an early release of the funds withheld by the public entity. This “summary proceeding” process could result in release of funds to the direct contractor in less than 30 days. The summary proceeding can also be challenged by the unpaid subcontractor or supplier. All public works contractors, subcontractors and suppliers should be aware of the process. The process for direct contractors to release a stop payment notice and for subcontractors and suppliers to challenge the process works as follows:
After a California stop payment notice has been served and the public entity has withheld funds accordingly, the direct contractor may challenge the stop payment notice by serving an “affidavit” (basically a sworn statement showing why the stop notice is not valid) on the public entity, demanding that the public entity release all funds withheld. Upon receipt of such an affidavit, the public entity will serve the subcontractor or supplier who served the stop payment notice with a copy of the affidavit, along with a “demand for release of funds”. If the stop payment notice claimant does not respond with a “counter-affidavit” by the date stated on the notice sent by the public entity (“not less than 10 days nor more than 20 days after service on the claimant of a copy of the affidavit”), then the public entity will be within its rights to release the withheld funds to the direct contractor, and the stop payment notice claimant will relinquish its stop payment notice rights.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
William L. Porter, Porter Law GroupMr. Porter may be contacted at
bporter@porterlaw.com
Washington School District Sues Construction Company Over Water Pipe Damage
August 27, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe Yakima Herald reported that “[t]he Toppenish School District is suing a local construction company over a breach of contract that allegedly led to defective water pipes at one of its elementary schools, according to a complaint filed with the Yakima County Superior Court earlier this week.”
According to the complaint (as reported by the Yakima Herald), Toppenish officials alleged that the Huylar Construction Co. failed to install calcium silicate seals during the pipe installation. Furthermore, the complaint stated that last November, the school district discovered “’[e]xtensive corrosion and deterioration’ of the pipes.” Toppenish argued that failure to install the seals is a breach of contract.
Toppenish is suing for about $120,000. The Yakima Herald stated that a Huylar representative “could not be reached for comment.”
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Builder’s Risk Coverage—Construction Defects
August 20, 2019 —
Brian Hearst - Construction ExecutiveThis is the second of three articles bringing clarity to the complex and challenging course of construction exposures and providing solutions for mitigating risk through builder’s risk insurance coverage. Part I, Builder’s Risk Coverage – Language Matters, addressed a select few critical exposures to projects under the course of construction. Part II addresses how a standard builder’s risk policy may respond to a loss arising from defective construction and alternative insurance market offerings that can help with specific costs associated with construction defect loss.
Coverage for Loss Ensuing from Faulty Workmanship
Part I tackled the standard builder’s risk exclusion that applies to losses arising from faulty materials or workmanship. Traditionally, carriers do not have an appetite for covering a contractor’s failure to perform their work properly. There is one exception, which is coverage is available for ensuing loss – or the resulting damage to other property from faulty workmanship.
If the excluded cause of loss (i.e., faulty workmanship) causes resultant damage, the builder’s risk policy will cover the damages to the extent the peril of fire is covered. The ensuing loss exception limits the faulty work exclusion to costs directly related to repairing or replacing the faulty work.
For example, suppose faulty wiring work leads to a fire which damages part of a structure under construction. The faulty workmanship exclusion would apply to the actual faulty wiring work, but if fire is a covered peril under the policy (this is nearly always the case), the policy would respond to the structure’s fire damage.
Reprinted courtesy of
Brian Hearst, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Mr. Hearst may be contacted at
Brian.Hearst@lockton.com
