Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 —
Samir R. Patel, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLPThere has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
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Staying the Course, Texas Supreme Court Rejects Insurer’s Argument for Exception to Eight-Corners Rule in Determining Duty to Defend
April 27, 2020 —
John C. Eichman, Sergio F. Oehninger, Grayson L. Linyard & Leah B. Nommensen - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogIn responding to a certified question from the Fifth Circuit in Richards v. State Farm Lloyds, the Texas Supreme Court held that the “policy-language exception” to the eight-corners rule articulated by the federal district court is not a permissible exception under Texas law. See Richards v. State Farm Lloyds, 19-0802, 2020 WL 1313782, at *1 (Tex. Mar. 20, 2020). The eight-corners rule generally provides that Texas courts may only consider the four corners of the petition and the four corners of the applicable insurance policy when determining whether a duty to defend exists. State Farm argued that a “policy-language exception” prevents application of the eight-corners rule unless the insurance policy explicitly requires the insurer to defend “all actions against its insured no matter if the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent,” relying on B. Hall Contracting Inc. v. Evanston Ins. Co., 447 F. Supp. 2d 634, 645 (N.D. Tex. 2006). The Texas Supreme Court rejected the insurer’s argument, citing Texas’ long history of applying the eight-corners rule without regard for the presence or absence of a “groundless-claims” clause.
The underlying dispute in Richards concerned whether State Farm must defend its insureds, Janet and Melvin Richards, against claims of negligent failure to supervise and instruct after their 10-year old grandson died in an ATV accident. The Richardses asked State Farm to provide a defense to the lawsuit by their grandson’s mother and, if necessary, to indemnify them against any damages. To support its argument that no coverage under the policy existed, and in turn, it had no duty to defend, State Farm relied on: (1) a police report to prove the location of the accident occurred off the insured property; and (2) a court order detailing the custody arrangement of the deceased child to prove the child was an insured under the policy. The federal district court held that the eight-corners rule did not apply, and thus extrinsic evidence could be considered regarding the duty to defend, because the policy did not contain a statement that the insurer would defend “groundless, false, or fraudulent” claims. In light of the extrinsic police report and extrinsic custody order, the district court granted summary judgment to State Farm.
Reprinted courtesy of Hunton Andrews Kurth attorneys
John C. Eichman,
Sergio F. Oehninger,
Grayson L. Linyard and
Leah B. Nommensen
Mr. Oehninger may be contacted at soehninger@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Linyard may be contacted at glinyard@HuntonAK.com
Ms. Nommensen may be contacted at leahnommensen@HuntonAK.com
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Under Privette Doctrine, A Landowner Delegates All Responsibility For Workplace Safety to its Independent Contractor, and therefore Owes No Duty to Remedy or Adopt Measures to Protect Against Known Hazards
September 29, 2021 —
Krsto Mijanovic, Jeffrey C. Schmid & John M. Wilkerson - Haight Brown & BonesteelIn Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021 WL 3671594) (“Gonzalez”), the Supreme Court of California held that a landowner generally owes no duty to an independent contractor or its workers to remedy or adopt other measures to protect them against known hazards on the premises. The Court applied the Privette doctrine which establishes a presumption that a landowner generally delegates all responsibility for workplace safety to its independent contractor. (See generally Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689; SeaBright Ins. Co. v. US Airways, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 590.) As such, the independent contractor is responsible for ensuring that the work can be performed safely despite a known hazard on the worksite, even where the contractor and its workers are unable to take any reasonable safety precautions to avoid or protect themselves from the known hazard.
In Gonzalez, the landowner, Mathis, had hired an independent contractor, Gonzalez, to clean a skylight on his roof. To access the skylight, Gonzalez needed to utilize a narrow path between the edge of the roof and a parapet wall. While walking along this path, Gonzalez slipped and fell to the ground, sustaining serious injuries. Gonzalez alleged this accident was caused by several dangerous conditions on the roof, including a slippery surface, a lack of tie-off points to attach a safety harness, and a lack of a guardrail. Gonzalez was aware of all of these hazards prior to the accident.
Reprinted courtesy of
Krsto Mijanovic, Haight Brown & Bonesteel,
Jeffrey C. Schmid, Haight Brown & Bonesteel and
John M. Wilkerson, Haight Brown & Bonesteel
Mr. Mijanovic may be contacted at kmijanovic@hbblaw.com
Mr. Schmid may be contacted at jschmid@hbblaw.com
Mr. Wilkerson may be contacted at jwilkerson@hbblaw.com
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Ninth Circuit Holds Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine Applies Beyond All-Risk Policies
April 20, 2016 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Ninth Circuit held that the efficient proximate cause doctrine is not limited to all-risk policies. Olin Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 4905 (9th Cir. March 17, 2016).
Olin operated a plant that produced industrial chemicals. Continental issued a policy covering the plant's boilers and machinery. In late 2008, the machinery was damaged. Continental denied coverage for damage to Olin's diaphragm cells, which were tanks containing metal cathodes covered by asbestos diaphragms. Continental argued that the damage to the cells was not covered because it was not caused by an "accident." The jury returned a verdict in favor of Olin.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Insurer Motion to Intervene in Underlying Case Denied
August 10, 2021 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Colorado Supreme Court determined that the insurer defending under a reservation of rights could not intervene in the underlying case after the insured assigned its rights to any bad faith claim against the insurer. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Bolt Factory Lofts Owners Ass'n, Inc., 2021 Colo. LEXIS 365 (Colo. May 24, 2021).
Bolt Factory initiated a construction defects lawsuit against various contractors. Several defendants filed third-party complaints against subcontractors, including Sierra Glass Company. Auto-Owners agreed to defend its insured, Sierra Glass, under a reservation of rights. Auto-Owners declined to settle with Bolt Factory for $1.9 million, within policy limits. Sierra Glass then retains independent counsel and entered into a settlement with Bolt Factory. The settlement allowed Sierra Glass to assign its bad faith claims to Bolt Factory in exchange for the right to pursue the insurer for payment of the excess judgment rather than Sierra Glass. Instead of entering into a stipulated judgment, Bolt Factory and Sierra Glass proceeded to an abbreviated trial.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
#3 CDJ Topic: Underwriters of Interest Subscribing to Policy No. A15274001 v. ProBuilders Specialty Ins. Co., Case No. D066615
December 30, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFMichael R. Vellado and
Nicole R. Kardassakis of
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP analyzed the appeals case that “reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of ProBuilders Specialty Insurance Company (“ProBuilders”) and held that the ‘other insurance’ clause in the ProBuilders policy did not relieve it of its duty to participate in the defense of its insured, Pacific Trades Construction & Development, Inc. ('Pacific Trades')."
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Another discussion of the ProBuilders appeal ruling occurred on the
California Construction Law Blog, written by
Yas Omidi of
Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLP. Omidi explained the appeal’s court decision: “In reversing the trial court’s decision, the appellate court characterized ProBuilder’s ‘other insurance’ clause as an ‘escape clause’—i.e., a clause that attempts to have coverage, paid for with the insured’s premiums, evaporate in the presence of other insurance.” Furthermore, she noted that “California public policy disfavors such clauses.”
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Builder and County Tussle over Unfinished Homes
November 13, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFRivard, Florida has been trying to get rid of a group of unfinished homes destroyed. Now Hernando County officials have decreed that the partially-built homes are unsafe and must be demolished. However, after the building permits were withdrawn, Costa Homes filed a lawsuit asking that they be reinstated. The county had given the builder a deadline to file new permits, but were met with a lawsuit.
Costa Homes seeks to be relived of the county’s requirement that each of the six homes be provided with $10,000 bond and also finds the county’s completion schedule to be “so short it constitutes a prescription for failure.” Building officials had declared the structures unsafe in August and had stipulated that they had to be made safe.
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Elevators Take Sustainable Smart Cities to the Next Level
May 26, 2019 —
Chris Smith - Construction ExecutiveFrom electric cars to solar panels, technology has been at the forefront of innovation in sustainability efforts. As greenhouse gas emissions continue to be a critical global concern, developing smart cities and sustainable energy practices are more important than ever.
In fact, Gartner predicts that by 2020, half of all smart city objectives will be centered around climate change, resilience and sustainability. To build truly intelligent cities, we need to optimize the sharing of information at a foundational level, starting with the structures on which these cities are built.
Where do we begin?
The United Nations estimates that almost 40 percent of today’s global greenhouse gas emissions come from buildings. To reduce these levels, the industry needs to begin creating smarter structures that use data insights to streamline functions in the building, and this starts with the infrastructural backbone: the elevator.
Reprinted courtesy of
Chris Smith, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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