Understanding Liability Insurer’s Two Duties: To Defend and to Indemnify
December 26, 2022 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesA liability insurer has two duties that are the crux of a liability policy: the duty to defend the insured in legal actions and the duty to indemnify the insured from losses covered under the policy. Many times, policyholders (insureds) do not fully understand or appreciate these two important duties. They need to and this is why having private counsel assist with coverage-related considerations is an absolute must.
An insurers’ duty to defend is separate from its duty to indemnify. A recent opinion out of the Middle District of Florida in Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Tate Transport Corp., 2022 WL 16963815 (M.D.Fla. 2022) clarifies the distinction between these duties with a focus on an insurer’s initial duty — the duty to defend. Please read below so you can have more of an appreciation of these duties. The court does a good job discussing Florida law with the emphasis on when an insurer’s initial duty to defend kicks-in:
Duty to Defend
Under Florida law, “an insurer’s duty to defend its insured against a legal action arises when the complaint alleges facts that fairly and potentially bring the suit within policy coverage.” The duty to defend is a broad one, broader than the duty to indemnify, and “[t]he merits of the underlying suit are irrelevant.” We determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend its insured based only on “the eight corners of the complaint and the policy,” and only as the complaint’s alleged facts are “fairly read[.]” The “facts” we consider in evaluating the duty to defend come solely from the complaint, regardless of the actual facts of the case and regardless of any later developed and contradictory factual record. “Any doubts regarding
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Connecticutt Class Action on Collapse Claims Faces Motion to Dismiss
January 02, 2019 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe federal district court dismissed some insurers from a class action suit alleging failure to provide coverage for collapse claims. Halloran v. Harleysville Preferred Ins. Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179807 (D. Conn. Oct. 19, 2018).
A class of homeowners brought suit in 2016 against their homeowners insurance companies ("defendants") for failure to cover collapse claims. Plaintiffs alleged they bought their homes between 1984 and 2015. Each of the homes had basement walls that were "crumbling and cracking due to the oxidation of certain minerals contained in the concrete." As a result of the deteriorating concrete, plaintiffs claimed that their basement walls were in a state of collapse.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
The Firm Hits the 9 Year Mark!
July 22, 2019 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsIt was 9 years ago today that I announced the formation and start of my solo practice, The Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PC. Back then, my children were in elementary and middle school. Now I have two college students, one at Appalachian State University (with a budding photography talent that has provided some photos for this blog (including that on this post)) and the other at West Virginia University, and a rising high school junior. In just the past year I began a tenure on the Section Council Virginia Bar Association Construction and Public Contracts Law section and chair of its Legislative Committee where I assisted in the drafting of the change in the mechanic’s lien form that takes effect today..
I was named to both the Virginia Business Magazine Legal Elite in Construction Law and for a 3rd consecutive year to Virginia Super Lawyers in Construction Litigation. I spoke on how to deal with a DPOR complaint this past November at the 39th Annual Construction Law and Public Contracts seminar (one I highly recommend for any lawyer interested in construction).
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Keeping Detailed Records: The Best Defense to Constructive Eviction
October 24, 2023 —
Ben T. Welch & Ken Brown - Snell & WilmerInevitably, commercial property owners and managers will be faced with a claim by a tenant of constructive eviction. This article is intended to describe what constructive eviction is and to suggest what owners and managers can do to prepare for, and ward off, such claims.
Constructive eviction occurs where a tenant’s “right of possession and enjoyment” of the leasehold is disrupted by the landlord in a manner that renders the premises “unsuitable for the purposes intended.”i Put another way, it is interference that is so “substantial nature and so injurious as to deprive the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of a part or the whole of the demised premises.”ii Although easy to describe in theory, constructive eviction can be devilishly difficult to determine in the real world. In litigation, determining when interference crosses over the line to constructive eviction is intensely fact-sensitive and resists sweeping generalizations.iii
For instance, Utah courts have held that tenants have been constructively evicted when they have been subjected to continual harassment or insults by the landlord or the landlord’s agent,iv prevented or impaired in their access to the leased premises during operating hours,v or when a landlord fails to provide an operable elevator (or other essential commercial amenities) necessary for a tenant’s business operations.vi By contrast, claims of “discomfort” or “inconvenience” have been rejected as a basis for constructive eviction.vii The same goes for claims that a landlord wrongfully served a three-day notice to pay or quit.viii
Generally, constructive eviction is an affirmative defense made in response to a landlord’s lawsuit for nonpayment of rent.ix It is not, as is commonly supposed, a basis for a tenant’s premature abandonment of the premises. In other words, the defense is raised after the tenant has vacated as a result of being effectively “evicted.”x Further, the defense requires the tenant to actually abandon the premises and do so within a “reasonable time” after the alleged interference.xi A tenant cannot stay in possession and simply refuse to pay rent on the basis of constructive eviction.xii
The key consideration in preparing for, and responding to, a claim of constructive eviction is keeping good records. A tenant claiming constructive evicting likely must prove that the issue was raised in a timely manner and, despite multiple entreaties, was never resolved.xiii As such, it is critical that landlords acknowledge tenant complaints as well as document in writing their efforts to ameliorate those complaints. While a landlord does not carry the burden of proof for constructive eviction, detailed documentation can thwart a tenant’s claim that a landlord has been inattentive or unwilling to address the tenant’s concerns.
Detailed records are also useful in disputes where a tenant claims substantial interference. “The whole point of constructive eviction is that the landlord basically drove the tenant out through the landlord’s action or inaction.”xiv As such, a landlord that is unable to document the steps taken in response to complaints will be grossly disadvantaged whereas the tenant, which had control and knowledge of the premises, will have a much easier time describing how the alleged interference deprived them of enjoying the premises.
Even with meticulous records, however, owners and managers may still face claims of construction eviction. In such instances, counsel should be retained to properly advise on compiling, preserving, and employing the evidence necessary to refute the tenant’s claims.
i Gray v. Oxford Worldwide Grp., Inc., 139 P.3d 267, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 2006).
ii Gray, 139 P.3d at 270 (citing Neslen, 254 P.2d at 850) (internal formatting omitted).
iii See Gray, 139 P.3d at 269–70 (citing Thirteenth & Washington Sts. Corp. v. Neslen, 254 P.2d 847, 850 (Utah 1953)); Brugger v. Fonoti, 645 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1982).
iv See Gray, 139 P.3d at 270–71.
v Thirteenth & Washington Sts. Corp. v. Neslen, 254 P.2d 847 (Utah 1953).
vi See Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 375, 378 (Utah 1996) (citing Union City Union Suit Co. v. Miller, 162 A.D.2d 101, 556 N.Y.S.2d 864 (1990)).
vii See Myrah v. Campbell, 163 P.3d 679, 682–84 (Utah Ct. App. 2007).
viii Barton v. MTB Enterprises, 889 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see also Brugger, 645 P.2d at 648 (stating that the tenant’s complaints revolved around standard problems commonly associated with building maintenance and did not rise to the level of substantial interference); viv Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 898–900 (Utah 1989) (upholding trial court’s findings of fact concerning insufficiency of disruption so as to justify claim for constructive eviction).
ix See Kenyon v. Regan, 826 P.2d 140, 142 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
x See Kenyon, 826 P.2d at 142.
xi See Kenyon, 826 P.2d at 142; see also Barton v. MTB Enterprises, Inc., 889 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Brugger, 645 P.2d at 648.
xii See Kenyon, 826 P.2d at 142 (citing Fernandez v. Purdue, 518 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1974)).
xiii See Brugger, 645 P.2d at 648 (noting that while the tenant had raised legitimate issues concerning state of the premises, the landorld had taken steps to remedy the problems within a reasonable time) (citing 49 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 617).
xiv Barton, 889 P.2d at 477.
Reprinted courtesy of
Ben T. Welch, Snell & Wilmer and
Ken Brown, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Welch may be contacted at bwelch@swlaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
What Happens When a Secured Creditor Files a Late Claim in an Equity Receivership?
September 28, 2017 —
Ben Reeves - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogPitting a receivership court’s inherent equitable powers against pre-existing property rights can lead to some pretty interesting questions. In SEC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 848 F.3d 1339, 1343-44 (11th Cir. 2017), the Eleventh Circuit recently examined whether a district court’s inherent authority to establish a claims submission process allowed the court to extinguish a security interest in real property based solely upon an untimely proof of claim. Much to the relief of secured creditors, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred, as a matter of law, by extinguishing the creditor’s pre-existing property rights under those circumstances.
Introduction
Equity vests a district court with “‘broad powers and wide discretion to determine relief in an equity receivership.’” Wells Fargo, 848 F.3d at 1343-44 (quoting SEC v. Elliot, 953 F.2d 1560, 1566 (11th Cir. 1992)). These powers include: (i) establishing procedures for the submission of claims to a receiver, and (ii) setting a claims bar date. Id. at 1344 (citing SEC v. Tipco, Inc., 554 F.2d 710, 711 (5th Cir. 1977)).
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Ben Reeves, Snell & WilmerMr. Reeves may be contacted at
breeves@swlaw.com
Supreme Court Overrules Longstanding Decision Supporting Collection of Union Agency Fees
July 02, 2018 —
Amy R. Patton, Blake A. Dillion, & Eric C. Sohlgren - Payne & FearsIn a 5 to 4 opinion, the United States Supreme Court overruled a longstanding decision which required government employees who are represented by but do not belong to a union, to pay a fair share or agency fee to cover the union's costs for collective bargaining activities. In Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 585 U.S. ___ (2018), the Supreme Court found that requiring such fees from nonconsenting public sector employees violates the First Amendment: "[n]either an agency fee nor any other form of payment to a public-sector union may be deducted from an employee, nor may any other attempt be made to collect such a payment, unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay."
Reprinted courtesy of Payne & Fears attorneys
Amy R. Patton,
Blake A. Dillion and
Eric C. Sohlgren
Ms. Patton may be contacted at arp@paynefears.com
Mr. Dillion may be contacted at bad@paynefears.com
Mr. Sohlgren may be contacted at ecs@paynefears.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Superintendent’s On-Site Supervision Compensable as Labor Under Miller Act
March 13, 2023 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesA recent Miller Act payment bond decision out of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, U.S. f/u/b/o Civil Construction, LLC v. Hirani Engineering & Land Surveying, PC, 58 F.4th 1250 (D.C. Circ. 2023), dealt with the issue of whether a subcontractor’s superintendent constitutes recoverable “labor” within the meaning of the Miller Act and compensable as a cost under the Miller Act that typically views labor as on-site physical labor.
The issue is that the Miller Act covers “[e]very person that has furnished labor or material in carrying out work provided for in a contract.” Civil Construction, supra, at 1253 quoting 40 U.S.C. s. 3133(b)(1). The Miller Act does not define labor. The subcontractor claimed labor includes actual superintending at the job site. The surety disagreed that a superintendent’s presence on a job site constitutes labor as the superintendent has to actually perform physical labor on the job site to constitute compensable labor under the Miller Act.
The subcontractor argued its subcontract and the government’s quality control standards required detailed daily reports that verified manpower, equipment, and work performed at the job site. It further claimed its superintendent had to continuously supervise and inspect construction activities on-site: “[the] superintendent had to be on-site to account for, among other things, hours worked by crew members, usage and standby hours for each piece of equipment, materials delivered, weather throughout the day, and all work performed. These on-site responsibilities reflected the government’s quality control standards, under which the superintendent as ‘the most senior site manager at the project, is responsible for the overall construction activities at the site…includ[ing] all quality, workmanship, and production of crews and equipment.” Civil Construction, supra, at 1253-54.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Digitalizing the Construction Site – Interview with Tenderfield’s Jason Kamha
August 30, 2017 —
Aarni Heiskanen - AEC BusinessHere’s my interview with Jason Kamha, Director at Tenderfield, an Australian construction software company.
Can you say a few words about yourself and your company?
Tenderfield is based in Sydney, Australia and was established in 2014. We provide a software-as-a-service (SAAS) platform that enables construction firms to collaborate on large construction projects throughout the tendering and project management phases.
A bit about myself, I have been working in the construction management field for over 10 years as an Estimator and a Contracts Administrator. I have always been interested in how technology can improve productivity and collaboration in construction. I worked on large projects and witnessed first-hand what can happen when information and people are disconnected.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Aarni Heiskanen, AEC BusinessMr. Heiskanen may be contacted at
info@aepartners.fi
