Hartford Stadium Controversy Still Unresolved
September 22, 2016 —
Scott Van Voorhis - Engineering News-RecordThe Hartford Yard Goats and the city of Hartford, Conn., say Arch Insurance—the surety for the dual developer/prime contractor of the minor-league baseball team’s new, unfinished stadium—has committed to helping complete the project now that the team and its developer have acrimoniously split.
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Scott Van Voorhis, Engineering News-RecordENR may be contacted at
enr.com@bnpmedia.com
Real Estate & Construction News Roundup (7/10/24) – Strong Construction Investment in Data Centers, Increase Use of Proptech in Hospitality and Effects of Remote-Work on Housing Market
August 05, 2024 —
Pillsbury's Construction & Real Estate Law Team - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogIn our latest roundup, renters stay in their units longer, GenAI change how commercial real estate operates, and banks continue high exposure due to commercial real estate.
- Strong investor interest, particularly in opportunistic and value-add segments, signals a strong market for construction firms specializing in high-yield projects. (Sebastian Obando, Construction Dive)
- A growing number of renters are staying in their units for longer periods of time than they did a decade ago with over one-third of U.S. renters have lived in the same apartment for more than five years. (Mary Salmonsen, Multifamily Dive)
- Several U.S. regional and mid-sized banks continue to face the squeeze from high exposure to the commercial real estate sector that has been shaken by higher-for-longer interest rates and empty office buildings. (Reuters)
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NY Appellate Court Holds Common Interest Privilege Applies to Parties to a Merger
January 07, 2015 —
Jay Shapiro, Lori S. Smith and Brittney Edwards – White and Williams LLPThe common interest privilege is a doctrine that operates to maintain the confidentiality of communications between parties and counsel that have aligned interests. It is designed to encourage the free flow of information between these parties, and has historically been utilized primarily in the context of litigation. However, in Ambac Assurance Corp., et al. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al., the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department recently expanded the common interest privilege by holding that it is applicable in transactional contexts. 2014 WL 6803006, No. 651612/10 (1st Dep’t 2014). The Ambac court defined the common interest doctrine as “a limited exception to waiver of the attorney-client privilege” when a third party is present during a communication between an attorney and his or her client. The doctrine shields such communications from disclosure when they are (1) protected by the attorney client privilege and (2) “made for the purpose of furthering a legal interest or strategy common to the parties.”
Until Ambac, New York courts touched on, but never squarely addressed, whether a third requirement must be satisfied before the common interest doctrine can be invoked: “that the communication must affect pending or reasonably anticipated litigation.” The Ambac court addressed and rejected this purported third requirement while reversing the decision of the trial court which found that defendant Bank of America failed “to cite any New York case that applied the common-interest doctrine outside of either joint-representation of two parties by one attorney, or where parties reasonably anticipated litigation.”
Reprinted courtesy of Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP attorneys
Jay Shapiro,
Lori S. Smith and
Brittney Edwards
Mr. Shapiro may be contacted at shapiroj@whiteandwilliams.com
Ms. Smith may be contacted at smithl@whiteandwilliams.com
Ms. Edwards may be contacted at edwardsb@whiteandwilliams.com
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Suppliers of Inherently Dangerous Raw Materials Remain Excluded from the Protections of the Component Parts Doctrine
December 02, 2015 —
Leah B. Mason & Michael J. Worth – Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLPIn Brady v. Calsol, Inc. 2015 No. B262028, the California Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed summary judgment for a raw materials supplier where there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the benzene levels contained in the supplier’s mineral spirits could have caused plaintiffs’ leukemia.
Plaintiffs were mechanics Ernest Brady and David Gibbs, who used Safety-Kleen solvent to degrease automotive parts. Brady and Gibbs were diagnosed with leukemia allegedly caused by exposure to Safety-Kleen solvent during the course of their employment. In 2008, Plaintiffs sued Calsol, Inc., a distributor of mineral spirits for the ultimate manufacturer, Safety-Kleen Systems, Inc. Plaintiffs asserted negligence and strict products liability claims. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that benzene, a carcinogen found in mineral spirits, caused their leukemia. Benzene is only carcinogenic to humans at certain levels. The parties dispute the levels of benzene found in the mineral spirits supplied to Safety-Kleen. Calsol contended the benzene levels were present only in low concentrations. Plaintiffs alleged the benzene levels were capable of causing injury.
Reprinted courtesy of
Leah B. Mason, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Michael J. Worth, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Ms. Mason may be contacted at lmason@hbblaw.com
Mr. Worth may be contacted at mworth@hbblaw.com
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Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Are Housing Prices Poised to Fall in Denver?
December 10, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFDenver, Dallas, and Houston’s housing markets are rising too quickly and will soon hit “’bubble territory’” according to a housing market index by Florida Atlantic University and Florida International University, reported the Denver Business Journal.
"There is about a 70 percent chance that renters in Denver will get more wealth on average than buyers," Ken Johnson, a real estate economist at the university in Boca Raton, Florida, told the Denver Post.
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English v. RKK. . . The Saga Continues
December 16, 2019 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsRemember back in 2018 when I thought I’d told you the end of the English Construction story regarding its various consultants, etc.? I was wrong. The matter went up on appeal to the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals where the Appeals Court considered the summary judgment granted to the defendant Rummel, Klepper & Kahl (“RKK”) based upon what came down to a contributory negligence reading of the indemnity clause that was allowed to survive in the first district court opinion relating to these ambiguous contracts finding that English was negligent so couldn’t recover. The 4th Circuit also considered the finding that defendant CDM Smith did not breach its contract as a matter of law and that English’s negligence was the cause of the damages.
The Court of Appeals reversed both of the holdings by the Western District of Virginia court, essentially stating that there was enough of a factual dispute to render any summary judgment to be premature.
As to English’s arguments regarding the indemnity scheme in the contracts, the court found that the interpretation was at least ambiguous enough that summary judgment was inappropriate, stating:
While we are not prepared to settle conclusively these interpretation disputes at the summary judgment stage, English’s proffered interpretation is, at the very least. reasonable. Indeed, of the two interpretations, English’s seems to be more closely aligned with the actual language in the contract. The district court thus erred in rejecting English’s interpretation and adopting RK&K’s interpretation as a matter of law.
[A]t bottom, while the district court was authorized to construe unambiguous language as a matter of law, it could not resolve genuine disputes regarding the meaning of ambiguous contractual language against the nonmoving party on summary judgment. We therefore vacate the court’s grant of summary judgment to RK&K and remand for further proceedings.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Rejection’s a Bear- Particularly in Construction
December 23, 2024 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsAs I read through this week’s cases published in Virginia Lawyers Weekly, I came across a case posing an interesting question. The question is, “If your bid is rejected along with everyone else’s, can you complain?” The short answer set out by the Rockingham County, Virginia Circuit Court is “No.” In the case of General Excavation v. City of Harrisonburg the Court looked at the Virginia Public Procurement Act’s bid protest provisions in Va. Code 2.2-4360 and 2.2-4364(C) in the context of General Excavation’s protest of the City’s failure to award it (or anyone else for that matter) the contract on which it was the low bidder. The controlling section of the statute allows a challenge to the award or proposed award of a contract.
In defending the action, the City of Harrisonburg argued that, because the Procurement Act waived some of the city’s sovereign immunity, it must be read strictly. The city further argued (somewhat ironically) that, because no award of the contract was given or even proposed, General Excavation could not bring suit because it would not be challenging the “proposed award or award” of a contract. Not surprisingly, the Rockingham County court held with the City and strictly construed the statute against General Excavation in finding that General Excavation did not have the standing necessary to bring suit under the statute.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
