Yet ANOTHER Reason not to Contract without a License
October 25, 2021 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsRemember when I stated that you cannot lawfully perform construction work in Virginia without a contractor’s license? Remember when I said that you risk non-payment if you do so? If you needed another reason, a relatively recent Virginia Court of Appeals decision upholding a criminal conviction for performing construction work without a license should be that reason.
In Riddel v. Commonwealth, the Court took up an appeal from the conviction of Jeff Riddel where Mr. Riddel was verbally asked by homeowners to inspect and then repair their septic system. Mr. Riddel then contracted with Fairfax Suburban Septic to pump out and repair the system. Mr. Riddel then delivered the homeowners an invoice from Fairfax Suburban Septic and instructed the homeowners to pay Fairfax Suburban Septic directly. After payment, the homeowners became aware that the work was not completed and that neither Mr. Riddel nor his subcontractor was licensed to perform septic work in Virginia.
During the trial, Mr. Riddel argued on a Motion to Strike the Commonwealth’s evidence that (1) he merely arranged for licensed contractors to perform the repairs to the septic system, arguing that Virginia Code §§
54.2-801 to 802 permitted Riddel to arrange the work without a contractor’s license and (2) no written contract to perform a septic inspection or repairs existed. The Circuit Court denied the motion and Mr. Riddel was convicted under Va. Code 54.1-111 for performing the work without a license. Needless to say, he appealed.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Denver Officials Clamor for State Construction Defect Law
August 20, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe Denver Business Journal reported that a construction defects law to encourage more condo development in Colorado was discussed during the Denver Metro Chamber of Commerce’s annual State of the City event.
Colorado Senator Jessie Ulibarri in attendance stated that the construction defect bill that he had sponsored earlier this year was defeated partly due to timing, and he plans on introducing a new bill early 2015.
Denver Mayor Michael Hancock spoke in favor of such a bill, alleging that nearly all developers avoid building multifamily units for fear of potential litigation. “We are being hamstrung by this law in the state of Colorado.”
However, the Denver Business Journal reported that those who favor status quo, including homeowners association industry groups and attorneys, claim that “changing the law will open the door to poor work on the part of developers and builders, leaving condo buyers holding the bag for repairs when something goes wrong in their home.”
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Maybe Supervising Qualifies as Labor After All
May 22, 2023 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsRemember back in 2021 when I
“mused” about Dickson v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland et al.? Remember how the Eastern District of Virginia held that mere supervision does not qualify as “labor” under the federal
Miller Act? Well, the 4th Circuit recently weighed in on the appeal of that case and had some interesting things to say about the definition of labor.
As a quick reminder, Plaintiff worked as a project manager on a project to repair and upgrade certain stairs at the Pentagon. Plaintiff subcontracted with prime contractor Forney Enterprises Inc. on this project. On Dec. 20, 2018, the prime contract was terminated. Plaintiff filed the Miller Act suit on Feb. 5, 2020. Dickson alleged that Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, or F&D, must pay him, pursuant to the Miller Act, the amount he is owed for the labor he performed on the project. Now before the district court were cross-motions for summary judgment. In evaluating Plaintiff’s claims, the district court examined the defendant’s claims that (1) Dickson’s work did not qualify as “Labor” under the Miller Act, and (2) that the suit was not timely filed. The Eastern District of Virginia court agreed with both arguments.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Defend Trade Secret Act of 2016–-Federalizing Trade Secret Law
October 07, 2016 —
Erin M. Stines and Reed Cahill - Ahlers & Cressman PLLCThe Defend Trade Secret Act of 2016 (DTSA) was signed into law on May 11, 2016, and became effective immediately. The DTSA allows an owner of a trade secret to sue in federal court for trade secret misappropriation. Previously, only state law governed civil misappropriation of trade secrets. While the DTSA largely mirrors the current state of the law under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), adopted by 48 states, including Washington,[1] there are some additions found in the new law.
The DTSA imposes the same three-year statute of limitations and authorizes remedies similar to those provided under the UTSA. The DTSA also offers new forms of relief, including a provision permitting ex parte seizure orders (that is, without a hearing or response from the opposing party) to prevent further misappropriation of the trade secret. The DTSA further provides for a new definition of trade secret. The UTSA's definition of a trade secret is a “formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process.” Under the DTSA, the definition of a “trade secret” is broadened to include “all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information...whether tangible or intangible...” [2]
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Erin M. Stines & Reed Cahill, Ahlers & Cressman PLLCMs. Stines may be contacted at
erin.stines@ac-lawyers.com
Housing Advocacy Group Moved to Dissolve New Jersey's Council on Affordable Housing
November 05, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe New Jersey Law Journal reported that "[a]n affordable housing advocacy group in New Jersey is asking the state Supreme Court to remove from the administration of Gov. Chris Christie the authority to determine municipalities’ obligations for low- and moderate-income housing and to instead place that responsibility in the hands of trial judges."
New Jersey's state constitution mandates affordable housing obligations (referred to as the Mount Laurel decisions).
“It is no longer possible to trust that COAH can or will faithfully implement the Mount Laurel doctrine,” wrote the center’s associate director, Kevin Walsh, in the motion to enforce litigants’ rights, as quoted by the New Jersey Law Journal. “This should be the end; there should be no more extensions, no further last chances.”
Municipalities are protected from being sued by developers, however, last year the court stated "that it would consider lifting that protection if COAH failed to adopt new regulations that passed constitutional muster," according to the New Jersey Law Journal.
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Supreme Court of New York Denies Motion in all but One Cause of Action in Kikirov v. 355 Realty Assoc., et al.
April 28, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFIn the construction defect suit Kikirov v. 355 Realty Associates, LLC, et al., the Supreme Court of the State of New York granted a dismissal of the plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, but denied the defendants’ motion in all other respects. The plaintiff alleged breach of contract, among other claims. “355 Realty was the sponsor of 355 Kings Highway Condominium, a condominium project located at 355 Kings Highway, in Brooklyn, New York. The condominium units were allegedly marketed as ‘ultra luxury condos,’ and a ‘Manhattan style condominium building,’ which would be the ‘epitome of luxury and quality.’ The construction of the six-story 28 unit residential condominium building began in approximately November 2003. […] Plaintiff entered into a purchase agreement, dated December 21, 2005, with 355 Realty (which was executed on behalf of 355 Realty by Michael Marino, as its member) for the purchase of Unit 2G in the building.”
The plaintiff alleged that construction defects emerged soon after moving into the unit: “After taking occupancy of his condominium unit, plaintiff allegedly experienced serious leakage and moisture problems in his unit, which caused a dangerous mold condition to develop, in addition to causing actual damage to the structural elements of his unit. According to plaintiff, the walls, moldings, and wood floors of his unit are constantly wet and moist, and there is severe buckling of the wood floors. Plaintiff claims that these problems have caused his unit to be uninhabitable. Plaintiff alleges that he has been forced to remove all of his personal belongings from his unit and has been unable to occupy his unit.”
According to the plaintiff, Foremost attempted to repair the defects, but only made the situation worse: “Specifically, plaintiff asserts that Foremost’s contractors opened his walls to remove the stained drywall, but never corrected the cause of the leaks, destroyed the walls, and never properly taped and painted the sheet rock. Plaintiff alleges that Foremost repaired the openings in a defective manner. Plaintiff also claims that his floor was repaired at that time by a subcontractor hired by Foremost, but the basic structural problem was never resolved and the leaks continued, compromising the beams and causing the mold conditions, in addition to all of the physical damage present in the unit. On or about July 16, 2009, plaintiff allegedly sent a notice of the defects to 355 Realty and to the managing agent designated by the condominium board, by certified mail, return receipt requested. Plaintiff asserts that defendants have failed and refused to repair and remedy the defective condition, and that the damage is extensive and requires major structural repairs.”
The plaintiff filed suit on May 4, 2010, and the original complaint asserted eight causes of action. “By decision and order dated September 13, 2010, the court granted a motion by defendants to dismiss plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, his third cause of action for breach of implied warranties, his fifth cause of action for negligence as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his seventh cause of action for negligence as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ, and his eighth cause of action for violations of General Business Law § 349 and § 350, and granted plaintiff leave to replead his first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his fourth cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and his sixth cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ.”
The plaintiff amended their complaint on October 18, 2010, and “has repleaded these three causes of action by asserting a first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, a second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and a third cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ. In addition, plaintiff, in his amended complaint, has added a fourth cause of action for fraud.”
The defendants, on the other hand, “argue that each of the four causes of action alleged by plaintiff in his amended complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that plaintiff’s amended complaint must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). Defendants also cite to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), and (5), asserting that dismissal is also required based upon documentary evidence and the Statute of Limitations contained in the limited warranty.” The defendants’ motion to dismiss the first cause of action, breach of contract against 355 Realty, was denied: “While defendants dispute that the alleged defects are actually structural in nature, plaintiff’s allegations as to their structural nature are sufficient, at this juncture, to withstand defendants’ motion to dismiss. Thus, dismissal of plaintiff’s first cause of action must be denied.”
Next, the court reviewed the second cause of action, which was breach of statutory warranties: “Defendants’ motion also seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, which alleges that, under applicable law, including General Business Law § 777-a, et seq., the sponsor warranted to purchasers of units that the units would be constructed in a skillful, careful, and workmanlike manner, consistent with proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices, and free of material latent, design, and structural defects. Defendants argue that General Business Law § 777-a, known as the housing merchant implied warranty, is inapplicable to this case because it is limited to the construction of a ‘new home,’ defined in General Business Law § 777 (5) as ‘any single family house or for-sale unit in a multi-unit residential structure of five stories or less.’ As noted above, the building in which plaintiff’s condominium unit is located is a six-story building.”
The motion to dismiss the second cause of action is denied. The court provided this reasoning: “the full text of the offering plan has not been provided, the court is unable to examine the entire written agreement so as to determine the purpose of the inclusion of the text of General Business Law § 777.”
In the third cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “a breach of contract claim as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ based upon their contract with 355 Realty, pursuant to which they agreed to be the general contractors/construction managers for the condominium, to undertake oversight responsibility for the design and construction of the condominium, to prepare and/or review drawings, plans, and specifications for the condominium, and to otherwise manage and oversee the project. Plaintiff alleges that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ breached their contractual obligations in that the condominium units were improperly and inadequately designed and constructed, and completed in an incompetent and unworkmanlike manner, with material design and construction defects.”
The motion to dismiss the third cause of action was denied as well: “Plaintiff alleges, in his amended complaint, that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ have acknowledged notice of the defects and have not denied that they are responsible for providing a warranty to plaintiff. Plaintiff also refers to this warranty, in his amended complaint, by noting that paragraph 16 of the purchase agreement stated that the ‘[s]eller shall not be liable to . . . the [p]urchaser for any matter as to which an assignable warranty . . . has been assigned . . . to [p]urchaser and in such case the sole recourse of such . . . [p]urchaser . . . shall be against the warrantor . . . except that in the event a contractor or subcontractor is financially unable or refuses to perform its warranty . . . [s]eller shall not be excused from its obligations enumerated in the [offering p]lan under Rights and Obligations of Sponsor.’ Consequently, the court finds that dismissal of plaintiff’s third cause of action as against Foremost and MMJ must also be denied.”
In the fourth cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “that defendants made false statements and representations orally, in advertisements, and in the purchase agreement, that the condominium was properly and adequately designed and constructed and completed in a competent and workmanlike manner, in accordance with the condominium plans and specifications and proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices consistent with applicable standards for a first class, luxury condominium in Brooklyn.”
The court dismissed the fourth cause of action stating, “it must be dismissed because it is duplicative of his first cause of action for breach of contract.” Therefore, “defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint is granted to the extent that it seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, and it is denied in all other respects.”
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A Discussion on Home Affordability
April 08, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFKrishna Rao, in the online publication Zillow Real Estate Research, analyzed statistics on home price affordability across the United States. Rao found that “[a]cross the United States, strong home price affordability has been recently eroded by a combination of rising home prices and mortgage rates. Some areas, particularly on the West Coast, have begun to look unaffordable compared to their historic norms, forcing some household to look to the periphery of urban areas in search of affordable homes.”
However, John McManus in Big Builder said a more helpful term when looking at the new home market would be “relative affordability (which inheres both payment power and access to credit).”
“Little attention has been given to the fact that many builders' mix--first- and second-time move-up and higher end homes.” McManus wrote that this “has skewed pricing conversations. When the buyer is ‘discretionary,’ has access to cash and no impediment of another property to sell in order to trigger a purchase--then both base price and price elasticity can be greater.”
Read the full story, Zillow...
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Insurance Law Alert: California Appeals Court Allows Joinder of Employee Adjuster to Bad Faith Lawsuit Against Homeowners Insurer
April 08, 2014 —
Valerie A. Moore and Christopher Kendrick - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Bock v. Hansen (No. A136567, filed 4/2/14), a California appeals court held that an adjuster employed by an insurer can be sued personally for falsely representing that a first party claimant's policy does not cover a loss.
In Bock, a 41-foot long, 7,300 pound tree limb crashed onto the insureds' home, damaging the roof, chimney, living room walls, windows and floors. The assigned adjuster was alleged to have engaged in "appalling" conduct, including instructing the insureds to clean up the damage themselves (leading to personal injury); denying that the tree cracked the chimney; insulting and disparaging the insureds; altering the scene before taking photographs; misrepresenting the terms of the policy; preparing false claim reports; conspiring with a contractor to prepare an intentionally false report; and knowingly relying on the false report in order to deny a legitimate claim.
The homeowners sued the insurer and named the adjuster personally on causes of action for negligent misrepresentation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. But the adjuster demurred arguing that he could not be sued personally because, as an employee of the insurer, he owed no duty to the insureds. The adjuster relied on Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Services, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 249 and Lippert v. Bailey (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 376, to argue that employees and agents of insurers cannot be held personally liable since, under the law of agency, the proper cause of action is against the principal and not the agent.
Reprinted courtesy of
Valerie Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com; Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
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