Columbus Ohio Building Expert Directory

Texas Supreme Court Rules That Subsequent Purchaser of Home Is Bound by Original Homeowner’s Arbitration Agreement With Builder

May 29, 2023 — Kim Altsuler - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
In a new opinion Lennar Homes of Texas Land and Construction, Ltd., et al. v. Kara Whiteley, Cause No. 21-0783, 66 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 8740, issued May 12, 2023, the Texas Supreme Court partially reversed two lower court decisions and held that an arbitration provision contained in the original homeowner’s contract with the builder was binding on a subsequent homeowner. In the decision, the court found that Kara Whiteley—the second owner of the home in Galveston, Texas—was bound to arbitrate her construction defect claims with Lennar by virtue of the doctrine of “direct-benefits estoppel.” The rationale was based on the fact that Whitely was seeking benefits emanating from Lennar’s contract with the original homeowner. The residence in question was first purchased from Lennar in May 2014. Whiteley purchased the home in July 2015. The original contract documents included several arbitration provisions—one in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, one in the Limited Warranty issued by Lennar, and one in the general warranty deed. Whiteley sued Lennar in Galveston County District Court alleging mold growth and other defects at the property. Lennar moved for arbitration and its motion was granted. The parties arbitrated the case and Lennar received an award in its favor. Lennar then moved the District Court to confirm the arbitration award, and Whiteley filed a cross-motion to vacate the award, arguing that Lennar’s original motion to compel arbitration should not have been granted. The District Court agreed with Whiteley, vacating the arbitration award. Lennar appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s vacatur, and Lennar appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Kim Altsuler - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
Ms. Altsuler may be contacted at kaltsuler@pecklaw.com

Wow! A Mechanic’s Lien Bill That Helps Subcontractors and Suppliers

March 05, 2015 — Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law Musings
You know how I’ve stated on many occasions that the contract is king here in Virginia? You know how that included contractual provisions waiving mechanic’s lien rights for subcontractors and suppliers? You know how I thought that the General Assembly would not do anything to make mechanic’s liens in Virginia easier to prosecute? Well, it seems, at least for waivers of mechanic’s lien rights by subcontractors and suppliers (more about general contractors later) I was wrong. This General Assembly session, the Senate introduced a bill, that has now passed both houses as of February 25, 2015, that adds language to Virginia Code Section 43-3 that effectively nullifies any contractual waiver of lien rights prior to any work having been performed by any tier of construction company aside from general contractors. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PC
Mr. Hill may be contacted at chrisghill@constructionlawva.com

Hawaii Federal District Court Denies Title Insurer's Motion for Summary Judgment

February 01, 2022 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
In a rare title insurance dispute before the federal district court in Hawaii, the court denied the insurer's motion for summary judgment while granting the insured's motion for summary judgment. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. GS Industries, LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 240601 (D. Haw. Dec. 16, 2021). GS Industries, LLC took ownership of a parcel of real property located fronting Waipa Lane in Honolulu. The property used four buildings and a parking area for 50 cars. GS obtained a title insurance policy from First American. The policy insured GS' fee simple interest in the property in the amount of $3,500,000. The policy insured GS "against loss or damage, not exceeding $3,500,000, sustained or incurred by GS by reason of . . . not right of access to and from the land,." The policy did not identify any issues with access to the property and did not define "access." A portion of Waipa Lane was owned by the City and County of Honolulu. Parcel 86 and Parcel 91 on Waipa Lane were privately owned. (Private Waipa Lane Parcels). Vehicular access to (ingress) and from (egress) the property was via Waipa Lane. Ingress was made via the publicly owned portion of Waipa Lane. Vehicular egress was made via the Private Waipa Lane Parcels. The City of Honolulu maintained the Private Waipa Lane Parcels and considered them to be pubic. None of the owners of Parcels 86 or 91 notified GS of their intent to block the use of Waipa Lane. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

General Contractors Have Expansive Common Law and Statutory Duties To Provide a Safe Workplace

February 18, 2020 — Paul R. Cressman Jr. - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC
On November 21, 2019, the Washington Supreme Court handed down its decision in Vargas v. Inland Washington, LLC.[1] At the time of the incident in May 2013, Mr. Vargas, the plaintiff, was helping pour the concrete walls for what would become a parking garage for an apartment building. He was employed by Hilltop Concrete Construction. Inland Washington was the general contractor, and subcontracted with Hilltop to pour concrete. Hilltop, in turn, entered into agreements with Ralph’s Concrete Pumping and Miles Sand & Gravel to provide a pump truck, certified pump operator, and supply concrete. A rubber hose carrying concrete whipped Mr. Vargas in the head. It knocked him unconscious and caused a traumatic brain injury. Vargas, through his guardian ad litem, along with his wife and children, sued Inland Washington, Ralph’s, and Miles. The trial court initially dismissed on summary judgment Vargas’ claims that Inland Washington was vicariously liable for the acts of Hilltop, Ralph’s, and Miles. Later, the trial court also granted Inland Washington’s motion for summary judgment that it was not directly liable as a matter of law. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Paul R. Cressman Jr., Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC
Mr. Cressman may be contacted at paul.cressman@acslawyers.com

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Adopts New Rule in Breach-of-the-Consent-to-Settle-Clause Cases

August 19, 2015 — Sean Mahoney – White and Williams LLP
In Babcock & Wilcox Company, et al. v. America Nuclear Insurers, et al., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently held that where a liability insurer has agreed to provide a defense to its insured in an underlying tort action subject to a reservation of rights but refuses to consent to a settlement in that action, the insured may nevertheless accept the settlement over the insurer’s objection where the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and non-collusive” from the perspective of a reasonably prudent person in the insured’s position in light of the totality of the circumstances and is covered. Babcock & Wilcox Company v. America Nuclear Insurers, No. 2 WAP 2014, 2015 WL 4430352 (Pa. Jul. 21, 2015). This decision fills an important gap in Pennsylvania precedent addressing the rules applicable when an insurer refuses to consent to an insured’s settlement of a lawsuit. In Babcock, the underlying plaintiffs sued Babcock & Wilcox Company and Atlantic Richfield Company (“the Insureds”) alleging that the Insured’s nuclear facilities caused bodily injury and property damage. The Insureds’ liability insurers agreed to defend the Insureds subject to a reservation of rights. The insurers later refused to consent to an offer to settle the underlying action for a total of $80 million because they believed the Insureds were likely to succeed on the merits. Nevertheless, in 2009, the Insureds accepted that offer and settled the underlying action for $80 million, notwithstanding the insurer’s refusal. The Insureds then sought reimbursement of the $80 million settlement from their insurers, who rejected that request on the ground that the Insureds had breached the consent-to-settlement/cooperation provisions of the implicated policies. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Sean Mahoney, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Mahoney may be contacted at mahoneys@whiteandwilliams.com

Quick Note: Attorney’s Fees on Attorney’s Fees

June 13, 2022 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
In a recent case, the appellate court held that the attorney’s fees provision in the contract was NOT broad enough to entitle the prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees for litigating the amount of attorney’s fees. This is known as “fees on fees” which is when you can recover your prevailing party attorney’s fees when you are fighting over the quantum that should be awarded to you as the prevailing party. The attorney’s fees provision at-issue stated: “In any lawsuit to enforce the Lease or under applicable law, the party in whose favor a judgment or decree has been rendered may recover its reasonable court costs including attorney’s fees from the non-prevailing party.” Language similar to this language can be found in many contracts as a prevailing party attorney’s fees provision. However, this provision was NOT broad enough to recover “fees on fees.” As explained in this article, if this is a consideration, you can negotiate or include this provision into your construction contract by expanding the scope of the prevailing party attorney’s fees provision to clarify that it entitles the prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees in litigating the amount of attorney’s fees. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

The Independent Tort Doctrine (And Its Importance)

October 24, 2022 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
A non-construction raises an important legal principle. Here it is because it applies to construction disputes. It actually applies to many business-type disputes. It is based on what is widely referred to as the independent tort doctrine: Florida law does not allow a party damaged by a breach of contract to recover exactly the same contract damages via a tort claim. “It is a fundamental, long-standing common law principle that a plaintiff may not recover in tort for a contract dispute unless the tort is independent of any breach of contract. A plaintiff bringing both a breach of contract and a tort claim must allege, in addition to the breach of contract, “some other conduct amounting to an independent tort.” Bedoyan v. Samra, 47 Fla.L.Weekly D1955a (Fla. 3d 2022) (internal citations omitted). Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

An Obligation to Provide Notice and an Opportunity to Cure May not End after Termination, and Why an Early Offer of Settlement Should Be Considered on Public Works Contracts

August 17, 2020 — Jeff Kaatz - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight
In 2015, the City of Puyallup (“City”) and Conway Construction Company (“Conway”) executed a public works contract for road improvements (“Project”). On March 9, 2016, approximately four months after work started on the Project, the City issued Conway a notice of suspension and breach of contract and identified nine defective and uncorrected work and safety concerns. Conway denied any wrongdoing, and on March 25, 2016, the City issued a notice of termination for default and withheld payments due to Conway. Conway subsequently filed suit in Pierce County Superior Court and alleged the City’s termination for default breached the contract and sought a determination that the City’s termination for default was improper and should be deemed a termination for convenience. Conway sought approximately $1.25 million in damages and recovery of its attorney fees and costs. Following a bench trial, the Trial Court found the City breached the contract and awarded Conway damages, attorney fees, and costs. The City appealed.[1] On appeal, after affirming the trial court’s determination that the City improperly terminated Conway, the Court of Appeals considered two other issues raised by the City. First, whether the City was entitled to a set-off for replacing defective work discovered after Conway was terminated. Second, whether Conway is entitled to attorney fees if it did not make the statutorily required offer of settlement per RCW 39.04.240. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Jeff Kaatz, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight
Mr. Kaatz may be contacted at Jeff.Kaatz@acslawyers.com

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