Connecticut Reverses Course for Construction Managers on School Projects
August 05, 2024 —
Anand Gupta - Construction Law Zone BlogOn June 6, 2024, Connecticut Governor Ned Lamont signed into law Public Act 24-151 (H.B. 5524) (Bill 5524). Bill 5524 authorized and adjusted bonds of the state and provisions related to state and municipal tax administration, as well as addressed school building projects. Notably, Bill 5524 removed the ban on construction managers self-performing work on public school construction projects, effective July 1, 2024. Allowing construction managers to self-perform certain portions of the work, such as general trades, subject to the standard bidding requirements, is a common industry practice that, theoretically, reduces total project costs by reducing the amount of subcontracted work. However, proponents of banning self-performance argue that construction managers have too much information to bid fairly and competitively.
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Anand Gupta, Robinson+Cole
Mr. Gupta may be contacted at agupta@rc.com
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Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Government Claims Act Does Not Apply to Actions Solely Seeking Declaratory Relief and Not Monetary Relief
March 25, 2024 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogPerhaps it should come as no surprise, but public entities get special treatment under the law, and when filing a claim against a public entity, in most cases, a claimant is required to file a claim with the public entity before filing suit under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code §810 et seq.).
But, as the next case demonstrates, that’s not always the case. In Stronghold Engineering Incorporated v. City of Monterey, 96 Cal.App.5th 1203 (2023), the 6th District Court of Appeals examined whether a public works contractor that alleged an extended overhead claim was required to file a Government Claims Act claim before filing suit when its initial complaint was limited to a claim for declaratory relief.
The Stronghold Case
In December 2015, general contractor Stronghold Engineering Incorporated entered into a construction contract with the City of Monterey for the renovation of the City’s conference center and an adjacent city-owned plaza. The construction contract provided that any modification to the construction contract had to be approved by the City through a written change order. No surprise there.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
Adobe Opens New Office Tower and Pledges No Companywide Layoffs in 2023
April 18, 2023 —
Edward Ludlow & Brody Ford - BloombergAdobe Inc., breaking ranks with an industry cutting costs and laying off workers, has opened a new office tower in its home city, adding new capacity for staff and pledging no companywide job cuts in 2023.
The Founders Tower is an 18-story, 1.25 million-square-foot shimmering glass addition to San Jose, California, a city Adobe has called home since the early ’90s. The software company’s fourth tower has capacity for 3,000 employee workstations, Adobe said Wednesday in a statement. Despite opening a new office with amenities, the company remains supportive of hybrid and flexible work arrangements.
“We’re actually committed to continuing to grow here,” Adobe Chief People Officer Gloria Chen said in an interview with Bloomberg Television to air Wednesday. “We are committed to not having companywide layoffs.”
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Edward Ludlow, Bloomberg and
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Subcontractor’s Miller Act Payment Bond Claim
September 07, 2017 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesSince I wrote my ebook on the application of federal Miller Act payment bonds, I have not discussed a case applying the Miller Act. Until now!
Below is a case that reinforces two important points applicable to Miller Act payment bond claims. First, the case reinforces what a claimant needs to prove to establish a Miller Act payment bond claim. Very important. Second, the case reinforces that a subcontractor is going to be governed by its subcontract. This means that those provisions regarding payment and scope of work are very important. Not that you did not already know this, but ignoring contractual requirements will not fly.
In U.S.A. f/u/b/o Netplanner Systems, Inc. v. GSC Construction, Inc., 2017 WL 3594261 (E.D.N.C. 2017), a prime contractor hired a subcontractor to run cabling and wiring at Fort Bragg. The subcontractor claimed it was owed a balance and filed a lawsuit against the general contractor the Miller Act payment bond.
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
Dadelstein@gmail.com
NLRB Broadens the Joint Employer Standard
September 17, 2015 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorPerhaps in anticipation of Labor Day, the National Labor Relations Board issued its ruling in Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal. d/b/a BFI Newby Island Recyclery, establishing an easier standard for unions to prove that a joint employer relationship exists. This will make it easier for unions to make the upstream company, like a parent company, liable for unfair labor practices, even if the upstream company had no direct involvement.
Some Background
BFI runs a recycling plant and contracts with Leadpoint to provide workers to sort garbage in the recycling plant. The staffing agreement specifically stated that Leadpoint was the sole employer of the personnel it supplied and Leadpoint handled supervision of the employees, not BFI.
Leadpoint’s employees sought to unionize and an election was held. The union filed a petition seeking a determination that Leadpoint and BFI were a joint employers.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
Louisiana 13th in List of Defective Bridges
November 27, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFAbout 1,800 bridges in the state of Louisiana have been rendered structurally deficient. According to a report by WAFB, that means “at least one of the three key parts of a bridge has a major defect.” Although the bridges need repair, they are not yet classified as unsafe, which would lead to the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development closing the bridges.
Over the last five years, the state has spent a billion dollars on repairing, maintaining, and replacing bridges, but the number keeps growing. The DOTD would not release a list of compromised bridges in the state, citing legal concerns.
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How Many New Home Starts are from Teardowns?
April 15, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFIn a NAHB/Wells Fargo Housing Market Index survey, builders were asked “Of the homes you started in 2014, approximately what share were on a site where a previous structure, or evidence of a previous structure, was present before you started?” According to the NAHB, the surveyors reported that “[o]n average, weighted by starts, […] just under five percent of their starts were teardowns according to the survey’s criterion.” When compared to census data, it equates to 31,800 single-family teardown starts in 2014.
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