California Supreme Court Holds that Design Immunity Does Not Protect a Public Entity for Failure to Warn of Dangerous Conditions
June 26, 2023 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogGet ready for more street signage.
The California Supreme Court, in
Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639, has held that Government Code section 830.6, which protects public entities from claims alleging dangerous conditions on public property if the design was approved by a public agencies’ legislative body or their designee, does not shield a public entity from claims that the public entity should have warned the public of known dangers.
We wrote about the Tansavatdi case
a while back when it was before the Court of Appeals. The case involves a very sad set of facts. A young boy was killed by a semi-trailer while waiting at a stoplight on his bicycle in Rancho Palos Verdes, California. The area where the boy was killed did not have a bicycle lane although stretches of the same road did. The 2nd District Court of Appeal, on appeal from a motion for summary judgment, held that even if the public entity could establish that it was immune from liability under Government Code section 830.6, the trial court should have considered whether the public entity should have been liable for failing to warn of a dangerous condition on public property.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFSafety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”
The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”
A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”
Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”
All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.
Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”
In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”
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Real Estate & Construction News Round-Up 05/04/22
May 23, 2022 —
Pillsbury's Construction & Real Estate Law Team - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogConstruction payment apps are on the rise, the European Union proposes to block Russians from buying European real estate, warehouse vacancy rates hit a 27-year low, and more.
- The Metaverse Group has made itself one of the most prominent virtual land owners, having invested more than $10 million into digital real estate purchases. (Katie Canales, Business Insider)
- The European Union proposed to block Russians from buying European real estate in its six package of sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. (Jorge Valero and Alberto Nardelli, Bloomberg)
- Although smart office buildings are able to easily identify viruses, they are susceptible to hacks, raising privacy and cybersecurity concerns in the market. (Konrad Putzier, The Wall Street Journal)
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Pillsbury's Construction & Real Estate Law Team
First-Party Statutory Bad Faith – 60 Days to Cure Means 60 Days to Cure
October 19, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn a first party bad-faith lawsuit, such as a bad faith claim against an insured’s property insurer, there are three requirements that must be met before the bad faith lawsuit is filed: “‘(1) determination of the insurer’s liability for coverage; (2) determination of the extent of the insured’s damages; and (3) the required notice must be filed under section 624.155(3)(a).’” Fortune v. First Protective Ins. Co., 45 Fla. L. Weekly D2092a (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (citation omitted).
The third requirement is for the insured to file a Civil Remedy Notice (known as a “CRN”) as a condition precedent to filing a statutory bad faith lawsuit giving the insurer 60 days’ notice of the bad faith violation and to cure the violation, i.e., pay the claim if the violation is payment.
A very common bad faith payment violation is the assertion that the insurer did NOT attempt “in good faith to settle claims when, under the circumstances, it could and should have done so, had it acted fairly and honestly towards its insured and with due regard for his or her interests.” Fla. Stat. s. 624.155(1)(b)(1).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
The (Jurisdictional) Rebranding of The CDA’s Sum Certain Requirement
April 15, 2024 —
Jordan A. Hutcheson and Stephanie Rolfsness - Watt TiederThe Contract Disputes Act (the “CDA”), 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 7101 et seq., which has provided the statutory framework for resolution of most contract disputes between the federal government and its contractors since 1978, has recently been the subject of changes in judicial interpretation, despite no corresponding statutory changes. The CDA’s implementing provisions in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), require that contractors submit a claim to the government in the form of written demand to a contracting officer requesting a final decision and seeking the payment of money in a sum certain prior to pursuing resolution via board or court. However, with respect to the sum certain requirement, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued an opinion in late 2023 determining that this requirement “should not be given the jurisdictional brand” as it has categorically received in the past. Rather, the court concluded that the sum certain requirement is merely an element of a claim for relief under the CDA that a contractor must satisfy to recover. This rebranding does not debase the sum certain requirement, but it does indicate a renewed focus on what constitutes “jurisdictional” in government contracts litigation.
Reprinted courtesy of
Jordan A. Hutcheson, Watt Tieder and
Stephanie Rolfsness, Watt Tieder
Ms. Hutcheson may be contacted at jhutcheson@watttieder.com
Ms. Rolfsness may be contacted at srolfsness@watttieder.com
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Entire Fairness or Business Judgment? It’s Anyone’s Guess
January 09, 2015 —
Maurice Pesso, Greg M. Steinberg and Christopher J. Orrico – White and Williams LLPIn lawsuits challenging the validity of business transactions and combinations, the most significant issue is often which standard of review the court applies: the defense-friendly “Business Judgment Rule” or the more stringent “Entire Fairness Standard.” The standard utilized by the court – or more often times the standard which the parties think the court will apply – can drive decisions on motion practice, settlement discussions, and resolution strategy. Under the Business Judgment Rule, directors are presumed to have acted in good faith and their decisions will only be questioned when they are shown to have engaged in self-dealing or fraud. However, if a “Controlling Shareholder” stands on both sides of the transaction, the court will often scrutinize the transaction under the more plaintiff-friendly “Entire Fairness Standard.”
So, what constitutes a “Controlling Shareholder?” If the party in question owns more than 50% of a company’s equity, the answer is clear-cut. However, for cases involving stockholders who own less than 50% of a company’s equity and stand on both sides of the disputed transaction, the answer is not so simple. This uncertainty was highlighted in back-to-back decisions by the Delaware Chancery Court in November 2014. On November 25, 2014, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss a derivative lawsuit alleging breach of fiduciary duty in In Re Sanchez Energy Derivative Litigation (“Sanchez”). Vice Chancellor Glasscock held that the complaint failed to plead facts sufficient to raise an inference that two directors with a collective 21.5% equity interest in the company were Controlling Shareholders. The very next day, in In Re Zhongpin Inc. Stockholders Litigation (“Zhongpin”), the Delaware Chancery Court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims against an alleged “Controlling Shareholder” and members of the company’s board. In Zhongpin, Vice Chancellor Noble held that sufficient facts were plead to raise an inference that a CEO with a 17.5% equity was a “Controlling Shareholder.”
Reprinted courtesy of White and Williams LLP attorneys
Maurice Pesso,
Greg M. Steinberg and
Christopher J. Orrico
Mr. Pesso may be contacted at pessom@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Steinberg may be contacted at steinbergg@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Orrico may be contacted at orricoc@whiteandwilliams.com
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Texas exclusions j(5) and j(6).
April 27, 2011 —
CDCoverage.comIn Evanston Ins. Co. v. D&L Masonry of Lubbock, Inc., No. 07-10-00358-CV (Tex. Ct. App. April 18, 2011), insured masonry subcontractor D&L sued its CGL insurer Evanston to recover costs incurred by D&L for the replacement of window frames damaged by D&L while performing masonry work adjacent to the window frames. The trial court granted summary judgment for D&L.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
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Burden of Proof Under All-Risk Property Insurance Policy
January 31, 2018 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesA recent Florida case, Jones v. Federated National Ins. Co., 43 Fla. L. Weekly D164a (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) discusses the burden of proof of an insured in establishing coverage under an all-risk property insurance policy. Getting right to this critical point, the court explained the burden of proof as follows:
1. The insured has the initial burden of proof to establish that the damage at issue occurred during a period in which the damaged property had insurance coverage. If the insured fails to meet this burden, judgment shall be entered in favor of the insurer.
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2. If the insured’s initial burden is met, the burden of proof shifts to the insurer to establish that (a) there was a sole cause of the loss, or (b) in cases where there was more than one cause, there was an “efficient proximate cause” of the loss.
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dadelstein@gmail.com
