Fairfield Connecticut Building Expert Directory

Liquidated Damages: Too High and It’s a Penalty. Too Low and You’re Out of Luck.

November 21, 2022 — Christian Fernandez - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation Blog
Liquidated damages provisions in commercial and residential real estate contracts play a vital role when a transaction goes south, and should be given careful consideration when negotiating a real estate contract. Liquidated damages may be referred to in a variety of ways, such as “earnest money,” a “good-faith deposit,” or a “non-refundable deposit,” but each typically denote a negotiated amount of money that a seller is entitled to retain should a buyer breach a purchase and sale agreement. The purpose of liquidated damages is to provide the parties with certainty when actual damages arising from a breach of contract may be difficult to calculate. Accordingly, liquidated damages provisions alleviate the need for potentially expensive litigation associated with proving damages. While parties are free to negotiate the amount of liquidated damages, the amount must approximate the loss anticipated at the time of contracting, or the loss that actually occurs as a result of a breach. Arizona courts have held that where the amount of liquidated damages is unreasonably large when compared to the anticipated loss or actual loss, the liquidated damages provision is unenforceable as a penalty. A breaching party faced with high liquidated damages will often seek to invalidate the provision as a penalty. If a court agrees, the non-breaching party may still recover damages, but must go through the process of proving such damages. Therefore, when negotiating a real estate contract, consideration should be given as to whether a liquidated damages amount is arbitrarily high when compared to an anticipated loss in the event of a breach. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Christian Fernandez, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Fernandez may be contacted at cfernandez@swlaw.com

Appellate Court Reinforces When the Attorney-Client Relationship Ends for Purposes of “Continuous Representation” Tolling Provision of Legal Malpractice Statute of Limitations

October 20, 2016 — Stephen J. Squillario & David W. Evans – Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP
In Gotek Energy, Inc. v. Socal IP Law Group, LLP (No. B26668, October 12, 2016), the Second District Court of Appeal held that rather than the date on which a client file is transferred to new counsel, the attorney-client relationship ends for statute of limitations purposes when, using an objective standard, there is no “ongoing mutual relationship” nor evidence of “activities in furtherance of the relationship.” (Emphasis in opinion.) Reprinted courtesy of Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
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New Jersey Appellate Court Reinstates Asbestos Action

March 05, 2015 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
According to the New Jersey Law Journal, an asbestos case involving “a long-time ship worker who died of mesothelioma was reinstated by a New Jersey appellate court on March 3.” A lower court judge had “dismissed the claims against them based on his view that the evidence presented by the plaintiff was insufficient to show that the ships on which he worked contained asbestos and that he was exposed to it.” However, the appeals judges disagreed. “Although the summary judgment motion was decided on a very narrow ground, we conclude that the record as a whole establishes a triable issue as to whether plaintiff was exposed to asbestos or asbestos-containing products on defendant’s dredges,” judges Susan Maven and Henry Carroll stated, according to the New Jersey Law Journal. Read the court decision
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Brief Overview of Rights of Unlicensed Contractors in California

September 10, 2014 — William M. Kaufman – Construction Lawyers Blog
Under California Contractor’s State License Law enumerated in Business and Professions Code Sections 7000 to 7191, a contractor may not “bring or maintain” any action for compensation for performing any act or contract for which a license is required unless the contractor was duly licensed “at all times” during performance. Bus & Prof Code Section 7031(a). What does this mean and who does it include? This is a question that often has to be answered on a case by case basis. Basically, California does not want unlicensed contractors to be able to get paid for work that should be performed by a licensed contractor. The law has set forth some general parameters. General contractors, subcontractors, and master developers must be licensed. However, suppliers, manufacturers, laborers and equipment lessors are exempt and do not need a contractor’s license. Essentially, those parties that merely furnish material or supplies without fabricating them into, or consuming them in the performance of work, do not need to be licensed. Bus & Prof Code Section 7052. There are sever fines and penalties for those who improperly perform construction work without a license. A contract between any contractor and an unlicensed subcontractor is a misdemeanor. Lack of a license bars all actions in law or in equity for collection of compensation for the performance of work requiring a license. There are very few exceptions to this rule. A “savvy” unlicensed contractor cannot simply avoid these requirements by “subbing” out all the work to licensed contractors. Any person who uses the services of an unlicensed contractor may file a court action or cross-complaint to recover all payments made to the unlicensed contractor. In addition, a person who uses the services of an unlicensed contractor is a victim of a crime and eligible for restitution of economic losses regardless of whether that person had knowledge that the contractor was unlicensed. Bus. & Prof Code Sections 7028, 7028.16. It goes without saying that performing work without a license on projects is a bad idea. Reprinted courtesy of William M. Kaufman, Lockhart Park LP Mr. Kaufman may be contacted at wkaufman@lockhartpark.com, and you may visit the firm's website at www.lockhartpark.com Read the court decision
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3M PFAS Water Settlement Could Reach $12.5B

July 16, 2023 — Jim Parsons, Debra K. Rubin
3M Co. has offically moved to settle claims of fouled drinking water stemming from the use of so-called “forever chemicals,” striking a deal with U.S. public water systems that could total $10.5 billion to $12.5 billion over 13 years, it said in a June 22 federal filing. Reprinted courtesy of Jim Parsons, Engineering News-Record and Debra K. Rubin, Engineering News-Record Ms. Rubin may be contacted at rubind@enr.com Read the full story... Read the court decision
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Know your Obligations: Colorado’s Statutory Expansions of the Implied Warranty of Habitability Are Now in Effect

November 04, 2019 — Luke Mecklenburg - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation Blog
The Colorado legislature had a busy session this year. Among the several significant bills it enacted, HB1170 strengthens tenant protections under the implied warranty of habitability. It became effective on August 2, 2019, so landlords and tenants alike are now subject to its requirements. The bill makes numerous changes to Colorado’s implied warranty of habitability, and interested parties should review the bill in detail. Landlords in particular may want to consider retaining legal counsel to make sure they have proper procedures in place to promptly deal with any habitability complaints within the new required timelines. This posting is not intended to provide a comprehensive guide to the changed law, but simply to highlight some of the most significant changes. With that caveat, landlords and tenants should be aware that as of August 2, 2019:

The following conditions are now deemed to make a residential residence uninhabitable for the purposes of the implied warranty of habitability:
- The presence of mold, which is defined as “microscopic organisms or fungi that can grow in damp conditions in the interior of a building.”
- A refrigerator, range stove, or oven (“Appliance”) included within a residential premises by a landlord for the use of the tenant that did not conform “to applicable law at the time of installation” or that is not “maintained in good working order.” Nothing in this statute requires a landlord to provide any appliances, but these requirements apply if the landlord either agreed to provide appliances in a written agreement or provided them at the inception of the tenant’s occupancy.
- Other conditions that “materially interfere with the tenant’s life, health or safety.”
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Reprinted courtesy of Luke Mcklenburg, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Mecklenburg may be contacted at lmecklenburg@swlaw.com
No Coverage Under Ensuing Loss Provision
September 09, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
The cost of removing and replacing cracked flanges to prevent future leakage was not covered as an ensuing loss under a builder’s risk policy in RK Mechanical, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Casualty Co. of Am., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83958 (D. Colo. Aug. 1, 2011).
The insured, RK Mechanical Inc., was a subcontractor hired to install plumbing for a residential construction project. RK was an additional insured on the general contractor’s policy with Travelers. RK installed approximately 170 CPVC flanges on the project. Subsequently, two of the flanges cracked, allowing water to overflow and causing water damage to the project. Travelers was notified of the flange failure and resulting water damage.
RK subsequently removed and replaced the two cracked flanges and began water remediation. Travelers paid for the cost of the water damage due to the cracked flanges.

RK then examined all of the flanges installed in the project and discovered many were cracked and/or showed signs of potential failure. RK removed and replaced the cracked flanges. RK tendered a claim and demand for indemnity to Travelers for these repair costs. Travelers denied the claim. RK then sued for breach of contract and declaratory relief. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
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A Court-Side Seat: Appeals and Agency Developments at the Close of 2020
December 29, 2020 — Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2Gavel
THE FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS The U.S. Court of Appeals On November 23, 2020, the court, in a 2-to-1 vote, rejected the plaintiff’s request for an emergency injunction pending appeal in the case of Manzanita Band of Kumeyaay Nation, et al. v. Wolf. The majority held the requirement for such relief did not meet the requirements set forth in Winter v. NRDC, 555 US 7 (2008). Here, the plaintiffs allege that that the government’s construction of a border wall violates several environmental laws that were illegally waived by the Secretary of the Interior. Judge Millett dissented in part because the plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. She pointed to the argument that the authority of the Secretary—or Acting Secretary—to take these actions has been successfully challenged in several federal district courts. An expedited pleading schedule was established by the court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit On November 17, 2020, in Ergon-West ,Inc. v. EPA, the court again reversed the EPA’s decision denying regulatory relief to a small refinery seeking a waiver of the renewable fuels mandate of the Clean Air Act. Ergon is a small refinery and requested relief in the basis of the economic harm that compliance would entail. In 2018, the court ruled in Ergon’s favor and remanded the case back to the agency. After relief was again denied, the court held that “Ergon has come forward with sufficient evidence undermining one aspect” of the agency’s latest decision, and the ruling was returned to EPA for additional analysis. It appears that a complicated process has become even more complicated. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Anthony B. Cavender, Pillsbury
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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