Seller Cannot Compel Arbitration for Its Role in Construction Defect Case<
March 01, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe buyer of a leaky home in Venice, California cannot be compelled to arbitration with the seller in a construction defect lawsuit, according to a decision in Lindemann v. Hume, which was heard in the California Court of Appeals. Lindemann was the trustee of the Schlei Trust which bought the home and then sued the seller and the builder for construction defects.
The initial owner was the Hancock Park Trust, a real estate trust for Nicholas Cage. Richard Hume was the trustee. In 2002, Cage agreed to buy the home which was being built by the Lee Group. Cage transferred the agreement to the Hancock Park Trust. Hancock had Richard Nazarin, a general contractor, conduct a pre-closing walk through. They also engaged an inspector. Before escrow closed, the Lee Group agreed to provide a ten-year warranty “to remedy and repair any and all damage resulting from water infiltration, intrusion, or flooding due to the fact that the door on the second and third floors of the residence at the Property were not originally installed at least one-half inch (1/2”) to one inch (1”) above the adjacent outside patio tile/floor on each of the second and third floors.”
Cage moved in and experienced water intrusion and flooding. The Lee Group was unable to fix the problems. Hume listed the home for sale. The Kamienowiczs went as far as escrow before backing out of the purchase over concerns about water, after the seller’s agent disclosed “a problem with the drainage system that is currently being addressed by the Lee Group.”
The house was subsequently bought by the Schlei Trust. The purchase agreement included an arbitration clause which included an agreement that “any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or any resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.” The warranty the Lee Group had given to Hancock was transferred to the Schlei trust and Mr. Schlei moved into the home in May 2003.
Lindemann enquired as to whether the work done would prevent future flooding. Nazarin sent Schlei a letter that said that measures had been taken “to prevent that situation from recurring.” In February, 2004, there was flooding and water intrusion. Lindemann filed a lawsuit against the Lee Group and then added the Hancock Park defendants.
The Hancock Park defendants invoked the arbitration clause, arguing that Lindemann’s claims “were only tangentially related to her construction defect causes of action against the Lee Group.” On June 9, 2010, the trial court rejected this claim, ruling that there was a possibility of conflicting rulings on common issues of law. “With respect to both the developer defendants and the seller defendants, the threshold issue is whether there was a problem with the construction of the property in the first instance. If there was no problem with the construction of the property, then there was nothing to fail to disclose.” Later in the ruling, the trial court noted that “the jury could find there was no construction defect on the property, while the arbitration finds there was a construction defect, the sellers knew about it, and the sellers failed to disclose it.” The appeals court noted that while Hancock Park had disclosed the drainage problems to the Kamienowiczs, no such disclosure was made to Sclei.
The appeals court described Hancock Park’s argument that there is no risk of inconsistent rulings as “without merit.” The appeals court said that the issue “is not whether inconsistent rulings are inevitable but whether they are possible if arbitration is ordered.” Further, the court noted that “the Hancock Park defendants and the Lee Group have filed cross-complaints for indemnification against each other, further increasing the risk of inconsistent rulings.”
The court found for Lindemann, awarding her costs.
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General Contractor’s Professional Malpractice/Negligence Claim Against Design Professional
November 30, 2017 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesA recent case supports a professional malpractice (negligence) claim by a general contractor against a design professional by reversing a trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the design professional and finding a question of fact remained as to an architect’s role in the renovation of a public construction project. By the appellate court finding that a question of fact remained, the appellate court was finding that it was a triable issue, which is exactly what the general contractor wanted in this case. Getting this issue and the facts to the jury is the leverage the general contractor presumably wanted.
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dadelstein@gmail.com
Building and Landscape Standards Enacted in Response to the Governor's Mandatory Water Restrictions Dealing with the Drought and Possible Effects of El Niño
January 06, 2016 —
Clayton T. Tanaka – Newmeyer & Dillion, LLPEarlier this year, with California facing one of the most severe droughts on record, Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. issued Executive Order B-29-15 (the “Executive Order”) aimed at conserving water supplies and reducing water waste throughout the State of California. For the first time in California’s history, this Executive Order directed state agencies to implement immediate measures to save water, increase enforcement against water waste, invest in new technologies, and streamline government response to ongoing drought conditions.
In response, various state agencies proposed emergency changes to existing building and landscape standards in the California Green Building Standards Code (California Code of Regulations, title 24, part 11) (“CALGreen”) and the Model Water Efficient Landscape Ordinance (California Code of Regulations, title 23, part 11) (“Model Ordinance”) pertaining to the use of potable water. In July, the California Building Standards Commission and the California Water Commission adopted the proposed changes after public review and comment.
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Clayton T. Tanaka, Newmeyer & Dillion, LLPMr. Tanaka may be contacted at
clay.tanaka@ndlf.com
New York’s Lawsky Proposes Changes to Reduce Home Foreclosures
May 20, 2015 —
Jesse Westbrook – BloombergNew York’s banking regulator proposed changes to the foreclosure process to try to help borrowers in the state keep their homes.
One reason New York has a high rate of foreclosures is that mandatory settlement meetings between borrowers and mortgage servicers typically don’t take place for months after a bank initiates a foreclosure, Benjamin Lawsky, superintendent of New York’s Department of Financial Services said in prepared remarks Tuesday.
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Jesse Westbrook, Bloomberg
Hybrid Contracts for The Sale of Goods and Services and the Predominant Factor Test
February 15, 2021 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesFlorida’s Uniform Commercial Code (also known as the UCC) applies to transactions for goods. “Goods” is defined by Article II of the UCC as “all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (chapter 678) and things in action.” Fla. Stat. s. 672.105(1).
The UCC does NOT apply to transactions for services. Transactions for services are governed by common law.
Oftentimes, transactions or contracts include BOTH goods and services. In this scenario, referred to as a hybrid contract, does the UCC or common law apply? In this scenario, courts apply the predominant factor test to determine whether the UCC or common law governs the transaction:
Whether the UCC or the common law applies to a particular hybrid contract depends on “whether the[ ] predominant factor, the [ ] thrust, the[ ] purpose [of the contract], reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally involved (e.g., contract with artist for painting) or is a transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved (e.g., installation of a water heater in a bathroom).” In such instances, the determination whether the “predominant factor” in the contract is for goods or for services is a factual inquiry unless the court can determine that the contract is exclusively for goods or services as a matter of law.
Allied Shelving & Equipment, Inc. v. National Deli, LLC, 154 So.3d 482, 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (citations omitted).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Daily Construction Reports: Don’t Leave the Job Without Them
January 11, 2022 —
Patrick Barthet - Construction ExecutiveTrying to remember exactly what was done at a job site last week, last month or last quarter along with knowing who worked at the site is nearly impossible without a written, video or electronic record for reference. That’s why daily construction reports are so important.
Yet many contractors fail to create these reports. And those that do create them, may do it only at the beginning of a project or sporadically throughout the progress of a job, and generally only when they are reminded to do so. Daily reports only become truly effective when they are, in fact, done daily. Whether it is to help resolve a pending delay issue or clarify a job site access claim, or any number of other matters where what happened at the time is so critical, those daily construction reports should be completed daily.
Be Timely
The reason that daily reports are admissible in court (with corroborating testimony) is that they are interpreted as being recorded at or about the time the events in question occurred. Field managers should, therefore, write up these reports daily while the work is occurring or very soon thereafter to capture as accurate an account as possible. If these reports are not created until the end of the week or month, the information will not be as accurate and may not be as helpful in supporting a particular position.
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Patrick Barthet, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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Mr. Barthet may be contacted at
pbarthet@barthet.com
The Flood Insurance Reform Act May be Extended to 2016
April 07, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFThe Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2011 (H. R. 1309) has been referred to the House Committee on Financial Services—the first step in the legislative process. The bill, if passed, would extend the program to September 30, 2016. It is currently slated to be terminated September 30 of this year. The bill also contains changes to premium rates, mapping protocols, and privatization initiatives.
H. R. 1309 has garnered the support of several Insurance organizations. Leigh Ann Pusey, president and CEO of the American Insurance Association (AIA), sent a letter of support to the Chair and Ranking member of the House Financial Services Subcommittee. “AIA has advocated for a long term reauthorization of the NFIP to protect consumers and help increase stability for real estate transactions and policyholders,” Pusey said. “AIA believes the five-year extension contained in HR 1309, will provide certainty in the flood program thereby increasing consumer and business confidence in the NFIP.”
Jimi Grande, senior vice president of federal and political affairs for the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC) spoke out in support of the bill. “For the NFIP to survive, the prices for flood insurance must reflect the actual costs of flood risk for a property,” Grande said. “HR 1309 will provide that transparency. In addition, the Technical Mapping Advisory Council will give communities a voice in the flood mapping process, fostering a better understanding of what flood maps represent and how they are made.”
Read H. R. 1309...
Read the American Insurance Association statement...
Read the NAMIC Press Release...
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Avoiding Lender Liability for Credit-Related Actions in California
October 27, 2016 —
Anthony J. Carucci – Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogAside from general statutory prohibitions on lender discrimination, there are certain circumstances under California law in which lenders may be held liable for credit-related actions, such as negotiating or denying credit. See generally 11 Cal. Real Est. § 35:3 (explaining that the business of lending money is subject to the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 et seq., the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov. Code § 12900 et seq., the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691, et seq.). Specifically, lenders have been held liable for credit-related actions where, among other things, the lender (1) breached a loan commitment; (2) committed fraud; or (3) breached a fiduciary duty owed to the borrower.
The Lender-Borrower Relationship
As a general rule, a lender does not owe a duty of care to a borrower when the lender’s involvement in a transaction does not exceed the scope of its conventional role as a lender of money. Oaks Management Corp. v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 453, 466 (“[I]t is established that absent special circumstances . . . a loan transaction is at arms-length and there is no fiduciary relationship between the borrower and lender.”); Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1089, 1096 (holding lender owed no duty of care to a borrower in preparing an appraisal of the real property that was security for the loan when the purpose of the appraisal is to protect the lender by satisfying it that the collateral provided adequate security for the loan, and noting that “as a general rule, a financial institution owes no duty of care to a borrower when the institution’s involvement in the loan transaction does not exceed the scope of its conventional role as a mere lender of money”).
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Anthony J. Carucci, Snell & WilmerMr. Carucci may be contacted at
acarucci@swlaw.com
