Worker’s Compensation Exclusivity Rule Gets “Trumped” by Indemnity Provision
October 27, 2016 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogSorry, I couldn’t help myself with the title.
The next case, Aluma Systems Concrete Construction of California v. Nibbi Bros., Inc., California Court of Appeals for the First District, Case No. A145734 (August 16, 2016), discusses the interplay between indemnity provisions and the worker’s compensation exclusivity rule.
The worker’s compensation exclusivity rule generally provides that worker’s compensation insurance is the exclusive remedy of employees for injuries or death arising out of the course and scope of their employment.
In the Aluma case, the California Court of Appeals, addressed what happens when a subcontractor’s employees are injured on a project, sue the general contractor, and the general contractor, pursuant to an indemnity provision in its subcontract, tenders the claim to the subcontractor whose worker’s compensation insurance has already paid the employees.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
New Executive Order: Revitalizing Our Nation’s Commitment to Environmental Justice for All
May 08, 2023 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelThe White House has released the text of the President’s new Executive Order strengthening the Federal Government’s commitment to taking new actions to enhance and promote environmental justice. The Order was published in the Federal Register on April 26, 2023 at 88 FR 25251. President Clinton’s pioneering 1994 Executive Order remains effective, but the Federal Government must, as part of a whole-of-government approach to environmental justice, “build upon and strengthen its commitment to deliver environmental justice to all communities across America.”
Unlike that Order, this Order defines “environmental justice.” For purposes of this new Order, “environmental justice” takes into account all adverse human health and environmental effects and hazards, including those related to climate change, the cumulative impacts of environmental and other burdens, and the legacy of racism or other structural or systematic barriers, and ensures equitable access to a healthy, sustainable and resilient environment in which to live, play, work, learn, worship and engage in cultural and subsistence practices.
“Federal activity” is now broadly defined as “any agency rulemaking, guidance, policy, program, practice or action that affects or has the potential to affect human health and the environment, including any agency action related to climate change.” This Order references the seven previous Executive Orders devoted to climate change, clean energy and the Inflation Reduction Act.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Fall 2024 Legislative Update:
October 28, 2024 —
Joshua Lane - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCReview of (a) RCW 60.30.010-020, (b) RCW 49.17.530, (c) RCW 19.95.020, (d) RCW 39.116.005, et seq., (e) RCW 36.70B.080, and (f) RCW 39.12.010 and .13
While much of the focus on the recent legislative updates has been on RCW 39.04.360, a number of other legislative changes may also have significant impacts on Washington’s construction industry. Six of these changes are summarized below.
A. RCW 60.30.010 and .020 (SSB 6108) – Concerning Retainage on Private Construction, Effective June 6, 2024
Last year, ESSB 5528 imposed restrictions and obligations related to retainage and timing of final payment on private (non-public works) projects. It capped retainage at 5%, required prompt payment on final payments, and required owners to accept a retainage bond on private construction projects, excluding single-family residential construction less than 12 units.
This year, SSB 6108 adds suppliers to the statutes (RCW 60.30.010 and 0.020) pertaining to retainage on private construction projects.
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Joshua Lane, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMr. Lane may be contacted at
joshua.lane@acslawyers.com
More Hensel Phelps Ripples in the Statute of Limitations Pond?
February 03, 2020 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsAs is always the case when I attend the Virginia State Bar’s annual construction law seminar, I come away from it with a few posts on recent cases and their implications. The first of these is not a construction case, but has implications relating to the state project related statute of limitations and indemnification issues for construction contracts brought out in stark relief in the now infamous Hensel Phelps case.
In Radiance Capital Receivables Fourteen, LLC v. Foster the Court considered a waiver of the statute of limitations found in a loan contract. The operative facts are that the waiver was found in a Continuing Guaranty contract and that the default happened more than 5 years prior to the date that Radiance filed suit to enforce its rights. When the defendants filed a plea in bar stating that the statute of limitations had run and therefore the claim was barred, Radiance of course argued that the defendants had waived their right to bring such a defense. The defendants responded that the waiver was invalid in that it violated the terms of Va. Code 8.01-232 that states among other things:
an unwritten promise not to plead the statute shall be void, and a written promise not to plead such statute shall be valid when (i) it is made to avoid or defer litigation pending settlement of any case, (ii) it is not made contemporaneously with any other contract, and (iii) it is made for an additional term not longer than the applicable limitations period.
The Circuit Court and ultimately the Supreme Court agreed with the defendants. In doing so, the Virginia Supreme Court rejected arguments of estoppel and an argument that a “waiver” is not a “promise not to plead.”
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
CA Court of Appeal Reinstates Class Action Construction Defect Claims Against Homebuilder
September 03, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFLaurence R. Phillips, Andrew S. Azarmi, and Stefani Warren of Dentons reported that “on August 19, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reinstated a class action asserting construction defect claims against a nationwide homebuilder.” According to the article, the decision is significant because “it effectively opens the door to class claims against homebuilders (and potentially other service providers employed in the homebuilding industry) arising out of alleged construction defects on California residential development and construction projects.”
The decision is unpublished, but “could signal a troubling trend for companies involved in the homebuilding industry in California. It is not yet clear whether the decision will be appealed to the California Supreme Court.”
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Yet ANOTHER Reminder to Always Respond
July 11, 2021 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsYou would think I wouldn’t have to discuss the absolute need to respond to any served pleadings, particularly after some of the prior examples of what can happen if you fail to respond. Of course, I wouldn’t be starting a post like this if those that were sued contacted an experienced attorney in a timely fashion and followed this advice.
Yet another example of the disastrous results that can occur simply from failing to file responsive pleadings occurred last year in the Eastern District of Virginia federal court in Alexandria, VA. In Pro-Telligent, LLC v. Amex Int’l, Inc. the Court considered a claim for breach of contract (among other causes of action) by Pro-Telligent against Amex. The operative facts are that Pro-Telligent was a subcontractor to Amex that claimed it was unpaid in the amount of $279,660.27, its Complaint was served on January 7, 2021, and Amex did not respond within the required 21-day window. The Court then held a hearing on February 28, 2020, regarding the validity of the Clerk of Court’s entry of default per the rules of court.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Maryland Court Affirms Condo Association’s Right to Sue for Construction Defects
November 27, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe Maryland Court of Appeals, that state’s highest court, recently reaffirmed that condominium association have broad discretion in suing for construction defects in when they are representing at least two unit owners. Nicholas D. Cowie of the Baltimore-based construction defect legal firm Cowie & Mott, gives his summary of the case on his firm’s web site.
Mr. Cowie notes that the Council of Unit Owners of Bentley Place Condominium sued the developer and builder for construction defects in both common areas and within units, representing itself and “two or more” unit owners. A jury awarded $6.6 million; the builder and developer appealed.
The court ruled on the appeal that the Council of Unit Owners had a right to pursue these claims, and could recover full damage to common elements, even if some owners are time-barred due to their date of purchase. Mr. Cowie represented the Council of Unit Owners during the lawsuit.
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California Appeals Court Remands Fine in Late Completion Case
November 18, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFThe California Court of Appeals in Stanislaus County has reversed the decision of the lower court in Greg Opinski Construction Inc. v. City of Oakdale. The earlier court had awarded the city of judgment of $54,000 for late completion, $3,266 for repair of construction defects and interest, and $97,775 in attorneys’ fees. The late completion of the project was due to actions by the City of Oakdale, however, the court rejected Opinski’s argument that the California Supreme Court decision in Kiewit did not allow this, as his contract with the city established a procedure for claiming extensions.
The appeals court noted that the Kiewit decision has been “criticized as an unwarranted interference in the power of contracting parties to shift the risk of delays caused by one party onto the other party by forcing the second party to give the first notice of any intention to claim an extension of time based on delays caused by first.” They cited Sweet, a professor at Boalt Hall, UC Berkeley’s law school, that Kiewit “gutted” the “provision that conditions the contractor’s right to claim an extension of time for delays beyond his control.”
Further changes in California law in response to the Kiewit decision lead to the current situation which the court characterized as “if the contractor wished to claim it needed an extension of time because of delays caused by the city, the contractor was required to obtain a written change order by mutual consent or submit a claim in writing requesting a formal decision by the engineer.”
Opinski also argued that the lower court misinterpreted the contract. The Appeals court replied that “Opinski is mistaken.” He cited parts of the contract regarding the increase of time, but the court rejected these, noting that “an inability to agree is not the same as an express rejection.”
The court also rejects Opinski’s appeal that “the evidence the project was complete earlier than September 30, 2005, is weightier than the evidence to the contrary,” which they describe as “not a winning appellate argument.” The court points out that the role of an appeals court is not to reweigh the evidence, but to determine “whether the record contains substantial evidence in support of the judgment.”
The court did side with Opinski on one question of the escrow account. They rejected most of his arguments, repeating the line “Opinski is mistaken” several times. They decided that he was mistaken on the timing of the setoff decision and on whether the city was the prevailing party. However, the appeals court did find that Opinski was not liable for interest on the judgment.
The appeals court rejected the awarding of prejudgment interest to the city as the funds from which the judgment was drawn was held in an escrow account. The court noted that the city had access to the funds and could “access the funds when it determined that Opinski had breached the contract.” The appeals court noted that the judgment exhausted the escrow balance and remanded the case to the lower court to determine the amount own to Opinski.
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