Seller Cannot Compel Arbitration for Its Role in Construction Defect Case<
March 01, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe buyer of a leaky home in Venice, California cannot be compelled to arbitration with the seller in a construction defect lawsuit, according to a decision in Lindemann v. Hume, which was heard in the California Court of Appeals. Lindemann was the trustee of the Schlei Trust which bought the home and then sued the seller and the builder for construction defects.
The initial owner was the Hancock Park Trust, a real estate trust for Nicholas Cage. Richard Hume was the trustee. In 2002, Cage agreed to buy the home which was being built by the Lee Group. Cage transferred the agreement to the Hancock Park Trust. Hancock had Richard Nazarin, a general contractor, conduct a pre-closing walk through. They also engaged an inspector. Before escrow closed, the Lee Group agreed to provide a ten-year warranty “to remedy and repair any and all damage resulting from water infiltration, intrusion, or flooding due to the fact that the door on the second and third floors of the residence at the Property were not originally installed at least one-half inch (1/2”) to one inch (1”) above the adjacent outside patio tile/floor on each of the second and third floors.”
Cage moved in and experienced water intrusion and flooding. The Lee Group was unable to fix the problems. Hume listed the home for sale. The Kamienowiczs went as far as escrow before backing out of the purchase over concerns about water, after the seller’s agent disclosed “a problem with the drainage system that is currently being addressed by the Lee Group.”
The house was subsequently bought by the Schlei Trust. The purchase agreement included an arbitration clause which included an agreement that “any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or any resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.” The warranty the Lee Group had given to Hancock was transferred to the Schlei trust and Mr. Schlei moved into the home in May 2003.
Lindemann enquired as to whether the work done would prevent future flooding. Nazarin sent Schlei a letter that said that measures had been taken “to prevent that situation from recurring.” In February, 2004, there was flooding and water intrusion. Lindemann filed a lawsuit against the Lee Group and then added the Hancock Park defendants.
The Hancock Park defendants invoked the arbitration clause, arguing that Lindemann’s claims “were only tangentially related to her construction defect causes of action against the Lee Group.” On June 9, 2010, the trial court rejected this claim, ruling that there was a possibility of conflicting rulings on common issues of law. “With respect to both the developer defendants and the seller defendants, the threshold issue is whether there was a problem with the construction of the property in the first instance. If there was no problem with the construction of the property, then there was nothing to fail to disclose.” Later in the ruling, the trial court noted that “the jury could find there was no construction defect on the property, while the arbitration finds there was a construction defect, the sellers knew about it, and the sellers failed to disclose it.” The appeals court noted that while Hancock Park had disclosed the drainage problems to the Kamienowiczs, no such disclosure was made to Sclei.
The appeals court described Hancock Park’s argument that there is no risk of inconsistent rulings as “without merit.” The appeals court said that the issue “is not whether inconsistent rulings are inevitable but whether they are possible if arbitration is ordered.” Further, the court noted that “the Hancock Park defendants and the Lee Group have filed cross-complaints for indemnification against each other, further increasing the risk of inconsistent rulings.”
The court found for Lindemann, awarding her costs.
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Aecmaster’s Digital Twin: A New Era for Building Design
May 06, 2024 —
Aarni Heiskanen - AEC BusinessI sat down with Anssi Auvinen, the CEO and founder of Finnish startup Aecmaster, to discuss the future of design and how the company plans to make it happen. Anssi envisions data-driven design as the next radical change in the AEC sector.
Anssi Auvinen started working in the building industry as a 16-year-old construction worker. Since then, he has acquired two master’s degrees: structural engineering and architecture.
During his career, Anssi has witnessed how the digitalization of the design sector has progressed, but the results for both designers and building owners could have been more impressive. That inspired him in 2019 to start up
Aecmaster, a software and consulting firm that aims to fulfill the promise of digitalization. The company’s software product launched in January 2024.
The need for digital twins
Anssi states that you can’t say you own a building until you possess its digital assets, the digital twin.
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Aarni Heiskanen, AEC BusinessMr. Heiskanen may be contacted at
aec-business@aepartners.fi
Texas Court of Appeals Conditionally Grant Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Anderson
April 25, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFThe Texas Court of Appeals conditionally grant mandamus relief to Anderson Construction Company and Ronnie Anderson (collectively “Anderson”)… from the trial court in a construction defect lawsuit filed by Brent L. Mainwaring and Tatayana Mainwaring. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.001-.007 (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). Relators contend the trial court abused its discretion by compelling discovery while the case was abated by operation of law.
The Court of Appeals opinion describes what led up to the proceedings: “The Mainwarings’ original petition identified certain defects in their Anderson-constructed home. Those defects concerned the roof trusses and framing, air conditioning, mortar and masonry, exterior doors and windows, and weep holes. With respect to the five areas of defects identified in their original petition, the Mainwarings gave Anderson the statutorily required notice on January 13, 2010. After implementing agreed extensions, Anderson made an offer of settlement for the defects the Mainwarings identified in their notice. Almost eight months later, the Mainwarings filed an amended petition adding defects they had not included in their original petition and notice. The additional defects the Mainwarings included in their amended petition had not been addressed by Anderson’s offer of settlement.”
Following these events, Anderson claimed the Mainwarings did not respond in writing to their settlement offer. “Anderson filed a verified plea in abatement on December 2, 2010. In the trial court, Anderson claimed that the Mainwarings failed to respond in writing to Anderson’s settlement offer, as required by Section 27.004(b) of the RCLA. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(b)(1). The Mainwarings moved to compel discovery responses from Anderson. The Mainwarings alleged that they rejected Anderson’s settlement offer, and that if their response was insufficient, they contend that Anderson’s offer was rejected by operation of law on the twenty-fifth day after the Mainwarings received it. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(i). The Mainwarings’ motion to compel was not supported by affidavit. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(d)(2). On January 13, 2011, Anderson filed a verified supplemental plea in abatement. Anderson alleged that the Mainwarings failed to provide written notice concerning the newly alleged defects and complained the Mainwarings were attempting to circumvent the inspection and resolution procedure of the RCLA. Over Anderson’s objection that the lawsuit had been abated, the trial court granted the Mainwarings’ motion to compel discovery.”
After listening to both sides, the Court of Appeals offered this reasoning for their opinion: “The parties do not dispute that Anderson inspected the property before the Mainwarings alleged the existence of additional defects in their amended pleading, nor do the Mainwarings claim that Anderson has been given an opportunity to inspect the additional defects the Mainwarings identified in their amended pleadings. We conclude the trial court did not have the discretion to deny or lift the abatement until the Mainwarings established their compliance with the statute. In other words, the Mainwarings are required to provide Anderson a reasonable opportunity to inspect the additional defects identified by their amended pleading, which will allow Anderson the opportunity to cure or settle with respect to the newly identified defects.”
The Court of Appeals spoke directly on the issue of mandamus relief: “The Mainwarings contend that mandamus relief is not available because the trial court’s ruling does not prevent Anderson from making settlement offers during the discovery process. ‘An appellate remedy is “adequate” when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments.’ In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004). The failure to abate a case is typically not subject to mandamus. See In re Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. 2002) (citing Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. 1985)). In this case, however, the case was abated by operation of law. By ignoring the statutory abatement, the trial court interfered with the statutory procedure for developing and resolving construction defect claims. See In re Kimball Hill Homes Tex., Inc., 969 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (An appeal provides an inadequate remedy for the trial court’s failure to observe automatic abatement pursuant to the RCLA.). The benefits of mandamus review are not outweighed by the detriments of mandamus review in this case.“
In conclusion, “The trial court had no discretion to compel discovery while the case was abated, and Anderson, who has been compelled to respond to discovery during a period the case was under an automatic abatement, has no adequate remedy on appeal. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to vacate its order of February 3, 2011, and fails to refrain from proceeding with the case until a motion to reinstate is filed that establishes compliance with the notice and inspection requirements of the Residential Construction Liability Act.”
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April Rise in Construction Spending Not That Much
June 28, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFApril saw an increase in construction spending that didn’t even break a half of a percent with just a 0.4% increase, although that’s better than March’s slight decrease of 0.8%, Both government and residential construction spending dropped, although government spending dropped only 1.2% and residential a miniscule 0.1%. This was slightly more than offset by the modest 2.2% increase in residential spending.
Although the April gains were modest, they come after the first year to increase after five years of decline.
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Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Shares Fall on Wind-Down Measure
March 12, 2014 —
Clea Benson and Cheyenne Hopkins – BloombergCommon shares of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac experienced their biggest intraday drop in 10 months after leaders of the Senate Banking Committee announced plans to eliminate the companies in a new bill.
Fannie Mae shares tumbled as much as 44 percent, paring the losses to 31 percent to close in New York at $4.03, after Edwin Groshans, a managing director at Washington-based equity research firm Height Analytics LLC, described the proposal as holder-negative. Freddie Mac fell 27 percent to close at $4.04. Preferred shares also dropped, some by as much as 12 percent.
The bipartisan measure, drafted with input from President Barack Obama’s administration, would replace the U.S.-owned mortgage financiers with government bond insurance that would kick in only after private capital suffered losses of at least 10 percent, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Tim Johnson and Senator Mike Crapo said in a statement today. The bill would require most borrowers to make down payments of at least 5 percent.
Ms. Benson may be contacted at cbenson20@bloomberg.net; Ms. Hopkins may be contacted at chopkins19@bloomberg.net
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Clea Benson and Cheyenne Hopkins, Bloomberg
Defense for Additional Insured Not Barred By Sole Negligence Provision
August 11, 2011 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiA general contractor was entitled to a defense as an additional insured when the underlying complaint did not allege it was solely negligent. A-1 Roofing Co. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 656 (Ill. Ct. App. June 24, 2011).
A-1 was the general contractor for a roof resurfacing job at a high school. Jack Frost Iron Works Inc. (“Frost”) was one of A-1’s subcontractors. Frost had a CGL policy with Navigators Insurance Company under which A-1 was an additional insured.
An employee of Frost’s subcontractor Midwest Sheet Metal Inc. was killed at the job site when a boom-lift he was operating flipped over. The boom-lift had been leased by another Frost subcontractor, Bakes Steel Erectors, Inc. (BSE). The deceased's estate filed suit against A-1, BSE and two other defendants.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
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COVID-19 Business Interruption Lawsuits Begin: Iconic Oceana Grill in New Orleans Files Insurance Coverage Lawsuit
April 20, 2020 —
Jeffrey J. Vita & William S. Bennett - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.On Monday, the iconic New Orleans restaurant, Oceana Grill, filed the first Coronavirus-related business interruption insurance coverage lawsuit in a US jurisdiction. The declaratory judgment action styled Cajun Conti, LLC, et. al. d/b/a Oceana Grill v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London was filed in Louisiana state court for the Parish of Orleans. As a direct result of the government-mandated closures and restrictions on public gatherings implemented by the City of New Orleans and State of Louisiana, Oceana Grill’s petition anticipates a significant loss of business income.
Based on allegations in the petition, there are several aspects of Oceana Grill’s policy that make this a good test case for business interruption coverage stemming from the Coronavirus. Although the specific policy language is not quoted in the petition, coverage provisions are categorically identified throughout.
As a preliminary matter, the policy at issue appears to be written on an “all risks” basis, meaning the insuring agreement of the policy would likely be triggered generally by all risks of “physical loss or damage” unless specifically excluded. This basis for coverage, which is common in property policies, is advantageous to policyholders, as it limits the insured’s burden of proof to establishing that there was physical loss or damage while leaving the burden of applying any more specific exclusion to the insurance company.
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Jeffrey J. Vita, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. and
William S. Bennett, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Mr. Vita may be contacted at jjv@sdvlaw.com
Mr. Bennett may be contacted at wsb@sdvlaw.com
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Contract, Breach of Contract, and Material Breach of Contract
July 05, 2023 —
Wendy Rosenstein - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCAt its most basic level, a contract is an agreement to make a trade. Parties to a contract agree to perform a specific action on the condition that the other side also performs a specific action. For instance, you and a Girl Scout could create a contract in which the Girl Scout agrees to deliver one box of cookies and you agree to pay her $6.00. In this case, both you and the Girl Scout have obligations under the contract.
If the Girl Scout failed to send you the cookies, what do you do? You send her a note, in writing, telling her that you expect the cookies (or assurance that you will get the cookies) within a certain amount of time—this is notice and the opportunity to cure. Most contracts have a “notice and opportunity to cure” provision, which essentially says that one side must give the other side an opportunity to fix breaches before canceling the contract. Once a party receives a notice to cure, they must either rectify the problem or offer adequate assurances that they will fix the problem. Generally, the party has only a short period of time to address the breach.
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Wendy Rosenstein, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC
