Contract’s Definition of “Substantial Completion” Does Not Apply to Third Party for Purposes of SOL, Holds Court of Appeal
June 15, 2020 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogThose of you in the construction industry know that the two primary statutes of limitation are the 4-year year statute of limitations for patent defects and 10-year statute of limitations for latent defects. Both statutes begin to run on “substantial completion.”
In Hensel Phelps Construction Co. v. Superior Court of San Diego, Case No. D076264 (January 22, 2020), the 4th District Court of Appeal examined whether the term “substantial completion,” as used in Civil Code section 941, which applies to residential construction, can be defined by the parties’ contract and applied to third-parties.
The Hensel Phelps Case
Hensel Phelps Construction Co. entered into a prime construction contract with the owner and developer of a mixed-use project in San Diego. Hensel Phelps was the general contractor on the project. The project included a residential condominium tower which would eventually be managed and maintained by Smart Corner Owners Association. Smart Corners was not a party to the contract.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
Revamp to Nationwide Permits Impacting Oil and Gas Pipeline, Utility and Telecom Line Work
March 29, 2021 —
Alex P. Prochaska, Jones Walker LLP - ConsensusDocsTo avoid delay costs and penalties, contractors involved in pipeline and utilities construction maintenance, repair and removal need to understand how the 43 year old Nationwide Permit (NWP) regime has changed specific to the NWP 12 and what is now required for compliance. This change is important for contractors who construct, maintain, or repair pipelines that cross or impact waters of the United States, including wetlands. NWPs are a useful tool to streamline construction of a pipeline project, but it is important for contractors to know when certain terms and conditions still apply to the particular NWP and those that have been eliminated.
On January 13, 2021, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) published a final rule that reissued and modified twelve existing NWPs and issued four new NWPs that will take effect on March 15, 2021.1 The remaining 40 NWPs that were not reissued or modified under this rule will continue under the general conditions and definitions of the January 6, 2017 final rule.
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Alex P. Prochaska, Jones Walker LLPMr. Prochaska may be contacted at
aprochaska@joneswalker.com
Virginia Families Hope to Sue over Chinese Drywall
October 10, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFAlthough Virginia isn't in the Fifth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals, some Virginia homeowners ended up with a case there. And now the court has to decide whether Taishan Gypsum Co. Ltd. can be sued in American courts for defects in its products. The case made its way to Louisiana after the courts consolidated cases from across the country. If the court decides that the homeowners can’t sue, they could appeal to the Supreme Court, although that’s likely a longshot. Or, the homeowners could sue in the Chinese courts, also not likely.
More than 300 homes in Virginia are affected by fumes from the Chinese-made drywall, but only seven residents in the town of Hampton Roads are at the heart of the current case. They were chosen as representative of the entire group. Those seven have been collectively awarded $2.6 million, but the drywall manufacturer is appealing the judgement. If Taishan is victorious, then the damages already awarded will be overturned and there won’t be an option for the others.
The drywall emitted gases which corroded metals in the homes. One couple, Steve and Liz Heischober went through seven air conditioning coils in three years, along with problems with corrosion of appliances and electrical systems. If the current suit succeeds, the Heischobers, and the other, will be compensated for their damages, including the costs of repair and relocation. If Taishan loses, they could be responsible for about $1 billion.
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2016 California Construction Law Upate
December 10, 2015 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogThe California State Legislature saw the introduction of 2,297 bills during the first half of the 2015-2016 legislative session of which 1,010 bills were signed into law.
For contractors, the bill (now law), having the most immediate effect is SB 467, which increases the license bond amount required of all contractors from $12,500 to $15,000. In addition to licensing changes, 2015 saw the enactment of a number of bills providing for alternative project delivery methods from design-build, to CM at risk, to public-private partnerships, and even the expanded use of enhanced infrastructure financing districts as the state enters its fourth year since the abolishment of redevelopment agencies.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
PAGA Right of Action Not Applicable to Construction Workers Under Collective Bargaining Agreement
December 26, 2022 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogCalifornia is one of the most employee-friendly states in the country. From strict hiring laws (don’t think about asking about an applicant’s criminal, credit or even salary history), to generous benefits (minimum wage, overtime, meal and rest breaks, family medical leave, etc.) and strict anti-harassment laws (if you have to think about it, even for a second, don’t do it), to protections for terminated workers (whistle blower protections, WARN notices, non-compete restrictions), California workers enjoy protections that many others do not.
This includes PAGA, or the Private Attorneys General Act, which authorizes aggrieved employees to file lawsuits against their employers to recover civil penalties on behalf of themselves, other employees, and the State of California for Labor Code violations. In general, the right of an employee to file a PAGA action cannot be waived by contract. However, Labor Code section 2699.6 which was enacted in 2018 provides an exception for construction workers who perform work under certain collective bargaining agreements.
In the next case, Oswald v. Murray Plumbing and heating Corporation, 82 Cal.App.5th 938 (2022), the 2nd District Court of Appeal examined whether collective bargaining agreement with a retroactive date, signed after an employee was terminated, precluded an employee from bringing a PAGA action.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
“Based On”… What Exactly? NJ Appellate Division Examines Phrase and Estops Insurer From Disclaiming Coverage for 20-Month Delay
August 20, 2019 —
Anthony L. Miscioscia and Timothy A. Carroll - White and Williams LLPOn May 28, 2019, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division examined the phrase “based on” in an assault-and-battery exclusion, finding that the phrase means “to make, form, or serve as the foundation of any claim, demand or suit.” C.M.S. Investment Ventures, Inc. v. American European Insurance Company, No. A-2056-17T3, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1215, at *8-9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 28, 2019) (CMS). The CMS case is also notable because the Appellate Division held that a 20-month delay in disclaiming coverage was unreasonable and therefore warranted estoppel.
In CMS, the insured was allegedly warned by its tenant about a faulty ground-floor window that failed to lock properly. Afterward, an intruder broke into the tenant’s apartment and sexually assaulted the tenant, who sued the insured on a premises liability claim. Before she filed suit, the tenant sought payment from the insured’s CGL insurer directly. The insurer denied coverage based on the assault-and-battery exclusion and closed the file, but never informed the insured. Later, the tenant sued the insured, which sought a defense and indemnity from its insurer, which again denied coverage based on the exclusion. The insured then sought a declaration of coverage on grounds that the exclusion was ambiguous, and the insurer “was estopped from denying coverage, because it waited [20] months to inform CMS of its coverage decision.” The trial court ruled in the insured’s favor which led to the appeal in CMS.
Reprinted courtesy of
Timothy Carroll, White and Williams LLP and
Anthony Miscioscia, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Miscioscia may be contacted at misciosciaa@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Carroll may be contacted at carrollt@whiteandwilliams.com
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Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 —
Samir R. Patel, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLPThere has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
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Courts Generally Favor the Enforcement of Arbitration Provisions
May 10, 2021 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn recent posts (
here and
here) I have discussed arbitration provisions and cases dealing with the enforceability of arbitration provisions.
The case of Lemos v. Sessa, 46 Fla.L.Weekly D701a (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) deals with two noteworthy principles when it comes to arbitration that warrant another post about arbitration provisions.
First, courts will and should try to resolve any ambiguity in arbitration provisions in favor of arbitration.
Second, when there is an offending arbitration provision or one that includes language that violates public policy, the trial court “should sever the offending provisions from the arbitration clause so long as such severance does not undermine the parties’ intent.” Lemos, supra. This principle is reinforced when the arbitration provision is in an agreement that contains a severability provision.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
