A Teaming Agreement is Still a Contract (or, Be Careful with Agreements to Agree)
November 18, 2019 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsI have discussed teaming agreements in this past here at Construction Law Musings. These agreements are most typically where one of two entities meets a contracting requirement but may not have the capacity to fulfill a contract on its own so brings in another entity to assist. However, these agreements are contracts and are treated as such here in Virginia with all of the law of contracts behind them.
One illustrative case occurred here in Virginia and was decided by the Virginia Supreme Court. That case is CGI Fed. Inc. v. FCi Fed. Inc. While this is not strictly a “construction” case, it helps lay out some of the pitfalls of teaming agreements in general.
In this case, the parties entered into a fairly typical small business (FCI) Big Business (CGI) teaming arrangement for the processing of visas for the State Department. The parties negotiated the workshare percentage (read payment percentage) should FCI get the work and the teaming agreement set out a framework for the negotiation of a subcontract between FCI, the proposed general contractor, and CGI, the proposed subcontractor. After a while working together, FCI submitted a proposal to the State Department and as part of the negotiations of this proposal, the work percentage for CGI was lowered in exchange for some management positions for CGI relative to the work by amendment to the original teaming agreement. However, one day later FCI submitted a proposal to the State Department that not only didn’t include the management positions, but further lowered CGI’s workshare.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Colorado Supreme Court Issues Decisions on Statute of Limitations for Statutory Bad Faith Claims and the Implied Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
July 11, 2018 —
Jennifer Arnett-Roehrich - Gordon & Rees Insurance Coverage Law BlogThe Colorado Supreme Court has been busy the past two weeks, issuing a couple rulings that should be of interest to the insurance industry:
Statute of Limitations for Bad Faith Statute: In Rooftop Restoration, Inc. v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 2018 CO 44 (May 29, 2018), the Colorado Supreme Court held that the one-year statute of limitations that applies to penalties, does not apply to claims brought under C.R.S. 10-3-1116, Colorado’s statutory cause of action for unreasonable delay or denial of benefits. Section 10-3-1116 provides that a first-party claimant whose claim for payment of benefits has been unreasonably delayed or denied may seek to recover attorney fees, costs, and two times the covered benefit, in addition to the covered benefit. A separate Colorado statute, CRS 13-80-103(1)(d) provides a one-year statute of limitations for “any penalty or forfeiture of any penal statutes.” To arrive at the conclusion that the double damages available under section 10-3-1116 is not a penalty, the Court looked at yet another statutory provision, governing accrual of causes of action for penalties, which provides that a penalty cause of action accrues when “the determination of overpayment or delinquency . . . is no longer subject to appeal.” The Court stated that because a cause of action under 10-3-1116 “never leads to a determination of overpayment or delinquency . . . the claim would never accrue, and the statute of limitations would be rendered meaningless.” Para. 15. Presumably, the default two-year statute of limitations, provided by CRS 13-80-102(1)(i), will now be found to apply to causes of action seeking damages for undue delay or denial of insurance benefits.
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Jennifer Arnett-Roehrich, Gordon & Rees Scully MansukhaniMs. Arnett-Roehrich may be contacted at
jarnett-roehrich@grsm.com
Another Colorado Construction Defect Reform Bill Dies
May 07, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFColorado construction defects reform Senate Bill 220 died when “Senate President Morgan Carroll, D-Aurora, declined to call a second committee to hear” the bill, according to Ed Sealover writing for the Denver Business Journal. Sen. Carroll declared that the “bill backers” did not incorporate any of the “suggestions she or House Speaker Mark Ferrandino had given them.”
“SB 220 would have required condo-unit owners to submit to alternative-dispute resolution such as arbitration or mediation if the unit developer required it,” Sealover reported. “And it would have required that a majority of members of a homeowners association agree to file a lawsuit, a standard significantly larger than the two-person bar that now must be met.”
Bill Cosponsor Sen. Mark Scheffel, R-Castle Rock, “believes litigation reform” will become “an election issue and” that it “has strong momentum heading into the 2015 session.”
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The Double-Breasted Dilemma
July 18, 2022 —
Lauren E. Rankins & Saloni Shah - ConsensusDocsWhat Is A Double-Breasted Operation?
A double-breasted operation is when a firm has two entities, and one entity performs work under collective bargaining agreements and the other does not. While this type of operation is not outright prohibited, it is often subject to a variety of challenges and scrutiny. To legally run a double-breasted operation, the two companies must remain separate and distinct. If the companies are not sufficiently separate and distinct from one another, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) or a court may find that the two companies are operating as a single entity or that the non-union company, or also known as the open shop, is merely an alter ego of the union company and, therefore, bound by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
In order to determine whether the companies are sufficiently separate and distinct, the two entities must pass either the single employer test or the alter ego test depending on the nature of the double-breasted operation. Typically, the single employer test is used when the two entities run parallel operations, and the alter ego test is used when the open shop replaces the union company. Under the single employer test, the NLRB or courts will generally consider four factors: (1) the interrelation of operations; (2) common management; (3) common control of labor relations; and (4) common ownership. The alter ego test does not require a finding that the companies are a single bargaining unit, but analyzes to what extent the two entities have substantially identical management, business operation and purpose, business equipment, customers, and ownership. While common ownership is a factor considered under both the single employer and alter ego tests, common ownership alone is not dispositive of whether the companies are sufficiently separate and distinct. In other words, the NLRB and courts do not simply look for common ownership to determine whether the double-breasted operation is lawful. It is merely one of many factors to consider.
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Lauren E. Rankins, Watt, Tieder, Hoffar & Fitzgerald, LLP (ConsensusDocs)Ms. Rankins may be contacted at
lrankins@watttieder.com
Insurers' Motion to Void Coverage for Failure to Attend EUO Denied
January 04, 2023 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe insurer's motion for summary judgment and disposal of the insureds' claim due to failure to attend an examination under oath (EUO) was denied. Perkins v Syndicate 4242 of Lloyd's of London, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196922 (W.D. La. Oct. 28, 2022).
The insureds' home suffered damage from Hurricane Laura on August 27, 2020, and Hurricane Delta on October 9, 2020. The insureds reported damage after Hurricane Laura under the homeowners policy. They filed suit in August 2021, alleging that Lloyds failed to adequately inspect their claims. The court issued a Case Management Order (CMO) that governed initial disclosures and the parties' participation in a streamlined settlement process for hurricane claims. The dispute did not settle, however, so the matter was set for a bench trial.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Coronavirus and Contract Obligations
March 30, 2020 —
David R. Cook - AHC Construction and Procurement BlogThe Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has caused a global disruption to businesses, causing many to temporarily close and lay off employees. As businesses assess the short– and long–term economic impact of COVID-19, they should also evaluate what contractual obligations and remedies are available under various agreements (e.g., leases, vendor agreements, and supply agreements). When performance may be delayed or may not occur altogether, businesses should consider their force majeure clauses, if any, and the doctrines of impossibility, impracticability, and frustration of purpose.
Force Majeure
Generally, unless a contract provides that performance will be suspended or relieved when certain events occur (e.g., “acts of God,” government regulation, acts of war or terror, strikes), each party is obligated to perform. However, when there is an express force majeure provision, certain events or acts may excuse non-performance or delayed performance. But depending on the jurisdiction, courts may construe force majeure provisions narrowly and excuse performance only for those events expressly listed in the clause. Nonetheless, if the force majeure provision includes pandemic, epidemic, quarantine, government act, disease, or similar terms, then the COVID-19 pandemic may excuse performance or allow delayed performance.
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David R. Cook, Autry, Hall & Cook, LLPMr. Cook may be contacted at
cook@ahclaw.com
Congratulations 2019 DE, NJ and PA Super Lawyers and Rising Stars
May 26, 2019 —
White and Williams LLPFifteen White and Williams lawyers have been named by Super Lawyers as a Delaware, New Jersey or Pennsylvania "Super Lawyer" while eight received "Rising Star" designations. Each lawyer who received the distinction competed in a rigorous selection process which took into consideration peer recognition and professional achievement. The lawyers named to this year's Super Lawyer list represent a multitude of practices throughout the firm.
| Super Lawyers 2019 |
|---|
| Attorney | Practice Area |
|---|
| John Balaguer |
PI Defense: Med Mal |
| Kevin Cottone |
PI Defense: Med Mal |
| Thomas Goutman |
Class Action |
| David Haase |
Business Litigation |
| Christopher Leise |
Civil Litigation: Defense |
| Randy Maniloff |
Insurance Coverage |
| David Marion |
Business Litigation |
| Peter Mooney |
Business Litigation |
| Michael Olsan |
Insurance Coverage |
| John Orlando |
General Litigation |
| Wesley Payne |
Insurance Coverage |
| Daryn Rush |
Insurance Coverage |
| Anthony Salvino |
Workers’ Comp |
| Patricia Santelle |
Insurance Coverage |
| Andrew Susko |
Civil Litigation: Defense |
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White and Williams LLP
Economic Damages and the Right to Repair Act: You Can’t Have it Both Ways
March 16, 2017 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogIn 2002, the California State Legislature passed Senate Bill 800 also known as the Right to Repair Act (Civil Code Sections 895 et seq.) in an effort to stem a then rising tide in residential construction defect litigation.
SB 800, which applies to newly constructed residential units including single-family homes and condominiums (but not condominium conversions) sold after January 1, 2003, was intended to curb residential construction defect lawsuits by giving developers and others in the construction chain an opportunity to repair construction defects before being sued in court. SB 800 also provides minimum construction standards and limits the time in which a homeowner can bring a claim for construction defects.
In Acqua Vista Homeowners Association v. MWI, Case No. D068406 (January 26, 2017), the California Court of Appeals for the Fourth District examined the circumstances in which homeowners can sue a material supplier under the Right to Repair Act.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
