FAIRFIELD CONNECTICUT BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

What You Need to Know About “Ipso Facto” Clauses and Their Impact on Termination of a Contractor or Subcontractor in a Bankruptcy

September 12, 2022 — Martha B. Chovanes & Laurie A. Stanziale - ConsensusDocs
While contractor bankruptcies have long been an issue in the construction industry, in the aftermath of COVID-19 and the resultant labor, material and supply-chain delays, contractor bankruptcies are of even greater concern. Many construction contracts attempt to protect the upstream party from a bankruptcy filing of its contractor or subcontractor by providing for an automatic right to terminate a contract, referred to as “ipso facto” clauses. However, such clauses are generally unenforceable as bankruptcy laws, specifically Section 365(e) of Title 11 of the United States Code, protect the party filing for bankruptcy (the “Debtor”) from unilateral termination of the contract by the non-Debtor party. What is an “Ipso Facto” clause? An ipso facto clause is a provision in an agreement which permits its termination by one party due to the bankruptcy, insolvency or financial condition of the other party. Reprinted courtesy of Martha B. Chovanes, Fox Rothschild LLP (ConsensusDocs) and Laurie A. Stanziale, Fox Rothschild LLP (ConsensusDocs) Ms. Chovanes may be contacted at mchovanes@foxrothschild.com Ms. Stanziale may be contacted at lstanziale@foxrothschild.com Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

Arbitration Clause Found Ambiguous in Construction Defect Case

October 28, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

The California Court of Appeals ruled on September 28 in the case of Burch v. Premier Homes. Ms. Burch bought a home after negotiating various addendums to the contract. The contract was a standard California Association of Realtors contract to which both the buyer and seller made additions. At issue in this case was paragraph 17 of the contract which included that “Buyer and Seller agree that any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.”

The seller/defendant’s Addendum 2 “included provisions relating to the arbitration of disputes that may arise.” Ms. Burch’s realtor, Lisa Morrin, told Burch that “she had never seen a proposed contractual provision that would require a home buyer to agree to arbitrate with a builder over construction defects.” Ms. Burch told Morrin that she did not want to buy the property if she would have to give up her rights under California law.

As part of Addendum 2, the buyer had to buy a warranty from the Home Buyers Warranty Corporation. The sale was held up for a while, as Ms. Burch waited for a copy of the warranty. When she received it, she took further exception to Addendum 2. Scott Warren of Premier Homes said he could not sell the property without Addendum 2. Ms. Burch told her realtor that despite the claims made by Mr. Warren that this was for her benefit, she felt it was more to the benefit of Premier Homes. Don Aberbrook of HBW agreed to the clause, contained in the final sentence of Addendum 2, being struck.

Subsequent to buying the home, Burch submitted a claim concerning construction defects. HBW denied the claim and Burch began an action against the defendants. Premier filed a motion to compel arbitration which Burch opposed.

The trial court ruled that the striking out of the arbitration clause at the end of Addendum 2 “created a conflict with respect to the parties’ intent as to the scope of arbitration.” The trial court found that “the parties’ intention was to preserve Burch’s right to make state law claims including her right to a jury trial for any non-warranty claims against the builder.”

The appeals court in their ruling looked at the standard of review and concluded that the purchase agreement was ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence was required to resolve that ambiguity. As the contract contained contradictory provisions as to whether or not arbitration was required, it was necessary for the trial court to examine these claims. The appeals court found that the evidence supported the conclusions of the trial court.

Finally, the appeals court found that “there was no valid agreement to arbitrate disputes.” The court noted that arbitration can only happen by mutual consent and “it is clear that Burch did not enter into an agreement to arbitrate any construction defect disputes she might have.”

Read the court’s decision…

Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

Indemnity Provision Prevails Over "Other Insurance" Clause

December 06, 2021 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
The Second Circuit predicted that the New York appellate courts would find the contractual indemnity provision prevailed over the application of an "other insurance" provisions. Cent. Sur. Co. v. Metro. Transit Auth., 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 29860 (2nd Cir. Oct. 5,2021). Long Island Railroad (LIRR) contracted with general contractor Rukh Enterprises, Inc. to complete a railroad bridge lead paint removal and repainting project on Metropolitan Transit Authority property. Rukh hired subcontractor, East Coast Painting & Maintenance to complete certain lead-related work on the project. An employee of East Coast suffered an injury while working on the project. The employee sued LIRR and Rukh. A settlement in the underlying case was reached, implicating three of four policies - Admiral (primary for LIRR), Arch (CGL for Rukh), and Harleysville (primary for East Coast). Century Surety (excess liability for Rukh) did not contribute to the settlement and disclaimed all coverage. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

---

Investigation Continues on Children Drowning at Construction Site

August 13, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
Two months ago, in Hobart, Illinois, two young boys (brothers) “drowned in an unsecured, excavated pit that filled with water” on a site owned by Goldschmidt Construction Services LLC of Hobart. The Post-Tribune reported that “Police Chief Richard Zormier said the department is waiting on reports from other agencies as it continues to investigate circumstances surrounding” the accident. “We want to be thorough. The young boys deserve it. Their family deserves it,” Zormier told the Post-Tribune. The family of the victims has filed a $60 million lawsuit against Goldschmidt Construction. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

No Coverage for Negligent Misrepresentation without Allegations of “Bodily Injury” or “Property Damage”

February 10, 2012 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii

Jeff City Industries was the general contractor for a sewer system improvement project in Branson, Missouri. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. United HRB Gen. Contractors, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145666 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 19, 2011). Branson sued Jeff City, alleging breach of the construction contract for the project. The claims included improperly bedded sewer piping, improper aligning portions of trenching for the sewer piping, improper service line connections to the sewer piping, etc.

Read the full story…

 

Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

What’s the Best Way to “Use” a Construction Attorney?

January 04, 2023 — Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law Musings
The question in the title of this post is one I think about a lot. I have also discussed some aspects of this topic previously here at Musings. As 2022 winds down and we head into 2023, my thoughts have landed back on how I as a construction lawyer can help my clients and how my construction industry clients can help me to be more effective. This post will focus on the latter aspect of the representation process. The first key aspect to helping your construction counsel more effectively assist you with any aspect of your construction business is to communicate. Attorneys are only as good as the information that we have. Always remember that while you as the contractor lived the project about which you called your attorney, that attorney is just hearing about it for the first time. Construction lawyers spend a lot of time playing catch-up and trying to get familiar with all aspects (good and bad) of your claim or issue. Do not assume that even the most knowledgeable construction attorney can anticipate how the evidence and facts will come out over the course of a representation. Attorneys apply law to facts, it is up to the client to give the attorney the initial facts. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of The Law Office of Christopher G. Hill
Mr. Hill may be contacted at chrisghill@constructionlawva.com

---

New Jersey Court Rules on Statue of Repose Case

May 26, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

A three-judge panel issued a per curium ruling on May 23 in Fairview Heights Condo. v. Investors (N.J. Super., 2011), a case which the members of a condominium board argued: “that the judge erred by: 1) dismissing plaintiff’s claims against RLI based upon the statute of repose; 2) dismissing the breach of fiduciary duty claims against the Luppinos based upon a lack of expert opinion; 3) barring the testimony of Gonzalez; and 4) barring the May 23, 1989 job site report.” The court rejected all claims from the condominium board.

The court found that the building must be unsafe for the statute of repose to apply. They noted, “the judge made no findings on whether the water seepage, or the property damage caused by such seepage, in any way rendered the building, or any of the units, unsafe.” Further, “without a specific finding on the question of whether the defects had rendered the building ‘unsafe,’ defendants were not entitled to the benefit of the ten-year statute of repose.“

On the second point, the court also upheld the lower court’s findings regarding the management company:

“The report submitted by Berman establishes that the EIFS product was defective in its design and would therefore have failed from the outset. The defects in that product were, according to Berman, not prone to repair or other mitigation. Therefore, even if defendants did not appropriately inspect or repair the EIFS, their failure to do so would have had no impact on the long-term performance of the EIFS exterior cladding. As plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on these questions, the judge properly granted summary judgment to the Luppinos on plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.”

On the final two points, the judges noted “plaintiff maintains that the judge committed reversible error when he excluded the Gonzalez certification and the 1989 job site report prepared by Raymond Brzuchalski.” They saw “no abuse of discretion related to the exclusion of the Gonzalez certification, and reject plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary.” Of the job site report, they found, “no abuse of discretion in the judge's finding that the Brzuchalski 1989 job site report did not satisfy the requirements of N.J.R.E.803(c)(6).”

Read the court’s decision

Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

California Governor Signs SB 496 Amending California’s Anti-Indemnity Statute

June 05, 2017 — William S. Bennett - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
The bill amends Cal. Civ. Code § 2782.8 as it applies to indemnity agreements with design professionals. The pre-existing § 2782.8 prohibited public agencies from requiring indemnity from design professionals for anything other than claims arising out of, pertaining to, or relating to the negligence, recklessness, or willful misconduct of the design professional. Under the newly passed bill, the indemnity restrictions imposed on public agencies when contracting with design professionals will now apply to all parties contracting with design professionals for professional services (effective Jan. 1, 2018). These restrictions also apply to a party contractually imposing a defense obligation on the design professional. The revised statute specifically identifies architects, landscape architects, professional engineers, and professional land surveyors as included within the meaning of “design professional,” however it is unclear whether that is the extent of the phrase’s meaning. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of William S. Bennett, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Mr. Bennett may be contacted at wsb@sdvlaw.com

---