Whether Subcontractor's Faulty Workmanship Is an Occurrence Creates Ambiguity
March 16, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Ohio Court of Appeals determined that the CGL policy was ambiguous as to whether a subcontractor's faulty workmanship was an "occurrence." Ohio N. Univ. v. Charles Constr. Serv., 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 258 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2017).
In 2007, Ohio Northern University (ONU) entered a contract with Charles Construction Services, Inc. (CCS) to construct a hotel on the campus. In 2011, the building was completed, but ONU found water intrusion and moisture damage in the interior. When remediating the water damage, ONU found additional, serious structural defects.
ONU sued CCS, alleging breach of contract, breach of express warranty, and negligent misrepresentation. CCS filed a third-party action against many of its subcontractors. Cincinnati Insurance Company (CIC) intervened and filed a cross-claim for a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to provide coverage to CCS. CIC and ONU filed cross motions for summary judgment.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
New Jersey Construction Company Owner and Employees Arrested for Fraud
December 04, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFFrank Chimento, Jr., the owner of Chimento Construction of Parsippany, New Jersey, and three of his employees, Joseph Carsillo, Frank Chimento III, and Carl J. Corso, were arrested by federal agents. The elder Chimento is accused of falsifying his own income taxes, as well as failing to collect and turn over federal and state payroll taxes. He is additionally charged with falsifying union benefit fund contributions.
The three employees are also accused of filing false income tax statements and also of attempting to defraud the state of New Jersey of unemployment compensation benefits. An additional unnamed conspirator made transactions at multiple financial institutions in order to pay employees directly in cash.
One of the three employees, Mr. Carsillo, worked for the company and received cash payments while maintaining to the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development that he was unemployed. Mr. Carsillo was receiving $526 per week from the NJDOL-WD in unemployment benefits, starting in 2009. From 2009 through 2011, Mr. Carsillo received $19,988 in unemployment benefits and an additional $351,788 in wages from Chimento.
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Repeated Use of Defective Fireplace Triggers Duty to Defend Even if Active Fire Does Not Break Out Until After End of Policy Period
November 30, 2016 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Tidwell Enterprises v. Financial Pacific Ins. Co. (No. C078665, filed 11/29/16), a California appeals court held that that even though a house fire occurred after the policy period, there was nonetheless a possibility of coverage because the fire might have been the result of ongoing damage to the wood in the chimney chase during the policy period, due to the exposure of that wood to excessive heat from the chimney every time a fire was burned in the fireplace.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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Court of Appeals Confirms that King County Superior Court’s Jury Selection Process Satisfies Due Process Requirements
December 04, 2023 —
Joshua Lane - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCRaymond Budd developed mesothelioma after working with a drywall product called “joint compound” from 1962 to 1972. He sued Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc. and others for damages, contending that the company’s joint compound caused his illness. A jury returned a verdict in Budd’s favor and awarded him nearly $13.5 million. Kaiser appealed, claiming (1) insufficient randomness in the jury-selection process, (2) erroneous transcription of expert testimony, (3) lack of proximate causation, (4) lack of medical causation, (5) an improper jury instruction on defective design, (6) improper exclusion of sexual battery and marital discord evidence, (7) improper admission of post-exposure evidence, (8) improper exclusion of regulatory provisions, and (9) a failure to link its product to Budd’s disease. The Court of Appeals, Division 1, affirmed the verdict in favor of Budd.
Though all of the nine bases for error raised by Kaiser merit discussion, the jury-selection process issue is most probative here. Kaiser made three challenges against the jury selection process.
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Joshua Lane, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMr. Lane may be contacted at
joshua.lane@acslawyers.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Watchdog Opens Cartel Probe Into Eight British Homebuilders
April 02, 2024 —
Damian Shepherd & Katharine Gemmell - BloombergBritain’s top antitrust enforcer has opened an investigation into eight housebuilders to probe potential information sharing, sharpening scrutiny of a sector that’s failing to deliver enough affordable housing to meet demand.
The Competition and Markets Authority has opened a cartel investigation into eight developers including Barratt Developments Plc, the Berkeley Group, Persimmon Plc and Vistry Group Plc. The investigation centers on concerns the companies may have exchanged competitively sensitive information, which could be influencing the build-out of sites and the prices of new homes. An initial review will take place until December.
CMA Chief Executive Officer Sarah Cardell told Bloomberg Television the watchdog had seen potential evidence of companies exchanging information relating to pricing, sales rates, and incentives offered to new homebuyers. The watchdog has the power to fine firms a maximum penalty of as much as 10% of annual revenue and disqualify directors following cartel investigations.
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Damian Shepherd, Bloomberg and
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Candis Jones Named to Atlanta Magazine’s 2024 “Atlanta 500” List
February 26, 2024 —
Candis Jones - Lewis Brisbois NewsroomAtlanta, Ga. (February 9, 2024) – Atlanta Partner Candis R. Jones has been named to Atlanta Magazine’s 2024 “Atlanta 500” list of the most powerful law professionals in Atlanta. This is the fourth year in a row she has received this recognition.
To compile this list, the publication reviewed nominations from the public and consulted experts across various sectors. The magazine’s editors and writers considered not only the status of the nominees within their respective organizations, but also whether the nominees were visionaries who led programs for their communities and created opportunities for employees. According to Atlanta Magazine, this list is “an anthology of the power that resides in Atlanta.”
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Candis Jones, Lewis BrisboisMs. Jones may be contacted at
Candis.Jones@lewisbrisbois.com
United States Supreme Court Limits Class Arbitration
May 13, 2019 —
Jeffrey K. Brown & Raymond J. Nhan - Payne & FearsOn April 24, 2019, the United States Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") bars orders requiring class arbitration when an agreement is ambiguous about the availability of such a procedure. Lamps Plus v. Varela, 587 U.S. __ , 2019 WL 1780275, (2019). In Lamps Plus, the Court clarified a 2010 case in which it held that a court may not compel arbitration on a class-wide basis when an agreement is silent on the availability of class arbitration. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 687 (2012).
In Lamps Plus, a 5-4 decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court explained that because the FAA envisions the use of traditional individualized arbitration, a party cannot be forced under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless the parties explicitly agreed to do so. Because class arbitration does not share the benefits of traditional arbitration -- lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the parties' choice of a neutral -- the FAA requires more than an "ambiguous" agreement to show that the parties bound themselves to arbitrate on a class-wide basis. Unlike individualized arbitration, or even traditional class actions, class arbitration raises serious due process concerns because absent class members will have limited judicial review. Based on these critical differences between individual and class arbitration, the Court reiterated in Lamps Plus that "courts may not infer consent to participate in class arbitration absent an affirmative contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so."
Reprinted courtesy of
Jeffrey K. Brown, Payne & Fears and
Raymond J. Nhan, Payne & Fears
Mr. Brown may be contacted at jkb@paynefears.com
Mr. Nhan may be contacted at rjn@paynefears.com
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