FAIRFIELD CONNECTICUT BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

The American Rescue Plan Act: What Restaurants Need to Act on NOW

March 22, 2021 — Michael Krueger - Newmeyer Dillion
The American Rescue Plan Act (“Act”) was passed by the Senate over the weekend and passed by the House today. President Biden is set to sign the Act into law on Friday, March 12th. The Act has $1.9 Trillion in relief funds with $28.6 Billion set aside for the restaurant industry in the Restaurant Revitalization Fund (“Fund”). The Fund has apportioned funds into two funding groups; $5 Billion for restaurants with annual gross revenue under $500,000 and $23.6 Billion for restaurants over $500,000 in annual gross revenue. Differences from the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) This is a grant program with no loan documents or forgiveness applications. Instead, each restaurant entity can apply for and receive up to $10M in grant funds through the Act. The amount a restaurant receives is based on the sum of the restaurant’s gross revenue in 2019 minus the gross revenue in 2020 minus PPP and EIDL money received. For example, Restaurant A made $7M gross revenue in 2019, made $3M gross revenue in 2020 and received $1M in PPP and EIDL combined. ($7M - $3M -$1M =$3M) The restaurant will receive $3M in grant funds directly from the SBA (as long as funds are available). Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Michael Krueger, Newmeyer Dillion
Mr. Krueger may be contacted at michael.krueger@ndlf.com

---

New Case Alert: California Federal Court Allows Policy Stacking to Cover Continuous Injury

November 23, 2016 — William S. Bennett - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
“Stacking” is a practice that is very favorable for policyholders, especially in environmental coverage cases involving extended pollution events. It allows a policyholder to combine the limits of multiple consecutive policies to cover continuous injury claims occurring over multiple policy periods. Without stacking, insurers can limit a policyholder’s recovery to a single policy limit. The Eastern District of California recently decided that a policyholder could stack the limits of six consecutive policies, where the occurrence was a continuous injury spanning all six policy years. Among other rulings, the court determined that the plain language of the policy under dispute did not prevent stacking. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of William S. Bennett, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Mr. Bennett may be contacted at wsb@sdvlaw.com

---

Under the Hood of U.S. Construction Spending Is Revised Data

January 06, 2016 — Vince Golle – Bloomberg
Here’s one key takeaway from the Commerce Department’s report Monday on U.S. construction spending. The 0.4 percent decrease in November, which itself was weaker than the most pessimistic Bloomberg survey forecast, was accompanied by downward revisions to prior months. The combination suggests some economists may revise down their fourth-quarter GDP tracking forecasts. * October construction spending rose 0.3 percent, compared with a prior estimate of 1 percent, while September outlays advanced 0.2 percent versus a previous estimate of a 0.6 percent gain Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Vince Golle, Bloomberg

---

Montana Court Finds Duty to Defend over Construction Defect Allegation

February 14, 2013 — CDJ STAFF
The U.S. District Court for Montana recently ruled on a case with underlying construction defect issues. Brian Margolies discussed Lukes v. Mid-Continent on the blog run by his firm, Traub Lieverman Straus & Shrewsberry LLP. In the construction defect case, the homeowner “alleged that the siding warped and pulled away from the house, which allowed for water intrusion and resulting exterior and interior damage.” Further, there were claims that “the insured or its subcontractor failed to install proper flashing, which also allowed for water intrusion.” The insured was Bernie Rubio, who had a general liability policy from Mid-Continent. Mid-Continent disclaimed coverage, citing sections of the business risk exclusions. The court did not find the clauses ambiguous, but concluded that they didn’t apply to the facts of the case. While the court concluded that Mid-Continent had a duty to defend, they did not determine if there was a duty to indemnify. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

Colorado Homebuyers Must be in Privity of Contract with Developer to Assert Breach of Implied Warranty of Suitability

May 03, 2017 — Maggie Stewart - Colorado Construction Litigation
On April 17, 2017, the Colorado Supreme Court announced its decision in Forest City v. Rogers, No. 15SC1089, 2017 CO 23 (Colo. Apr. 17, 2017). The Court held that privity of contract is necessary for a homebuyer to assert a claim for breach of implied warranty of suitability against a developer. In other words, one must be a party to a contract to pursue a claim for breach of any implied warranty of suitability therein. Defendant Forest City was the developer of a mixed use property in Stapleton. Forest City subdivided the land and sold the vacant lot at issue to a professional builder, Infinity. Infinity then built a residence and sold it to the plaintiff, Tad Rogers. After moving into the home, Rogers came to believe that the water table beneath the house along with calcite leaching from the road material led to a buildup of calcite in the foundation drain, making the basement uninhabitable and causing the sump pump to work overtime. Rogers sued Forest City on various theories, including breach of the warranty of suitability. In particular, Rogers alleged that Forest City impliedly warranted to him that his lot was suitable for a home with a finished basement, when in fact it was not. He prevailed on this claim at the trial court level. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Maggie Stewart, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
Ms. Stewart may be contacted at stewart@hhmrlaw.com

---

Subsequent Owners of Homes Again Have Right to Sue Builders for Construction Defects

October 07, 2016 — Mark L. Parisi – White and Williams LLP
Owners of homes with damage from construction defects have long had the standing to sue the builders of their homes using the legal theories of 1) breach of contract, 2) breach of implied warranty, and 3) breach of Pennsylvania’s consumer fraud statute, the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). Before the 2014 decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Conway v. Cutler, even owners who were not the original purchasers of their homes, so-called subsequent owners, had a right to sue the builder of their homes using implied warranty as the legal theory. But the Supreme Court in Conway said in 2014 that even though an implied warranty theory is not based on a written contract, it is a quasi contract theory and because subsequent owners never had a contractual relationship with the builder of their home, the implied warranty cause of action was not available. Subsequent purchasers were thus left without a remedy for damage from defective construction in their homes and builders had a second safe harbor from claims regarding homes they built. The first safe harbor is Pennsylvania’s Statute of Repose. If the home was completed more than 12 years before a lawsuit was filed, the Statute of Repose bars the claim. But after Conway, if the home was sold, this also cut off a builder’s potential liability for construction defects in the home. ENTER THE UTPCPL On July 26, 2016 the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the case of Adams v. Hellings Builders issued a non-published (and therefore non-precedential) decision in a stucco construction defect case that held that subsequent purchasers could sue their home’s builder under the UTPCPL because the Act had no requirement that the purchaser of a product, or home, be the original purchaser. The decision cites several other appellate cases not involving construction defect claims that held that the UTPCPL was a valid legal theory for claims regarding products purchased second hand by the plaintiffs in those other cases. The court in Adams held that there was no reason that a suit regarding construction defects in a home should be treated any differently. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Mark L. Parisi, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Parisi may be contacted at parisim@whiteandwilliams.com

---

Arizona Supreme Court Confirms Eight-Year Limit on Construction Defect Lawsuits

July 18, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

Acting on the case of Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. Partnership, the Arizona Supreme Court has ruled that Arizona’s eight-year statute of repose applies. The case was referred to the court by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which had asked for a clarification of Arizona law. The case focused on three questions:



1. Does the filing of a motion for class certification in an Arizona court toll the statute of limitations for individuals, who are included within the class, to file individual causes of action involving the same defendants and the same subject matter?2. If so, does this class-action tolling doctrine apply to statutes of repose, and more specifically, to the statute of repose for construction defects set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") § 12-552?3. If the doctrine applies to statutes of repose, and specifically § 12-552, may a court weigh the equities of the case in determining whether, and to what extent, an action is tolled?



The litigation at hand has a lengthy history, starting with a case referred to as “Hoffman” in 2003. The Albano plaintiffs were not able to join in Hoffman, and they filed their own lawsuit in 2006. An additional lawsuit was filed by the Albano plaintiffs in 2007. The courts decided that the Albano plaintiffs’ lawsuit was untimely.



The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the statute of repose was the appropriate standard for this case. They noted that “the eight-year statute of repose period began to run on November 6, 1997, the date of the Town of Gilbert’s final inspection. Albano II was filed on November 5, 2007.”



The court found that the plaintiffs had waited too long for start their suit. As a result, they found it unnecessary to answer the first or third questions. Justice A. John Pelander of the Arizona Supreme Court wrote the opinion, dated June 30, 2011.

Read the court’s decision…

Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

New Jersey Law regarding Prior Expert’s Testimony

April 15, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
Mary Pat Gallagher writing for the New Jersey Law Journal reported that “[l]awyers who track down an opposing expert's testimony from prior cases must disclose that fact during discovery but need not say whether they plan to use it in cross-examining the expert at trial, a New Jersey appeals court says.” In Dalton v. Crawley, the Appellate Division held that “[d]ecisions about cross-examination ‘involve the attorney's mental processes, so they are inherently work product.’” The issue began when “one of the defense lawyers, Michael McGann, figured out from the deposition questions Mahoney directed at one of his experts that he had transcripts of testimony from earlier cases,” according to the New Jersey Law Journal. “Hit with a notice to produce the transcripts, [Plaintiff attorney Brian] Mahoney refused, saying they were ‘attorney work product and we will not be telling you what we have developed regarding this expert.’" The New Jersey Law Journal declared that the “ruling means both sides will have to indicate what transcripts they have gathered for use—giving the name of each expert as well as the name and docket number of the prior cases where those experts testified. “ Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---