Massachusetts Business Court Addresses Defense Cost Allocation and Non-Cumulation Provisions in Long-Tail Context
March 06, 2022 —
Eric B. Hermanson & Austin D. Moody - White and WilliamsA business court in Massachusetts has weighed in on two key issues affecting allocation of insurance coverage for long-tail liabilities in Massachusetts. Specifically, in Crosby Valve LLC et al. v. OneBeacon America Insurance Company, et al.,
[1] involving asbestos bodily injury claims, Judge Kenneth Salinger of the Suffolk County Business Litigation Session addressed:
- whether defense costs in long-tail cases were subject to the same pro rata allocation scheme the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) adopted to govern successively triggered insurers' indemnity obligations in Boston Gas Company v. Century Indemnity Company;[2] and
- whether “non-cumulation” provisions, like those addressed by the New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Viking Pump,[3] were consistent with this pro rata allocation methodology.
As to the first issue — i.e., allocation of defense costs — Judge Salinger declined to follow Boston Gas, and found the SJC’s holding in that case was limited to an insurers’ indemnity obligations. The SJC in Boston Gas had focused on the language of the policy insuring agreement, saying “[t]his policy applies to ... property damage ... which occurs anywhere during the policy period.” The SJC had also pointed to the policy definition of “occurrence” as “an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.”
[4]
Reprinted courtesy of
Eric B. Hermanson, White and Williams LLP and
Austin D. Moody, White and Williams
Mr. Hermanson may be contacted at hermansone@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Moody may be contacted at moodya@whiteandwilliams.com
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It Has Started: Supply-Chain, Warehouse and Retail Workers of Essential Businesses Are Filing Suit
June 22, 2020 —
Robert G. Devine, James Burger & Douglas Weck - White and Williams LLPSupply-chain businesses that are appropriately characterized as “essential” have remained open for the delivery of critical supplies while everyone else has been told to close up shop and stay home. Now essential-business employees are contracting COVID-19 and filing suit. Following up on our earlier piece — “Is a Violation of a COVID-19 Order the Basis For Civil Liability?” — it is important to recognize that government directives, oftentimes couched as “recommendations,” can come to define what it means to provide a reasonably safe workplace that protects employees from COVID-19. While common law negligence defenses consider the reasonableness of conduct, these directives will likely become the standard.
The cases that have been filed are overwhelmingly premised upon the timeless negligence construct. The negligence construct, simply put, imposes a duty to act as a reasonable person would under the circumstances. Nonetheless, while the negligence construct lives in the ordinary world of “reasonableness,” infection-control guidance lives in the rapidly developing world of the science of COVID-19. Guidance on seemingly basic questions, such as the methods of transmission (e.g., personal contact, mucus membrane only, airborne transmission) or even the virus’s shelf life on different surfaces, of particular interest packaging and material handling equipment, can change by the day. All of this provides challenges for the supply-side business looking to protect its workforce.
Reprinted courtesy of White and Williams LLP attorneys
James Burger,
Robert Devine and
Douglas Weck
Mr. Burger may be contacted at burgerj@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Devine may be contacted at deviner@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Weck may be contacted at weckd@whiteandwilliams.com
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No Duty to Indemnify When Discovery Shows Faulty Workmanship Damages Insured’s Own Work
November 07, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFOur post last week addressed the duty to defend when alleged faulty workmanship caused loss to property adjacent to where the insured was working. See Pamerin Rentals II, LLC v. R.G. Hendricks & Sons Constr., Inc., 2012 Wis. App. LEXIS 698 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2012) [post here]. Today, we report on recent developments in the same case where the court determined, despite earlier finding the insurer owed a defense, it had no duty to indemnify. Pamperin Rentals II, LLC v. R.G. Hendricks & Sons Constr., Inc., 2012 Wisc. App. LEXIS 793 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2012).
Hendricks contracted to “prepare the site and supply and install concrete, tamped concrete, and colored concrete” at several service stations. The owner sued Hendricks, alleging the concrete “was defective and/or the work performed was not done in a workman-like manner and resulted in damages, and will require replacement.”
Pekin Insurance Company agreed to defend Hendricks subject to a reservation of rights.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii.Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Real Estate & Construction News Roundup (5/29/24) – Megaprojects on the Rise, Agency Guidance for CRE, and an Upbeat Forecast for Commercial Real Estate Investment
June 21, 2024 —
Pillsbury's Construction & Real Estate Law Team - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogIn our latest roundup, summer travelers seek alternative lodging options, purpose-built wellness real estate investments grow, bonds backed by CRE debt hit are hit with losses, and more!
- Across all property types, purpose-built wellness real estate investment has grown dramatically in recent years, including properties with wellness features as a focus. (Mary Salmonsen, Multifamily Dive)
- The travelers on the road this summer will have different demographics, budgets and reasons for travel and different preferences on accommodations, with more travelers opting for alternative housing options. (Noelle Mateer, Hotel Dive)
- Megaprojects are on the rise, with massive projects, from rail tunnels to computer chip factories, having myriad stakeholders and lengthy timelines that span political administrations. (Julie Strupp, Construction Dive)
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Pillsbury's Construction & Real Estate Law Team
Three-Year Delay Not “Prompt Notice,” But Insurer Not “Appreciably Prejudiced” Either, New Jersey Court Holds
November 04, 2019 —
Anthony L. Miscioscia and Timothy A. Carroll - White and Williams LLPIn Harleysville Preferred Insurance Company v. East Coast Painting & Maintenance, LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135295 (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 2019) (East Coast Painting), the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey held that an insurer, which received notice of a bodily injury accident three years after it happened, was not “appreciably prejudiced” by such late notice, even as the court acknowledged notice three years later did not satisfy the policy’s “prompt notice” condition. The court also held that the policy’s “Operational Exclusion,” which excluded coverage for bodily injury arising out of the operation of “cherry pickers and similar devices,” did not apply because the accident arose out of the use of a “scissor lift,” which is not a device similar to a cherry picker.
East Coast Painting arose out of a Queens, New York bridge-painting project, during which an employee of the insured, East Coast Painting and Maintenance LLC was injured while “standing on a scissor lift mounted to the back of a truck,” owned and operated by East Coast. The employee sued various project-related entities which, in turn, joined East Coast as a defendant. East Coast sought coverage under its business auto policy, and the insurer agreed to defend the insured under a reservation of rights. The insurer subsequently sought a declaration that it did not owe coverage based on, among other things, the policy’s “Operational Exclusion,” and the insured’s failure to satisfy the policy’s “prompt notice” condition. The insurer moved for summary judgment on both of those bases, but the court in East Coast Painting denied the motion.
As for the insurer’s “prompt notice” defense, the court in East Coast Painting concluded that, the insured’s notice to the insurer was not prompt because it did not receive notice until three years after the accident. But, the court added, the inquiry does not end there. “[T]his Court must determine whether [the insurer] was appreciably prejudiced by that delay.” Reviewing the facts, the court held that the insurer was not “appreciably prejudiced,” even though during the three-year delay the lift truck was “not properly maintained” or “in the same condition it was at the time of the Accident.” The court observed that the insurer had “ample other evidence with which it can defend itself,” such as experts who inspected the lift truck and opined about the cause of the accident.” [Emphasis added.] Further, “there are multiple contemporaneous accident reports,” “a list of the East Coast employees on site at the time,” “photographs of the lift truck and its location when [the employee] was injured,” and “depositions of [the employee] and others regarding the events at issue.” Thus, the court held, the insurer was not prejudiced and summary judgment was inappropriate.
Reprinted courtesy of
Anthony L. Miscioscia, White and Williams LLP and
Timothy A. Carroll, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Miscioscia may be contacted at misciosciaa@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Carroll may be contacted at carrollt@whiteandwilliams.com
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The Big Three: The 9th Circuit Joins The 6th Circuit and 7th Circuit in Holding That Sanctions For Bad-Faith Litigation Tactics Can Only Be Awarded Against Individual Lawyers and Not Law Firms
September 03, 2015 —
Christopher B. Lloyd & Stephen J. Squillario – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2015 S.O.S. 13–56099 – filed August 27, 2015), the Ninth Circuit joined the shortlist of Circuit Courts to hold that sanctions for bad-faith litigation tactics under 28 U.S.C. section 1927 can only be sought against individual attorneys and not law firms. Section 1927 authorizes sanctions against “[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States … who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously….”
On behalf of the client, an attorney with Kaass Law filed a complaint against ten different defendants, including Wells Fargo Bank, which moved to dismiss under F.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6). Rather than responding to the motion to dismiss, plaintiff filed a motion to amend the initial complaint; Wells Fargo Bank filed a notice of non-opposition.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher B. Lloyd, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr.Lloyd may be contacted at clloyd@hbblaw.com
Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com
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Architects Should Not Make Initial Decisions on Construction Disputes
July 05, 2023 —
Bill Wilson - Construction Law ZoneA common provision often deleted from the standard form AIA documents is the provision in the AIA A201 General Conditions requiring an Initial Decision Maker (IDM) for claims between the contractor and owner. In the A201, the contracting parties have the option of naming their own IDM for the project. If an IDM is not selected (which is typically the case) the architect serves this role by default. While it is in all parties’ best interests to resolve disputes quickly and efficiently, using the architect as the IDM is not the best way to achieve such a resolution.
Several reasons work against using the architect as the IDM. Contractors typically don’t trust architects to be impartial in resolving disputes because the architect is paid by the owner. Most architects don’t have the temperament or any training to facilitate dispute resolution. An architect’s “initial decision” could even drive the parties further apart and lead to further issues later in the project. The architect may also be perceived to be part of the problem that led to the dispute in the first place. Also, many architects simply prefer to avoid serving the thankless role of an IDM altogether. Lastly, inserting the architect into the dispute resolution process as a required IDM adds an additional unnecessary step to dispute resolution, which can delay the overall procedure.
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Bill Wilson, Robinson & Cole LLPMr. Wilson may be contacted at
wwilson@rc.com
Vancouver’s George Massey Tunnel Replacement May Now be a Tunnel Instead of a Bridge
January 06, 2020 —
Tim Newcomb - Engineering News-RecordThe constant political back-and-forth in British Columbia, Canada, over how to deal with an aging George Massey Tunnel, opened in 1959, has ping-ponged from uncertainty to a $3.5 billion, 10-lane bridge, back to uncertainty, to no bridge and now to an eight-lane submerged tunnel.
Tim Newcomb, Engineering News-Record
ENR may be contacted at ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
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