How to Determine the Deadline for Recording a California Mechanics Lien
September 17, 2015 —
William L. Porter, Esq. – Porter Law Group BulletinThe California Mechanics Lien is one of the most valuable collection devices available to contractors, subcontractors and suppliers who are unpaid for work performed and materials supplied in relation to a California private works construction project. The mechanics lien allows the claimant to sell the property where the work was performed in order to obtain payment. As noted below, in order to pursue this remedy, certain deadlines must be met.
Know Your Mechanics Lien Filing Deadlines Generally
Working within deadlines is absolutely crucial to preserving mechanics lien rights under California law. The deadlines differ, depending on whether you are a ”direct” contractor, also known as “original” or “prime” contractor (one who contracts directly with the property owner) or a subcontractor or material supplier. The primary differences are that the direct contractor is only required to serve the “Preliminary Notice” on the Construction Lender (Civil Code section 8200-8216), whereas the subcontractor and material supplier must serve not only the Construction Lender, but also the Owner and Direct Contractor (see Civil Code section 8200(e)). Another difference is that a direct contractor has a longer period of time in which to record a mechanics lien after a valid “notice of completion” or a “notice of cessation” has been recorded (Civil Code sections 8180-8190), (60 days for original contractors as compared to 30 days for subcontractors and suppliers – See Civil Code sections 8412 and 8414).
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
William L. Porter, The Porter Law GroupMr. Porter may be contacted at
bporter@porterlaw.com
Statute of Frauds Applies to Sale of Real Property
April 19, 2022 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn law school, one of the first legal doctrines we learn is known as the “statute of frauds.” The statute of frauds is essentially a defense to a contract enforcement action claiming the contract is unenforceable due to the statute of frauds. In other words, this doctrine is raised when one party seeks to enforce a contract. The other party argues, “not so fast,” because the contract is NOT enforceable in light of the statute of frauds.
Common scenarios where the statute of frauds comes into play are with transactions involving real property or agreements where services are not to be performed within one year.
The statue of frauds doctrine is contained in Florida Statute s. 725.01:
No action shall be brought whereby to charge any executor or administrator upon any special promise to answer or pay any debt or damages out of her or his own estate, or whereby to charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person or to charge any person upon any agreement made upon consideration of marriage, or upon any contract for the sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or of any uncertain interest in or concerning them, or for any lease thereof for a period longer than 1 year, or upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of 1 year from the making thereof, or whereby to charge any health care provider upon any guarantee, warranty, or assurance as to the results of any medical, surgical, or diagnostic procedure performed by any physician licensed under chapter 458, osteopathic physician licensed under chapter 459, chiropractic physician licensed under chapter 460, podiatric physician licensed under chapter 461, or dentist licensed under chapter 466, unless the agreement or promise upon which such action shall be brought, or some note or memorandum thereof shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some other person by her or him thereunto lawfully authorized.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Jury's Verdict for Loss Caused by Collapse Overturned
September 18, 2023 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Florida Court of Appeal overturned the jury's verdict findng loss caused by collapse. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Caboverde, 2023 Fla. App. LEXIS 4474 (Fla. Ct. App. June 28, 2023).
The insured homeowners had two claims. One was a 2016 ceiling collapse; the second was loss caused by Hurricane Irma in 2019. The homeowners' policy covered collapse defined as "an abrupt falling down or caving in of a building or any part of a building with the result that the building . . . cannot be occupied for its intended purpose." Collapse had to be caused by, among other things, decay or insect damage that was hidden from view.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
ICC/ASHRAE/USGBC/IES Green Model Code Integrates Existing Standards
December 04, 2018 —
Nadine M. Post - Engineering News-RecordThe release this month of the 2018 edition of the International Green Construction Code marks the first time two sustainability standards developers have joined to foster green buildings and streamline code adoption. The model IgCC is now integrated with ASHRAE’s standard for high-performance buildings. And to reduce green-standard confusion even further, the 2018-IgCC is aligned with the LEED rating system program.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Nadine M. Post, ENRMs. Post may be contacted at
postn@enr.com
Is the Event You Are Claiming as Unforeseeable Delay Really Unforeseeable?
September 26, 2022 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIs the item or event you are claiming as an unforeseeable, excusable delay really unforeseeable? This is not a trick question.
Just because your construction contract identifies items or events that constitute unforeseeable, excusable delay does not mean those items can be used as a blanket excuse or crutch for the contractor. That would be unfair.
For instance, it is not uncommon for a construction contract to list as unforeseeable, excusable delay the following events or items: “(i) acts of God or of the public enemy, (ii) act of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, (iii) acts of another Contractor in the performance of a contract with the Government, (iv) fires, (v) floods, (vi) epidemics, (vii) quarantine restrictions, (viii) strikes, (ix) freight embargoes, (x) unusually severe weather, or (xi) delays of subcontractors or suppliers at any tier arising from unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of both the Contractor and the subcontractors or suppliers.” See, e.g., F.A.R. 52.249-10(b)(1). While the itemization of excusable delay may be worded differently, the point is there may be a listing as to what items or events constitute excusable delay. An excusable delay would justify additional time and, potentially, compensation to the contractor.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Breach Of Duty of Good Faith And Fair Dealing Packaged With Contract Disputes Act Claim
March 27, 2023 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesAn interesting opinion on a motion to dismiss came out of the United States Court of Federal Claims dealing with the claim that the government breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing in administering the prime contract. The contractor’s argument was that the government breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by denying the contractor’s claim under the Contract Disputes Act (CDA). This was a creative claim and argument that deserves consideration because it tied in the contracting officer’s denial of the CDA claim for additional money with a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
In this case, Aries Construction Corp. v. U.S., 2023 WL 2146598 (Fed. Cl. 2023), a prime contractor was hired for a water pipeline construction project. The contractor encountered unexpected difficult site conditions that required additional equipment and labor. The contractor informed the contracting officer and alleged it was instructed to proceed with the additional equipment and labor. The contractor submitted a claim under the CDA but the contracting officer denied the claim. The contractor pursued the claim in the United States Court of Federal Claims arguing the government breached the contract and, of interest, breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing.
The government moved to dismiss the breach of good faith and fair dealing claim arguing that besides failing to state a cause of action the Court of Federal Claims had no jurisdiction because the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing was not properly presented to the contracting officer under the CDA. The Court of Federal Claims denied the government’s motion.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Balancing Cybersecurity Threats in Smart Cities: Is the Potential Convenience of “Smart” Intersections Worth the Risk?
September 02, 2024 —
James P. Bobotek & Brian E. Finch - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogThe term “smart cities” has become popular parlance for municipalities’ attempts to enhance delivery of urban services and infrastructure through information and communications technology. While they may conjure images of neon-lit high rises or streetscapes populated by sleek, hovering vehicles, a bit like the 1960s-era The Jetsons cartoon envisioned our high-tech future, the reality of smart cities has begun to emerge in more subtle, less glamourous forms. Cities tend to focus on wastewater monitoring, traffic control and energy distribution technologies in their efforts to become incrementally “smarter.”
Smart cities lean heavily on automation, internet connectivity and the Internet of Things (IoT)—including smartphones, connected cars and a host of web-based appliances and utilities—to boost the delivery and quality of essential urban services and infrastructure like transit, sanitation, water, energy, emergency response and more. Successful smart cities need infrastructure that supports such connectivity, and they pull data from hundreds, or even thousands, of sensors that can be used to analyze and shepherd the direction of resources.
Reprinted courtesy of
James P. Bobotek, Pillsbury and
Brian E. Finch, Pillsbury
Mr. Bobotek may be contacted at james.bobotek@pillsburylaw.com
Mr. Finch may be contacted at brian.finch@pillsburylaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 2017 WL 1488711 Rejects Liberty Mutual, Holding Once Again that the Right to Repair Act is the Exclusive Remedy for Construction Defect Claims
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. - Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinBackground
In Gillotti v. Stewart (April 26, 2017) 2017 WL 1488711, which was ordered to be published on May 18, 2017, the defendant grading subcontractor added soil over tree roots to level the driveway on the plaintiff homeowner’s sloped lot. The homeowner sued the grading subcontractor under the California Right to Repair Act (Civil Code §§ 895, et seq.) claiming that the subcontractor’s work damaged the trees.
After the jury found the subcontractor was not negligent, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The homeowner appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly construed the Right to Repair Act as barring a common law negligence theory against the subcontractor and erred in failing to follow Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the subcontractor.
Impact
This is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal has held that Liberty Mutual (discussed below) was wrongly decided and held that the Right to Repair Act is the exclusive remedy for construction defect claims. The decision follows its holding in Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hicks) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 333, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act’s pre-litigation procedures apply when homeowners plead construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Right to Repair Act. Elliott is currently on hold at the California Supreme Court, pending the decision in McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, wherein Liberty Mutual was rejected for the first time by the Fifth District. CGDRB continues to follow developments regarding the much anticipated McMillin decision closely, as well as all related matters.
Discussion
The Right to Repair Act makes contractors and subcontractors not involved in home sales liable for construction defects only if the homeowner proves they negligently cause the violation in whole or part (Civil Code §§ 911(b), 936). As such, the trial court in Gillotti instructed the jury on negligence with respect to the grading subcontractor. The jury found that while the construction did violate some of the Right to Repair’s building standards alleged by the homeowner, the subcontractor was not negligent in anyway. After the jury verdict, the trial court found in favor of the grading subcontractor.
The homeowner moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly barred a common law negligence theory against the grading subcontractor. The trial court denied the motions on the grounds that “[t]he Right to Repair Act specifically provides that no other causes of action are allowed. See Civil Code § 943.” The trial court specifically noted that its decision conflicted with Liberty Mutual, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act does not eliminate common law rights and remedies where actual damage has occurred, stating that Liberty Mutual was wrongly decided and that the Liberty Mutual court was naïve in its assumptions regarding the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act.
In Gillotti, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the Liberty Mutual court failed to analyze the language of Civil Code § 896, which “clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative intent that the Act apply to all action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, residential construction, except as specifically set forth in the Act. The Act does not specifically except actions arising from actual damages. To the contrary, it authorizes recovery of damages, e.g., for ‘the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards....’ ([Civil Code] § 944).”
The Court also disagreed with Liberty Mutual’s view that because Civil Code §§ 931 and 943 acknowledge exceptions to the Right to Repair Act’s statutory remedies, the Act does not preclude common law claims for damages due to defects identified in the Act. The Court stated: “Neither list of exceptions, in section 943 or in section 931, includes common law causes of action such as negligence. If the Legislature had intended to make such a wide-ranging exception to the restrictive language of the first sentence of section 943, we would have expected it to do so expressly.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code § 897 preserves a common law negligence claims for violation of standards not listed in Civil Code § 986. It explained that the section of Civil Code § 897, which provides, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure,” expresses the legislative intent that the Right to Repair Act be all-encompassing. Anything inadvertently omitted is actionable under the Act if it causes damage. Any exceptions to the Act are made expressly through Civil Code §§ 931 and 934. The Court concluded in no uncertain terms that the Right to Repair Act precludes common law claims in cases for damages covered by the Act.
The homeowner further argued that she was not precluded from bringing a common law claim because a tree is not a “structure,” and therefore the alleged tree damage did not fall within the realm of the Right to Repair. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument, holding that while the tree damage itself was not expressly covered, the act of adding soil to make the driveway level (which caused the damage) implicated the standards covered by the Right to Repair Act. The Court explained that since under the Act a “structure” includes “improvement located upon a lot or within a common area” (Civil Code § 895(a)), as the driveway was an improvement upon the lot, the claim was within the purview of the Right to Repair Act. As the soil, a component of the driveway, caused damage (to the trees), it was actionable under the Act.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
