Update Relating to SB891 and Bond Claim Waivers
June 10, 2015 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsSeveral bills were passed and will go into effect on July 1, 2015 that affect the construction industry here in Virginia. The most interesting of these was an amendment to the mechanic’s lien statutes relating to waivers of lien rights.
As I posted in March, SB891 amended the mechanic’s lien statute, Va. Code Section 43-3, to remove proactive waivers of lien and bond rights. This bill has been signed into law with a minor modification.
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Travelers’ 3rd Circ. Win Curbs Insurers’ Asbestos Exposure
May 03, 2017 —
Gregory D. Podolak - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.In breaking news this week, LAW360.com posted that the Third Circuit ruled Friday that “a common exclusion found in a Travelers policy bars coverage for claims arising out of asbestos in any form, limiting insurers’ potential exposure to asbestos injury claims by precluding policyholders from arguing that the exclusionary language is ambiguous and doesn’t extend to products containing the carcinogen.”
In its detailed analysis of the decision, LAW360 turned to Greg Podolak for his analysis.
Gregory D. Podolak, managing partner of Saxe Doernberger & Vita PC’s Southeast office, said the ruling is a cautionary tale that should galvanize policyholders and their insurance brokers to take a closer look at policies to delete or curtail broad “arising out of” language in exclusions. Otherwise, insureds could find themselves without any coverage for claims even remotely related to a certain product, he said.
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Gregory D. Podolak, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Mr. Podolak may be contacted at
gdp@sdvlaw.com
On the Ten Year Anniversary of the JOBS Act A Look-Back at the Development of Crowdfunding
May 02, 2022 —
J. Kyle Janecek & Jeffrey M. Dennis - Newmeyer DillionLast month marked the ten-year anniversary of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, which was signed into law by President Obama on April 5, 2012. On May 16, 2016, Title III of the JOBS Act was enacted, as the final piece of the JOBS Act, which gave businesses better access to crowdfunding tactics due to the ability to raise funds based on equity. Today, the JOBS Act and the impact of equity crowdfunding more generally has grown among multiple industries, from entertainment and technology to real estate and construction, and has come a long way from the non-equity crowdfunding of Kickstarter and Indiegogo. So what have been the powers that businesses gained from Title III of the JOBS Act? What has been the impact of the last ten years? Where do businesses go from here to better utilize this source of funding?
WHAT ARE THE CROWDFUNDING POWERS GIVEN BY THE JOBS ACT?
The main difference and change that the JOBS Act had on the field of "crowdfunding" was that for the first time, unaccredited investors could obtain equity stakes in businesses through online solicitations. However, a business was still required to go through the proper approved channels, like accredited crowdfunding portals to solicit and receive funding. Prior to this, crowdfunding had gotten more of an impact and reputation from platforms like Kickstarter and Indiegogo, platforms that benefitted creative works or could act as a "pre-order" system with no guaranty of performance or quality of goods by the party seeking funds.
Reprinted courtesy of
J. Kyle Janecek, Newmeyer Dillion and
Jeffrey M. Dennis, Newmeyer Dillion
Mr. Janecek may be contacted at kyle.janecek@ndlf.com
Mr. Dennis may be contacted at jeff.dennis@ndlf.com
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Colorado Requires Builders to Accommodate High-Efficiency Devices in New Homes
December 14, 2020 —
David M. McLain – Colorado Construction LitigationStarting in 2009, the Colorado Legislature began adding requirements that builders offer certain options to accommodate high-efficiency devices. These requirements started with solar prewire options in 2009, then water-smart home options in 2010. In 2020, the Legislature added requirements for electric vehicle charging and heating systems. These sections apply to unoccupied homes serving as sales inventory or a model home or manufactured homes, as defined by Colorado law. While the Legislature has only required builders to include options to accommodate these devices, it may be just a matter of time until builders must install the prescribed devices themselves.
In 2009, the Legislature passed C.R.S. 38-35.7-106, which was amended this year by HB 20-1155. As it now reads, Colorado law requires every builder of single-family detached residences to offer to have the home’s electrical or plumbing system, or both, include:
- A residential photovoltaic solar generation system or a residential thermal system, or both;
- Upgrades of wiring or plumbing, or both, planned by the builder to accommodate future installation of such systems; and
- A chase or conduit, or both, constructed to allow ease of future installation of the necessary wiring or plumbing for such systems.
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David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & RoswellMr. McLain may be contacted at
mclain@hhmrlaw.com
Stormy Seas Ahead: 5th Circuit to Review Whether Maritime Law Applies to Offshore Service Contract
July 26, 2017 —
Richard W. Brown & Afua S. Akoto - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Earlier this year, the 5th Circuit applied the Davis factors to determine the validity of an indemnity clause in a Master Services Contract. In Larry Doiron Inc. et al., v. Specialty Rental Tool & Supply LLP et al., the court affirmed the notion that if a contract provides services on navigable waters aboard a vessel, a maritime contract exists, even if the contract calls for incidental or insubstantial work unrelated to the use of a vessel. With this decision, plaintiffs were granted indemnification for a crane injury and all was well on the open seas.
The 5th Circuit made waves, however, on July 7, 2017, when it agreed to rehear the case en banc. In its petition for rehearing, defendant STS argued that: (1) the original opinion conflicted with Supreme Court precedent by applying tort law principles to a contract case; (2) the court misapplied the Davis factors and the decision was contrary to Davis because the historical treatment of specialty well service work has been established as non-maritime; (3) the court needed to address whether a contract is subject to maritime or land-based law in the context of offshore mineral exploration.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard W. Brown, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. and
Afua S. Akoto, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Mr. Brown may be contacted at rwb@sdvlaw.com
Ms. Akoto may be contacted at asa@sdvlaw.com
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General Liability Alert: A Mixed Cause of Action with Protected and Non-Protected Activity Not Subject to Anti-SLAPP Motion
February 18, 2015 —
Valerie A. Moore, Lawrence S. Zucker II and Blythe Golay – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Baral v. Schnitt (filed 2/5/2015, No. B253620), the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, held that California’s anti-SLAPP statute does not authorize the striking of allegations of protected activity in a cause of action that also contains meritorious allegations of non-protected activity not within the purview of the statute. In so holding, the court attempted to resolve, or at least add its voice to, the growing conflict among appellate districts on the issue.
A SLAPP lawsuit (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) seeks to chill or punish the exercise of constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances. California’s Legislature enacted the anti-SLAPP statute to permit a defendant to file a special motion to strike as to any cause of action that arises out of an act in furtherance of such rights. In Baral, the plaintiff alleged that his business partner had violated fiduciary duties in usurping the plaintiff’s ownership and management interests in their jointly owned company, so that the defendant could benefit from a secret sale of the company. The complaint alleged that the defendant hired a public accounting firm and prevented the plaintiff from participating in its investigation in order to force the plaintiff's cooperation of the sale of the company. The defendant filed an anti-SLAPP motion, seeking to strike all references to the accounting firm's audit. The trial court denied the motion, on the ground that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to causes of action, not allegations.
Reprinted courtesy of Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP attorneys
Valerie A. Moore,
Lawrence S. Zucker II and
Blythe Golay
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com.
Mr. Zucker may be contacted at lzucker@hbblaw.com.
Ms. Golay may be contacted at bgolay@hbblaw.com.
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Defense Owed for Product Liability Claims That Do Not Amount to Faulty Workmanship
December 30, 2013 —
Tred Eyerly — Insurance Law HawaiiThe trial court's holding that there was no occurrence based on claims from faulty workmanship was reversed by the appellate division of the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The underlying claims were based on product liability tort claims, not faulty workmanship. Indalex Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA., 2013 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3186 (Pa. Superior Court Dec. 3, 2013).
The underlying lawsuits claimed that the insureds' windows and doors were defectively designed or manufactured, which resulted in water leakage causing physical damage, such as mold and cracked walls. There were also personal injury claims.
The insureds had a primary policy with OneBeacon Insurance Group, but the policy limits were exhausted. The insureds turned to their commercial umbrella policy issued by National Union. The policy defined occurrence as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in Bodily Injury or Property Damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the Insured."
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Tred EyerlyTred Eyerly can be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Connecticut Court Clarifies a Limit on Payment Bond Claims for Public Projects
May 15, 2023 —
Bill Wilson - Construction Law ZoneIn All Seasons Landscaping, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co., No. DBD-CV21-6039074-S, 2022 WL 1135703 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 4, 2022) the plaintiff, a subcontractor on a state project, commenced a lawsuit against the surety who issued a payment bond on the project two years after the subcontractor last performed any original contract work on the project. The defendant surety moved to dismiss the action based on the one-year statute of limitation in Connecticut General Statute § 49-42. The plaintiff countered that it complied with that deadline because it also performed warranty inspection work after the contract was completed and within the limitation period in section 49-42. The issue of whether warranty work or minor corrective work can extend the limitations period in section 49-42 had not previously been addressed by a Connecticut court.
Section 49-42(b) governs the limitation period on payment bond claims on public projects. It provides in relevant part that “no … suit may be commenced after the expiration of one year after the last date that materials were supplied or any work was performed by the claimant.” Section 49-42 provides no guidance on what “materials were supplied or any work was performed” by the claimant means, nor is there any direct appellate-level authority in Connecticut on this issue. What is clear under well-established law in Connecticut is that the time limit within which suit on a payment bond must be commenced under Section 49-42 is not only a statute of limitation but a jurisdictional requirement establishing a condition precedent to maintenance of the action and such limit is strictly enforced. If a plaintiff cannot prove its suit was initiated within this time constraint, the matter will be dismissed by the court as untimely.
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Bill Wilson, Robinson & Cole LLPMr. Wilson may be contacted at
wwilson@rc.com