Product Liability Alert: Evidence of Apportionment of Fault Admissible in Strict Products Liability Action
March 26, 2014 —
R. Bryan Martin and Kristian B. Moriarty - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Romine v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (No. B239761, filed March 17, 2014), the California Court of Appeal for the Second District held that a trial court must permit a defendant, in a products liability action, to present evidence of apportionment of fault among settling and non-settling entities. The case involved an automobile collision in which the plaintiff was struck from behind, causing the driver’s seat to recline and propel plaintiff into the back seat where she struck her head. Plaintiff was left quadriplegic as a result.
Plaintiff brought suit against the driver who caused the accident, the Nissan entities who manufactured the car plaintiff was driving, Johnson Controls, Inc. (“Johnson”), Ikeda Engineering Corporation (“Ikeda”), Vintec Co. (“Vintec”), and Autoliv ASP, Inc., who designed and manufactured the driver’s seat of the vehicle plaintiff was driving, and against Faurecia Automotive Seating, Inc. who manufactured the recliner mechanism of plaintiff’s vehicle’s front seat. Ikeda participated in the design of the driver’s seat and Vintec manufactured the driver’s seat. Johnson manufactured the seat belt for the driver’s seat of plaintiff’s vehicle in accordance with Nissan’s design. Prior to trial, plaintiff settled with the defendant driver, the Nissan defendants, the Autoliv defendants, and Faurecia Automotive Seating, Inc. Plaintiff elected to proceed to trial solely on a cause of action for strict products liability against Ikeda and Vintec. Pursuant to a stipulation, Johnson agreed it would be legally responsible for damages awarded to plaintiff at trial based upon the actions of Vintec or Ikeda.
At trial, the court precluded Vintec and Ikeda from offering evidence that: (1) plaintiff would not have been injured if her vehicle’s seat belt was designed in a different manner by Nissan; (2) Nissan chose the manufacturer of the recliner mechanism and required defendants to use that manufacturer and that part in the seat; and (3) The other defendants had already reached settlements with plaintiff.
Reprinted courtesy of
R. Bryan Martin, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Kristian B. Moriarty, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Martin may be contacted at bmartin@hbblaw.com; Ms. Moriarty may be contacted at kmoriarty@hbblaw.com
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Tennessee High Court Excludes Labor Costs from Insurer’s Actual Cash Value Depreciation Calculations
May 27, 2019 —
Michael S. Levine & Geoffrey B. Fehling - Hunton Andrews KurthThe Tennessee Supreme Court has refused to construe an ambiguous definition of actual cash value to allow for deduction of labor costs as part of depreciation calculations where that subset of repair costs are not clearly addressed in the policy. Despite the split of authority nationwide, the Tennessee case presents a straightforward application of policy interpretation principles to a common valuation issue in first-party property claims.
In Lammert v. Auto-Owners (Mutual) Insurance Co., No. M2017-2546-SC-R23-CV (Tenn. Apr. 15, 2019), insureds brought a class-action lawsuit against their property insurer, Auto-Owners, alleging breach of contract. The plaintiffs each owned buildings damaged by a hail storm and had each submitted claims to Auto-Owners. Auto-Owners accepted the claims and determined that the losses would be determined on an actual cash value basis. In performing those valuations, Auto-Owners depreciated both the building materials and the labor costs associated with repairing the properties. The insureds challenged the labor cost depreciation. Auto-Owners moved to dismiss the lawsuit. In response, the insureds requested that the district court certify to the Tennessee Supreme Court whether, “[u]nder Tennessee law, may an insurer in making an actual cash value payment withhold a portion of repair labor as depreciation when the policy (1) defines actual cash value as ‘the cost to replace damaged property with new property of similar quality and features reduced by the amount of depreciation applicable to the damaged property immediately prior to the loss,’ or (2) states that ‘actual cash value includes a deduction for depreciation?”’
Reprinted courtesy of
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Geoffrey B. Fehling, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Fehling may be contacted at gfehling@HuntonAK.com
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No One to Go After for Construction Defects at Animal Shelter
January 28, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe Riverside County Animal Shelter in Thousand Palms has had problems since it opened in 2006, including floors that weren't able to withstand scratching by dogs and a malfunctioning HVAC system. The county's expenses only started with the $6.9 million cost of building the shelter, as the building has required almost constant repairs. Riverside County Supervisor John Benoit said that "there were shortcomings in the construction that became apparent later."
The County can't sue, because the builder closed operations after a bankruptcy. "There's no one to go after," said Benoit.
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New Jersey Law regarding Prior Expert’s Testimony
April 15, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFMary Pat Gallagher writing for the New Jersey Law Journal reported that “[l]awyers who track down an opposing expert's testimony from prior cases must disclose that fact during discovery but need not say whether they plan to use it in cross-examining the expert at trial, a New Jersey appeals court says.” In Dalton v. Crawley, the Appellate Division held that “[d]ecisions about cross-examination ‘involve the attorney's mental processes, so they are inherently work product.’”
The issue began when “one of the defense lawyers, Michael McGann, figured out from the deposition questions Mahoney directed at one of his experts that he had transcripts of testimony from earlier cases,” according to the New Jersey Law Journal. “Hit with a notice to produce the transcripts, [Plaintiff attorney Brian] Mahoney refused, saying they were ‘attorney work product and we will not be telling you what we have developed regarding this expert.’"
The New Jersey Law Journal declared that the “ruling means both sides will have to indicate what transcripts they have gathered for use—giving the name of each expert as well as the name and docket number of the prior cases where those experts testified. “
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Arbitration is Waivable (Even If You Don’t Mean To)
February 16, 2016 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsBe careful with how you act with arbitration clauses in your contracts. If you are not careful in how you act to enforce these clauses, you could find yourself stuck in court whether you like it or not.
As I stated in a recent update to a post last month, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently weighed in on the issue of a contractor’s waiver of its rights to arbitration under a contract. Briefly, the facts of Forrester v. Penn Lyon Homes, et. al., No. 07-2171 are as follows. The Forrester’s sued Penn Lyon and its warranty company alleging among other things a breach of express warranty based upon a warranty contract containing a mandatory arbitration clause. Instead of immediately alleging an affirmative defense based upon the arbitration clause, the defendants removed the case to federal court and litigated for 18 months before raising the arbitration defense for the first time.
The 4th Circuit (correctly in my opinion) affirmed the lower court and held that the defendants defaulted their right to arbitration because of their actions in defense of the court action and the prejudice to the plaintiffs caused by those actions.
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Construction Defect Claims Not Covered
May 10, 2022 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe court found that the insured's negligent acts causing damage to only the structure of the home it built were not covered under the CGL policy. Westfield Ins. Co. v. Zaremba Builders II LLC, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36189 (N.D. Ill. March 2, 2022).
Zaremba contracted to build a house for the Vrdolyak Trust. After completion of the home, the occupants found many problems, including painting defects such as bubbling and peeling, leaving the basement full of water for months, causing damage to ductwork, framing and piping in the house, etc. The Trust sued and Westfield denied a defense.
Westfield filed a declaratory judgment action for a ruling that it had no duty to defend or indemnify. On Westfield's motion for summary judgment, the court determined there was no property damage. Property damage included "physical injury to tangible property." When the alleged damage occurred in the course of a construction project, tangible property had to be property outside the scope of the contract for project.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
In Contracts, One Word Makes All the Difference
July 21, 2018 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsHere at Musings, I sometimes feel as if I am beating the “contract is king” drum to death. However, each time I start to get this feeling, a new case out of either the Virginia state courts or the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals here in Richmond reminds me that we all, lawyers and contractors alike, need to be reminded of this fact on a regular basis. The terms written into a construction contract (or any other contract for that matter) will control the outcome of any dispute in just about every case.
A recent 4th Circuit case takes this to the extreme in pointing out the the choice which of two tiny words can change the entire set of procedural rules and even the courthouse in which your dispute will be decided. In FindWhere Holdings Inc. v. Systems Env. Optimization LLC, the Fourth Circuit looked at a forum selection clause found in a contract between the parties. In this case, the clause stated that any dispute would be litigated in the courts “of the State of Virginia.” When the defendants tried to remove the case from Virginia state court to the Eastern District of Virginia federal courts, the federal court remanded the case, sending it back to the Circuit Court of Loudoun County, Virginia.
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Christopher G. Hill, The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Can a Receiver Prime and Strip Liens Against Real Property?
September 20, 2021 —
Ben Reeves - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogCourts overseeing receivers generally enjoy broad discretion in directing and approving a receiver’s proposed actions. But does that authority extend to a receiver not only granting a super-priority lien ahead of existing liens, but also selling the real property free and clear of all liens? In County of Sonoma v. Quail, 56 Cal.App.5th 657 (Ct. App. 2020), the California Court of Appeals answered that question in the affirmative.
Quail involved a 47,480 square-foot lot with two houses, a few garages, several outbuildings, and numerous trailers surrounded by a veritable junk yard. Despite many of these structures being uninhabitable, unsanitary, and dangerous, multiple families resided on the lot. Although Sonoma County (the “County”) ordered the owner to remediate the property several times, he failed and refused to do so. After several years of these violations going unabated, the County ultimately sought and obtained the appointment of a receiver over the real property.
To obtain funds necessary to repair the property, the receiver asked the court for permission to borrow money through the issuance of a receivership certificate to be secured by a super-priority lien—i.e., a lien ahead of all other liens—against the real property. Although the trial court initially declined to prime existing liens, when the receiver could find no one to lend money (since the land lacked equity), the trial court relented and approved a super-priority lien despite the senior secured lender’s objection (the “lender”).
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Ben Reeves, Snell & WilmerMr. Reeves may be contacted at
breeves@swlaw.com
