Professional Malpractice Statute of Limitations in Construction Context
June 26, 2023 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn an interesting dichotomy, which statute of limitations applies to professional malpractice claims relating to construction claims, i.e., in the construction context?
Is it the two year statute of limitations in Florida Statute s.
95.11(4)( a) that governs professional malpractice claims or is it the four year statute of limitations in Florida Statute s.
95.11(3)(c) that governs actions “founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement toot real property”? This dichotomy led the appeal in American Automobile Ins. v. FDH Infrastructure Services, LLC, 48 Fla.L.Weekly D1091a (Fla. 3d DCA 2023).
This case sadly involved a construction accident that led to deaths. A contractor was engaged to install an antenna on an existing television tower. The contractor hired an engineering firm “to perform a structural analysis as to the stability and weight-bearing capacity of the tower. [The engineer] was contractually obligated to assess the proposed rigging plan…to lift the loads necessary to construct the antenna.” FDH Infrastructure Services, supra. Unfortunately, after the installation of the antenna commenced, the rigging components failed resulting in workers falling to their deaths. After insurers paid out benefits, they sued the engineering firm under equitable and contractual subrogation theories. The engineering firm moved for summary judgment arguing the subrogation claims were barred by the professional malpractice two year statute of limitations in section 95.11(4)(a). The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the engineering firm.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
The Activist Group Suing the Suburbs for Bigger Buildings
December 10, 2015 —
Patrick Clark – BloombergIn a speech last month, Council of Economic Advisers Chairman Jason Furman blamed zoning restrictions—local land-use rules governing things like how tall buildings can grow—for the lack of affordable housing, lost economic productivity, and rising inequality across the U.S.
On Tuesday, a San Francisco activist named Sonja Trauss took Furman's argument to the streets, filing a lawsuit in Contra Costa County (Calif.) to fight what she sees as a lost opportunity to build more housing.
Trauss's organization, the San Francisco Bay Area Renters Federation (yes, SFBARF), is suing the City of Lafayette, a Bay Area suburb of about 25,000, to block plans to build 44 single-family homes on a plot of land once slated for a 315-unit apartment complex. Her argument relies on a three-decade-old California law intended to check local governments’ ability to reduce the density of certain construction projects. Called the Housing Accountability Act, the law has been used successfully by developers of affordable housing who have had their projects blocked, Trauss said, but never by an advocacy group advocating for greater density as a public good.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Patrick Clark, Bloomberg
New Safety Standards Issued by ASSE and ANSI
March 28, 2012 —
Melissa Brumback, Construction Law in North CarolinaThe American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE) have recently announced their approval of two new safety standards to enhance construction site safety.
The two new standards, which are set to take effect during June 2012, are the ANSI/ASSE A10.1-2011 Pre-Project and Pre-Task Safety and Health Planning for Construction and Demolition Operations, and the ANSI/ASSE A10.26-2011 Emergency Procedures for Construction and Demolition Sites.
The new A10.1-2011 standard was designed to assist construction owners, contractors, and designers by ensuring that safety and health planning were standard parts of their pre-construction planning. It is also intended to help owners of construction sites to establish a process for evaluating constructor candidates with regard to their safety and health performance planning.
The A10.26 standard applies to emergency situations, including fires, collapses, and hazardous spills. The standard deals with emergency rescue, evacuation, and transportation of injured workers, and also plans for coordinating with emergency medical facilities ahead of potential disasters.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Dewey Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Project Completion Determines Mechanics Lien Recording Deadline
April 08, 2024 —
William L. Porter - Porter Law GroupThe California mechanics lien is one of the most powerful collection remedies available to contractors, subcontractors and suppliers who are unpaid for work performed and materials supplied in relation to a California private works construction project. The mechanics lien allows the claimant to actually sell the property where the work was carried out in order to obtain payment, entirely of course, against the wishes of the property owner. There are a number of important steps to follow and timelines to be met in order to pursue this remedy.
First, Understand Your Preliminary Notice Deadline
Working within deadlines is absolutely crucial to preserving mechanics lien rights under California law. The deadlines differ, depending on whether you are a “direct” contractor, also known as “original” or “prime” contractor (one who contracts directly with the property owner) or a subcontractor or material supplier. The process begins with the serving of a “preliminary notice” no later than 20 days after the party serving the preliminary notice begins supplying labor or materials to the project. Direct contractors are only required to serve the preliminary notice on the construction lender (Civil Code section 8200-8216), whereas subcontractors and material suppliers must serve not only the construction lender, but also the owner and direct contractor (see Civil Code section 8200(e)).
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
William L. Porter, Porter Law GroupMr. Porter may be contacted at
bporter@porterlaw.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Subcontractor Not Estopped from Enforcing Lien Not Listed In Bankruptcy Petition
March 01, 2017 —
Chadd Reynolds – Autry, Hanrahan, Hall & Cook, LLPIn Stock Building Supply, Inc. v. Platte River Insurance Co.,[1] the Court of Appeals dealt with issues of judicial estoppel, bankruptcy, retroactive application of statutory lien amendments, and the full payment defense.
The owner, Madison Retail-Suwanee, LLC (“Madison”) hired Cannon/Estapa General Contractors, Inc. (“Cannon”) to be the general contractor for the construction of a shopping center (“the Project”). Cannon subcontracted with Stock Building Supply (“Stock”) to supply labor, materials, and services for the Project. Cannon failed to complete the project and Madison had yet to pay Cannon the full contract price. In 2007, Stock timely filed a lien on the Project and obtained a judgment against Cannon for the amount due under the subcontract. Platte River Insurance Company (“Platte”), the surety, issued a bond to discharge Stock’s lien. Consequently, Stock pursued an action against Platte to collect the judgment in the amount of $93,865.27.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Chadd Reynolds, Autry, Hanrahan, Hall & Cook, LLPMr. Reynolds may be contacted at
reynolds@ahclaw.com
The Insurance Coverage Debate on Construction Defects Continues
February 05, 2015 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorNew Hampshire is the first court of 2015 to weigh in on construction defect coverage issues. The case, Cogswell Farm Condominium Association v. Tower Group, involved a typical situation. Lemery Building Company was hired to build 24 residential condominium units. After construction, the condominium association sued the builder asserting that the weather barrier, including the water/ice shield, flashing, siding, and vapor barrier, was defectively constructed and resulted in damage to the units due to water leaks. The condominium association also sued Lemery’s insurer for a determination as to whether the builder’s Commercial General Liability (CGL) insurer had to provide coverage for the claim.
The trial court ruled against the condominium association, finding that the “your work” exclusion applied. The exclusion in the builder’s CGL policy provided that there was no coverage for property damage to “[t]hat particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because ‘your work’ was incorrectly performed on it.”
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
Federal Court in New York Court Dismisses Civil Authority Claim for COVID-19 Coverage
October 11, 2021 —
Eric D. Suben - Traub LiebermanCourts nationwide have been grappling with coverage for business interruption claims arising from closures occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic, with mixed results by jurisdiction. A recent decision on the issue from the federal Southern District of New York sheds light on New York law regarding this pressing issue.
In Elite Union Installations, LLC v. National Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA, 2021 WL 4155016 (Sept. 13, 2021), directives issued by governmental authorities required the insured construction company to shut its doors, leading to a layoff of some employees while others continued to work from home. The insured made a claim under its commercial property coverage for damage to its premises, which it claimed were rendered “uninhabitable” and required repair in the form of alterations to comply with social distancing requirements. In the ensuing coverage litigation, National Union moved to dismiss the complaint alleging covered first-party property damage defined in the policy as “direct physical loss of or damage to property.”
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Eric D. Suben, Traub LiebermanMr. Suben may be contacted at
esuben@tlsslaw.com
