Aecmaster’s Digital Twin: A New Era for Building Design
May 06, 2024 —
Aarni Heiskanen - AEC BusinessI sat down with Anssi Auvinen, the CEO and founder of Finnish startup Aecmaster, to discuss the future of design and how the company plans to make it happen. Anssi envisions data-driven design as the next radical change in the AEC sector.
Anssi Auvinen started working in the building industry as a 16-year-old construction worker. Since then, he has acquired two master’s degrees: structural engineering and architecture.
During his career, Anssi has witnessed how the digitalization of the design sector has progressed, but the results for both designers and building owners could have been more impressive. That inspired him in 2019 to start up
Aecmaster, a software and consulting firm that aims to fulfill the promise of digitalization. The company’s software product launched in January 2024.
The need for digital twins
Anssi states that you can’t say you own a building until you possess its digital assets, the digital twin.
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Aarni Heiskanen, AEC BusinessMr. Heiskanen may be contacted at
aec-business@aepartners.fi
Congratulations Bryan Stofferahn, August Hotchkin, and Eileen Gaisford on Their Promotion to Partner!
April 19, 2021 —
Bremer Whyte Brown & O’MearaBryan Stofferahn has been with BWB&O’s Oakland office since 2016 and has been practicing law since 2002. Mr. Stofferahn focuses his practice on insurance defense matters and was lead counsel on the Millennium Tower construction defect case in San Francisco, which was the largest construction defect action in the country.
Outside of work, Bryan is passionate about traveling the world with his wife Claire and has finished in last place in two separate chili cook-offs (pre-COVID, of course).
August Hotchkin has been with BWB&O since 2013 and helped open the Reno office located in Northern Nevada in 2016. He is duly licensed in both Nevada and California, handling various legal matters, especially complex litigation, throughout Northern Nevada and Northern California.
Mr. Hotchkin has taken several cases to trial, including a successful defense verdict on a wrongful death matter. He has also argued countless dispositive motions as well as having cases heard at the Appellate level.
During his free time, Mr. Hotchkin enjoys golfing, snowboarding, and spending time with his family and friends, especially up at Lake Tahoe.
Eileen Gaisford has been with BWB&O’s Woodland Hill’s office for almost a decade and is licensed to practice law in California.
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Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP
Professional Liability Alert: California Appellate Courts In Conflict Regarding Statute of Limitations for Malicious Prosecution Suits Against Attorneys
April 28, 2014 —
David W. Evans & Stephen J. Squillario – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn conflict with an earlier decision by a different division within the same District, and with a prior decision of another District which followed the earlier case, Division Three of the Second Appellate District has concluded, contrary to established precedent, that the general two-year limitations period set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 (“Section 335.1”) applies to malicious prosecution claims against attorneys, rather than the specific one-year statute of limitations for claims against attorneys codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 (“Section 340.6”).
In Roger Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. v. Krane & Smith, APC (filed April 15, 2014, Case No. B237424, consolidated with Case No. B239375), Roger Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. (“Cleveland Golf”), filed a malicious prosecution action against Krane & Smith (“the Attorneys”), who had unsuccessfully prosecuted the underlying breach of contract matter for their client against Cleveland Golf. In that action, on April 26, 2010, the trial court entered its order granting a motion for nonsuit and dismissing the complaint in favor of Cleveland Golf. On May 24, 2011, or approximately 13 months after the trial court had dismissed the underlying complaint, Cleveland Golf commenced a malicious prosecution action against the Attorneys. In the interim, the Attorneys initiated an appeal of the underlying judgment, which was eventually dismissed approximately seven months later. In response to the complaint, the Attorneys filed a special motion to strike, commonly referred to as an anti-SLAPP motion, which included the argument that the malicious prosecution claim was time-barred under the one-year limitations period of Section 340.6. The trial court granted the Attorneys’ motion based on the statute of limitations (and Cleveland Golf’s failure to demonstrate a probability of success on the merits) and dismissed the case. Cleveland Golf’s appeal followed.
Reprinted courtesy of
David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com, Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com
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When Does a Contractor Legally Abandon a Construction Project?
January 24, 2018 —
Rick Erickson - Real Estate Litigation BlogLately, we’ve been spending more time as litigators pursuing and defending claims of abandonment against contractors. It has become apparent that abandonment is often misinterpreted in its legal meaning and effect. Here are some thoughts on abandonment to consider.
On its face, the concept of abandonment is simple enough. For any number of reasons, a contractor abandons a project when the contractor stops showing up. Abandonment is major concern for all players on the project because it causes critical path delays and significant costs to replace the contractor with another contractor, many times at a much higher cost than the original contractors’ bid.
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Rick Erickson - Snell & WilmerMr. Erickson may be contacted at
rerickson@swlaw.com
Subrogation Waiver Unconscionable in Residential Fuel Delivery Contract
April 29, 2024 —
Ryan A. Bennett - The Subrogation StrategistIn a matter of first impression, the Superior Court of Connecticut (Superior Court), in American Commerce Ins., Co. v. Eastern Fuel Corp., No. CV-206109168-S, 2024 Conn. Super. LEXIS 380, held that a waiver of subrogation provision in a consumer fuel service/delivery contract violated public policy. The Superior Court overruled the motion for summary judgment filed by Eastern Fuel Corporation (Eastern) and determined that the clause was impermissible as the contract was entered into by two parties with unequal bargaining power.
American Commerce Insurance Company (American) provided property insurance to Arlene and James Hillas (the Insureds) for their home in Woodbridge, Connecticut. The Insureds hired Eastern to service their heating system on or around October 25, 2018. The service work at the property included inspecting the oil filters and flushing the fuel lines. On November 1, 2018, when the Insureds turned the heating system on for the first time that season, the two oil tanks on the property were allegedly full. After a series of deliveries, claims that the oil levels were lower than expected, discovering oil staining on the floor and Eastern’s replacement of the oil lines, Eastern delivered another 429 gallons. However, after the delivery, additional leaks were discovered relating to the oil line replacements. Ultimately, the Insureds submitted a claim to American and American paid in excess of $59,000 for the damage incurred.
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Ryan A. Bennett, White and Williams LLPMr. Bennett may be contacted at
bennettr@whiteandwilliams.com
Arizona Court of Appeals Rules Issues Were Not Covered in Construction Defect Suit
December 09, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFThe Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of Peters v. Marque Homes. In this case, Walter Peters provided the land and funding for Marque Homes to build a luxury residence in Glendale, Arizona. By the terms of the “Joint Venture Agreement,” Peters provided the land and funding, while Marque would not charge Peters for overhead, profits, or supervision fees. The agreement specified that profits would be divided equally.
Two years later, Marque sued Peters claiming he had breached his obligations by refusing several offers for the home. Peters replied that Marque had “failed to complete the home so it is habitable to prospective purchasers.” Peters stated he had “retained an expert inspector who had identified numerous defects.” The court appointed a Special Commissioner to list the home for sale. Peters purchased the home with two stipulations ordered by the court. At this point, the earlier case was dismissed with prejudice.
Peters then sued Marque “asserting express and implied warranty claims arising out of alleged construction defects in the home.” Marque claimed that Peters’s claims were “precluded by the prior joint venture dispute.” The court granted Marque’s motion.
The appeals court reversed the lower court’s decision, determining that Peters’s claims were not precluded by the agreement. Although there had been a prior case between the two parties, warranty issues did not form a part of that case. “Peters never raised these allegations nor presented this evidence in support of any warranty claim.”
The court also noted that the “parties never agreed to preclude future warranty claims.” Marque and Peters “agreed in the stipulated sale order that ‘the sale of the property to a third party shall be “as is” with a 10-year structural warranty.’” The court noted that the agreement said nothing about one of the parties buying the house.
The appeals court left open a claim by Marque that there are no implied or express warranties available to Peters. They asked the Superior Court to address this.
Read the court’s decision…
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Toxic Drywall Not Covered Under Homeowner’s Policy
March 28, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Duphuys of Baton Rouge Louisiana found themselves needing to argue both sides of an issue, according to the judge in Duphuy v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company. The Duphuys alleged that the drywall in their home “emits odorous gases that cause damage to air-condition and refrigerator coils, copper tubing, electrical wiring, computer wiring, and other household items.” Additionally, they reported damage to “their home’s insulation, trimwork, floors, cabinets, carpets, and other items” which they maintained were “covered under the ‘ensuing loss’ portion of their policy.”
Their insurer declined coverage, stating that the damages were not a “direct, physical loss,” and even if they were “four different exclusions independently exclude coverage, even if such loss occurred.” The policy excludes defective building materials, latent defects, pollutants, and corrosion damage. The court noted that “ambiguities in policy exclusions are construed to afford coverage to the insured.”
The court did determine that the Duphuys were not in “a situation where the plaintiffs caused the risk for which they now seek coverage.” The judge cited an earlier case, In re Chinese Drywall, “a case with substantially similar facts and construing the same policy” and in that case, “property damage” was determined to “include the loss of use of tangible property.” The court’s conclusion was that the Duphuys “suffered a direct, physical loss triggering coverage under their policy.”
Unfortunately for the Duphuys, at this point the judge noted that while they had a “direct, physical loss,” the exclusions put them “in the tough predicament of claiming the drywall is neither defective nor its off-gassing corrosive or a pollutant, but nonetheless damage-causing.”
In the earlier Chinese Drywall case, the judge found that “faulty and defective materials” “constitutes a physical thing tainted by imperfection or impairment.” The case “found the drywall served its intended purpose as a room divider and insulator but nonetheless qualified under the exclusion, analogizing the drywall to building components containing asbestos that courts have previously determined fit under the same exclusion.” In the current case, the judge concluded that the drywall was “outside the realm of coverage under the policy.”
The court also found that it had to apply the corrosion exclusion, noting that the plaintiffs tried to evade this by stating, “simplistically and somewhat disingenuously, that the damage is not caused by corrosion but by the drywall itself.” The plaintiffs are, however, parties to another Chinese drywall case, Payton v. Knauf Gips KG, in which “they directly alleged that ‘sulfides and other noxious gases, such as those emitted from [Chinese] drywall, cause corrosion and damage to personal property.’” As the court pointed out, the Duphuys could not claim in one case that the corrosion was caused by gases emitted by the drywall and in another claim it was the drywall itself. “They hope their more ambiguous allegations will be resolved in their favor and unlock the doors to discovery.”
The court quickly noted that “the remaining damage allegations are too vague and conclusory to construe” and permitted “exploration of the latent defect and pollution exclusions.”
The judge concluded that the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient facts to establish coverage under the ensuing loss provision, stating that the “plaintiffs must allege, at the very least, how the drywall causes damage to the trimwork, carpet, etc., not simply that it does so.” Given the court’s determinations in the case, the plaintiffs’ motion was dismissed.
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Insurer's Motion to Dismiss Allegations of Collapse Rejected
August 08, 2018 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiIn yet another of the collapse cases being litigated in state and federal courts in Connecticut, the federal district court denied the insurer's motion to dismiss. Rosenberger v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95345 (D. Conn. June 6, 2018).
The insureds had policies with Amica since 1989. Policies before December 18, 2006, covered collapse caused by hidden decay or other specified causes. "Collapse" was not defined by the policy. These policies did not include any provisions explicitly excluding coverage for a chemical reaction.
The post-2006 policies held by the insureds covered collapse, but under a significantly modified definition. The newer policy language stated that "collapse applies only to an abrupt collapse." Further, collapse was defined as "an abrupt falling down or caving in of a building or any part of a building with the result that the building or part of the building cannot be occupied for its intended purpose."
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
