Useful Life: A Valuable Theory for Reducing Damages
March 29, 2017 —
Brooke E. Beebe, Esq. - Florida Construction Law NewsThe situation is one all too familiar to construction defect litigants. A homeowner contracts with a roofing contractor to install a new roof with a life expectancy of ten years.[1] After only five years, the homeowner brings a claim for construction defects in the roof alleging that the roof requires complete replacement due to water intrusion. The homeowner seeks damages for the full replacement cost of the roof. However, under a “useful life” theory, the homeowner would not be entitled to damages for the full amount of the replacement cost. Instead, the homeowner would be entitled to one-half of the cost of the replacement roof, taking into account the fact that he or she had been deprived of only five, rather than ten, years of use. “Useful life” is best understood as the expected length of time that a newly built construction element can be reasonably anticipated to last, subject to routine maintenance and ordinary wear and tear. The “useful life” theory holds that granting the homeowner damages for the full replacement cost of the roof would result in unjust enrichment to the homeowner, who had contracted for a roof with a ten-year, rather than a fifteen-year, useful life.
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Brooke E. Beebe, Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A.Ms. Beebe may be contacted at
brooke.beebe@csklegal.com
Changes to Judicial Selection in Mexico Create a New Case for Contractual ADR Provisions
November 25, 2024 —
Juan Pablo Sandoval - The Dispute ResolverThe Mexican Congress recently discussed and approved a Constitutional Amendment called the “Judiciary Amendment” which was ironically published in the Official Gazette on September 15, 2024, the day before Mexican Independence Day.
With this Judiciary Amendment, the Mexican Congress determined that Federal Judges, Federal Magisters and the Ministers of the Supreme Court will now be elected through direct and popular election. Before the Judiciary Amendment, Federal Judges and Magisters used to have a judicial career; many of them started as law clerks and were promoted step by step until becoming Judge or Magister.
Ministers of the Supreme Court were appointed by the Senate through an election of three candidates designated by the President.
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Juan Pablo Sandoval, COMAD, S.C.Mr. Sandoval may be contacted at
jpsandoval@comad.com.mx
Construction Mezzanine Financing
March 29, 2017 —
Tim Davis & Steven Coury - White and Williams LLPConstruction mezzanine lending is on the rise and more development deals are getting done with a capital stack that includes mezzanine debt in addition to the traditional components of sponsor equity and senior mortgage debt. Below are important issues and concepts to bear in mind when structuring the financing of a construction project that includes a mezzanine debt component.
Funding Sequence
Funding Sequence
When will the proceeds of the mezzanine loan be advanced? In some instances, the mezzanine loan proceeds will be advanced only after all of the borrower’s equity has been contributed to the construction of the project. In other instances, the borrower’s equity and the mezzanine loan proceeds go in either pari passu or simultaneously at another ratio. If the equity is not entirely contributed in advance, the mezzanine lender may require that the uncontributed equity be held by the mezzanine lender or held in a pledged account. The mezzanine lender may also further mitigate the risk of non-funding of the equity by requiring an equity funding guaranty (as discussed below).
Additionally, when will the mezzanine loan proceeds be advanced in relation to the senior mortgage loan proceeds? Will the entire mezzanine loan be advanced prior to any senior mortgage loan advance or will they be advanced pari passu? Depending on the business deal, the mezzanine loan agreement will need to reflect how and when the equity, the mezzanine debt, and the mortgage debt will be advanced.
Reprinted courtesy of
Tim Davis, White and Williams LLP and
Steven Coury, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Davis may be contacted at davist@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Coury may be contacted at courys@whiteandwilliams.com
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Insurer Could Not Rely on Extrinsic Evidence to Circumvent Its Duty to Defend
February 14, 2023 —
Lorelie S. Masters & Yaniel Abreu - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogIn
First Mercury Insurance Co. v. First Florida Building Corp., et al., a federal district court ordered that an insurer had a duty to defend its insured against an underlying personal injury lawsuit. 2023 WL 23116, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2023). First Mercury is a cautionary tale about how insurers may try to circumvent their obligations by improperly considering extrinsic evidence when determining whether they have a duty to defend their insureds.
First Mercury is a coverage dispute over an underlying personal injury lawsuit that was filed against the insured, a construction company, for injuries the claimant allegedly sustained at a construction site. Id. The claimant alleged that he was at the construction site as an invitee who was “working with” the insured. Id. The insurer agreed to defend the insured against the personal injury lawsuit under a reservation of rights. Id. However, the insurer filed a coverage action seeking a declaration that coverage for the personal injury lawsuit was excluded under the policy. Id. Specifically, the insurer, on summary judgment, argued that the claimant was an employee of the insured who was injured in the course of his employment, thus falling within the employer’s liability and workers’ compensation exclusions in the policy. Id. Although the insurer acknowledged that the personal injury complaint against the insured triggered its duty to defend under the policy, the insurer argued that those exclusions relieved its duty to defend or indemnify the insured. Id.
Reprinted courtesy of
Lorelie S. Masters, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Yaniel Abreu, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Ms. Masters may be contacted at lmasters@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Abreu may be contacted at yabreu@HuntonAK.com
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Draft Federal Legislation Reinforces Advice to Promptly Notify Insurers of COVID-19 Losses
April 20, 2020 —
James Hultz - Newmeyer DillionInsurers across the country are nearly universally denying claims for business interruption stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic. Those denials have in turn been met with swift litigation and potential legislative action. The first business interruption coverage lawsuit related to COVID-19 was filed in New Orleans on March 16. There are now no less than 13 such cases nationwide and many more are likely to follow. Further, legislatures in at least seven states are considering legislation that would, to varying degrees, mandate business interruption coverage for COVID-19 losses, notwithstanding any seemingly contrary policy provisions.
From the early stages of the pandemic, we have consistently advised our clients to promptly notify their insurers of all COVID-19 related losses, even where coverage appeared uncertain. The deluge of coverage litigation and contemplated legislation could drastically alter how insurers handle COVID-19 claims. But policyholders who have failed to satisfy policy notice requirements could miss out on the benefits of those changes. Therefore, policyholders would be ill-advised to sit on the sidelines and wait it out.
Now, draft Federal legislation appears to add further impetus to instructions to “tender early.” The contemplated “Pandemic Risk Insurance Act of 2020” would reportedly devote billions of dollars of federal funds through a Department of Treasury administered reinsurance program designed to offset losses sustained by insurers who actually pay business interruption losses. The legislation is still taking shape but would reportedly create “a Federal program that provides for a transparent system of shared public and private compensation for business interruption losses resulting from a pandemic or outbreak of communicable disease.” President Trump is also reportedly pressuring insurers to provide business interruption coverage. The massive influx of federal funds and pressure from the White House could encourage insurers to reconsider denials of COVID-19 business interruption claims.
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James Hultz, Newmeyer DillionMr. Hultz may be contacted at
james.hultz@ndlf.com
Colorado Federal Court Confirms Consequetial Property Damage, But Finds No Coverage for Subcontractor
November 01, 2022 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiA recommended decision from the Magistrate Judge of the Federal District Court for the District of Colorado found there was no coverage for the subcontractor's faulty workmanship, but recognized that Colorado finds consequential damages to be property damage. Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Houston Cas. Co., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117857 (D. Colo. July 5, 2022).
The insured, Tripp Construction, was a subcontrator for contructing balconies at an apartment complex. The owner complained that Tripp failed to properly install balconies. The defective installation of certain balcony components damaged other, non-defective components.
The general contractor had an OCIP policy issued by Houston Casualty Company (HCC). The general contractor also had a Subcontractor Default policy issued by Indian Harbor.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Be Strategic When Suing a Manufacturer Under a Warranty with an Arbitration Provision
October 02, 2023 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesI’ve said this before, and I’ll say it again: arbitration is a creature of contract. If you don’t want to arbitrate, don’t agree to an arbitration provision as the means to resolve your dispute. Now, with that said, there are times you may not have a choice. An arbitration provision in a warranty from a manufacturer of a product is an example. If you are procuring the product, you are agreeing to the terms of the express warranty. Manufacturers are not negotiating their product warranty on a case-by-case basis considering they are not typically the ones selling the product directly to the end user. This does not mean that is a bad thing. It just means if you elect to sue the manufacturer directly for an alleged product defect or under the terms of the warranty, you should read the warranty and consider the strategic aspect that suing the manufacturer will have on your case.
In SICIS North America, Inc. v Sadie’s Hideaway, LLC, 48 Fla.L.Weekly D1581c (Fla. 1st DCA 2023), an owner elected to sue a tile manufacturer, a general contractor, the architect, and a window and door company. One of the arguments the owner raised was that exterior tiles installed were defective. The tiles were procured by the general contractor. The owner sued the general contractor under various theories and sued the tile manufacturer for breaches of warranty and negligence. The general contractor asserted a crossclaim for indemnification against the tile manufacturer. The tile manufacturer moved to compel the owner’s claim and the general contractor’s crossclaim to arbitration since there was an arbitration provision in the warranty documents and the general contractor’s indemnification claim arose from that transaction. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration. On appeal, the appellate court reversed:
First, because [the owner] was suing [the tile manufacturer] based upon the written warranty, it was bound by the arbitration provision contained in [the general contractor’s] agreement with [the tile manufacturer]. As the Florida Supreme Court has explained, “[W]hen a plaintiff sues under a contract to which the plaintiff is not a party . . . we will ordinarily enforce an arbitration clause contained in that contract, absent some other valid defense. . . .” . [The owner] had no valid defense against arbitration, a fact which it apparently realized when it voluntarily dismissed its express warranty claim after the notice of appeal and initial brief were filed.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
New York Court of Appeals Takes Narrow View of Labor Law Provisions in Recent Cases
July 03, 2022 —
Lisa M. Rolle & Matthew Feinberg - Traub LiebermanSince the end of March, the New York State Court of Appeals has issued decisions in favor of the defense concerning New York Labor Law §240 and §241. These pro-defendant decisions take a narrow view of the scope of the Labor Law provisions. However, while it remains to be seen how the Court’s below will apply the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, these recent decisions are beneficial for the defense bar going forward.
In Toussaint v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J March 22, 2022 N.Y. LEXIS 391 | 2022 NY Slip Op 01955 | 2022 WL 837579, the Court held that 12 NYCRR 23-9.9 (a), does not set forth a concrete specification sufficient to give rise to a non-delegable duty under Labor Law § 241 (6). In Toussaint Plaintiff, who was an employee of Skanska USA Civil Northeast, Inc., brought the lawsuit against the Port Authority asserting claims under Labor Law § 200 (1) and Labor Law § 241 (6) after he was struck by a power buggy while operating a rebar-bending machine at the World Trade Center Transportation Hub construction site owned by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Power buggies are small, self-operated vehicles used to move materials on construction sites. On the day of the accident, a trained and properly designated operator drove the buggy into the area near the plaintiff's workstation. That vehicle operator got off the vehicle, but short time thereafter, another worker—who was not designated or trained to do so—drove the buggy a short while prior to losing control and striking plaintiff. Plaintiff relied upon 12 NYCRR 23-9.9(a) which states that “[no person other than a trained and competent operator designated by the employer shall operate a power buggy.” In rejecting plaintiff’s argument the Court held that the "trained and competent operator" requirement is general, as it lacks a specific requirement or standard of conduct.
Reprinted courtesy of
Lisa M. Rolle, Traub Lieberman and
Matthew Feinberg, Traub Lieberman
Ms. Rolle may be contacted at lrolle@tlsslaw.com
Mr. Feinberg may be contacted at mfeinberg@tlsslaw.com
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