Connecticut Court Finds Anti-Concurrent Causation Clause Enforceable
March 19, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiCanvassing both case law and scholarly authority, the court determined that the anti-concurrent cause (ACC) provision barred coverage for loss caused by Tropical Storm Irene. Lombardi v. Universal N. Am Ins. Co., 2015 Conn. Super. LEXIS 138 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 2015).
Tropical Storm Irene caused the insured's home to shift and move from its concrete pier foundation. The house later had to be demolished.
The insurer's expert concluded that the house was removed from the foundation by storm surge and not by wind. The damage caused by wind was limited to 24 feet of trim missing from the roof and about 70 square feet of shingles that were blown away. The insured's expert concluded the house was removed from its foundation due to a combination of wind and water forces. The insured's expert reported that "the water wave action most probably caused most damage to the dwelling support pilings, with wind conditions contributing to the wave action."
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Florida’s Fourth District Appeals Court Clarifies What Actions Satisfy Florida’s Construction Defect Statute of Repose
November 14, 2018 —
Rahul Gogineni - The Subrogation SpecialistIn Gindel v. Centex Homes, 2018 Fla.App. LEXIS 13019, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal recently concluded that the date on which the plaintiffs provided a pre-suit notice in compliance with §558.004 of Florida’s construction defect Right-to-Cure statute, Fla. Stat. §§ 558.001 to 558.005, et. seq., is the date on which the plaintiff commenced a “civil action or proceeding,” i.e. an “action,” within the meaning of Florida’s construction defect statute of repose, Florida Statue § 95.11(3)(c). Thus, reversing the decision of the trial court, the Fourth District held that the plaintiffs timely-filed their construction defect action against the defendants.
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Rahul Gogineni, White and Williams LLPMr. Gogineni may be contacted at
goginenir@whiteandwilliams.com
Construction Litigation Roundup: “Hold the Pickles, Hold the Lettuce?”
October 02, 2023 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyHold the pickles, hold the lettuce?
You can even hold the service… or at least proof of it!
In a dispute over the construction of a Burger King restaurant in Tupelo, Mississippi, a state court suit by the owner against its general contractor and architect was removed to federal court by one of the defendant parties, on the basis of the diversity of citizenship of the defendant parties from the plaintiff, per 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).
For its part, plaintiff, upon achieving service of its state court complaint against the various defendants, filed a proof of service as to the party which sought to remove the case, but not as to the other defendants (even though the other defendants were served). Once the case was removed to federal court and after the deadline for removal has passed, plaintiff sought to have the matter remanded based on the lack of the consent of the entirety of the defendant group to the removal, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (“When a civil action is removed solely under section 1441(a), all defendants who have been properly joined and served must join in or consent to the removal of the action.”).
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
Architect, Engineer, and Design Professional Liens in California: A Different Animal than the Mechanics’ Lien
August 15, 2022 —
William L. Porter - Porter Law GroupMost in the construction industry are familiar with the rules governing California mechanics’ liens. They know that the Preliminary Notice of Civil Code Section 8034 and 8200-8216 is an important foundational prerequisite document and that the deadline to record a mechanics’ lien is generally triggered by events occurring at the end of construction, including completion of the work of improvement and/or the recording of the notice of completion or notice of cessation. Most of these rules are found in California Civil Code sections 8160-8494.
While architects, engineers and other design professionals are certainly entitled to pursue a mechanics’ lien at the end of a construction project when they are unpaid for their work, unless they also consider the remedy available to them under the California “design professional lien,” they are missing a powerful opportunity to preserve the right to payment only available to architects, engineers, and design professionals.
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William L. Porter, Porter Law GroupMr. Porter may be contacted at
bporter@porterlaw.com
Eighth Circuit Affirms Finding of Bad Faith, Award of Costs and Prejudgment Interest
October 25, 2021 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of bad faith and award to the insured of taxable costs and prejudgment interest. Selective Ins. Co. v. Sela, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 26062 (8th Cir. Aug. 30, 2021).
The insured suffered two hail storms that damaged his home. In 2010, the first storm caused over half a million dollars in loss. Before submitting a claim to his original insurer or beginning any repairs, the insured secured a new policy with Selective. The policy did not exclude pre-existing damage, it did preclude coverage if the insured "willfully and with intent to defraud, concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance relating to the insurance."
Before issuing the policy, Selective appraised the property and assigned a $1.6 million value to the home. The insured then filed a claim with his original insurer and received $510,787.23 for actual cash value of his loss. Neither the terms of this settlement nor this new policy with Selective required the insured to repair all of the 2010 damage.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
The Living Makes Buildings Better with Computational Design
November 12, 2019 —
Aarni Heiskanen - AEC BusinessThe AEC industry has a responsibility and mandate when it comes to addressing significant global challenges in the sector and improving operational practice. Professionals such as Lorenzo Villaggi, Senior Research Scientist at The Living, believe that new design technologies hold the key to better-performing built environments.
“Although I’m trained as an architect, I’ve always had an interest in how technology can interact with and have an impact on design processes,” says Lorenzo. “I’ve developed a familiarity with advanced computational tools and eventually developed my own.”
These computational tools are primarily designed to assist with the generation of design options and improve performance analysis. They range from small systems that help users design faster, all the way to elaborate software that can perform complex, mission-critical tasks.
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Aarni Heiskanen, AEC BusinessMr. Heiskanen may be contacted at
aec-business@aepartners.fi
Be Careful When Requiring Fitness for Duty Examinations
October 21, 2015 —
Craig Martin – Construction Contractor AdvisorFitness for Duty examinations can be an important part of an employer’s hiring and retention protocol. The Nebraska Supreme Court recently clarified when an employer may require applicants and employees to undergo fitness for duty examinations. In Arens v. Nebco, Inc., the court ruled that an employer must have a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its demand that a current employee submit to a fitness for duty examination.
In this case, Lenard Arens suffered two significant injuries over the course of his 25 years of employment with Nebco. The second injury, a closed head injury, limited the type of work he could do and required written instructions due to short term memory loss. Arens was assigned to drive tractor-trailer trucks. Several years after returning to work, Arens had two minor accidents with his truck within a matter of days. Arens supervisor required him to undergo fitness for duty examination. Arens failed the fitness for duty examination and was terminated. Arens filed suit, claiming that Nebco discriminated against him by making him take a fitness for duty test.
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Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLPMr. Martin may be contacted at
cmartin@ldmlaw.com
