MDL for Claims Against Manufacturers and Distributors of PFAS-Containing AFFFs Focuses Attention on Key Issues
July 05, 2021 —
Gregory S. Capps & Lynndon K. Groff - White and Williams LLPClaims against manufacturers and distributors of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS)-containing aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) are hurtling forward. Two important developments in this opening salvo of PFAS-related claims against numerous defendants could have important ramifications not only on future PFAS litigation, but on insurance coverage for potential PFAS liabilities as well. First, ten bellwether cases are progressing closer to trial. Second, the key “government contractor defense” has been slated for briefing.
In December 2018, the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation established a multi-district litigation (MDL 2873) for AFFF PFAS claims in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. Unlike previous PFAS lawsuits (primarily against DuPont and/or 3M), the lawsuits in MDL 2873 target dozens of defendants who manufactured and distributed AFFF and its constituent chemicals. MDL 2873 now houses approximately 1,200 member cases, which include the following categories of claims: (i) claims for property damage asserted by water providers, (ii) claims for property damage asserted by property owners, (iii) bodily injury claims, and (iv) claims for medical monitoring for potential future injury.
Reprinted courtesy of
Gregory S. Capps, White and Williams LLP and
Lynndon K. Groff, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Capps may be contacted at cappsg@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Groff may be contacted at groffl@whiteandwilliams.com
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Differing Rulings On Construction Defect Claims Leave Unanswered Questions For Builders, and Construction Practice Groups. Impact to CGL Carriers, General Contractors, Builders Remains Unclear
March 07, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFIn the past year a number of state and federal courts have rendered a number of conflicting decisions that promise to alter or perhaps shift entirely the paradigm, of how builders manage risk.
According to a report today by Dave Lenckus in Property Casualty 360 “Nine state and federal courts and one state legislature over the past year have addressed whether a construction defect a defective product or faulty workmanship is fortuitous and therefore an occurrence under the commercial general liability insurance policy. Four jurisdictions determined it is; three said no; two ruled that a construction defect that causes consequential damage to property other than the work product is an occurrence; and one federal court contributed its conflicting case law that has developed in Oregon since its high court ruled in 2000 that a construction defect is not an occurrence”.
The article strongly suggests that in the absence of a clear consensus over what the recent rulings mean for builders and contractors coverage disputes will intensify and continue to proliferate.
Doing this on a state-by-state basis has caused a lot of confusion among buyers and sellers, said Jeffrey A. Segall, a Tampa-based senior vice president and the Florida Construction Practice leader at Willis of Florida, a unit of Willis Group Holdings.
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“Made in America Week” Highlights Requirements, Opportunities for Contractors and Suppliers
August 14, 2023 —
Sarah Barney & Amy Hoang - The Construction SeytOn July 21, 2023, President Biden designated July 23-29, 2023, as “Made in America Week.” This proclamation builds on the Biden Administration’s efforts to bolster domestic manufacturing through evolving policies attached to government funds that require contractors and suppliers to feature varying amounts of U.S.-made content in their products and services. To commemorate this week, here is a refresher on “Made in America” and what it means for government contractors and suppliers.
What does “Made in America” mean?
Under Executive Order 14005, the Administration defined “Made in America” laws as “all statutes, regulations, rules, and Executive Orders relating to Federal financial assistance awards or Federal procurement, including those that refer to “Buy America” or “Buy American,” that require, or provide a preference for, the purchase or acquisition of goods, products, or materials produced in the United States, including iron, steel, and manufactured goods offered in the United States.” Generally speaking, “Made in America” or “Buy American” requirements refer to:
- The Buy American Act (BAA) of 1933, establishing domestic sourcing preferences for unmanufactured and manufactured articles, materials, and supplies procured by the federal government for public use, including those used on federal construction contracts;
Reprinted courtesy of
Sarah Barney, Seyfarth and
Amy Hoang, Seyfarth
Ms. Barney may be contacted at sbarney@seyfarth.com
Ms. Hoang may be contacted at ahoang@seyfarth.com
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Conflict of Interest Accusations may Spark Lawsuit Against City and City Manager
February 07, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFCasper, Wyoming Councilman Craig Hedquist—who is also owner of Hedquist Construction—has been “accused of violating state and local conflict-of-interest laws,” according to the Star-Tribune. In response, Hedquist “is threatening a lawsuit against City Manager John Patterson, the city of Casper and ‘possibly others,’ according to a letter obtained by the Star-Tribune.”
The letter, which was sent to City Attorney William Luben by Hedquist attorney John Robinson, “demands the city preserve, from Aug. 1, 2012, on, all records of communication and consultation with attorneys and investigators, along with minutes, notes, recordings, executive sessions and digital data regarding Hedquist and Hedquist Construction.”
City Manager John Patterson told the Star-Tribune that “he was unaware of the letter and didn't know what the lawsuit might be about.”
Hedquist maintains that there was never a conflict of interest: “The general and expected practice for the Casper City Council members is to not vote on matters in which a council member may have a personal interest and record this recusal in the public record,” Hedquist said, as reported by the Star-Tribune. “I have done this on all contract matters regarding Hedquist Construction.”
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How to Determine the Deadline for Recording a California Mechanics Lien
September 17, 2015 —
William L. Porter, Esq. – Porter Law Group BulletinThe California Mechanics Lien is one of the most valuable collection devices available to contractors, subcontractors and suppliers who are unpaid for work performed and materials supplied in relation to a California private works construction project. The mechanics lien allows the claimant to sell the property where the work was performed in order to obtain payment. As noted below, in order to pursue this remedy, certain deadlines must be met.
Know Your Mechanics Lien Filing Deadlines Generally
Working within deadlines is absolutely crucial to preserving mechanics lien rights under California law. The deadlines differ, depending on whether you are a ”direct” contractor, also known as “original” or “prime” contractor (one who contracts directly with the property owner) or a subcontractor or material supplier. The primary differences are that the direct contractor is only required to serve the “Preliminary Notice” on the Construction Lender (Civil Code section 8200-8216), whereas the subcontractor and material supplier must serve not only the Construction Lender, but also the Owner and Direct Contractor (see Civil Code section 8200(e)). Another difference is that a direct contractor has a longer period of time in which to record a mechanics lien after a valid “notice of completion” or a “notice of cessation” has been recorded (Civil Code sections 8180-8190), (60 days for original contractors as compared to 30 days for subcontractors and suppliers – See Civil Code sections 8412 and 8414).
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William L. Porter, The Porter Law GroupMr. Porter may be contacted at
bporter@porterlaw.com
Municipalities Owe a Duty to Pedestrians Regardless of Whether a Sidewalk Presents an “Open and Obvious” Hazardous Condition. (WA)
February 25, 2014 —
Natasha Khachatourians – Scheer & Zehnder LLP Liability NewsletterIssue: Does a municipality owe a duty to pedestrians to keep sidewalks reasonably safe for their intended use even if the condition of the sidewalk is an open and obvious hazard? YES
Facts: Plaintiff Nanci Millson liked to walk in Lynden, Washington. While plaintiff regularly walked through her neighborhood and knew that various areas of the sidewalk were cracked and lifted, she continued to walk through her neighborhood nonetheless. Plaintiff felt that the sidewalks closer to her neighborhood were in better condition and when she reached an area a block away from her home, she picked up speed even though she was in an area of sidewalk she previously had not walked before. Plaintiff became distracted, tripped on an elevated sidewalk and fell, suffering various injuries.
Plaintiff sued the City of Lynden (“City”) for negligently failing to maintain the sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition. The City argued that the tripping hazard was “open and obvious”, and the trial court granted the City summary judgment. The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether an “open and obvious” condition is a matter of law to be decided by the court.
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Natasha Khachatourians, Scheer & Zehnder LLP Ms. Khachatourians may be contacted at
natashak@scheerlaw.com
New York Appellate Court Addresses “Trigger of Coverage” for Asbestos Claims and Other Coverage Issues
November 30, 2020 —
Paul A. Briganti - Complex Insurance Coverage ReporterOn October 9, 2020, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, decided an appeal from a trial court’s 2018 summary judgment ruling on a number of coverage issues arising out of asbestos-related bodily injury claims against plaintiffs Carrier Corporation (Carrier) and Elliott Company (Elliott). See Carrier Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 396 CA 18-02292, Mem. & Order (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 4th Dep’t Oct. 9, 2020).
The Fourth Department reversed the trial court’s ruling that, under New York’s “injury in fact trigger of coverage,” injury occurs from the first date of exposure to asbestos through death or the filing of suit as a matter of law. The parties agreed that, because the policy language at issue required personal injury to take place “during the policy period,” “the applicable test in determining what event constitutes personal injury sufficient to trigger coverage is injury-in-fact, ‘which rests on when the injury, sickness, disease or disability actually began.’” Id. at 3 (quoting Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Rapid-American Corp., 609 N.E.2d 506, 511 (N.Y. 1993)). The Fourth Department concluded that, in resolving the issue, the trial court erred by relying on inapposite decisions in other cases where: (1) the parties had stipulated or otherwise not disputed that first exposure triggered coverage[1]; or (2) the issue had not been resolved on summary judgment, but rather at trial based on expert medical evidence[2]. The Fourth Department further explained that, even if plaintiffs here had met their initial burden on summary judgment by submitting admissible evidence that asbestos-related injury actually begins upon first exposure, the defendant-insurer’s opposition – which included affidavits of medical experts contradicting that evidence and averring instead that “harm occurs only when a threshold level of asbestos fiber or particle burden is reached that overtakes the body’s defense mechanisms” – raised a triable issue of fact. Id. at 4. The Fourth Department also rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the defendant-insurer was collaterally estopped on the “trigger” issue by a California appellate court’s decision in Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The Fourth Department reasoned that the issues litigated in the two cases were not identical because, among other things, California and New York “apply different substantive law in determining when asbestos-related injury occurs.” Carrier, Mem. & Order at 4.
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Paul A. Briganti, White and Williams LLPMr. Briganti may be contacted at
brigantip@whiteandwilliams.com
Without Reservations: Fourth Circuit Affirms That Vague Reservation of Rights Waived Insurers’ Coverage Arguments
January 09, 2023 —
Lara Degenhart Cassidy & Matthew J. Revis - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogThe Fourth Circuit recently affirmed insurance coverage for a South Carolina policyholder based on the “axiomatic principle” that an insurer which fails to fully and fairly articulate its potential coverage defenses in a reservation of rights letter loses the right to contest coverage on those grounds.
Stoneledge at Lake Keowee Owner’s Assoc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 19-2009, 2022 WL 17592121 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Harleysville Group Insurance v. Heritage Communities, Inc., 803 S.E.2d 288 (S.C. 2017)). More particularly, in Stoneledge, the Fourth Circuit affirmed per curiam a South Carolina District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a homeowners association that had successfully sued its general contractors for construction defects and was seeking to recover the damages owed from the contractors’ insurers. The Fourth Circuit agreed that the insurers’ vague reservation of rights letters failed to reserve the defenses on which the insurers purported to deny coverage.
The question before the court in Stoneledge was whether the two insurers that had each agreed to defend their respective general-contractor insureds in the homeowner association’s underlying litigation had sufficiently informed their policyholders of their coverage positions. Specifically, the court considered whether the insurers provided notice of their intention to challenge coverage on specific bases and explained why those bases applied in their respective reservation of rights letters. Both of the insurers’ letters followed the typical approach of identifying various policy provisions and exclusions and outlining the general mechanics of those provisions, but they fell short of applying the provisions or exclusions to the facts in the case at hand. Further, the letters stated that the insurers would reevaluate how the provisions applied as the underlying case progressed. One of the insurer’s letters expressed doubt as to coverage but did not offer any analysis on the reasons for the prospective coverage denial.
Reprinted courtesy of
Lara Degenhart Cassidy, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Matthew J. Revis, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Ms. Cassidy may be contacted at lcassidy@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Revis may be contacted at mrevis@HuntonAK.com
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