Before Celebrating the Market Rebound, Builders Need to Read the Fine Print: New Changes in Construction Law Coming Out of the Recession
November 26, 2014 —
Alan H. Packer - Newmeyer & Dillion, LLPAs the homebuilding market continues to improve, many builders find themselves maneuvering familiar roads. That said, important new realities have taken hold since the market collapse. Navigating these changes requires extra thought for practical and legal reasons.
Using Old Designs “Off the Shelf”?
The adoption of the California Building Standards Code in 2010, with an updated schedule to go into effect January 1, may complicate the use of older designs. In addition, some builders are contemplating building on pads constructed five or more years ago, temporarily shelved until market conditions improved. Because of changes in both the applicable Code and due to possible changes in the underlying soils and drainage, these projects require additional scrutiny before starting construction.
Mechanic’s Lien Law Changes
Not too long ago, the California Legislature recently overhauled the entire mechanic’s lien law system in California. New forms, new statutory references, new rules and deadlines are all applicable to projects under construction now. Make sure your documents are up to date, as the use of older forms (particularly for liens, progress payments, and final payments) could create legal problems in the future.
Indemnity Law Changes
Since 2006, California lawmakers have passed four rounds of legislation aimed at limiting indemnity provisions in construction contracts. The laws are aimed at two aspects of indemnity law: “Type 1” indemnity provisions, and liability for the costs of defending a claim.
Type 1 Indemnity. California law previously permitted a builder to obtain “Type 1” indemnity from its subcontractors for all claims. Under a Type 1 provision, if a claim arose out of the trade’s work, the trade was fully responsible to defend and indemnify the builder – even if other trades or the Builder were partially at fault. Some cases even allowed, typically in a commercial context, the builder to obtain Type 1 indemnity even if the trade was not negligent, as long as the claim involved its work.
Defense Obligation. In 2008, California’s highest court issued an opinion in Crawford v. Weather Shield, evaluating an indemnity provision requiring trade (a window supplier/manufacturer) to defend the builder in claims involving allegations of damages arising out of the trade’s work. Because the trade had contractually agreed to defend the builder, the Court held it responsible for the builder’s defense costs -- even though, ultimately, the trade was found
not liable for the actual damages claimed.
Recent legislation after Crawford has dramatically shifted how indemnity provisions will be enforced. Builders may no longer obtain Type 1 indemnity for residential construction defect claims covered by SB800; instead, indemnity is limited to the extent a claim arises out of the trade’s work. Even more recent legislation applied these changes to claims arising out of commercial construction projects. The recent legislation allows the trades “options” on how to defend the builder, with an eye toward requiring that they pay only a “reasonably allocated” portion for the builder’s defense costs.
Smart builders are refining their contract documents to take into account these new limitations on indemnity provisions.
Insurance Market Changes
Due to uncertainties in subcontractor insurance and other factors, many builders have also converted their liability insurance from a “bring your own” model to “wrap-up” insurance, where the builder’s policy also covers their trades. Builders should carefully examine their subcontracts in light of this change as well.
Trade Partner Changes
On a practical level, many trade partners, particularly in the residential sector, have gone out of business or moved on to greener pastures. Builders need to find and negotiate contracts with new trade partners on the fly, and educate them on the builders’ procedures for payment and construction.
SB800 documentation
A decade ago, most builders updated their purchase documents and subcontracts for California’s “Right to Repair Law” (also known as SB800), which set forth functionality standards for construction defects in residential housing, and procedures for resolving claims prior to litigation. Builders ramping up to meet market demand should examine how they implemented SB800 changes in contract documents. Issues to consider:
- Whether to opt out of -- or back into -- statutory procedures.
- Whether to include arbitration or judicial reference provisions to control where claims are litigated after the SB800 process.
- Re-training personnel to preserve SB800 rights, including sign-offs on purchase documentation and recordation of key documents.
- Recent Court of Appeal decisions have complicated the SB800 landscape, potentially opening the door to “common law” tort claims in at least subrogation contexts. Strategic planning at the document stage may be a good way to mitigate this risk as the cases wind their way through the judicial process.
The continuing surge in building activity is a welcome sign for builders who have weathered the storm. Before taking too many steps, builders should consult with counsel, their designers, and their insurance advisors to take into account the new realities of this recovering housing market.
About the Author
Alan H. Packer is a partner in the expanding Walnut Creek, CA, office of the law firm of
Newmeyer & Dillion LLP whose specialties include real estate, insurance, and construction litigation. To reach Alan, call 925.988.3200 or email him at alan.packer@ndlf.com.
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Mercury News Editorial Calls for Investigation of Bay Bridge Construction
July 01, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFEditors at the San Jose Mercury News called for investigations of the construction of the new eastern span of the Bay Bridge: “It's time for public officials, especially members of the Metropolitan Transportation Commission, state legislators and Gov. Jerry Brown, to demand thorough independent analyses.”
Problems with the $6.5 billion structure were found about nine months ago, which led to questions regarding the “integrity and maintenance costs” that were allegedly covered up by Caltrans officials. Issues raised included questions “about the strength of thousands of bolts, including at the base of the tower and the connections of the main cable; cracked welds in the suspension span; and rusting of the single cable holding up the bridge.”
The Mercury editors, however, do not show much optimism about the situation: “It's likely that, absent a political outcry, Caltrans will sign off. From the start, agency officials have failed to adequately oversee the construction and thrown public money at problems while trying to cover-up their own failures. Brown, ultimately responsible for Caltrans, has dismissed concerns about the bridge's integrity.”
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Gilbert’s Plan for Downtown Detroit Has No Room for Jail
October 08, 2014 —
Chris Christoff – BloombergBillionaire Dan Gilbert envisions a vibrant and shiny downtown Detroit, where he owns a casino and about 60 buildings. His urban Eden doesn’t include a jail with 2,000 criminals.
Gilbert is resisting county officials’ plans to restart construction on a half-finished jail mired in cost overruns, criminal investigations and debt. The project, which the Wayne County Commission may revive tomorrow, would replace a complex on land that Gilbert, the 52-year-old founder and chairman of Detroit-based Quicken Loans Inc., offered to buy for $50 million to build a hotel, housing and stores.
The dispute over the jail, which has sat unfinished for 16 months, pits one of Detroit’s most prominent boosters against a county government over how to reinvigorate the city’s heart. Gilbert, whose company is the nation’s largest online retail mortgage lender, has invested $1.3 billion there, betting on the former auto-manufacturing capital’s resurgence after decades of decline that pushed it into a record $18 billion municipal bankruptcy.
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Chris Christoff, BloombergMr. Christoff may be contacted at
cchristoff@bloomberg.net
Navigating the Construction Burrito: OCIP Policies in California’s Construction Defect Cases
November 16, 2023 —
Alexa Stephenson & Ivette Kincaid - Kahana FeldIn the early 2000’s, Owner-Controlled Insurance Programs (OCIP) or WRAPS, were traditionally used in large commercial projects of over $50 million in construction costs. As construction defect lawsuits became more prevalent, subcontractors found themselves unable to meet the insurance requirements of their contracts with developers and general contractors because they could not find insurance companies that were willing to insure the risk. This presented a problem for developers and general contractors and left them with no option but to look into new insurance products that would insure them and all subcontractors who worked on the project. OCIPs became in some instances the only insurance option for developers, general contractors, and subcontractors to build single-family or multi-family projects in California and other western states.
OCIPS or WRAPS, often likened to the layers of a savory burrito, offer both enticing benefits and potential pitfalls. Just as a burrito’s ingredients can harmonize or clash, OCIP policies can shape the outcome of legal battles, impacting contractors, developers, and insurers alike.
Pros – Savoring the OCIP Burrito:
1. Wrapped Protection: Much like a well-folded burrito envelops its contents, OCIP policies offer comprehensive coverage for construction projects. Developers, general contractors, and subcontractors find comfort in knowing that their liability risks are bundled into a single policy, ensuring all enrolled parties have coverage in the event of a claim.
Reprinted courtesy of
Alexa Stephenson, Kahana Feld and
Ivette Kincaid, Kahana Feld
Ms. Stephenson may be contacted at astephenson@kahanafeld.com
Ms. Kincaid may be contacted at ikincaid@kahanafeld.com
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Court Rules Planned Development of Banning Ranch May Proceed
June 10, 2015 —
Kristian B. Moriarty and Lawrence S. Zucker II – Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLPIn Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach (filed 5/20/2015, No. G049691), the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held the Environmental Impact Report prepared by the City of Newport Beach for the partial development of Banning Ranch complied with California environmental protection statutes and local ordinances.
Under the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), a city desiring to approve or carry out a project that may have significant effect on the environment must prepare an environmental impact report (“EIR”) designed to provide the public with detailed information about the effect which a proposed project will have on the environment. The California Coastal Act of 1976 provides for heightened protection of environmentally sensitive habitat areas (“ESHA”) defined as any “area in which plant or animal life or their habitats are either rare or especially valuable because of their special nature or role in an ecosystem and which could be easily disturbed or degraded by human activities and developments.”
In 2006, the City of Newport Beach adopted a General Plan for the physical development of the city. The plan specifically identifies Banning Ranch as having significant value as a wildlife habitat and open space resource for citizens. The general plan includes a primary goal of complete preservation of Banning Ranch as open space. To the extent the primary goal cannot be achieved, the plan identifies a secondary goal allowing limited development of Banning Ranch “to fund preservation of the majority of the property as open space.” The plan also requires the City to coordinate any development with the state and federal agencies.
Reprinted courtesy of
Kristian B. Moriarty, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Lawrence S. Zucker II, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Moriarty may be contacted at kmoriarty@hbblaw.com; Mr. Zucker may be contacted at lzucker@hbblaw.com
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Pennsylvania “occurrence”
December 30, 2013 —
Scott Patterson — CDCoverageIn Indalex Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 2013 WL 6237312 (Pa. Super. 2013), insured Indalex was sued in multiple underlying actions, filed in states other than Pennsylvania, alleging that Indalex defectively designed or manufactured windows and doors resulting in leaks causing damage beyond the Indalex product, including mold, wall cracks, and personal injuries. The complaints included strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and breach of contract causes of action. After Indalex’s primary CGL policies exhausted, Indalex filed a declaratory judgment action against its umbrella insurer National Union.
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Scott PattersonScott Patterson can be contacted at cdcoverage.com
Structure of Champlain Towers North Appears Healthy
August 04, 2021 —
Nadine M. Post - Engineering News-RecordThere is good news for the residents of the occupied Champlain Towers North, the 12-story residential condominium in Surfside, Fla., located a short distance up Collins Avenue from its near-twin Champlain Towers South, which failed unexpectedly June 24. The unstable remaining wing of the Champlain Towers South concrete structure was imploded July 4, after the partial progressive collapse that killed at least 94 people and left another 22 still missing.
Reprinted courtesy of
Nadine M. Post, Engineering News-Record
Ms. Post may be contacted at postn@enr.com
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Construction Defect Coverage Summary 2013: The Business Risks Shift To Insurers
January 13, 2014 —
John Husmann and Adam Fleischer, BatesCarey LLP, Chicago, ILIn 2013, courts examining insurance coverage for construction defect claims departed from earlier precedent and trended toward allowing construction companies to shift the costs of their faulty workmanship to their insurers, thereby reversing the previous public policy trend against coverage for such claims.
The tension in all construction defect insurance disputes is typically over which party—the insured or insurer—should bear the cost of the repair and replacement work to fix or complete the job that the insured was hired to do. For some time, courts have recognized that there is a public policy against allowing construction companies to get paid to perform faulty workmanship, and then to force their insurers to be the financers for the repair and replacement costs. Such courts issued landmark decisions precluding insurance coverage for construction defects in these situations. This trend against allowing insurance coverage for the repair of faulty workmanship was alive and well in 2012.
However, in 2013, court decisions focused more on the hyper-technical interpretation of policy wording and strayed from those public policy considerations upon which previous decisions relied. This 2013 trend was seen in three areas of construction defect insurance decisions in particular:
1. Decisions addressing whether an insured’s faulty workmanship can be considered a covered “occurrence.”
2. Even when faulty workmanship may not be an “occurrence” as it relates to the insured’s work, some decisions found that the same faulty workmanship to one part of the insured’s project could be an “occurrence” if it caused damage to other non-defective parts of the insured’s project.
3. Decisions addressing whether a policy’s exclusion for damage to the particular part of property on which the insured was working can be applied as intended to prevent coverage for the repair and replacement costs resulting from the insured’s faulty work.
The 2013 decisions in each of these areas are addressed in the three sections below. The overall trend to be derived from these cases is that courts have gotten away from analyzing the common sense public policy considerations behind earlier precedent and have instead seized on the technical application of policy wording to allow insureds to shift more of their business risk and increase insurers’ overall exposure.
I. IS FAULTY WORKMANSHIP AN “OCCURRENCE”? SEVERAL MORE STATES SAY YES.
In 2013, while the Supreme Court of Alabama adhered to the idea that an insured cannot obtain insurance to pay the cost of repairing its own work, the highest courts in West Virginia and North Dakota went the opposite direction, even overturning their own recent precedent to make the insurance company responsible for bearing the cost to repair and replace its insured’s faulty work. In order to transfer the risk of faulty construction from builder to insurer, these courts ruled that, if the defective construction was not expected or intended by the insured, then the “occurrence” requirement of the policy’s insuring agreement is satisfied. Of course, the practical failing of these rulings is that it gives construction companies a “double recovery”: they get paid once by the consumer to build the project, and then the cost of repairing the project gets paid by insurance. This very economic disincentive was at the heart of the early legal trend precluding coverage for such construction defects; a trend that is now slowly being reversed with almost no discussion of the economic and business havoc that will result.
A. Cherrington v. Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co., 231 W. Va. 470, 745 S.E.2d 508 (March 27, 2013)
The Supreme Court of West Virginia overturned previous precedent to find that defective workmanship causing the need to repair the construction itself constitutes an “occurrence” under a CGL policy.
In Cherrington, a homeowner sued a builder for the costs to repair defects in a newly-constructed residence. There was no damage alleged to anything but the project itself. The builder’s insurer denied coverage arguing, among other reasons, allegations of defective construction do not constitute an “occurrence.” The insurer’s position was grounded in several West Virginia Supreme Court decisions that found that poor workmanship, standing alone, does not constitute an occurrence. Webster Cnty. Solid Waste Auth. v. Brackenrich & Associates, Inc., 217 W. Va. 304, 617 S.E.2d 851 (2005); Corder v. William W. Smith Excavating Co., 210 W. Va. 110, 556 S.E.2d 77 (2001); Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Pioneer Home Improvement, Inc., 206 W. Va. 506, 526 S.E.2d 28 (1999).
In an about-face, the West Virginia Supreme Court overruled its prior decisions and found that faulty workmanship can constitute an occurrence if it was not intended or expected by the insured. The court observed that a majority of other jurisdictions found that faulty workmanship is covered by a CGL policy, either in judicial decisions or by legislative amendments to state insurance codes. On this point, we note that on November 25, 2013 a bill was introduced before the New Jersey Assembly that would require CGL policies issued to construction professionals to define “occurrence” so as to include claims for faulty workmanship.
The court reasoned that, by defining occurrence, in part, as “an accident,” the policy must be interpreted to provide coverage for damages or injuries that were not deliberately or intentionally caused by the insured. The court also noted that the policy contained an exclusion property damage to “your work” (exclusion l.), which implies that damage to the insured’s work must be within the policy’s basic insuring agreement, or there would not have been the need for the exclusion. Thus, the court reasoned that a finding that faulty workmanship is not an occurrence would be inconsistent with the “your work” exception. Therefore, the court expressly overruled its prior decisions and found that the builder’s insurer had a duty to defend.
B. K & L Homes, Inc. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2013 ND 57, 829 N.W.2d 724 (April 5, 2013)
The Supreme Court of North Dakota changed course and held that faulty workmanship may constitute an “occurrence” so long as the faulty work and the resulting damage was not anticipated, intended, or expected.
Homeowners sued the insured homebuilder alleging that their house suffered damage because of substantial shifting caused by improper footings and inadequately compacted soil under the footings and foundation that had been constructed by a subcontractor of the insured.
The main issue before the North Dakota Supreme Court was whether inadvertent faulty workmanship constitutes an accidental “occurrence” potentially covered under the CGL policy. The court examined the drafting history of the standard ISO CGL form and surveyed cases nationwide. The court concluded that faulty workmanship may constitute an “occurrence” if the faulty work was “unexpected” and not intended by the insured, and the property damage was not anticipated or intentional, so that neither the cause nor the harm was anticipated, intended, or expected.
In reaching its conclusion, the North Dakota Supreme Court specifically rejected its own prior decision in ACUITY v. Burd & Smith Constr., Inc., 721 N.W.2d 33, 2006 ND 187 (N.D. 2006), which held that faulty or defective workmanship, standing alone, is not an accidental “occurrence.” The court explained that the prior decision incorrectly drew a distinction between faulty workmanship that damages the insured’s work or product and faulty workmanship that damages a third party’s work or property. The court found that there is nothing in the definition of “occurrence” that supports the notion that faulty workmanship that damages the own work of the insured contractor is not an “occurrence.” The North Dakota Supreme Court’s change in approach, like the decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court in Cherrington, is marked by a narrow focus on whether the faulty work was purposeful, without regard to the broader concepts that insurance coverage is not meant to satisfy the insured’s contractual business obligations.
C. Capstone Building Corp. v. American Motorists Insurance Co., 308 Conn. 760, 67 A.3d 961 (June 11, 2013)
The Supreme Court of Connecticut found as a matter of first impression that defective workmanship causing defects in the insured’s own project can constitute an “occurrence.”
The insureds, a general contractor and project developer, settled construction defect claims against them brought by the University of Connecticut involving the allegedly negligent construction of a dormitory building. The settlement was for repairs necessary to correct the insured’s own work and not for any other incidental property damage. After the settlement, the insured sought coverage for the settlement amount from the insurer that had issued an Owner Controlled Insurance Program policy for the dormitory project. In a matter of first impression in Connecticut, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that defective workmanship necessitating repairs can indeed constitute an insured “occurrence,” reasoning that, because the negligent work was unintentional from the point of view of the insured, such negligent work may constitute an accident or occurrence. Similar to the approach in Cherrington and K & L Homes, the court reasoned that insurance policies are designed to cover foreseeable risks, and that a deliberate act of constructing a project, when performed negligently, does indeed constitute a covered accidental “occurrence” if the effect is not intended or expected.
D. Taylor Morrison Servs., Inc. v. HDI-Gerling Am. Ins. Co., 746 S.E.2d 587 (Ga., July 12, 2013)
The Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that an “occurrence” does not require damage to the property or work of someone other than the insured.
A class of 400 homeowners in California sued the insured homebuilder for negligently constructing the foundation of their homes, resulting in damage to the homes due to the cracked and buckling foundations. The homebuilder’s insurer defended the class action and filed a declaratory judgment action in Georgia federal court, arguing that the claims against the insured did not allege an “occurrence” because the damages at issue were simply the repairs to the insured’s faulty work. The Eleventh Circuit certified the question of whether Georgia law requires there to be damage to property other than the insured’s own work for an “occurrence” to exist under a CGL policy.
The Supreme Court of Georgia found that negligent construction which damages only the insured’s own work can indeed constitute an accidental “occurrence.” Like the recent decisions discussed above, the court observed that the term “accident” meant an unexpected or unintended event, and, therefore, the identity of the person whose interests were damaged is irrelevant. However, in a lengthy series of footnotes, the court further observed in dicta that defectively constructed property cannot be said to be physically injured by the work that brought it into existence. However, the court did not attempt to define the precise line of demarcation between defective and non-defective work when both are a part of the same project.
E. Owners Ins. Co. v. Jim Carr Homebuilder, LLC, 1120764, 2013 WL 5298575 (Ala., Sept. 20, 2013)
The Supreme Court of Alabama confirmed that faulty workmanship, standing alone, does not constitute an “occurrence.”
The insured homebuilder sought coverage for an adverse arbitration award wherein it was determined that the insured had defectively constructed a home resulting in damages due to water infiltration, causing “significant mental anguish” to the homeowner. The insurer defended the insured in the arbitration, but denied indemnity coverage for the award.
The Supreme Court of Alabama agreed with the insurer, finding that, because the insured was hired to build the entire house, any property damage or bodily injury (mental anguish) that resulted from the insured’s faulty workmanship was not caused by an “occurrence.” The court indicated only damage to something other than the insured’s own work (which was not present in this case) can be considered damage caused by an “occurrence.” The implication of this case is that either property damage or bodily injury that results from faulty workmanship is not caused by an “occurrence,” although the court did not expressly discuss this issue it its holding.
II. AN INSURED’S FAULTY WORKMANSHIP TO ONE PART OF A PROJECT MAY BE AN “OCCURRENCE” IF IT CAUSES DAMAGE TO OTHER NON-DEFECTIVE PARTS OF THE INSURED’S PROJECT.
Even in jurisdictions where the costs to repair faulty workmanship is typically not an “occurrence,” courts do recognize that, if the same faulty workmanship of the insured damages another part of the insured’s project which was not otherwise defective, then this does qualify as an occurrence. See French v. Assurance Co. of Am., 448 F.3d 693, 706 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that a CGL policy does not provide coverage to correct defective workmanship but that the policy provides coverage for the cost to remedy property damage to the contractor's otherwise non-defective work-product).
Examining the issue of how to treat one part of the insured’s project that was damaged by a different, defective part of the same insured’s project, the Sixth Circuit, predicting Kentucky law, found in 2013 that the insured subcontract’s faulty workmanship that damages otherwise non-defective part of the project is not an “occurrence” if the damage was of the type the insured was hired to prevent or control. However, the Colorado U.S. District Court went the opposite direction in ruling that the insured’s faulty workmanship to one part of the project that damages other non-defective parts of the same project does indeed qualify as an occurrence.
A. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Kay & Kay Contracting, LLC, Case No. 12-5791 (C.A.6 (Ky.) Nov. 19, 2013)
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals predicted that, under Kentucky law, faulty workmanship that results in damage to other parts of a project is not an “occurrence” if the kind of damage that results is what the insured was hired to control or prevent.
The insured, a foundation subcontractor, performed site preparation and constructed a building pad for a Wal-Mart store. After the store was built, cracks in the building’s walls were noticed. Wal-Mart alleged that the fill under one corner of the building had settled, resulting in the structural problems. Wal-Mart demanded that the general contractor remedy the problem, who in turn demanded the same from the insured. The insured subcontractor sought coverage from its CGL carrier, which denied coverage and filed a declaratory judgment action based, in part, on basis that there was no “occurrence” because there was only faulty workmanship in need of repair.
The court observed that under Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 306
S.W.3d 69, 73 (Ky. 2010) the faulty construction of the building pad (the insured’s own work) was not an “occurrence.” However, the court observed that the claimed damage included more than just the building pad. The court noted that the Kentucky Supreme Court had not decided the issue of whether damage to parts of a construction project other than the insured’s faulty work constitutes an “occurrence.” The court reasoned that even if the Kentucky Supreme Court would determine that collateral damage to property other than the insured’s work is an “occurrence,” it would not adopt a version of such a rule that would apply when the damage at issue was the obviously and foreseeable consequence of the insured’s faulty work.
The court observed that in Cincinnati, the Kentucky Supreme Court emphasized the significance of the insured’s control over the work in analyzing the whether an “occurrence” took place. Specifically, in Cincinnati, the Kentucky Supreme Court opined that events that are within the control of the insured are not truly accidental or fortuitous. The court reasoned that the alleged damage to the Wal-Mart was due solely to the soil settlement—work that was within the insured’s control. The entire reason the insured was hired was to prevent the soil from settling in a manner that would cause damage to the structure. Thus, the court predicted that the Kentucky Supreme Court would not find that an “occurrence” takes place when the damage to a project that is allegedly caused by the defective workmanship of a subcontractor hired to control against that very damage from happening. Therefore, the court ordered that summary judgment be granted in favor of the insurer.
We also note that an opinion earlier this year, McBride v. ACUITY, 510 Fed.Appx. 451, 2013 WL 69358 (C.A.6 (Ky.) Jan. 7, 2013), The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals predicted that, under Kentucky law, the insured’s faulty workmanship to any parts (including non-defective parts) of the insured’s own project does not qualify as an “occurrence.”
B. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Creek Side at Parker Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 2013 WL 104795 (D. Colo. Jan. 8, 2013)
Colorado U.S. District Court found faulty workmanship of a subcontractor potentially qualified as an “occurrence” where the subcontractor’s faulty workmanship caused damage to other, non-faulty parts of the project.
A homeowners association sued the developer/builder of a residential development project seeking damages allegedly caused by construction defects. The homeowners association alleged that the developer/builder’s subcontractors performed defective work that caused consequential damage to other, non-faulty parts of the project.
The district court found that the underlying lawsuit alleged an “occurrence.” Citing Greystone Constr., Inc. v. Nat’l Fire & Mar. Ins. Co., 661 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 2011) (Colo. law), the district court explained that “[f]aulty workmanship can constitute an occurrence that triggers coverage under a CGL policy if … the damage was to non-defective portions of the contractor’s or subcontractor’s work.” The district court also found that at least some of the alleged property damage was to non-defective portions of its or its subcontractors’ work on the same project. Accordingly, the district court held that there was at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there had been an “occurrence.”
III. EXCLUSION FOR DAMAGES TO PART OF PROPERTY ON WHICH INSURED IS WORKING.
One frequently discussed exclusion with regard to coverage for construction defect claims, is the exclusion for property damage to that part of real property on which the insured or any subcontractors are performing operations. This exclusion (along with several other “business risk” exclusions) embodies the notion that the cost of repairing or replacing the consequences of shoddy workmanship or paying for the fulfillment of a contractual commitment is not covered. In standard general liability forms, this provision appears as exclusion j(5) and states that the insurance does not apply to property damage to:
"That particular part of real property on which you or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing operations, if the "property damage" arises out of those operations."
In 2013, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the exclusion applies if the insured’s subcontractor is still performing operations—even though the insured’s own operations are complete. However, in a different case, the U.S. District Court in Massachusetts held that exclusion j(5) only applies if there is a sufficient connection between the scope of the insured’s work and the damaged property. Finally, the South Dakota Supreme Court confirmed that the exclusion applies to damage while the insured’s subcontractor is working, but does not bar coverage to construction materials not yet incorporated into a project. These cases illustrate the varied applicability and interpretation of exclusion j(5) reached by different courts.
A. Bennett & Bennett Const., Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 405 S.C. 1, 747 S.E.2d 426 (2013)
The Supreme Court of South Carolina found that exclusion j(5) applies if the property damage takes place while the insured’s subcontractor’s operations are ongoing.
A general contractor hired a masonry subcontractor to construct a brick wall. After completion of the wall, the general contractor observed mortar and slurry dried on the face of the wall and instructed the subcontractor to correct the appearance of the wall. The subcontractor hired a power washing company to clean the bricks, which resulted in discoloration and removal of the decorative finish on the bricks. The general contractor was forced to replace the damaged wall on its own, after which the general contractor sued and obtained a default judgment against the subcontractor. The general contractor then sued the subcontractor’s insurer in a declaratory judgment action.
The insurer relied in part on exclusion j(5) to deny coverage, arguing that there was no coverage for the damage to the wall because it was damage “to that part of the real property on which the insured was performing operations.” The general contractor argued that the exclusion did not apply because the damage took place after the insured’s operations (the construction of the brick wall) were over. The court held that whether the brick wall installation (work performed by the insured itself) was completed was irrelevant to the applicability of exclusion j(5) because the insured’s operations for the purposes of the exclusion include work performed by any of the insured’s subcontractors. That is, the exclusion barred coverage so long as the power washing company hired by the insured was still performing operations on the insured’s behalf at the time the damage took place. Because the damage occurred during the insured’s operations, exclusion j(5) barred coverage for the damage to the bricks.
B. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wisconsin v. Five Star Bldg. Corp., CIV.A. 11-30254-DJC, 2013 WL 5297095 (D. Mass. Sept. 19, 2013)
U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts determined that exclusion j(5) only applies to damage to “that particular part of real property” that was within the scope of the insured’s work, and not other portions of the overall structure.
An insurer filed a declaratory judgment action against its insured relating to a claim for damages at a university science center that arose from the insured’s work in upgrading the center’s HVAC system. The insured’s work included puncturing the weather membrane in the roof and installing temporary patches at the puncture sites until the new HVAC system was complete. Heavy rain caused some of the patches to fail and water to enter the building. The insurer agreed to pay for the damage caused to the interior of the center, but refused to pay for damage to the roof, in part based on exclusion j(5), arguing that the entire roof was the “particular part” of the building on which the insured was performing operations.
The court rejected the insurer’s argument, reasoning that puncturing the roof was incidental to the ventilation system upgrade. The court noted that the roof accounted for only a small part of the total work on the project and that there was an insufficient nexus between the scope of the insured’s HVAC work and the damage to the roof. Unfortunately, the court seemed to ignore the fact that the temporary roof patches which failed were clearly part of the insured’s work and, presumably, a necessary part of the HVAC upgrade. Nevertheless, the court concluded that exclusion j(5) was not a bar to coverage for the damage to the roof as well as the rest of the structure damaged by water intrusion.
C. Swenson v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 2013 S.D. 38, 831 N.W.2d 402 (May 15, 2013)
The South Dakota Supreme Court found that building material yet to be installed at a project is not “real property” and exclusion j(5) did not apply.
Finally, in a 2013 decision of the South Dakota Supreme Court, the court held that a “your work” exclusion in a homebuilder’s policy did not bar coverage for damage to building materials that were negligently left exposed to the elements because the materials were not installed and, therefore, not yet “real property.” However, the court applied the exclusion to completed parts of the structure damaged because they were left open to rain and snow. Consistent with the decision in Bennett (part A. above), the court observed that the exclusion applies because the insured or its subcontractor(s) were actively performing the construction work when the damage took place. As the entire structure (a new home) was the insured’s work, the court was not faced with the issue in Five Star (part B. above).
CONCLUSION
There is a single insurance issue at the heart of most construction defect coverage disputes: when construction work is performed negligently, is the resulting defect simply part of the business risk that the insured must pay to repair, or is the resulting defect true damage to a third party’s property that may be insured under a general liability policy? During 2013, legal rulings in different states continue to demonstrate the evolution of the answer to this question. An increasing number of states appear to be ignoring the economic reality surrounding insured’s responsibility for its faulty workmanship. In these states, courts focused on the term “accident” to find coverage for the repair and replacement costs arising from defective construction claims. Furthermore, even in cases where the insured’s faulty workmanship itself does not constitute an “occurrence,” some courts are creating an exception where the insured’s negligence on one part of the project caused damage to a different non-faulty part of the same insured’s project.
The legal landscape for construction defect claims appears to be shifting rapidly and posing new challenges to insurers and claims professionals, who are faced with an increasing number of lawsuits and claims alleging faulty workmanship. Perhaps 2014 may bring a renewed legal focus on the public policy and intent behind the construction defect insurance provisions, and thereby shift the risk of correcting faulty construction away from insurers and back onto the insured parties that contracted for, controlled and were compensated for the work itself.
FOOTNOTES:
1. Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 81 N.J. 233, 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979) (finding that a liability policy “does not cover an accident of faulty workmanship but rather faulty workmanship which causes an accident”); Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co. of Am., 323 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1982) (reasoning that CGL is meant to cover tort liability for damage to others, and not for the insured’s contractual liability for economic loss because the insured’s work is less than that for which the damaged person bargained); Monticello Ins. Co. v. Wil-Freds Const., Inc., 277 Ill. App. 3d 697, 661 N.E.2d 451 (Ill.App.Ct. 1996) (construction defects that are the natural and ordinary consequences of faulty workmanship are not an “occurrence” unless there has been damage to third party property.)
2. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Auchter Co., 673 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2012); Nautilus Ins. Co. v. JDL Dev., IX, LLC, 10 C 3435, 2012 WL 1156917 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2012), appeal dismissed (June 12, 2012); Aquatectonics, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 10-CV-2935 DRH ARL, 2012 WL 1020313 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012)
3. See Colorado Revised Statutes Section 13-20-808, effective May 21, 2010 (requires courts to presume that work resulting in property damage, including to the work itself, is accidental and an “occurrence”); Arkansas Code Annotated Section 23-79-155, effective July 27, 2011 (requires general liability policies to have a definition of “occurrence” that includes property damage or bodily injury resulting from faulty workmanship); South Carolina Code Annotated Section 38-61-70, effective May 17, 2011 (mandates that property damage resulting from faulty workmanship meeting the policy’s definition of “occurrence”); Hawaii Revised Statutes Section 431:1-217, effective June 3, 2011 (after a 2010 Hawaii appellate court ruling holding that construction defect claims do not constitute an occurrence, this statute was effectuated which requires courts to apply case law that was in effect at the time a policy was placed—such that pre-2010 policies may cover construction defects whereas post-2010 policies may not.)
You may contact Mr. Husmann at jhusmann@batescarey.com. Mr. Fleischer can be contacted at afleischer@batescarey.com
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