Intel's $20B Ohio 'Mega-Site' is Latest Development in Chip Makers' Rush to Boost US Production
January 24, 2022 —
Jim Parsons - Engineering News-RecordIntel’s recently announced Ohio chip manufacturing complex could begin construction by the end of this year, setting the stage for a long-term, multibillion-dollar development effort many experts have likened to building a small city from scratch.
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Jim Parsons, Engineering News-Record
ENR may be contacted at enr@enr.com
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Illinois Court Assesses Factual Nature of Term “Reside” in Determining Duty to Defend
October 30, 2023 —
James M. Eastham - Traub LiebermanIn State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Guevara, 2023 IL App (1st) 221425-U, P2, the Illinois First District Court of Appeals addressed an insurance carrier’s duty to defend under a homeowners insurance policy. The underlying suit stemmed from an alleged injury suffered at a residence located in Berwyn, Illinois and owned by named insured Luz Melina Guevara, a defendant in the suit. After Guevara tendered the suit, State Farm filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Guevara because Guevara did not “reside” at the insured premises.
The policy defined the "insured location" as the "residence premises," and residence premises was defined as "the one, two, three or four-family dwelling, other structures, and grounds or that part of any other building; where you reside and which is shown in the Declarations." In response to the underlying lawsuit, Guevara had filed an answer and affirmative defenses in which Guevara denied the allegation that "At all relevant times, [Guevara] resided in Berwyn, Cook County, Illinois." Guevara admitted that she owned the Berwyn property but denied that she "resided in, maintained and controlled the property". The declaratory judgment complaint alleged (among other things) that, based on admissions by Guevara in her answer, the Berwyn residence was not an "insured location" under the State Farm policy. State Farm moved for summary judgment at the trial court level on this ground and summary judgment was granted in State Farm’s favor. An appeal ensued wherein the parties disagreed as to whether there is a genuine issue of material fact that, under the language of the policy, State Farm had no duty to defend because the Berwyn property was not an "insured location" because she did not "reside" there.
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James M. Eastham, Traub LiebermanMr. Eastham may be contacted at
jeastham@tlsslaw.com
Is the Issuance of a City Use Permit Referable? Not When It Is an Administrative Act
January 10, 2018 —
Adam E. Lang - Real Estate Litigation BlogArizona’s Constitution gives electors in cities, towns, and counties the ability to refer legislation that was enacted by their local elected officials to the ballot for popular vote. Ariz. Const. art. IV, Pt. 1 § 1(8). But only legislative acts are referable; administrative acts are not. In general, a legislative act makes new law and creates policy, is permanent in nature, and is generally applied. On the other hand, an administrative act is one that executes and implements a law already in place. Wennerstrom v. City of Mesa, 169 Ariz. 485, 489-90, 821 P.2d 146, 150-51 (1991).
For more than fifty years, Arizona courts have been clear: zoning and rezoning ordinances are legislative acts and therefore referable to popular vote. City of Phoenix v. Fehlner, 90 Ariz. 13, 17, 363 P.2d 607, 609 (1961) (holding that “what constitutes an appropriate zone is primarily for the legislature”); Fritz v. City of Kingman, 191 Ariz 432, 432, 957 P.2d 337, 337 (1998) (noting “we reaffirm our view that zoning decisions are legislative matters subject to referendum”); Pioneer Trust Co. of Arizona v. Pima Cty., 168 Ariz. 61, 64–65, 811 P.2d 22, 25–26 (1991) (holding “that, in Arizona, zoning decisions are legislative acts subject to referendum” and that even a “conditional approval of . . . rezoning was a legislative act”); Cottonwood Dev. v. Foothills Area Coal. of Tucson, Inc., 134 Ariz. 46, 653 P.2d 694 (1982) (analyzing whether zoning referendum complied with statutory requirements); Wait v. City of Scottsdale, 127 Ariz. 107, 108, 618 P.2d 601, 602 (1980) (noting “that the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances constitute legislative action”); City of Phoenix v. Oglesby, 112 Ariz. 64, 65, 537 P.2d 934, 935 (1975) (“The matter of zoning is appropriately one for the legislative branch of government.”); Queen Creek Land & Cattle Corp. v. Yavapai Cty. Bd. of Sup’rs, 108 Ariz. 449, 452, 501 P.2d 391, 394 (1972) (denying an attempt to enjoin referendum on county’s zoning decision).
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Adam E. Lang, Snell & WilmerMr. Lang may be contacted at
alang@swlaw.com
It’s Time for a Net Zero Building Boom
May 02, 2022 —
James S. Russell - BloombergIs it too much to ask Americans to take their foot off the gas and reset their thermostats? On March 18, the International Energy Agency released a 10-point plan for reducing oil use, arguing that advanced economies can readily cut demand by 2.7 million barrels a day in the next four months, an amount large enough to avoid major supply shortages as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine roils the energy market.
The plan’s major prescriptions will look familiar to anyone who recalls the OPEC shocks of the 1970s: reducing speed limits to improve gas mileage, boosting transit use, and discouraging non-essential car and air travel. But its exclusive focus on the transportation sector overlooks the substantial efficiency gains to be had from the built environment: Buildings consume about 40% of the energy used in the U.S. every year.
Yet reducing energy use in buildings has been stigmatized by fossil-fuel interests as a lifestyle deprivation — an argument that’s been internalized by pundits and politicians even as geopolitical turmoil drive spikes in oil prices and climate change impacts upend millions of lives.
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James S. Russell, Bloomberg
New York Appellate Court Addresses “Trigger of Coverage” for Asbestos Claims and Other Coverage Issues
November 30, 2020 —
Paul A. Briganti - Complex Insurance Coverage ReporterOn October 9, 2020, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, decided an appeal from a trial court’s 2018 summary judgment ruling on a number of coverage issues arising out of asbestos-related bodily injury claims against plaintiffs Carrier Corporation (Carrier) and Elliott Company (Elliott). See Carrier Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 396 CA 18-02292, Mem. & Order (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 4th Dep’t Oct. 9, 2020).
The Fourth Department reversed the trial court’s ruling that, under New York’s “injury in fact trigger of coverage,” injury occurs from the first date of exposure to asbestos through death or the filing of suit as a matter of law. The parties agreed that, because the policy language at issue required personal injury to take place “during the policy period,” “the applicable test in determining what event constitutes personal injury sufficient to trigger coverage is injury-in-fact, ‘which rests on when the injury, sickness, disease or disability actually began.’” Id. at 3 (quoting Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Rapid-American Corp., 609 N.E.2d 506, 511 (N.Y. 1993)). The Fourth Department concluded that, in resolving the issue, the trial court erred by relying on inapposite decisions in other cases where: (1) the parties had stipulated or otherwise not disputed that first exposure triggered coverage[1]; or (2) the issue had not been resolved on summary judgment, but rather at trial based on expert medical evidence[2]. The Fourth Department further explained that, even if plaintiffs here had met their initial burden on summary judgment by submitting admissible evidence that asbestos-related injury actually begins upon first exposure, the defendant-insurer’s opposition – which included affidavits of medical experts contradicting that evidence and averring instead that “harm occurs only when a threshold level of asbestos fiber or particle burden is reached that overtakes the body’s defense mechanisms” – raised a triable issue of fact. Id. at 4. The Fourth Department also rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the defendant-insurer was collaterally estopped on the “trigger” issue by a California appellate court’s decision in Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The Fourth Department reasoned that the issues litigated in the two cases were not identical because, among other things, California and New York “apply different substantive law in determining when asbestos-related injury occurs.” Carrier, Mem. & Order at 4.
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Paul A. Briganti, White and Williams LLPMr. Briganti may be contacted at
brigantip@whiteandwilliams.com
Update: Lawyers Can Be Bound to Confidentiality Provision in Settlement Agreement
January 13, 2020 —
Danielle Ward, Esq. - Balestreri Potocki & HolmesIn July 2019, the California Supreme Court ruled that an attorney’s signature under the often-used phrase “approved as to form and content” does not preclude a finding that the attorney could be bound to the terms of a settlement agreement. (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781.) This decision marks a reversal of the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s 2018 ruling that approval of a contract is not tantamount to an agreement to be bound by that contract.
The underlying action stemmed out of a wrongful death suit by Wendy Crossland and Richard Fournier, parents of the decedent, against Monster Energy Company. The parties negotiated a settlement, a critical of element of which was a confidentiality provision aimed at keeping the the settlement secret.
The confidentiality provision prohibited plaintiffs and their counsel of record from disclosing both the existence of the settlement, or the terms thereof, to any person, entity, or publication, including the legal website Lawyers & Settlements. The attorneys signed the agreement under the phrase “approved as to form and content.”
Shortly after the settlement agreement was executed, the Plaintiffs’ attorney Bruce Schechter disclosed his clients’ settlement with Monster in an interview with Lawyers & Settlements. Monster filed suit against Mr. Schechter for breach of contract, among other causes of action. Mr. Schechter challenged the lawsuit with a SLAPP motion, essentially arguing that the lawsuit was meritless and merely an attempt to thwart freedom of speech.
The trial court denied Mr. Schechter’s motion as to the breach of contract cause of action finding that the settlement clearly contemplated that the attorneys were subjected to the terms of the agreement, and Schechter’s claim that he was not a party because he merely approved as to form and content was “beyond reason.”
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that Mr. Schechter was not a party to the agreement by virtue of his signature approving the form and content, and the Plaintiffs had no authority to bind their attorney to the terms of the agreement. The Court of Appeal found that by affixing his signature to the agreement Mr. Schechter was merely manifesting his “professional thumbs up” in line with legal industry’s customary understanding.
In its reversal, the California Supreme Court did not disturb the legal community’s understanding of the phrase “approved as to form and content.” Rather, the Court concluded that an attorney’s signature under that often-used phrase does not preclude as a matter of law that the attorney intended to be bound by the agreement. The entire agreement, including the substantive provisions, need to be examined to determine the attorney’s intent in affixing his/her signature to the agreement.
Turning to the Crossland/Fournier Monster settlement agreement, the Court was unpersuaded by Mr. Schechter’s argument that he was not bound to the agreement because counsel was not included in the definition of “party”. The Court stated that it’s the substance of the agreement that determines whether counsel is a party to the contract, as opposed to a party to the lawsuit.
The Court was persuaded, in part, by the important role that confidentiality plays in brokering settlements. It noted that public disclosure of private settlements would serve to “chill” parties’ ability to resolve matters short of trial, and there was little doubt that confidentiality was an important term of the Crossland/Fournier Monster settlement. In concluding that Monster had met its burden to defeat an anti-SLAPP motion, the Court pointed to the numerous references to counsel in the substantive provisions of the agreement which a trier of fact could conclude bound Mr. Schechter to the confidentiality terms.
Danielle Ward has concentrated her law practice on defending developer, general contractor, and subcontractor clients in a variety of construction matters. She has been an attorney with Balestreri Potocki & Holmes since 2010 and can be reached at dward@bph-law.com.
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Slowing Home Sales Show U.S. Market Lacks Momentum: Economy
August 27, 2014 —
Lorraine Woellert – BloombergThe pace of new-home sales fell to the slowest in four months in July, signaling U.S. real estate lacks the vigor to propel faster growth in the economy.
Purchases unexpectedly declined 2.4 percent to a 412,000 annualized pace, weaker than the lowest estimate of economists surveyed by Bloomberg, Commerce Department data showed today in Washington. June purchases were revised up to a 422,000 rate after a May gain that was also bigger than previously estimated.
Housing has advanced in fits and starts this year as tight credit and slow wage growth kept some prospective buyers from taking advantage of historically low borrowing costs. Bigger job and income gains, along with a further slowdown in price appreciation, would help make properties more affordable.
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Lorraine Woellert, BloombergMs. Woellert may be contacted at
lwoellert@bloomberg.net
The Basics of Subcontractor Defaults – Key Considerations
February 15, 2021 —
Gerard J. Onorata - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.The success of general contractors in completing a construction project is often dependent upon the performance of their subcontractors. General contractors have frequently said exactly this. Traditionally, the key subcontractors on a project are the electrical, plumbing, HVAC and structural steel subs. Due to the fundamental nature of the work performed by these trades, the risk of defaulting and terminating one or more of them is likely to have a substantial impact on the project, more so than with the trade contractors that perform their work after a building is made weather tight (i.e., drywall, tile, painting).
Most general contractors have, over a period of years, established longstanding relationships with certain subcontractors that they have come to depend upon. The risk of having to default and terminate one of these subs is minimal. Nevertheless, there will inevitably arise occasions when even a once reliable subcontractor fails to perform and it becomes necessary to invoke the remedies of default and termination. Areas ripe for controversy with subcontractors that often can lead to default and termination often involve disputes over change orders and the scope of work, the installation of defective work and the back-charges that ensue therefrom, and, to a lesser extent, conflicts that arise from ambiguous plans and specifications and the extra work and delays caused by the discovery of unforeseen site conditions.
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Gerard J. Onorata, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.Mr. Onorata may be contacted at
gonorata@pecklaw.com
