SEATTLE WASHINGTON BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Recent Developments with California’s Right to Repair Act

June 11, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
In Lexology, Amy Kuo Alexander of Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP analyzed recent decisions involving California’s Right to Repair Act, SB 800. According to Alexander, “SB 800, applies to all new residential construction sold after January 1, 2003” and “[i]t establishes a process to resolve certain construction defect claims prior to the filing of any lawsuit by a homeowner of new residential construction.” Alexander’s three main discussion points include “SB 800 is Not the Exclusive Remedy,” “Notice Requirements to Builder Under SB 800,” and “Parties Can Opt Out of SB 800 to Adopt Their Own Prelitigation Procedure So Long as the Terms Are Not Unconscionable.” Read the court decision
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California Supreme Court Addresses “Good Faith” Construction Disputes Under Prompt Payment Laws

June 06, 2018 — Garret Murai - California Construction Law Blog
It’s been a rollercoaster. But the ride appears to be over. In United Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Coast Iron & Steel Co., Case No. S231549 (May 14, 2018), the California Supreme Court addressed whether a direct contractor can withhold payment from a subcontractor based on the “good faith dispute” exception of the state’s prompt payment laws if the “dispute” concerns any dispute between the parties or whether the dispute must be directly relevant to the specific payment that would otherwise be due. California’s Prompt Payment Laws California has a number of construction-related prompt payment laws scattered throughout the state’s Civil Code, Public Contracts Code and Business and Professions Code. Their application depends on the type of construction involved, whether public or private; the type of payment involved, whether a progress payment or retention; and who is paying, whether it’s a private owner, public entity, direct contractor, or subcontractor. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLP
Mr. Murai may be contacted at gmurai@wendel.com

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Insurer Could Not Rely on Extrinsic Evidence to Circumvent Its Duty to Defend

February 14, 2023 — Lorelie S. Masters & Yaniel Abreu - Hunton Insurance Recovery Blog
In First Mercury Insurance Co. v. First Florida Building Corp., et al., a federal district court ordered that an insurer had a duty to defend its insured against an underlying personal injury lawsuit. 2023 WL 23116, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2023). First Mercury is a cautionary tale about how insurers may try to circumvent their obligations by improperly considering extrinsic evidence when determining whether they have a duty to defend their insureds. First Mercury is a coverage dispute over an underlying personal injury lawsuit that was filed against the insured, a construction company, for injuries the claimant allegedly sustained at a construction site. Id. The claimant alleged that he was at the construction site as an invitee who was “working with” the insured. Id. The insurer agreed to defend the insured against the personal injury lawsuit under a reservation of rights. Id. However, the insurer filed a coverage action seeking a declaration that coverage for the personal injury lawsuit was excluded under the policy. Id. Specifically, the insurer, on summary judgment, argued that the claimant was an employee of the insured who was injured in the course of his employment, thus falling within the employer’s liability and workers’ compensation exclusions in the policy. Id. Although the insurer acknowledged that the personal injury complaint against the insured triggered its duty to defend under the policy, the insurer argued that those exclusions relieved its duty to defend or indemnify the insured. Id. Reprinted courtesy of Lorelie S. Masters, Hunton Andrews Kurth and Yaniel Abreu, Hunton Andrews Kurth Ms. Masters may be contacted at lmasters@HuntonAK.com Mr. Abreu may be contacted at yabreu@HuntonAK.com Read the court decision
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Standard of Care

December 16, 2019 — Jay Gregory - Gordon & Rees Construction Law Blog
One of the key concepts at the heart of Board complaints and civil claims against a design professional is whether or not that design professional complied with the applicable standard of care. In order to prevail on such a claim, the claimant must establish (typically with the aid of expert testimony) that the design professional deviated from the standard of care. On the other side of the coin, to defend a design professional against a professional malpractice claim, defense counsel attempts to establish that – contrary to the claimant’s allegations – the design professional, in fact, complied with the standard of care. Obviously, it becomes very important in such a claim situation to determine what the standard of care is that applies to the conduct of the defendant design professional. Often, this is easier said than done. There is no dictionary definition or handy guidebook that identifies the precise standard of care that applies in any given situation. The “standard of care” is a concept and, as such, is flexible and open to interpretation. Traditionally, the standard of care is expressed as being that level of service or competence generally employed by average or prudent practitioners under the same or similar circumstances at the same time and in the same locale. In other words, to meet the standard of care a design professional must generally follow the pack; he or she need not be perfect, exemplary, outstanding, or even superior – it is sufficient merely for the designer to do that which a reasonably prudent practitioner would do under similar circumstances. The negative or reverse definition also applies, to meet the standard of care, a practitioner must refrain from doing what a reasonably prudent practitioner would have refrained from doing. Although we have this ready definition of the standard of care, in any given dispute it is practically inevitable that the parties will have markedly different opinions as to: (1) what the standard of care required of the designer; and (2) whether the defendant design professional complied with that requirement. The claimant bringing a claim against a design professional typically will be able to find an expert reasonably qualified (at least on paper) who will offer an opinion that the defendant failed to comply with the standard of care. It is just as likely that the counsel for the defendant design professional will be able to find his or her own expert who will counter the opinion of the claimant’s expert and maintain that the defendant design professional, in fact, complied with the standard of care. What’s a jury to think? The concept of standard of care is intertwined with the legal concept of negligence. In the vast majority of law suits against design professionals, a claimant (known as the plaintiff) will assert a claim for negligence against the design professional now known as the defendant.1 As every first year law student learns while studying the field of “Torts,” negligence has four subparts. In order for a defendant to be found negligent, the claimant must establish four elements: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) causation; and (4) damages. In other words, to establish a claim against a defendant design professional, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care but breached that duty and, as a result, caused the plaintiff to suffer damages. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Jay Gregory, Gordon & Rees Scully Mansukhani
Mr. Gregory may be contacted at jgregory@grsm.com

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Arbitration Clause Found Ambiguous in Construction Defect Case

October 28, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

The California Court of Appeals ruled on September 28 in the case of Burch v. Premier Homes. Ms. Burch bought a home after negotiating various addendums to the contract. The contract was a standard California Association of Realtors contract to which both the buyer and seller made additions. At issue in this case was paragraph 17 of the contract which included that “Buyer and Seller agree that any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.”

The seller/defendant’s Addendum 2 “included provisions relating to the arbitration of disputes that may arise.” Ms. Burch’s realtor, Lisa Morrin, told Burch that “she had never seen a proposed contractual provision that would require a home buyer to agree to arbitrate with a builder over construction defects.” Ms. Burch told Morrin that she did not want to buy the property if she would have to give up her rights under California law.

As part of Addendum 2, the buyer had to buy a warranty from the Home Buyers Warranty Corporation. The sale was held up for a while, as Ms. Burch waited for a copy of the warranty. When she received it, she took further exception to Addendum 2. Scott Warren of Premier Homes said he could not sell the property without Addendum 2. Ms. Burch told her realtor that despite the claims made by Mr. Warren that this was for her benefit, she felt it was more to the benefit of Premier Homes. Don Aberbrook of HBW agreed to the clause, contained in the final sentence of Addendum 2, being struck.

Subsequent to buying the home, Burch submitted a claim concerning construction defects. HBW denied the claim and Burch began an action against the defendants. Premier filed a motion to compel arbitration which Burch opposed.

The trial court ruled that the striking out of the arbitration clause at the end of Addendum 2 “created a conflict with respect to the parties’ intent as to the scope of arbitration.” The trial court found that “the parties’ intention was to preserve Burch’s right to make state law claims including her right to a jury trial for any non-warranty claims against the builder.”

The appeals court in their ruling looked at the standard of review and concluded that the purchase agreement was ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence was required to resolve that ambiguity. As the contract contained contradictory provisions as to whether or not arbitration was required, it was necessary for the trial court to examine these claims. The appeals court found that the evidence supported the conclusions of the trial court.

Finally, the appeals court found that “there was no valid agreement to arbitrate disputes.” The court noted that arbitration can only happen by mutual consent and “it is clear that Burch did not enter into an agreement to arbitrate any construction defect disputes she might have.”

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New Jersey Supreme Court Upholds $400 Million Award for Superstorm Sandy Damages

February 22, 2021 — Kerianne E. Kane - Saxe Doernberger & Vita
In New Jersey Transit Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London,1 New Jersey’s highest court upheld an appellate decision2 finding that New Jersey Transit Corporation (“NJT”) was entitled to full coverage under its property insurance policy for damages caused by Superstorm Sandy. In July 2012, NJT secured a multi-layered “all risks” property insurance program from eleven insurers for the policy period of July 1, 2012, to July 1, 2013. The policies covered all perils and damage to NJT’s property unless specifically excluded. The primary layer, issued by Lexington Insurance Company, provided the first $50 million of coverage. The second layer provided coverage up to $100 million, the third layer provided an additional $175 million, and the fourth layer provided coverage of $125 million, for a total of $400 million in coverage. The excess layer insurers included Certain Underwriters At Lloyd’s, London, Torus Specialty Insurance Company, and several other carriers. All participating insurers’ policies included a standard policy form and separate endorsements, some of which were included in all policies and some of which were unique to specific insurers. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Kerianne E. Kane, Saxe Doernberger & Vita
Ms. Kane may be contacted at kkane@sdvlaw.com

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NY Appeals Court Ruled Builders not Responsible in Terrorism Cases

January 13, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ Staff
In a ruling on a case related to the September 11, 2001 attacks, New York federal appeals court stated that builders and developers could not be held responsible for losses linked to terrorism, Reuters reports. Circuit Judge Rosemary said the building “would have collapsed regardless of any negligence ascribed by plaintiffs' experts.” Scott Sweeney writing for the Schinnerer's RM Blog explained, “This decision should make it harder for constructors and designers to be held responsible for damages resulting from major acts of terrorism and unforeseeable events that can be nearly impossible to prepare for.” Read the full story at Reuters... Read the full story at Schinnerer's RM Blog... Read the court decision
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California Imposes New Disabled Access Obligations on Commercial Property Owners

October 07, 2016 — Garret Murai – California Construction Law Blog
The following article was written by my colleague David Goldman on the new ADA accessibility legislation which was signed into law this past month by Governor Brown. Since July 1, 2013, California Civil Code section 1938 has required commercial property owners to disclose in every commercial lease whether the property being leased has been inspected by a Certified Access Specialist (“CASp”). A CASp is an individual certified by the State of California as qualified and knowledgeable of construction-related access to public accommodations by persons with disabilities. In addition to disclosing whether or not the property being leased has been CASp inspected, if a CASp inspection has occurred, the commercial lessor must disclose in the lease whether the premises has or has not met all the applicable construction-related accessibility standards established by law. These lease requirements, along with other disability access obligations, were discussed in an earlier article written in 2012. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Garret Murai, Wendel, Rosen, Black & Dean LLP
Mr. Murai may be contacted at gmurai@wendel.com

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