Occurrence Definition Trends Analyzed
August 27, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFIn The Legal Intelligencer, Gordon S. Woodward, partner at Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis, analyzed the changing definition of occurrence in the insurance industry, and more specifically in Pennsylvania.
Woodward begins by going over “the traditional view of occurrence as it relates to coverage for faulty products or defective work,” in which “the existence of a defect in a product or an event in which a defective product injures only itself does not constitute an occurrence.” However, he stated that “there is a growing trend in favor of finding that an occurrence can include the circumstance where defective work results in damage only to the work or product itself (so long as the damage was neither intended nor expected by the insured).” Woodward also explained Pennsylvania developments and legislative changes (such as a South Carolina statute).
These changes need to be monitored, Woodward stated, “as they have the potential to dramatically alter the coverage landscape from one jurisdiction to the next.”
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2021 2Q Cost Report: Industry Execs Believe Recovery Is in Full Swing
August 04, 2021 —
Jonathan Keller - Engineering News-RecordThe first six months of 2021 have seen big materials cost hikes, increasing labor shortages and uncertainty over federal action on a major infrastructure package. Despite the headwinds, ENR’s Construction Industry Confidence Index has surged up 17 points to a rating of 68—the highest single jump between quarters since the index was started in 2009. The previous record was 16 points between Q4 of 2011 and Q1 of 2012.
Reprinted courtesy of
Jonathan Keller, Engineering News-Record
Mr. Keller may be contacted at kellerj@enr.com
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Lumber Liquidators’ Home-Testing Methods Get EPA Scrutiny
June 10, 2015 —
Matthew Townsend – BloombergThe home testing method Lumber Liquidators Holdings Inc. is using to reassure customers that their floors are safe is being questioned by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
In response to allegations that its Chinese-made laminate flooring emitted excessive levels of formaldehyde, a known carcinogen, Lumber Liquidators sent thousands of do-it-yourself tests to people who’d purchased the products. Customers use a device in the kit to measure the air in their homes for 24 hours, then send the package back to have the results evaluated.
While the EPA didn’t take a position on the specifics of Lumber Liquidators’ test program, the agency said on its website that home air testing “may not provide useful information due to the uncertainties” of the method. Air tests don’t pinpoint the specific source of a contaminant, and there are no widely accepted standards for indoor formaldehyde levels, the agency said.
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Matthew Townsend, Bloomberg
Partner Lisa M. Rolle and Associate Vito John Marzano Obtain Dismissal of Third-Party Indemnification Claims
December 22, 2019 —
Lisa M. Rolle & Vito John Marzano - Traub Lieberman PerspectivesOn June 1, 2019, Traub Lieberman partner Lisa M. Rolle and associate Vito John Marzano successfully secured dismissal of all third-party claims on behalf of a corporate entity and its principal in a third-party action in the New York State Supreme Court, County of Bronx. The underlying action concerned a trip and fall that occurred on a public sidewalk located in the Bronx. Plaintiff commenced suit against the corporation property owner and its principal. Defendants/third-party plaintiffs commenced the third-party action seeking contractual and common-law indemnification against three third-party defendants, the corporate tenant, another corporate entity that was not a party to the lease and its principal. Traub Lieberman represented the latter two third-party defendants.
On behalf of the corporate entity that was not a party to the lease, Traub Lieberman moved for dismissal on the basis that the lease constitutes documentary evidence establishing as a matter of law that the non-tenant corporation cannot be held liable to third-party plaintiffs. On behalf of the principal, Traub Lieberman sought dismissal for failure to state a cause of action because the principal was shielded from liability by virtue of having incorporated his business, and the complaint did not allege a claim for piercing the corporate veil.
In opposition, third-party plaintiffs sought to amplify their pleadings by alleging that a de facto merger had occurred between the non-tenant corporation and the tenant corporation. Third-party plaintiffs further argued that the corporate principal executed a guaranty to the lease, thus accepting liability on behalf of the tenant corporation.
Reprinted courtesy of
Lisa M. Rolle, Traub Lieberman and
Vito John Marzano, Traub Lieberman
Ms. Rolle may be contacted at lrolle@tlsslaw.com
Mr. Marzano may be contacted at vmarzano@tlsslaw.com
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New Law Impacting Florida’s Statute of Repose
June 29, 2017 —
Meredith N. Reynolds & K. Stefan Chin – Peckar & Abramson, P.C.On June 14, 2017, Governor Scott signed House Bill 377 into law, clarifying that Florida’s ten-year
Statute of Repose commences either when the work is completed or when final payment becomes
due, whichever is latest. The new law resolves a problem for contractors created by a recent Florida
court ruling that held the Statute of Repose to commence as late as when the owner made final
payment. The applicable amendments to Florida Statute Section 95.11 take effect on July 1, 2017
and apply to all causes of action that accrue on or after that date.
Perhaps the most critical component of a construction professional’s risk management program is
the length of time that it is liable for the work performed on a project. While contractual warranty
periods typically run one or two years from substantial completion, the true length of a contractor’s
post-completion obligation is measured by the “Statute of Repose,” which establishes the period of
time following the completion of construction that a lawsuit can be filed for construction defects.
Reprinted courtesy of
Meredith N. Reynolds, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. and
K. Stefan Chin, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
Ms. Reynolds may be contacted at mreynolds@pecklaw.com
Mr. Chin may be contacted at kschin@pecklaw.com
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While Starts Fall, Builder Confidence and Permits are on the Rise
June 17, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe National Association of Home Builders’ (NAHB) Eye on Housing reported that “the NAHB/Wells Fargo Housing Market Index and the expansion of housing permits, suggest more growth ahead.”
While the Census Bureau and HUD reported that housing starts in May declined 11.1%, Eye on Housing points to a positive sign in that building permits were up 11.8% in the same month.
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Texas Condo Construction Defect Code Amended
September 17, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAccording to David H. Fisk of Kane Russell Coleman & Logan PC, “Before filing a lawsuit or initiating an arbitration proceeding pertaining to a construction defect, a condominium association in Texas with eight or more units must now comply with the newly added Section 82.119 to Chapter 82 of the Texas Property Code.”
Fisk reported that the new section “requires affected associations to have a licensed professional engineer inspect the units and common elements in question and prepare a written report that (1) identifies the specific units or common elements, (2) describes the present physical condition of the units or common elements, and (3) describes any modifications, maintenance, or repairs to the units or common elements performed by the unit owners or the association.”
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Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
