High School Gym Closed by Construction Defects
October 28, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFThe high school gym in Lake Oswego, Oregon has been shut down because testing has revealed that the construction defects have lead to deterioration of the structural integrity of the roof. The school district noted that there was a chance of collapse if there were a “significant seismic event or heavy rain and winds and snow.” The school district has been in a lawsuit with the builders since 2008, which was recently settled for $600,000.
The school board is still determining whether the original contractor will be asked to correct the defect or if they will bid the job out.
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Maine Case Demonstrates High Risk for Buying Home “As Is”
August 27, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAccording to Meredith Eilers of Bernstein Shur, writing in JDSupra Business Advisor, a Boston Appeals court “enforced an 'as is' provision in a purchase and sale agreement and concluded that the sale of a multimillion dollar oceanfront property in Bar Harbor was not accompanied by Maine’s implied warranty of habitability.”
Eilers explained that “the first circuit concluded that the bargained-for ‘as is’ provision that was incorporated into the purchase and sale agreement—in exchange for a reduction in the purchase price—essentially waived any claims from the buyer regarding misrepresentations by the sellers.” This left “the buyer to incur the repair costs without the ability to recover those costs from the seller” and it demonstrated “that agreeing to such a clause when closing a real estate deal has real risks.”
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Save A Legal Fee? Sometimes You Better Talk With Your Construction Attorney
May 10, 2012 —
Douglas Reiser, Builders Council BlogI love writing this column, because I think it’s refreshing for contractors to hear that they don’t always need an attorney. Today’s post is the “Un-Save a Legal Fee” because I want to point out a specific illustration of when you definitely need your attorney. Using a construction contract template can be fine, but you always need to consider its application to each project ? or it could bite you in the rear.
Seattle attorney Paul Cressman published a prime depiction of bad contract management, last week. A Florida appellate court struck down a general contractor’s “pay if paid” clause when it became ambiguous because of some incorporated language from its prime contract. Specifically, a clause in the prime contract required the general contractor to pay all subcontractors before receiving payment from the owner, while the general contractor’s “pay if paid” clause required its subcontractors to wait for payment until it arrived from the owner.
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Construction Contract Clauses Only a Grinch Would Love – Part 4
November 30, 2016 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogScope, time and cost provisions may be the most important clauses in your construction contract but they’re not the only ones which can impact your bottom line. The fourth and final part in a multi-part series, here are some other important construction contract clauses that can put a damper on your holidays.
Provision: Warranty Provisions
- Typical Provision: “Subcontractor warrants to Contractor that all materials and equipment furnished shall be new unless otherwise specified and that all Work performed shall be performed in a good and workmanlike manner, of good quality and free from defects, and in conformance with industry standards, manufacturer’s recommendations and the Contract Documents. All work not conforming to these requirements, including substitutions not properly approved, shall be considered defective. Subcontractor agrees to promptly make good any and all defects due to faulty workmanship, materials and/or equipment which may appear within the Contract Documents, and if no such period is stipulated in the Contract, then for a period of one year from the date of acceptance by the Owner. Nothing herein shall shorten or limit any applicable periods of limitations including, but not limited to, those set forth in Civil Code, Part 2, Title 2, Chapter 3.”
- What it Means: Warranty periods are subject to the agreement of the parties. However, warranties are different than limitations periods, such as California’s 4 year statute of repose for patent defects and 10 year statute of repose for latent defects (note: a statute of repose is different than a statute of limitation. A statute of repose sets a deadline based on an event. So, for example, under the 10 year statute of repose for latent defects a claimant must bring a latent defect claim within 10 years following substantial completion even if the latent defect wasn’t discovered until 10 years and 1 month following substantial completion. A statute of limitation, in contrast, sets a deadline based on the occurrence of an injury or damage. So, for example, California has a 2 year statute of limitation for personal injuries, which sets a deadline of 2 years from the date of injury to bring a personal injury claim). Warranty periods are also different from limitations periods because most warranties require work to be corrected at no cost, and because many contracts include attorney’s fee provisions, breach of a warranty can give rise to claim for attorney’s fees as well.
- What You Can Do: Lower-tiered parties should examine warranty provisions to see if they are reasonable, and if not reasonable, should seek to either eliminate or limit those provisions, such as by reducing the warranty period or providing different warranty periods for different components of work, etc.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
America’s Factories Weren’t Built to Endure This Many Hurricanes
November 05, 2024 —
Brooke Sutherland - BloombergAmerica’s factories aren’t built for the current cascade of extreme weather events.
Dozens of
industrial sites were in the zone of impact as Hurricane Milton slammed into Florida’s West Coast this week, including several concrete plants, speed boat manufacturing operations and facilities owned by
Honeywell International Inc., Johnson Controls International Plc,
General Electric Co. and Illinois Tool Works Inc., among others. Meanwhile, a Baxter International Inc. facility in Marion, North Carolina, that makes 60% of the intravenous fluids used in hospitals around the country was
shuttered because of damage from Hurricane Helene just two weeks ago. Mines responsible for producing more than 80% of the world’s supply of commercial high-purity quartz in nearby Spruce Pine
were also affected by severe flooding, raising the risk of disruptions to semiconductor production, which relies on the material.
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Brooke Sutherland, Bloomberg
Texas Law Bars Coverage under Homeowner’s Policy for Mold Damage
July 13, 2011 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiAlthough the insurer paid for some of the mold damage at the insured’s home, the Fifth Circuit eventually determined the homeowner’s policy did not cover such damage. Rooters v. State Farm Lloyds, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12306 (5th Cir. June 15, 2011).
The policy excluded loss caused by hail to personal property unless the direct force of wind or hail made an opening in the roof allowing rain to enter. Further, the policy excluded loss caused by mold or other fungi.
In 1999, hail and rain caused water damage to the roof and interior of the residence. State Farm paid $19,000 to repair the roof. Another $1,800 was paid for repairs to the interior of the building. In 2002, the insured noticed black mold. State Farm issued an additional check for $4,402 for mold abatement.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
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Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 2017 WL 1488711 Rejects Liberty Mutual, Holding Once Again that the Right to Repair Act is the Exclusive Remedy for Construction Defect Claims
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. - Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinBackground
In Gillotti v. Stewart (April 26, 2017) 2017 WL 1488711, which was ordered to be published on May 18, 2017, the defendant grading subcontractor added soil over tree roots to level the driveway on the plaintiff homeowner’s sloped lot. The homeowner sued the grading subcontractor under the California Right to Repair Act (Civil Code §§ 895, et seq.) claiming that the subcontractor’s work damaged the trees.
After the jury found the subcontractor was not negligent, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The homeowner appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly construed the Right to Repair Act as barring a common law negligence theory against the subcontractor and erred in failing to follow Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the subcontractor.
Impact
This is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal has held that Liberty Mutual (discussed below) was wrongly decided and held that the Right to Repair Act is the exclusive remedy for construction defect claims. The decision follows its holding in Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hicks) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 333, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act’s pre-litigation procedures apply when homeowners plead construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Right to Repair Act. Elliott is currently on hold at the California Supreme Court, pending the decision in McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, wherein Liberty Mutual was rejected for the first time by the Fifth District. CGDRB continues to follow developments regarding the much anticipated McMillin decision closely, as well as all related matters.
Discussion
The Right to Repair Act makes contractors and subcontractors not involved in home sales liable for construction defects only if the homeowner proves they negligently cause the violation in whole or part (Civil Code §§ 911(b), 936). As such, the trial court in Gillotti instructed the jury on negligence with respect to the grading subcontractor. The jury found that while the construction did violate some of the Right to Repair’s building standards alleged by the homeowner, the subcontractor was not negligent in anyway. After the jury verdict, the trial court found in favor of the grading subcontractor.
The homeowner moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly barred a common law negligence theory against the grading subcontractor. The trial court denied the motions on the grounds that “[t]he Right to Repair Act specifically provides that no other causes of action are allowed. See Civil Code § 943.” The trial court specifically noted that its decision conflicted with Liberty Mutual, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act does not eliminate common law rights and remedies where actual damage has occurred, stating that Liberty Mutual was wrongly decided and that the Liberty Mutual court was naïve in its assumptions regarding the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act.
In Gillotti, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the Liberty Mutual court failed to analyze the language of Civil Code § 896, which “clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative intent that the Act apply to all action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, residential construction, except as specifically set forth in the Act. The Act does not specifically except actions arising from actual damages. To the contrary, it authorizes recovery of damages, e.g., for ‘the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards....’ ([Civil Code] § 944).”
The Court also disagreed with Liberty Mutual’s view that because Civil Code §§ 931 and 943 acknowledge exceptions to the Right to Repair Act’s statutory remedies, the Act does not preclude common law claims for damages due to defects identified in the Act. The Court stated: “Neither list of exceptions, in section 943 or in section 931, includes common law causes of action such as negligence. If the Legislature had intended to make such a wide-ranging exception to the restrictive language of the first sentence of section 943, we would have expected it to do so expressly.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code § 897 preserves a common law negligence claims for violation of standards not listed in Civil Code § 986. It explained that the section of Civil Code § 897, which provides, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure,” expresses the legislative intent that the Right to Repair Act be all-encompassing. Anything inadvertently omitted is actionable under the Act if it causes damage. Any exceptions to the Act are made expressly through Civil Code §§ 931 and 934. The Court concluded in no uncertain terms that the Right to Repair Act precludes common law claims in cases for damages covered by the Act.
The homeowner further argued that she was not precluded from bringing a common law claim because a tree is not a “structure,” and therefore the alleged tree damage did not fall within the realm of the Right to Repair. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument, holding that while the tree damage itself was not expressly covered, the act of adding soil to make the driveway level (which caused the damage) implicated the standards covered by the Right to Repair Act. The Court explained that since under the Act a “structure” includes “improvement located upon a lot or within a common area” (Civil Code § 895(a)), as the driveway was an improvement upon the lot, the claim was within the purview of the Right to Repair Act. As the soil, a component of the driveway, caused damage (to the trees), it was actionable under the Act.
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Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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2018 Update to EPA’s “Superfund Task Force Report”
September 04, 2018 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelThe U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently released its Superfund Task Force Recommendations 2018 Update (the Update). The Superfund Task Force was established by former EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt to “provide recommendations on an expedited timeframe on how the agency can restructure the cleanup process, realign incentives of all involved parties to promote expeditious remediation, reduce the burden on cooperating parties, incentivize parties to remediate sites, encourage private investment in cleanups of sites and promote the revitalization of properties across the country.” Over the years, thousands of sites have been listed on EPA’s National Priority List (NPL) of Superfund sites, but the process by which listed sites are cleaned up and finally removed from the NPL has been agonizingly slow. The process is governed by the National Contingency Plan rules. The Update states that, as of July 3, 2018, there are 1,346 sites listed on the NPL, and overall, 399 sites have been removed from the NPL.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
