Do Not Forfeit Coverage Under Your Property Insurance Policy
February 22, 2021 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIf you have read prior articles (see
here and
here as an example), then you know that when it comes to first-party property insurance policies, an insured must comply with post-loss obligations in the policy. Failure to comply with a post-loss obligation gives the insurer the argument that the insured materially breached the policy and, therefore, forfeited rights to coverage. Naturally, this is avoidable by ensuring post-loss obligations are complied with, ideally under the guidance of counsel and qualified public adjusters to ensure your rights are being preserved and maximized.
[W]hen an insurer has alleged, as an affirmative defense to coverage, and thereafter has subsequently established, that an insured has failed to substantially comply with a contractually mandated post-loss obligation, prejudice to the insurer from the insured’s material breach is presumed, and the burden then shifts to the insured to show that any breach of post-loss obligations did not prejudice the insurer.
Universal Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Horne, 46 Fla.L.Weekly D201b (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) quoting American Integrity Ins. Co. v. Estrada, 276 So.3d 905, 916 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Utah’s Highest Court Holds That Plaintiffs Must Properly Commence an Action to Rely on the Relation-Back Doctrine to Overcome the Statute of Repose
August 20, 2018 —
Shannon M. Warren - The Subrogation StrategistEarlier this summer, in Gables & Villas at River Oaks Homeowners Ass’n v. Castlewood Builders LLC, 2018 UT 28, the Supreme Court of Utah addressed the question of whether the plaintiff’s construction defects claims against the general contractor for a construction project were timely-filed, or barred by the statute of repose. In Utah, the statute of repose requires that an action be “commenced within six years of the date of completion.” The plaintiff alleged that its 2014 amended complaint naming the general contractor as a defendant was timely-commenced because, before the date on which Utah’s statute of repose ran, a defendant filed a motion to amend its third-party complaint to name the general contractor as a defendant, and the defendant subsequently assigned its claims to the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that the filing of its 2014 amended complaint related back[1] to the date of its original complaint. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that an action is “commenced” by filing a complaint and that a motion for leave to amend does not count as “commencing” an action.
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Shannon M. Warren, White and Williams LLPMs. Warren may be contacted at
warrens@whiteandwilliams.com
No Coverage for Homeowner Named as Borrower in Policy but Not as Insured
July 08, 2024 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe magistrate judge recommended that the homeowner's complaint seeking coverage for damage caused by Hurricanes Laura and Delta be denied because the homeowner was only named as the borrower under the policy. LeDay v. Integon Nat'l Ins. Co., 2024 U,S. Dist. LEXIS 87369 (W.D. La. April 15, 2024).
When the homeowner sought coverage for hurricane damage, it was denied. The homeowner then sued and Integon moved to dismiss. Integon argued it did not issue a policy to the homeowner, but the policy was issued to Midland Mortgage. The pro se homeowner did not respond to the motion.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
If I Released My California Mechanics Lien, Can I File a New Mechanics Lien on the Same Project? Will the New Mechanics Lien be Enforceable?
December 29, 2020 —
William L. Porter - Porter Law GroupIf I Released My California Mechanics Lien, Can I File a New Mechanics Lien on the Same Project? Will the New Mechanics Lien be Enforceable?
In general, the answer to the above questions is “Yes”, but only if you meet the following requirements:
- You must only release the mechanics lien itself, but not the “right” to a mechanics lien: There is an important distinction to be made between releasing a mechanics lien and releasing the right to a mechanics lien. Whether you do one or the other will depend on the specific language used in your release. In the case of Santa Clara Land Title Co. v. Nowack and Associates, Inc. (1991) 226 Cal. App.3d, 1558 a “release of mechanics lien” document was recorded TO THE County Recorder’s office which included a statement that the mechanics lien was “fully satisfied, released and discharged”. Based on this language, the court concluded that the mechanics lien claimant had waived its “right” to a further mechanics lien on the same property for the work in question. The court concluded that since the release stated that the claim was “fully satisfied” the right to mechanics lien on the project had forever been waived. The Nowak case can be distinguished from the case of Koudmani v. Ogle Enterprises, Inc., (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1650, where the release of mechanics lien only stated that the mechanics lien was “otherwise released and discharged” and not that it was “satisfied”. Based on the distinction drawn from the two cases, a simple mechanics lien release that only releases the mechanics lien itself, but not the “right” to a mechanics lien should be used. At the following link you will find a proper form to achieve this purpose: https://www.porterlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/03PRI-Mechanics-Lien-Release.pdf
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William L. Porter, Porter Law GroupMr. Porter may be contacted at
bporter@porterlaw.com
Sales of Existing U.S. Homes Decrease on Fewer Investors
September 24, 2014 —
Jeanna Smialek – BloombergPurchases of previously owned U.S. homes unexpectedly declined in August for the first time in five months as investors retreated from the market.
Existing home sales dropped 1.8 percent to a 5.05 million annual pace, from a revised 5.14 million pace in July, the National Association of Realtors reported today in Washington. The median forecast of 72 economists in a Bloomberg survey called for 5.2 million. The share of properties sold to investors was the lowest in almost five years.
As wage gains are slow to materialize and credit conditions remain tight, it has been difficult for first-time homebuyers to enter the housing market to make up the decrease in investor activity. Employment growth and easier lending rules could help would-be buyers to feel more secure in taking the plunge into homeownership.
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Jeanna Smialek, BloombergMs. Smialek may be contacted at
jsmialek1@bloomberg.net
The Risks and Rewards of Sustainable Building Design
July 25, 2021 —
Caroline A. Harcourt & Adam Weaver - Gravel2GavelThe shift towards a “greener” environment has resulted in cities and states implementing electrification mandates, which will have a major impact on both current and future building design. Currently, most commercial and residential end users are already all-electric. However, there are some exceptions, such as space and water heating, that use a significant amount of energy. Several states, including California and New York, have cities that have introduced legislation requiring new construction to be all-electric. This means, for example, using electricity for heating rather than fossil fuels such as natural gas. Mandate or not, building owners and developers should consider the risks and rewards of an all-electric design.
General Rewards
- Reaching Climate Goals: As part of the Clean Energy Plan, as described in a previous post, President Biden has created a goal for the United States of achieving a carbon pollution-free American utility sector by 2035. Because residential and commercial building account for 40 percent of energy consumption in the United States, all-electric building designs will help governments and businesses reach the ambitious climate goals that have been set for the coming years.
Reprinted courtesy of
Caroline A. Harcourt, Pillsbury and
Adam Weaver, Pillsbury
Ms. Harcourt may be contacted at caroline.harcourt@pillsburylaw.com
Mr. Weaver may be contacted at adam.weaver@pillsburylaw.com
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Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFSafety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”
The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”
A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”
Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”
All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.
Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”
In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”
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District Court of Missouri Limits Whining About the Scope of Waiver of Subrogation Clauses in Wine Storage Agreements
May 01, 2019 —
Gus Sara - The Subrogation StrategistIn Netherlands Ins. Co. v. Cellar Advisors, LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10655 (E.D. Mo.), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri considered the scope of a waiver of subrogation clause in two wine storage agreements. The court held that the subrogation waivers were limited in scope and, potentially, did not apply to the damages alleged in the pleadings. This case establishes that, in Missouri, waivers of subrogation are narrowly construed and cannot be enforced beyond the scope of the specific context in which they appear.
In 2005, Krista and Reid Buerger (the Buergers) contracted Marc Lazar (Lazar) to assist with purchasing, transporting and storing their wine. In 2006, the Buergers entered into a contract with Lazar’s company, Domaine StL, for the storage of their wine in St. Louis. In 2012, the Buergers contracted with Lazar’s other company, Domaine NY, for storage of their wine in New Jersey. The 2006 and 2012 contracts included subrogation waivers. Pursuant to the contracts, Lazar and the Domaine companies (collectively, Defendants) would buy wine for the Buergers by either using the Buergers’ credit card or invoicing them after a purchase.
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Gus Sara, White and Williams LLPMr. Sara may be contacted at
sarag@whiteandwilliams.com
