Construction Cybercrime Is On the Rise
May 26, 2019 —
Tom Sawyer & Jeff Rubenstone - Engineering News-RecordAt the end of April, just as St. Ambrose Roman Catholic Church in Brunswick, Ohio, neared the close of a five-month-long, $5.5-million renovation, Father Bob Stec, the parish pastor, was surprised to hear that the contractor, Marous Brothers Construction, Willoughby, Ohio, had not received a $1.7- million payment.
Reprinted courtesy of
Tom Sawyer, Engineering News-Record and
Jeff Rubenstone, Engineering News-Record
Mr. Sawyer may be contacted at sawyert@enr.com
Mr. Rubenstone may be contacted at rubenstonej@enr.com
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When Your “Private” Project Suddenly Turns into a “Public” Project. Hint: It Doesn’t Necessary Turn on Public Financing or Construction
September 28, 2017 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogIn 1931, during the Great Depression, the federal government enacted the Davis-Bacon Act to help workers on federal construction projects. The Davis-Bacon Act, also known as the federal prevailing wage law, sets minimum wages that must be paid to workers on federal construction projects based on local “prevailing” wages. The law was designed to help curb the displacement of families by employers who were recruiting lower-wage workers from outside local areas. Many states, including California, adopted “Little Davis-Bacon” laws applying similar requirements on state and local construction projects.
California’s current prevailing wage law requires that contractors on state and local public works projects pay their employees the general prevailing rate of per diem wages based on the classification or type of work performed by the employee in the locality where the project is located, as well as to hire apprentices enrolled in state-approved apprentice programs and to make monetary contributions for apprenticeship training.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Massachusetts Federal Court Holds No Coverage for Mold and Water Damage Claim
February 11, 2019 —
Brian Margolies - TLSS Insurance Law BlogIn its recent decision in Clarendon National Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co., 2019 WL 134614 (D. Mass. Jan. 8, 2019), the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts had occasion to consider the application of a prior knowledge provision in the context of a claim for mold and water-related bodily injury and property damage.
Philadelphia insured a condominium property management company under a general liability insurance policy for the period September 1, 2007 through September 1, 2008. In 2009, the insured was sued by a unit owner alleging bodily injury and property damage resulting from toxic mold conditions resulting from leaks that had been identified in her unit as early as 2004. Notably, the complaint alleged that mold was identified in 2006 and that repair efforts were undertaken, but that these efforts all proved unsuccessful. Plaintiff alleged that she was forced to vacate her apartment in 2008 as a result of the conditions.
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Brian Margolies, Traub LiebermanMr. Margolies may be contacted at
bmargolies@tlsslaw.com
Contract Change #8: Direct Communications between Owners and Contractors (law note)
March 28, 2018 —
Melissa Dewey Brumback - Construction Law in North CarolinaAs the Engineer or Architect of Record, you probably have frequently experienced Owners and Contractors communicating directly, in direct contravention of the language of the contract that requires them to endeavor to route all communications through the design team. With the latest version of the 201,
direct communication is now authorized, to recognize both the reality of what was happening on the ground and to recognize that sometimes Owners and Contractors may need to communicate without waiting for the design team.
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Melissa Dewey Brumback, Construction Law in North Carolina
Virginia Decision Emphasizes Importance of Naming All Necessary Parties
June 17, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFNate Budde on the Construction Payment Blog, discussed the potential of mechanics liens, and the pitfalls that occur when not all necessary parties are named. Budde analyzed the case Johnson Controls Inc. v. Norair Eng’g Corp. that involved a “claimant’s failure to name all the necessary parties in his claim against a bond,” resulting “in the claimant losing his claim against the bond, and with it, an opportunity to get paid.”
Budde concluded, “Unfortunately, as was the case here, when the bond claim is not handled correctly procedurally, a party can be left with no recourse for payment. It’s important to understand which of the parties involved should be named in both mechanics lien claims and bond claims.”
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Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 2017 WL 1488711 Rejects Liberty Mutual, Holding Once Again that the Right to Repair Act is the Exclusive Remedy for Construction Defect Claims
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. - Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinBackground
In Gillotti v. Stewart (April 26, 2017) 2017 WL 1488711, which was ordered to be published on May 18, 2017, the defendant grading subcontractor added soil over tree roots to level the driveway on the plaintiff homeowner’s sloped lot. The homeowner sued the grading subcontractor under the California Right to Repair Act (Civil Code §§ 895, et seq.) claiming that the subcontractor’s work damaged the trees.
After the jury found the subcontractor was not negligent, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The homeowner appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly construed the Right to Repair Act as barring a common law negligence theory against the subcontractor and erred in failing to follow Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the subcontractor.
Impact
This is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal has held that Liberty Mutual (discussed below) was wrongly decided and held that the Right to Repair Act is the exclusive remedy for construction defect claims. The decision follows its holding in Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hicks) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 333, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act’s pre-litigation procedures apply when homeowners plead construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Right to Repair Act. Elliott is currently on hold at the California Supreme Court, pending the decision in McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, wherein Liberty Mutual was rejected for the first time by the Fifth District. CGDRB continues to follow developments regarding the much anticipated McMillin decision closely, as well as all related matters.
Discussion
The Right to Repair Act makes contractors and subcontractors not involved in home sales liable for construction defects only if the homeowner proves they negligently cause the violation in whole or part (Civil Code §§ 911(b), 936). As such, the trial court in Gillotti instructed the jury on negligence with respect to the grading subcontractor. The jury found that while the construction did violate some of the Right to Repair’s building standards alleged by the homeowner, the subcontractor was not negligent in anyway. After the jury verdict, the trial court found in favor of the grading subcontractor.
The homeowner moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly barred a common law negligence theory against the grading subcontractor. The trial court denied the motions on the grounds that “[t]he Right to Repair Act specifically provides that no other causes of action are allowed. See Civil Code § 943.” The trial court specifically noted that its decision conflicted with Liberty Mutual, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act does not eliminate common law rights and remedies where actual damage has occurred, stating that Liberty Mutual was wrongly decided and that the Liberty Mutual court was naïve in its assumptions regarding the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act.
In Gillotti, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the Liberty Mutual court failed to analyze the language of Civil Code § 896, which “clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative intent that the Act apply to all action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, residential construction, except as specifically set forth in the Act. The Act does not specifically except actions arising from actual damages. To the contrary, it authorizes recovery of damages, e.g., for ‘the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards....’ ([Civil Code] § 944).”
The Court also disagreed with Liberty Mutual’s view that because Civil Code §§ 931 and 943 acknowledge exceptions to the Right to Repair Act’s statutory remedies, the Act does not preclude common law claims for damages due to defects identified in the Act. The Court stated: “Neither list of exceptions, in section 943 or in section 931, includes common law causes of action such as negligence. If the Legislature had intended to make such a wide-ranging exception to the restrictive language of the first sentence of section 943, we would have expected it to do so expressly.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code § 897 preserves a common law negligence claims for violation of standards not listed in Civil Code § 986. It explained that the section of Civil Code § 897, which provides, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure,” expresses the legislative intent that the Right to Repair Act be all-encompassing. Anything inadvertently omitted is actionable under the Act if it causes damage. Any exceptions to the Act are made expressly through Civil Code §§ 931 and 934. The Court concluded in no uncertain terms that the Right to Repair Act precludes common law claims in cases for damages covered by the Act.
The homeowner further argued that she was not precluded from bringing a common law claim because a tree is not a “structure,” and therefore the alleged tree damage did not fall within the realm of the Right to Repair. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument, holding that while the tree damage itself was not expressly covered, the act of adding soil to make the driveway level (which caused the damage) implicated the standards covered by the Right to Repair Act. The Court explained that since under the Act a “structure” includes “improvement located upon a lot or within a common area” (Civil Code § 895(a)), as the driveway was an improvement upon the lot, the claim was within the purview of the Right to Repair Act. As the soil, a component of the driveway, caused damage (to the trees), it was actionable under the Act.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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Contractor Gets Benched After Failing to Pay Jury Fees
April 11, 2022 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogTrial by jury is a fundamental right under the U.S. and California Constitutions. However, to avail yourself of this right, you not only have to declare that in advance that you intend to try your case to a jury but post jury fees as well. In TriCoast Builders, Inc. v. Fonnegra, a contractor who failed to timely post jury fees, discovered on the day of trial that it waived the right to insist on a jury trial when the defendant pulled an “I gotcha” and waived his right to a jury trial.
The TriCoast Case
In May 2014, Nathaniel Fonnegra house was damaged by fire. The following month, Fonnegra entered into a construction contract with TriCoast Builders, Inc. to repair the property. Dissatisfied with the work, Fonnegra terminated the contract, and TriCoast in turn filed a complaint against Fonnegra for unpaid work.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
Burden to Prove Exception to Exclusion Falls on Insured
April 19, 2022 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiIn a dispute between two insurers, the Ninth Circuit relied upon Nevada law in finding that the burden of proving that an exception to the exclusion applies was on the insured. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co., 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 1626 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2022).
Ironshore insured seven subcontractors. The policy included an exclusion providing there was no coverage for any property damage for the subcontractors' for "work performed prior to the policy inception." An exception to the exclusion provided that the exclusion did not apply to property damage that was "sudden and accidental and takes place within the policy period."
The seven subcontractors were sued for work they had performed. Zurich defended and indemnified the subcontractors. Zurich then sued Ironshore seeking contribution and indemnification for defense and settlement costs. The parties stipulated that all construction work at issue had been completed before the inception of Ironshore's policy and that none of the complaints against the subcontractors alleged that sudden and accidental damage had occurred after the inception of Ironshore's policy.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
