Lenders and Post-Foreclosure Purchasers Have Standing to Make Construction Defect Claims for After-Discovered Conditions
October 10, 2013 —
W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. — Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCThe Colorado Court of Appeals has decided a case which answers a question long in need of an answer: do banks/lenders have standing to assert construction defect claims when they receive title to a newly-constructed home following a foreclosure sale or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure? The decision was released on August 1, 2013, in the case of Mid Valley Real Estate Solutions V, LLC v. Hepworth-Pawlack Geotechnical, Inc., Steve Pawlak, Daniel Hadin, and S K Peightal Engineers, Ltd. (Colorado Court of Appeals No. 13CA0519).
The background facts of the case are typical of a Colorado residential construction defect case generally. A developer contracted for an analytical soil engineering report from a geotechnical engineering firm (H-P) which made a foundation recommendation. The developer’s general contractor then retained an engineering firm (SPKE) to provide engineering services, including a foundation design. The general contractor built the foundation in accordance with the H-P and SPKE criteria and plans.
The house was not sold by the developer and went into default on the construction loan. These events resulted in a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure to a bank-controlled entity which purchased the house for re-sale. Shortly after receiving the developer’s deed, the bank-related entity discovered defects in the foundation that resulted in a construction defect suit against the two design firms and related individuals.
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W. Berkeley Mann, Jr.W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. can be contacted at
mann@hhmrlaw.com
Attorneys Fees Under California’s Prompt Payment Statutes. Contractor’s “Win” Fails the Sniff Test
October 02, 2015 —
Roger Hughes – California Construction Law BlogThis past month, the California Court of Appeals for the Third District, in James L. Harris Painting & Decorating, Inc. v. West Bay Builders, Inc., Case No. C072169 (August 27, 2015), handed down a decision in a construction contract battle that has raged since 2007. And, once again, the winner is . . . in the words of Justice Andrea Lynn Hoch who authored the opinion . . . . “no prevailing party in [the] case” and hence “no prevailing party attorney’s fees [ ] awarded.”
Background
In Harris, subcontractor James L. Harris Painting & Decorating, Inc. (“Harris”) sued general contractor West Bay Builders, Inc. (“West Bay”) for extra work performed on a school construction project in Stockton, California. Among its claims, Harris asserted that West Bay was liable under California’s prompt payment statutes for failure to timely pay Harris.
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Roger Hughes, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Hughes may be contacted at
rhughes@wendel.com
Bright-Line Changes: Prompt Payment Act Trends
September 16, 2024 —
Stephanie L. Cooksey - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.Untimely payment by the owner for contract work and additional work on construction projects can place an unfair financial burden on contractors and subcontractors. Most states have attempted to eliminate or mitigate this inequity in construction contracting through Prompt Payment Acts that govern payment deadlines and provide remedies for untimely payment. This article addresses the legislative trends aimed at minimizing the risk of non-payment, overdue payment, and withholding retainage in favor of downstream parties to a construction contract.
Fortifying Contractor Protections with “Bright-Line” Language
Over the last decade, states have been tightening prompt payment laws by replacing broad, general statutory language with bright-line rules. What is a bright-line rule? A specific or definite figure, a quantifiable marker—i.e., something owners, contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers should be aware of. Practically speaking, the more bright-line a prompt payment statute is, the greater the likelihood it will affect a construction project in your state.
A standard form construction contract, if not reviewed carefully, can create conflicts or confusion if it gives a party more leeway on payment deadlines than the applicable Prompt Payment Act. For example, consider an owner-issued Construction Change Directive (“CCD”) that requires a contractor to commence additional work immediately while a formal change order is negotiated. Consequently, a CCD can push financial burdens downstream, whether inadvertently or not, and may conflict with statutory payment deadlines. Nevertheless, an owner can be justified in its utilization of a CCD to maintain the project schedule. How should the parties competing interests be resolved?
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Texas Court of Appeals Conditionally Grant Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Anderson
April 25, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFThe Texas Court of Appeals conditionally grant mandamus relief to Anderson Construction Company and Ronnie Anderson (collectively “Anderson”)… from the trial court in a construction defect lawsuit filed by Brent L. Mainwaring and Tatayana Mainwaring. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.001-.007 (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). Relators contend the trial court abused its discretion by compelling discovery while the case was abated by operation of law.
The Court of Appeals opinion describes what led up to the proceedings: “The Mainwarings’ original petition identified certain defects in their Anderson-constructed home. Those defects concerned the roof trusses and framing, air conditioning, mortar and masonry, exterior doors and windows, and weep holes. With respect to the five areas of defects identified in their original petition, the Mainwarings gave Anderson the statutorily required notice on January 13, 2010. After implementing agreed extensions, Anderson made an offer of settlement for the defects the Mainwarings identified in their notice. Almost eight months later, the Mainwarings filed an amended petition adding defects they had not included in their original petition and notice. The additional defects the Mainwarings included in their amended petition had not been addressed by Anderson’s offer of settlement.”
Following these events, Anderson claimed the Mainwarings did not respond in writing to their settlement offer. “Anderson filed a verified plea in abatement on December 2, 2010. In the trial court, Anderson claimed that the Mainwarings failed to respond in writing to Anderson’s settlement offer, as required by Section 27.004(b) of the RCLA. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(b)(1). The Mainwarings moved to compel discovery responses from Anderson. The Mainwarings alleged that they rejected Anderson’s settlement offer, and that if their response was insufficient, they contend that Anderson’s offer was rejected by operation of law on the twenty-fifth day after the Mainwarings received it. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(i). The Mainwarings’ motion to compel was not supported by affidavit. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(d)(2). On January 13, 2011, Anderson filed a verified supplemental plea in abatement. Anderson alleged that the Mainwarings failed to provide written notice concerning the newly alleged defects and complained the Mainwarings were attempting to circumvent the inspection and resolution procedure of the RCLA. Over Anderson’s objection that the lawsuit had been abated, the trial court granted the Mainwarings’ motion to compel discovery.”
After listening to both sides, the Court of Appeals offered this reasoning for their opinion: “The parties do not dispute that Anderson inspected the property before the Mainwarings alleged the existence of additional defects in their amended pleading, nor do the Mainwarings claim that Anderson has been given an opportunity to inspect the additional defects the Mainwarings identified in their amended pleadings. We conclude the trial court did not have the discretion to deny or lift the abatement until the Mainwarings established their compliance with the statute. In other words, the Mainwarings are required to provide Anderson a reasonable opportunity to inspect the additional defects identified by their amended pleading, which will allow Anderson the opportunity to cure or settle with respect to the newly identified defects.”
The Court of Appeals spoke directly on the issue of mandamus relief: “The Mainwarings contend that mandamus relief is not available because the trial court’s ruling does not prevent Anderson from making settlement offers during the discovery process. ‘An appellate remedy is “adequate” when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments.’ In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004). The failure to abate a case is typically not subject to mandamus. See In re Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. 2002) (citing Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. 1985)). In this case, however, the case was abated by operation of law. By ignoring the statutory abatement, the trial court interfered with the statutory procedure for developing and resolving construction defect claims. See In re Kimball Hill Homes Tex., Inc., 969 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (An appeal provides an inadequate remedy for the trial court’s failure to observe automatic abatement pursuant to the RCLA.). The benefits of mandamus review are not outweighed by the detriments of mandamus review in this case.“
In conclusion, “The trial court had no discretion to compel discovery while the case was abated, and Anderson, who has been compelled to respond to discovery during a period the case was under an automatic abatement, has no adequate remedy on appeal. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to vacate its order of February 3, 2011, and fails to refrain from proceeding with the case until a motion to reinstate is filed that establishes compliance with the notice and inspection requirements of the Residential Construction Liability Act.”
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Vinny Testaverde Alleges $5 Million Mansion Riddled with Defects
January 15, 2014 —
Melissa Zaya-CDJ STAFFFormer Tampa Bay Buccaneers quarterback Vinny Testaverde and his wife Mitzi filed suit December 20, 2013 claiming breach of contract and building code violations on their $5 million, Odessa, Florida mansion, according to the Tampa Tribune. The Testaverdes allege that their six-year old, 6,700 square foot home has multiple defects, including “wet floors and walls when it rains and a grand staircase leading to the front door that is sinking, taking with it two columns that support the porch roof,” The Tampa Tribune reports.
Gray Homes of Tampa Bay were contracted by the couple to build their mansion on Lake Keystone. The Tampa Tribune stated that several months before filing suit, the Testaverdes sent a certified letter to Gray Homes stating they had uncovered “a series of defects.” According to the article, Gray Homes had not yet responded to the Tampa Tribune’s message asking for a comment.
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NY Pay-to-Play Charges Dropped Against LPCiminelli Executive As Another Pleads Guilty
June 06, 2018 —
Mary B. Powers & Debra K. Rubin - Engineerings News-RecordThe former president of New York contractor LPCiminelli—the firm that has been at the center of an alleged pay-to-play scheme playing out since 2016 when he and two other executives were indicted—got a reprieve as federal prosecutors said they were dropping all charges against him, including wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud and making false statements to federal agents, according to a June 1 court filing.
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Mary B. Powers, ENR and
Debra K. Rubin, ENR
Ms. Rubin may be contacted at rubind@enr.com
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Skanska Will Work With Florida on Barge-Caused Damage to Pensacola Bay Bridge
October 19, 2020 —
Jim Parsons - Engineering News-RecordFlorida Dept. of Transportation investigators continue to assess damage to the Pensacola Bay Bridge, which sustained multiple impacts from two construction barges unmoored by Hurricane Sally’s storm-driven waves on Sept. 15.
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Jim Parsons, Engineering News-Record
ENR may be contacted at ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
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Definitions Matter in Illinois: Tenant Held Liable Only for Damage to Apartment Unit
September 09, 2024 —
Gus Sara - The Subrogation StrategistIn Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, No. 1-23-0833, 2024 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1372, the Appellate Court of Illinois considered whether the terms of a lease agreement limited a tenant’s liability for fire damages, a fire caused by her negligence, to her apartment unit only. The plaintiff insured the subject apartment building, which incurred damage to several units as result of a fire in the tenant’s unit. The lease defined “Premises” as the specific apartment unit occupied by the tenant and held the tenant responsible for damage caused to the Premises. While the court found that the lease permitted the plaintiff to subrogate against the tenant, it held that the lease terms limited the damages to the tenant’s apartment unit only.
In Gonzalez, the plaintiff’s insured owned a multi-unit apartment building in Chicago. In September 2019, the building owner entered into a lease agreement with the defendant for apartment Unit 601. The lease stated that Unit 601 was the “Leased Address (Premises).” Another provision stated that building owner “hereby leases to Tenant(s) and Tenant(s) hereby leases from Landlord(s) for use as a private dwelling only, the Premises, together with the fixtures and appliances (if any) in the premises…” The lease also stated that “Tenant shall be liable for any damage done to the premises as a result of Tenant’s or Tenant’s invitees, guests or others authorized to reside in the Premises [sic] direct action, negligence, or failure to inform Landlord of repairs necessary to prevent damage to the Premises.”
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Gus Sara, White and WilliamsMr. Sara may be contacted at
sarag@whiteandwilliams.com
