Residential Construction: Shrinking Now, Growing Later?
August 17, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFJim Haugey, the Chief Economist for Reed Construction Data noted that new residential construction spending fell 0.2% in June and a slightly larger drop of 0.5% in residential remodeling. While economic growth is still low, Haugey states that homebuilders have “record low inventories.” He forecasts a shrinkage of 1.5% in 2011, followed by about 20% growth in 2012.
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Is the Issuance of a City Use Permit Referable? Not When It Is an Administrative Act
January 10, 2018 —
Adam E. Lang - Real Estate Litigation BlogArizona’s Constitution gives electors in cities, towns, and counties the ability to refer legislation that was enacted by their local elected officials to the ballot for popular vote. Ariz. Const. art. IV, Pt. 1 § 1(8). But only legislative acts are referable; administrative acts are not. In general, a legislative act makes new law and creates policy, is permanent in nature, and is generally applied. On the other hand, an administrative act is one that executes and implements a law already in place. Wennerstrom v. City of Mesa, 169 Ariz. 485, 489-90, 821 P.2d 146, 150-51 (1991).
For more than fifty years, Arizona courts have been clear: zoning and rezoning ordinances are legislative acts and therefore referable to popular vote. City of Phoenix v. Fehlner, 90 Ariz. 13, 17, 363 P.2d 607, 609 (1961) (holding that “what constitutes an appropriate zone is primarily for the legislature”); Fritz v. City of Kingman, 191 Ariz 432, 432, 957 P.2d 337, 337 (1998) (noting “we reaffirm our view that zoning decisions are legislative matters subject to referendum”); Pioneer Trust Co. of Arizona v. Pima Cty., 168 Ariz. 61, 64–65, 811 P.2d 22, 25–26 (1991) (holding “that, in Arizona, zoning decisions are legislative acts subject to referendum” and that even a “conditional approval of . . . rezoning was a legislative act”); Cottonwood Dev. v. Foothills Area Coal. of Tucson, Inc., 134 Ariz. 46, 653 P.2d 694 (1982) (analyzing whether zoning referendum complied with statutory requirements); Wait v. City of Scottsdale, 127 Ariz. 107, 108, 618 P.2d 601, 602 (1980) (noting “that the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances constitute legislative action”); City of Phoenix v. Oglesby, 112 Ariz. 64, 65, 537 P.2d 934, 935 (1975) (“The matter of zoning is appropriately one for the legislative branch of government.”); Queen Creek Land & Cattle Corp. v. Yavapai Cty. Bd. of Sup’rs, 108 Ariz. 449, 452, 501 P.2d 391, 394 (1972) (denying an attempt to enjoin referendum on county’s zoning decision).
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Adam E. Lang, Snell & WilmerMr. Lang may be contacted at
alang@swlaw.com
California Supreme Court Declines Request to Expand Exceptions to Privette Doctrine for Known Hazards
January 17, 2022 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogFirst things first. Happy New Year! Hope you had a good one.
To start things off in the new year we’ve got an employment-related case for you – Gonzalez v. Mathis, 12 Cal.5th 29 (2021) – a California Supreme Court case involving the Privette Doctrine. For those not familiar with the Privette Doctrine, the Privette Doctrine is named after the case Privette v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.4th 689 (1993), which held that project owners and higher-tiered contractors are not liable for workplace injuries sustained by employees of lower-tiered contractors. Since then, courts have carved out a few exceptions to the Privette Doctrine including the “retained control exception” (also known as the Hooker exception – that’s the name of the case not the occupation of the injured worker) whereby a “hirer,” that is, the higher-tiered party who hired the lower-tiered party whose employee is injured, can be held liable if the hirer: (1) retains control over any part of the lower-tiered party’s work; and (2) negligently exercises that control in a manner that affirmatively contributes to the worker’s injury.
Another exception is the “concealed hazard exception” (also known as the Kinsman exception) whereby a hirer can be held liable if: (1) the hirer knew, or should have known, of a concealed hazard on the property that the lower-tiered contractor did not know of and could not have reasonably discovered; and (2) the hirer railed to warn the lower-tiered contractor of that hazard.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
Blurred Lines: New York Supreme Court Clarifies Scope of Privileged Documents in Connection with Pre-Denial Communications Prepared by Insurer's Coverage Counsel
September 17, 2015 —
Greg Steinberg – White and Williams LLPIn a recent decision, the New York Supreme Court clarified the scope of privileged documents with respect to communications prepared by an insurer’s counsel prior to issuing a denial of coverage letter. The coverage litigation at issue arose out of MF Global Inc.’s claims under fidelity bonds for losses incurred as a result of large trades made by former MF Global employee, Evan Dooley. The trades cost MF Global, Dooley’s former clearing firm, $141 million after it had to reimburse the CME Group, Inc. futures clearinghouse that handled the trade. The insurers that issued the fidelity bonds contested coverage and sued MF Global in 2009.
The opinion underscores the fact that there is no “bright line” rule in New York with respect to disclosure of communications in the insurance context prior to the issuance of a coverage determination – the disclosure requirement will instead turn on what’s actually privileged. In addition, while retention of counsel may not serve as an automatic shield for all documents prepared prior to the coverage decision, insurers will not be required to disclose, among other things, communications which include an “indicia of the provision of legal services.”
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Greg Steinberg, White and Williams LLPMr. Steinberg may be contacted at
steinbergg@whiteandwilliams.com
President Trump Nullifies “Volks Rule” Regarding Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Recordkeeping Requirements
April 13, 2017 —
Louis “Dutch” Schotemeyer – Newmeyer & Dillion LLPOSHA requires employers to maintain safety records for a period of five years. The Occupational Safety and Health Act contains a six month statute of limitations for OSHA to issue citations to employers for violations. In an effort to close the gap between the five years employers are required to keep records and the six month citation window, the Obama Administration implemented the “Volks Rule,” making recordkeeping requirements a “continuing obligation” for employers and effectively extending the statute of limitations for violations of recordkeeping requirements from six months to five years.
On March 22, 2017, the Senate approved a House Joint Resolution (H.J. Res. 83) nullifying the “Volks Rule” and limiting the statute of limitations to six months for recordkeeping violations. President Trump signed the resolution nullifying the “Volks Rule” on April 3, 2017. The nullification appears to be in line with President Trump’s stated goal of generally eliminating governmental regulations.
What Does This Mean for California Employers?
California manages its own OSHA program, which generally follows the federal program, but is not always in lock-step with Federal OSHA. Cal/OSHA, under its current rules, may only cite employers for recordkeeping violations that occurred during the six months preceding an inspection or review of those records. To date, there has been no indication that California’s Division of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH) has plans to adopt the “Volks Rule.” Barring a change, California employers will continue to operate under the status quo and be required to maintain safety records for five years, but will only be exposed to citations for recordkeeping violations occurring within the last six months.
Current Cal/OSHA Recordkeeping Requirements
Cal/OSHA form 300 (also known as the “OSHA Log 300”) is used to record information about every work-related death and most work-related injuries that cannot be treated with onsite first aid (specific requirements can be found in the California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Sections 14300 through 14300.48). Currently, California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Section 14300.33 requires employers to retain OSHA Log 300 for a period of five years following the end of the calendar year during which the record was created, despite the fact that Cal/OSHA can only cite employers for failing to maintain such records for up to six months preceding an inspection.
Looking to the Future
Cal/OSHA is working on regulations that would require electronic submission of OSHA Log 300 records in California. This would bring Cal/OSHA more in line with Federal OSHA, which already requires electronic submission.
About Newmeyer & Dillion
For more than 30 years, Newmeyer & Dillion has delivered creative and outstanding legal solutions and trial results for a wide array of clients. With over 70 attorneys practicing in all aspects of business, employment, real estate, construction and insurance law, Newmeyer & Dillion delivers legal services tailored to meet each client’s needs. Headquartered in Newport Beach, California, with offices in Walnut Creek, California and Las Vegas, Nevada, Newmeyer & Dillion attorneys are recognized by The Best Lawyers in America©, and Super Lawyers as top tier and some of the best lawyers in California, and have been given Martindale-Hubbell Peer Review's AV Preeminent® highest rating. For additional information, call 949-854-7000 or visit www.ndlf.com.
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Louis "Dutch" Schotemeyer, Newmeyer & Dillion LLPMr. Schotemeyer may be contacted at
dutch.schotemeyer@ndlf.com
Construction Defect Claim Must Be Defended Under Florida Law
February 15, 2018 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Eleventh Circuit found that the insured caused property damage to areas beyond its own work, obligating the insurer to defend. Addison Ins. Co. v. 4000 Island Blvd. Condo. Ass'n, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 26870 (11th Cir. Dec. 28, 2017).
The condominium association contracted with Poma Construction Corp. to replace the building's aging concrete balcony railings with new aluminum and glass railings. Poma subcontracted with Windsor Metal Specialties, Inc. to paint the new railings. Work was completed on February 24, 2012. Poma issued a 10-year warranty covering its installation of the railings. Windsor issued a 20-year limited warranty covering the paint job.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Certificates of Insurance May Confer Coverage
December 30, 2019 —
Brett M. Hill - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCCertificates of insurance are a common tool used in the construction industry to provide proof of insurance coverage. The legal effect of certificates of insurance has been a source of debate in Washington. Insurance companies have argued that certificates of insurance are “informational only” and do not alter the terms of the applicable insurance policy. Insurance companies have taken the position that if a certificate of insurance provides for coverage that is different than what the policy provides, the insurance company is only bound to provide what the policy provides.
The Washington State Supreme Court weighed in on this issue in an opinion issued on October 10, 2019, and held that an insurance company is bound by the terms of its certificate of insurance – even if it conflicts with the policy. In T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Selective Insurance Company of America, Selective’s agent issued a certificate of insurance to “T-Mobile USA, Inc., its subsidiaries and affiliates” and stated that those entities were “included as additional insured” under the policy. The certificate of insurance was issued by Selective’s agent when T-Mobile’s contractor purchased an insurance policy from Selective for a cell tower project. The contractor’s agreement for the project was with T-Mobile Northeast – not T-Mobile USA. The contract between T-Mobile Northeast and the contractor stated that T-Mobile Northeast would be an additional insured. The Selective insurance policy stated that any third party would automatically be an additional insured if the contractor was required to name the third party as an additional insured. The contract did not provide that T-Mobile USA would be an additional insured.
A property owner damaged by the cell tower project sued T-Mobile USA. T-Mobile USA tendered the claim to Selective. Selective denied the claim because the contract between the contractor and T-Mobile Northeast did not require the contractor to name T-Mobile USA as an additional insured.
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Brett M. Hill, Ahlers Cressman Sleight PLLCMr. Hill may be contacted at
brett.hill@acslawyers.com
Attorney’s Fees Entitlement And Application Under Subcontract Default Provision
May 06, 2019 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMany subcontracts contain a provision in the default section that reads something to the effect:
“Upon any default, Subcontractor shall pay to Contractor its attorney’s fees and court costs incurred in enforcing this Subcontract or seeking any remedies hereunder.”
Oftentimes, a party may wonder as to the enforceability of the provision and how it is applied in the context of a dispute between a contractor and its subcontractor where both parties have asserted claims against the other.
In an opinion out of the Middle District of Georgia, U.S. f/u/b/o Cleveland Construction, Inc. v. Stellar Group, Inc., 2019 WL 338887 (M.D.Ga. 2019), a subcontractor and prime contractor on a federal construction project each asserted claims against the other in the approximate amount of $4 Million, meaning there was a potential $8 Million swing in the dispute.
The subcontract contained a provision entitling the contractor to recover attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing the subcontract or seeking remedies under the subcontract upon any default, identical to the provision above.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
