How to Remove a Mechanics Lien from Your Property
March 21, 2022 —
Hannah Kreuser - Porter Law GroupIt sometimes happens that a contractor or material supplier records a mechanics lien on your property that becomes expired. Other times, the mechanics lien may be wrong, invalid and unenforceable for some reason, serving no legitimate purpose. The contractor or material supplier may be reasonable and release the mechanics lien once these issues are brought to its attention, but the contractor or material supplier may very well refuse to release the mechanics lien when requested. When this happens, what are your options?
In California, there are various ways to bring this type of mechanics lien to a court’s attention in the hopes that the court will cause it to be released. Three of the more common methods are: (1) a petition under California Civil Code (“CCC”) § 8480; (2) a petition under California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) § 765.010; or (3) a Lambert motion. This article will briefly discuss each of these methods.
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Hannah Kreuser, Porter Law GroupMs. Kreuser may be contacted at
hkreuser@porterlaw.com
Surety Bond Now a Valid Performance Guarantee for NC Developers (guest post)
June 09, 2016 —
Melissa Dewey Brumback – Construction Law in North CarolinaWelcome summer days! Today we have a guest post by Todd Bryant, president and founder of
Bryant Surety Bonds. He is a surety bonds expert with years of experience in helping contractors get bonded and start their business. While design professionals generally don’t have to deal with performance bonds directly, they are often at the front lines of advising owners as to various Requests for Proposals submitted by hopeful contractors. In that spirit, be sure to read how the new law changes security requirements. Take it away, Todd!
Last year wrapped up with some good news for North Carolina subdivision developers:
House Bill 721 confirmed that construction bonds are, in fact, a viable form of performance guarantee. Previous legislation was ambiguous on this point, but the new bill– which took effect last October– sought to clear up the confusion. Although the new rules have been in effect for eight months, there’s been scant coverage of the changes, and what they mean for developers.
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Melissa Dewey Brumback, Ragsdale Liggett PLLCMs. Brumback may be contacted at
mbrumback@rl-law.com
Wells Fargo Shuns Peers’ Settlement in U.S in Mortgage
May 13, 2014 —
Andrew Zajac – BloombergFollowing two years in which its big-bank peers paid almost $2 billion to resolve fraud accusations by the Federal Housing Administration, Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC) has decided it isn’t giving up so easily.
Wells Fargo was one of five banks that agreed in 2012 to a nationwide, $25 billion settlement with the Justice Department over mortgage wrongdoing that included botched foreclosures. The FHA then took additional action against four of the banks, including Wells Fargo, for related housing-crisis wrongdoing. Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc. and JPMorgan Chase & Co. decided to settle those matters. San Francisco-based Wells Fargo, which argued the nationwide settlement should have blocked the new FHA claims against it, chose to fight.
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Andrew Zajac, BloombergMr. Zajac may be contacted at
azajac@bloomberg.net
Florida Court of Appeals Rejects Insurer’s Attempt to Intervene in Underlying Lawsuit to Submit Special Interrogatories
October 09, 2018 —
Jeremy Macklin - TLSS Insurance Law BlogOn August 10, 2018, the Florida Court of Appeals for the Second District upheld a trial court’s dismissal of an insurance company’s intervention in a tort lawsuit brought against its insured for the purposes of submitting special interrogatories and verdict forms.
In Houston Specialty Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 2018 Fla. App. LEXIS 11197, 2018 WL 3795785 (Fla. 2d DCA Aug. 10, 2018), the insured, All Florida Weatherproofing and Construction, Inc. (“All Florida”) provided pressure washing, roof coating, and other roof-related services. Houston Specialty issued a general liability policy to All Florida. In 2012, a worker fell off a roof while applying protective coating on behalf of All Florida. The worker and his family sued All Florida in connection with the worker’s injuries.
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Jeremy Macklin, Traub Lieberman Straus & Shrewsberry LLPMr. Macklin may be contacted at
jmacklin@tlsslaw.com
Construction Law Client Alert: California Is One Step Closer to Prohibiting Type I Indemnity Agreements In Private Commercial Projects
June 15, 2011 —
Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLPOn June 1, 2011 by majority vote, the California Senate passed Senate Bill 474, which would amend Civil Code section 2782, and add Civil Code section 2782.05. The passage of this new law is a critical development for real estate developers, general contractors and subcontractors because it will affect how these projects are insured and how disputes are resolved.
Civil Code section 2782 was amended in 2007 to prohibit Type I indemnity agreements for residential projects only. Since 2007, various trade associations and labor unions have lobbied to expand those very same restrictions to other projects. These new provisions apply to contracts, entered into after January 1, 2013, that are not for residential projects, and that are not executed by a public entity. The revisions provide that any provision in a contract purporting to indemnify, hold harmless, and defend another for their negligence or other fault is against public policy and void. These provisions cannot be waived.
A provision in a contract requiring additional insured coverage is also void and unenforceable to the extent it would be prohibited under the new law. Moreover, the new law does not apply to wrap-up insurance policies or programs, or a cause of action for breach of contract or warranty that exists independently of the indemnity obligation.
The practical impact of this new law is that greater participation in wrap-up insurance programs will likely result. While many wrap-up programs suffer from problems such as insufficient limits, and disputes about funding the self-insured retention, the incentive for the developer or general contractor to utilize wrap-up insurance will be greater than ever before because they will no longer be able to spread the risk of the litigation to the trades and the trade carriers.
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Reprinted courtesy of Steve Cvitanovic of Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP.
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$24 Million Verdict Against Material Supplier Overturned Where Plaintiff Failed to Prove Supplier’s Negligence or Breach of Contract Caused an SB800 Violation
March 16, 2017 —
Jon A. Turigliatto, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. – Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinAcqua Vista Homeowners Assoc. v. MWL Inc. (2017) 2017 WL 371379
COURT OF APPEAL EXTENDS GREYSTONE HOMES, INC. v. MIDTEC, INC., HOLDING THAT CIVIL CODE §936 CREATES A NEGLIGENCE STANDARD FOR CLAIMS AGAINST MATERIAL SUPPLIERS BROUGHT UNDER SB800.
The Fourth District California Court of Appeal recently published its decision Acqua Vista Homeowners Assoc. v. MWI, Inc. (2017) 2017 WL 371379, holding that claims against a material supplier under SB800 (Civil Code §895 and §936) require proof that the SB800 violation was caused by the supplier's negligence or breach of contract.
Civil Code §936 states in relevant part, that it applies "to general contractors, subcontractors, material suppliers, individual product manufacturers, and design professionals to the extent that the general contractors, subcontractors, material suppliers, individual product manufacturers, and design professionals caused, in whole or in part, a violation of a particular standard as the result of a negligent act or omission or a breach of contract .... [T]he negligence standard in this section does not apply to any general contractor, subcontractor, material supplier, individual product manufacturer, or design professional with respect to claims for which strict liability would apply."
Acqua Vista Homeowners Association (the "HOA") sued MWI, a supplier of Chinese pipe used in the construction of the Acqua Vista condominium development. The HOA's complaint asserted a single cause of action for violation of SB800 standards, and alleged that defective cast iron pipe was used throughout the building. After trial, the trial court entered a judgment against MWI in the amount of $23,955,796.28, reflecting the jury's finding that MWI was 92% responsible for the HOA's damages.
MWI filed a motion for a directed verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds that the HOA had failed to present any evidence that MWI had caused an SB800 violation as a result of its negligence or breach of contract, and had therefore failed to prove negligence and causation as required by SB800, citing to Greystone Homes, Inc. v. Midtec, Inc.(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1194. The trial court denied both motions, relying on the last sentence of Civil Code §936, which states in part, "[T]he negligence standard in this section does not apply to any ... material supplier ... with respect to claims for which strict liability would apply."
The Court of Appeal reversed and ordered the trial court to enter judgment in favor of MWI. The Court of Appeal relied on the legislative history of S8800 and Greystone, which held that the first sentence of Civil Code §936 contains an "explicit adoption of a negligence standard" for S8800 claims against product manufacturers. The Court of Appeal reasoned that since §936 treats product manufacturers and material suppliers identically, the holding of Greystone must equally apply to material suppliers.
Because the complaint did not state a common law cause of action for strict liability, the HOA was required to prove that the damages were caused by MWI' s negligence or breach of contract. Although, the Court of Appeal found that while the HOA's evidence may have supported a finding that the manufacturer of the leaking pipes was negligent, the HOA had not provided any evidence that MWI, the supplier, had failed to supply the type of pipe ordered, acted unreasonably in failing to detect any manufacturing defects present in the pipe, or damaged it during transportation. Accordingly, the HOA could not prove that the alleged S8800 violation was caused, in whole or in part, by MWI' s negligence, omission, or breach of contract.
In light of the decision, homeowner and associations that allege only violations of SB800 standards without asserting a common law cause of action for strict liability cannot prevail by simply producing evidence of a violation, and are required to prove that violation was caused by the negligent act or omission, or breach of contract, of the defendant contractor, material supplier, and/or product manufacturer.
Reprinted courtesy of
Jon A. Turigliatto, Esq, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq., Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Turigliatto may be contacted at jturigliatto@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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Mobile Home Owners Not a Class in Drainage Lawsuit
March 01, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFComparing it to a “complex construction defect action,” the California Court of Appeals for Orange County has rejected the claims of a group of mobile home owners that they should be certified as a class in their lawsuit against Huntington Shorecliffs Mobilehome Park. The Appeals court sustained the judgment of the lower court. The court issued a decision in the case of Criswell v. MMR Family LLC on January 17, 2012.
The claims made by the group were that the owners and operators of the mobile home park had known of an “on-going and potentially worsening shallow groundwater condition on the property” and had “exacerbated the problem by changing ‘the configuration and drainage related to the hillside that abuts’ the park.” The homeowners claimed that the class should consist of “any past or current homeowner during the same time frame” who had experienced “the accumulation of mold, fungus, and/or other toxins,” “property damage to his/her mobilehome and/or other property resulting from drainage problems, water seepage, water accumulation, moisture build-up, mold, fungus, and/or other toxins,” emotional distress related to drainage problems or mold, and finally health problems “resulting from exposure to drainage problems, water seepage, water accumulation, moisture build-up, mold, fungus, and/or other toxins, in or around one’s home, lot, or common areas of the park.”
The lower court concluded that while the limits of the class were identifiable, they failed to constitute a class in other ways. First, the people affected were small enough in number that they could be brought together. They “are not so numerous that it would be impracticable to bring them all before the Court.”
The court noted that while many of the homeowners would have issues in common, they did not find “a well-defined community of interest among the class members.” The Appeals Court wrote that “the individual issues affecting each mobile home and homeowner will predominate over the common issue of the presence of standing or pooling water in and around the park.” The court noted that each home would be affected differently by water and “the ‘accumulation of mold, fungus, and/or other toxins.’”
While the court conceded that there would be common issues, such as the “defendants’ alleged concealment of excess moisture conditions and their allegedly negligent roadwork and landscaping,” they noted that “these common issues would be swamped by the swarm of individual determinations of property damage, emotional distress, and personal injury.” The Appeals Court cited an earlier case that ruled against certification “if a class action ‘will splinter into individual trials.’” The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court that they could not proceed as a class.
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Massachusetts Federal Court Rejects Adria Towers, Finds Construction Defects Not an “Occurrence”
July 03, 2022 —
Eric B. Hermanson & Austin D. Moody - White and WilliamsIn an important ruling for insurers, U.S. District Court Judge Patti Saris found that Massachusetts does not follow the position taken in Cypress Point Condo Association v. Adria Towers, LLC, 226 N.J. 403, 418 (2016), i.e., it does not hold that "faulty workmanship claims [should be recognized] as ... an 'occurrence,' thus triggering coverage, 'so long as the allegedly defective work [was] performed by a subcontractor rather than the policyholder itself."
[1]
Instead, Judge Saris reaffirmed earlier Massachusetts authority holding faulty work is not an "occurrence" for coverage purposes,
[2] and found this authority applied whether or not the work in question was subcontracted.
In the alternative, Judge Saris found, even if a contractor's faulty work could be deemed an an "occurrence," such work did not constitute covered "property damage," because none of the alleged damage was "outside the scope of the work that Tocci was contractually required to fulfill as general contractor."
[3]
Reprinted courtesy of
Eric B. Hermanson, White and Williams and
Austin D. Moody, White and Williams
Mr. Hermanson may be contacted at hermansone@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Moody may be contacted at moodya@whiteandwilliams.com
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